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ABSTRACT 
The present thesis is dedicated to the conflict theory versus practice in translation studies in 
Brazil. This conflict is understood as a manifold phenomenon highly dependent on two basic 
sets of factors. The first set of factors refers to one‘s standpoint in relation to translation, i.e. 
whether one is a practitioner, a scholar or a student. The second set of factors concerns one‘s 
affinities with a predominantly essentialist or a predominantly anti-essentialist way of 
thinking. In addition to exploring these factors, I analyse the works of two prominent 
translation thinkers in Brazil, namely Rosemary Arrojo and Paulo Henriques Britto. Their 
standpoints and theoretical views help to illustrate and further develop the initial reflections 
on the conflict theory versus practice in translation studies, giving rise to a number of 
questions relevant not only in Brazil, but to translation studies in general. Addressing issues 
such as the institutionalisation of translation, the aim of translation theory, the purpose of 
translator training, the impact of poststructuralist thought on translation studies, amongst 
several others, this thesis offers an overview of the field of translation studies today.    
Keywords: Translation Studies, Translation Theory, Translation Practice, Poststructuralist 
Thought.   
 
 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die vorliegende Arbeit befasst sich mit dem Konflikt Theorie gegen Praxis in der 
Translationswissenschaft in Brasilien. Ein solcher Konflikt wird als ein vielseitiges 
Phänomen verstanden, das stark abhängig von zwei grundlegenden Reihen von Faktoren ist. 
Bei der ersten Reihe von Faktoren geht es um den Standpunkt, den jemand im Bereich der 
Translation hat, nämlich den Standpunkt des Praktikers/ der Praktikerin, des 
Wissenschaftlers/ der Wissenschaftlerin oder des/der Studierenden. Die zweite Faktorenreihe 
befasst sich mit Einstellungen – es geht darum, ob man zu einer überwiegend 
essentialistischen oder anti-essentialistischen Auffassung neigt. Zusätzlich zu der Analyse 
solcher Faktoren werden die Arbeiten zweier berühmter brasilianischer 
TranslationswissenschaftlerInnen untersucht: Rosemary Arrojo und Paulo Henriques Britto. 
Ihre Standpunkte und ihre theoretischen Ansätze verdeutlichen  die Grundbetrachtungen zum 
Konflikt Theorie gegen Praxis in der Translationswissenschaft, beziehungsweise entwickeln 
diese weiter. Dadurch werden  verschiedene relevante Fragen aufgeworfen, die nicht nur die 
Translationswissenschaft in Brasilien betreffen, sondern die Translationswissenschaft im 
Allgemeinen. Da die vorliegende Arbeit Themen wie u.a. die Institutionalisierung von 
Translation, das Ziel der Translationstheorie, den Zweck der ÜbersetzerInnenausbildung und 
die Auswirkung des poststrukturalistischen Denkens auf die Translationswissenschaft 
behandelt, bietet sie einen Überblick über die heutige Translationswissenschaft.  
Schlüsselwörter: Translationswissenschaft, Translationstheorie, Translationspraxis, 
poststrukturalistisches Denken.    
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subsequently to this thesis. Many thanks to the Universität Wien for their support, and to the 
Universidade Federal do Paraná, particularly to Maurício Carodzo, for receiving me.     
 Finally, I would like to thank Daniel Stirrat not only for his careful reading and 
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Vienna my intention was to write about the interface between the German functional 
approach and contemporary thought. This initial idea was gradually substituted by a wish to 
write about translation studies in Brazil – since to my surprise everyone in Europe seemed so 
interested in Brazil. I then set out to write about contemporary translation studies in Brazil, 
but soon realised it was a far too vast subject for me to be able to cover in one thesis. The 
number of books, journals, and academic works and events on translation in Brazil is simply 
enormous. I would without doubt end up with a very partial overview of a few unfairly 
homogenised tendencies squeezed into convenient categories.  
 As I started my research, I began with the works quoted here and realised I had more 
than enough material for one thesis. Of course the choice of subject – theory versus practice – 
and the choice of perspective – poststructuralist – were by no means random. Rather, these 
are subjects that have marked my short career in translation studies the most.    
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INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
_____________________________________________________ 
A much discussed issue in the field of translation studies is the relationship or the conflict 
between translation theory and translation practice. Indeed, this conflict has a strong impact 
on the way one perceives translation studies in general, including its institutionalisation, the 
aim of translator/interpreter training, the purpose of translation theory, the relationship 
between original and translation, the notion of professionalism as far as translators and 
interpreters are concerned, the object of translation research, amongst various others.  
One such conflict appears to stem from numerous different elements. In the present 
thesis, this conflict is understood as a symptom of at least two sets of factors. The first set of 
factors refers to one‘s standpoint as regards translation. The most typical standpoints in our 
area are those of the practitioner, the scholar and the student. In addition to standpoints, the 
question of whether one‘s affinities lie closer to a predominantly essentialist or a 
predominantly anti-essentialist way of thinking seems equally important, thus making up the 
second set of factors mentioned above.  
The different possible combinations amongst these sets of factors give rise to several 
disparate views as for the questions raised in the first paragraph above. While some, for 
example, will claim that the aim of translation theory should be to make translation practice 
more efficient, others will defend the awareness-raising nature of theoretical reflection. 
Likewise, while some will argue that the purpose of translator/interpreter training is to fulfil 
the needs of the market, others will say that higher education should have more to do with 
critical thinking than with acquiring technical competence. The discussions are indeed 
endless and manifold, and certainly go beyond the modest boundaries of translation studies to 
influence one‘s very notion of theory, research and professionalism. 
In the present thesis I would like to investigate the elements lying beneath these 
different views on translation theory and practice – together with the issues that arise from 
these views – trying to understand not only where they come from, but also their 
implications. I have limited the scope of my work to translation studies in Brazil, but am 
convinced that many of the issues relevant in Brazil today may also help to shed light on 
discussions taking place all over the world.  
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The first part of this thesis, entitled ―A Theoretical Practice and a Practical Practice‖, 
will be dedicated to the different notions of theory and practice (and their interaction) that 
appear to emerge from the two sets of factors mentioned above. In this part, the works of 
mostly Brazilian but also non-Brazilian thinkers will help to carve the contours of these 
diverse notions of translation theory and practice. In addition to the question of standpoints 
and (anti-) essentialist affinities, Part I will start exploring some of the questions raised in the 
first paragraph above, such as the purpose of higher education and the notion of research in 
translation.  
Part I will open with an interchapter in which I clarify some of the terminology I will 
use. Chapter 1 will be devoted to initial reflections on the conflict theory versus practice 
based on my personal experience as a translation student and teacher. Because the question of 
the purpose of higher education and the aim of research will be at the heart of this first 
chapter, in Chapter 2 I will address these issues more directly. Chapter 3 will feature the 
opinions of (mostly) Brazilian scholars and practitioners on the issue of the interaction 
between translation theory and practice. At this point, it will become clear that even though 
they all use the words ―theory‖ and ―practice‖, they seem to be speaking of utterly different 
concepts.  
So in Chapter 4 I will look into one of the possible reasons for such different notions 
of theory and practice, namely that of standpoints. But since standpoints alone do not appear 
to be able to account for the multiplicity of views on this issue, in Chapter 5 I will analyse to 
what extent an essentialist or anti-essentialist way of thinking may be responsible for the 
emergence of such disparate views as far as translation is concerned. Because the 
contributions made by poststructuralist thought will play a pivotal role in this part, in the last 
chapter (6) I will address the question of whether these reflections labelled as poststructuralist 
inaugurate a new paradigm in translation studies. 
Part II, dedicated to Brazilian scholar Rosemary Arrojo, will include an analysis of 
Arrojo‘s standpoint as an academic, as well as a thorough revision of most of her earlier 
works. Likewise, Part III will be devoted to Brazilian poet, translator and translation 
professor Paulo Henriques Britto, also including an analysis of his multiple standpoints and 
academic works on translation. The objective of Parts II and III will be to illustrate and 
further develop some of the issues raised in Part I. As Arrojo and Britto represent very 
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different views as far as translation is concerned, the analysis of their standpoints and 
academic work will offer an overview particularly of the reception of poststructuralist 
thought in Brazil. Restricted though it may be, this overview will certainly help to shed light 
on phenomena taking place outside Brazil as well – such as that of the institutionalisation of 
translation studies and the will to devise so-called global or universal theories of translation.  
Finally, in Part IV, which is called ―Closing Remarks to an Open Debate‖, I will come 
back to a number of questions raised in the previous parts, all of which surrounding the 
notions of theory and practice in translation studies together with the countless issues that 
derive from these notions. As the title indicates, rather than provide pretentiously universal 
answers to the questions I raise, I hope to open a debate that is well aware of the ineluctable 
heterogeneity of translation studies.      
All in all, my two main objectives are the following. Firstly to offer an overview of 
the works of two prominent translation studies scholars in Brazil. Their work should unveil 
not only some of the most discussed issues in Brazilian translation studies, but also the 
reception of foreign theories and tendencies in the country. Secondly to present a thorough 
discussion of the issues of translation theory and practice, as well as of the other questions 
that emerge from these issues. This discussion, though initially based mostly on the works of 
Brazilian thinkers, should reveal itself to be fruitful for translation studies in general. 
As will be made clear in Part I below, because the present thesis draws inspiration 
from poststructuralist thought, my intention is by no means to follow a strictly ―scientific‖ 
methodology, overlooking heterogeneity, flattening differences and proposing, in the end, 
absolute and universally applicable answers to the questions I raise. Instead, I understand that 
controversy and fuzzy taxonomy are inevitable. But even more importantly than that, I 
understand that the questions I raise only make sense when embedded in a context and 
viewed through a particular perspective. In this sense, this thesis embraces heterogeneity and 
rules out the will for consensus and unanimity.        
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PART I: A THEORETICAL PRACTICE AND A PRACTICAL PRACTICE 
_____________________________________________________ 
In Brazil 60-80 per cent of new titles consist of 
translations. 
UNESCO 2008 
In 2007 the second edition of the book Conversas com Tradutores
1
 (BENEDETTI and 
SOBRAL [2003] 2007)
2
, or Interviews with Translators, was published in Brazil. According 
to the blurb, the objective of the book is to provide an overview of translation in Brazil from 
the translators‘ points of view. The organisers of the book came up with nine rather general 
questions about the translation market in Brazil, the basic competences translators must 
master, the influence of globalisation on translation, the concept of mistake in translation, the 
future perspectives in the field of translation, the role of translation criticism and translators‘ 
pay, amongst other issues. These nine questions were then sent to nineteen ―dos nomes mais 
importantes da tradução em nosso país, na atualidade‖, or nineteen of the most important 
names in the field of translation in Brazil today
3
 (idem, 31), who then wrote relatively short 
answers (the book has a total of 214 pages). Leaving aside the fact that the questions are not 
only overly general, but also identical for all nineteen translators – who, in turn, work in 
completely different areas – the Introduction (by Francis H. Aubert, professor of translation 
studies at the Universidade de São Paulo), Preface (by Ivone C. Benedetti, professional 
translator) and some the of the interviews themselves seem to point towards the apparent 
―divórcio‖, or divorce of translation theory and translation practice in Brazil, which is 
perceived by most involved as problematic.  
Aubert ([2003] 2007, 10) claims that this divorce is due to the fact that 
                                                             
1 In the present thesis, italics will be used to mark all languages other than English, to indicate book titles and to 
convey emphasis in English.  
2 Because I will quote various excerpts from different interviews, both here and in Chapter 3 below, I will 
simply refer to the book as a whole, and not to the individual interviews. The only exceptions will be Aubert‘s 
Introduction and Benedetti‘s Preface. Similarly, in the References below, the book will feature as a whole and 
the individual interviews will not be mentioned, except for the Introduction and Preface.    
3 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations were done by me.  
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(...) para um bom número de tradutores, a boa teoria é aquela que proporciona soluções 
diretas e límpidas para o cotidiano do fazer tradutório. O anseio, ainda que inconfesso, 
é pelo modelo do dicionário, do manual de estilo (...).  
(...) for a large number of translators, a good theory should provide clear and direct 
solutions for their everyday translation tasks. Although secretly, what they long for is a 
dictionary-like model, a stylistic manual (...).  
Benedetti seems to be one of these translators as she asserts that ―para as próprias pessoas 
envolvidas com tradução é muito clara a divisão entre teoria e prática‖, or for the people 
involved with translation, there is a very clear division between theory and practice 
(BENEDETTI [2003] 2007, 25). Furthermore, she maintains that  
(...) seria muito salutar uma interação produtiva entre teoria e prática (...). Os 
tradutores práticos, ou praticantes, raramente lêem teoria. (...) a teorização sem 
consideração da prática corre o risco de pecar pela generalização apressada, pelas 
soluções idealísticas (...) (idem, 25-26).   
(...) a productive interaction between theory and practice would be extremely salutary. 
(...) Translators or practitioners rarely read theory. (...) theorisation that does not take 
practice into account risks being overly generalised, filled with idealistic solutions (...).  
One of the interviewees, Paulo Henriques Britto, professor of translation studies at the 
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, translation theorist, translator and poet 
(see part III below), also seems to corroborate this idea: ―no campo da teoria de tradução 
atual, há alguns posicionamentos teóricos que são francamente irreais, e que não parecem 
resistir à prova dos nove da aplicação à prática‖, or nowadays there are, in the field of 
translation theory, a few theoretical standpoints that are simply unreal, standpoints which, 
casting out nines, would not be applicable to translation practice (BENEDETTI and 
SOBRAL [2003] 2007, 92-93).   
While some emphasise that translation theory should be practice-oriented, thus 
implying that a marriage of theory and practice would be ideal, others stress the awareness-
raising character of theoretical reflection quite independently from practical aims. Francis 
Aubert, for instance, is an example of the latter:  
É da teoria, ou da teorização, que derivam as práticas conscientes, lúcidas, capazes, a 
qualquer tempo, de se justificarem, de se defenderem, de se imporem (...). Da teorização 
nasce a conscientização (awareness). É a partir da teorização que se faz uma prática 
verdadeiramente profissional (...) (AUBERT [2003] 2007, 14-15).  
Conscientious, lucid practices derive from theory and from theorisation; practices that 
can always be justified, defended, imposed (...). The act of theorising gives rise to 
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awareness (...). And it is through awareness that one can then proceed to a truly 
professional practice (...).  
Similarly, Heloísa Gonçalvez Barbosa, professor of translation studies at the Universidade 
Federal do Rio de Janeiro, asserts that    
Embora muitos tradutores profissionais tenham alguma desconfiança da teoria, é ela 
quem me dá segurança (...). A teoria é importante na formação do tradutor, porque lhe 
confere um poder de reflexão sobre sua vida profissional. Dá-lhe mais segurança nas 
tomadas de decisão e nos posicionamentos profissionais que toma. Ao mesmo tempo, a 
teoria ajuda o tradutor a encontrar seu lugar no mundo, na história (BENEDETTI and 
SOBRAL [2003] 2007, 59 – my emphasis). 
Theory is what gives me confidence (...), although many professional translators find it 
questionable. Theory is extremely important in translator training because it grants 
translators the power to reflect upon their work. It provides them with confidence in 
decision-making and helps them to find a professional stand. In addition to that, theory 
helps translators to find their place in the world, in history.           
In this sense, it seems clear that what Benedetti, Britto, Aubert and Barbosa mean by 
translation theory (and practice) is quite different. At first sight, Benedetti and Britto seem to 
be speaking of translation theory as a set of precepts that should, ideally, govern over 
practice, systematising it and making it easier; a notion of theory, therefore, that is strictly 
practice-oriented and whose success or failure derive from its usefulness as far as translation 
practice is concerned, from the interaction between translation theory and translating. Indeed, 
in Aubert‘s opinion, this appears to be the idea and expectation ―a large number of 
translators‖ (see above) have of translation theory. In this case, one could speak of an ideal 
―marriage‖ of theory and practice – that ends up in ―divorce‖ when the interaction is not as 
successful as one would expect. Aubert and Barbosa, on the other hand, seem to speak here 
of translation theory as a source of awareness that should ideally lead to more ―lucid, 
conscientious practices‖, to ―reflect[ion]‖ (see above). In this light, the objective of 
translation theory, rather than govern over practice, would be to give rise to more aware 
translators. As our discussions advance, it is essential to keep this difference in mind as 
regards the notions of translation theory.       
Ruth Bohunovsky investigates, in a 2001 paper
4
 (BOHUNOVSKY 2001), the 
relationship between contemporary translation theories and contemporary translation 
                                                             
4
 ‗A (Im)possibilidade da ŖInvisibilidadeŗ do Tradutor e da sua ŖFidelidadeŗ: Por um Diálogo entre a Teoria e 
a Prática de Tradução‘ – The (Im)possibility of Translators‘ ―Invisibility‖ and their ―Faithfulness‖: Towards a 
Dialogue between Translation Theory and Practice.   
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practices in Brazil, and her findings are rather curious. On the one hand we have translation 
theorists – most of whom scholars, professors at universities – that keep up with the newest 
tendencies in the field, bringing contributions academically recognised the world over. On the 
other hand we have a number of translators who have nothing to do with academia, and who 
claim that their translations are faithful and neutral, deprived of any ideology or even 
interpretation – which in the eyes of certain members of academia, particularly through a 
more postmodern perspective, is not only regrettable, but also impossible.  
Though significantly less comprehensive, Bohunovsky‘s research is somewhat similar 
to the one recently carried out by David Katan (KATAN 2009). In his paper ‗Translation 
Theory and Professional Practice: A Global Survey of the Great Divide‘ he presents the 
results of a survey carried out with 1000 practicing translators and interpreters from 25 
different countries and with various educational backgrounds – though most went through 
some kind of interpreter/translator training. His findings are indeed very similar to 
Bohunovsky‘s: (i) most participants claimed that their loyalty lies with source texts – rather 
than with the reader or listener, the commissioner or client, or the translators/interpreters 
themselves  (idem, 138-139); (ii) most agree that ―ideally a translator/interpreter should be 
invisible‖ (idem, 140-141); (iii) most claimed that translation theory is only a ―useful‖ part of 
translator/interpreter training – as opposed to an ―essential‖ or ―important‖ part – placing it at 
number 8 in importance amongst 12 elements – behind ―practice‖, ―strategies‖, ―electronic 
tools‖, ―subject specific knowledge‖, ―contrastive grammar/linguistics‖, ―the 
translator‘s/interpreter‘s profession‖, and finally ―intercultural theory and practice‖, in this 
order (idem, 142-147).  
Therefore, one can say that Katan‘s findings, together with Bohunovsky‘s, appear to 
reinforce the aforementioned divorce of translation theory and practice. And here one could 
look back at Aubert‘s first indented quotation above and generalise that the subjects of these 
surveys are practitioners and, therefore, their overall expectation as far as translation theory is 
concerned tends to be, indeed, the marriage of theory and practice – i.e. the interaction that 
makes practice easier, more automatic and systematised. But for some reason, as hinted at by 
Aubert and clearly stated by Britto (see above), this marriage is not always prosperous, thus 
leading to a divorce.      
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Still trying to shed light on this divorce, the 1998 book Tradução Ŕ Teoria e Prática 
(Translation – Theory and Practice) has a promising title. The professor of English at the 
Universidade de São Paulo, John Milton, presents us with a rather broad overview of the 
field of translation studies, particularly of literary translation. As regards the possible 
contributions of his book, he asserts in the introduction that it examines the area [of literary 
translation] through a new perspective, contrasting its recent developments with traditional 
approaches – ―ele examin[a] a área de uma nova perspectiva, contrastando 
desenvolvimentos recentes com abordagens tradicionais‖ (MILTON 1998, 10). Indeed, 
chapter by chapter the book dissects the opinions of the most renowned literary translators 
and translation scholars from the times of Cicero and Jerome until the late 20
th
 century.  
The last chapter of Milton‘s book is dedicated to literary translation theory in Brazil. 
However, Milton warns us in his introduction that besides the Concretistas (i.e. mainly 
Augusto and Haroldo de Campos), the chapter ―chama a atenção para outros estudos 
aleatórios, sem encontrar, no entanto, alguma outra escola de tradução com linhas definidas 
no Brasil‖, or mentions other random studies, but nevertheless finds no other well-defined 
translation school in Brazil (idem, 9). The chapter is divided into four sections, as follows: 
section one is about the Campos brothers; section two is about José Paulo Paes, distinguished 
Brazilian poet, literary translator and translation theorist; section three is dedicated to "Outros 
grupos de tradutores brasileiros‖, or other Brazilian translation groups (idem, 214), including 
writers from two different literary movements (Brazilian Modernism and the 1945 
Generation); and, finally, section four examines ―Outros trabalhos sobre a tradução literária 
no Brasil‖, or other works about literary translation in Brazil (idem, 217).  
In this last section, Milton insists that it is impossible to distinguish other literary 
translation schools in Brazil – ―não é possível distinguir nenhuma outra escola de tradução 
literária‖ (idem). He then divides the recent material on literary translation published in 
Brazil (―material recente sobre a tradução literária publicado no Brasil‖ – idem, 203) into 
four different types. The first type is what Milton calls ―conselhos para o futuro tradutor‖, or 
advising future translators (idem, 217-218), whereby authors caution future translators 
against translation traps and false cognate words. The books written by Paulo Rónai
5
 in the 
                                                             
5 Paulo Rónai is perceived as the first author to write about translation studies in Brazil (Escola de Tradutores 
[Translation School], 1952). Born in Hungary in 1907, he first went to Brazil in 1940 trying to escape the 
Second World War. There he worked as a French and Latin teacher and published a number of translations and 
  
16 
mid-1970s (Guia Prático da Tradução Francesa [Translating into French: A Practical Guide] 
and Escola de Tradutores
6
 [Translation School]) are instances of this first type. The second 
type comprises translation memoirs, such as A Tradução Vivida [Experiencing Translation] 
(1981), again by Paulo Rónai. The third type is what Milton calls comparative translation and 
mainly consists of papers, published in several media, comparing a number of different 
translations of the same work. According to Milton, these works tend to be extremely 
prescriptive, such as Walter C. Costa‘s article on the different translations of Emily 
Dickinson‘s poems (‗Emily Dickinson Brasileira‘ or Brazilian Emily Dickinson).  
Finally, the fourth type of recent publication in the field of translation studies includes 
books, papers, theses and dissertations on translation theory. And here once again John 
Milton reminds his readers of the ―quadro bastante confuso‖, or quite confusing outlook 
(idem, 218) of translation theory in Brazil. He argues that most works on translation in Brazil 
took no interest in abstract ideas, but rather in translation practice – ―a maioria dos trabalhos 
sobre a tradução no Brasil não se interessou por idéias abstratas, mas pela tradução 
prática‖ (idem, 219). Moreover, he asserts that very little has been written in Brazil on 
literary translation from a historic or descriptive perspective – ―muito pouco foi escrito em 
termos de uma abordagem histórica ou descritiva da tradução literária no Brasil‖ (idem, 
222). He adds that ―falta uma história da tradução literária no Brasil‖, or we need a history 
of literary translation in Brazil (idem, 226).  
In fact, lately Milton has become increasingly more associated with a line of research 
that could be called historiographical-descriptive, mostly aiming at describing translation 
schools and tendencies across times – his 1998 book (mentioned above) being a good 
example of it, as well as his 2002 book, O Clube do Livro e a Tradução (MILTON 2002). It 
is nonetheless interesting to remark that Milton appears to be seeking translation theory 
mostly within translation schools, thus denoting a very specific notion of translation theory, 
one that is strictly linked with translation models, and/or large and institutionalised 
translation movements – hence his remarks on the ―confusing outlook‖, lack of ―literary 
translation schools‖ or lack of interest in ―abstract ideas‖ in Brazil (see above). In this sense, 
like Bohunovsky‘s and Katan‘s works, John Milton‘s work seems to strengthen the divorce of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
books on the art and craft of the translator. In 1974 he founded the ABRATES, Associação Brasileira de 
Tradutores or Brazilian Translators‘ Association.   
6 Please refer to footnote 77 in Chapter 2, Part II below. 
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translation theory and practice in Brazilian translation studies – at least as far as this model-
like notion of translation theory is concerned. And once again one could speak of ―a divorce‖ 
because beforehand ―a marriage‖ was presupposed.     
Perhaps for this reason Milton decided to only briefly mention Rosemary Arrojo, as 
well as the reception of deconstruction in Brazil, which by 1998 had already established itself 
quite firmly. Though rather abundant by 1998
7, these works labelled ―poststructuralist‖ or 
―deconstructionist‖8 never constituted a hegemonic whole in Brazil, never leading to the 
establishment of so-called translation schools and models. In any case, it is clear that the 
scope of Milton‘s work was not translation studies in Brazil specifically. I will come back to 
the question of this apparent lack of works dedicated to translation theory in Brazil at the end 
of Part I. 
Maybe what triggers the divorce (and the marriage, for that matter) of theory and 
practice in translation studies is the fact that what is meant by the words ―theory‖ and 
―practice‖ varies greatly from theorist to theorist, professor to professor, translator to 
translator, interpreter to interpreter – as already briefly discussed above. In this part of the 
present thesis, I will look into how different translation scholars and translators/interpreters 
perceive the concepts of theory and practice and their (lack of) interaction. The main 
objective of this first part is to carve the contours of the different notions of theory and 
practice to which translation theorists and practitioners appear to refer, thus showing that they 
usually speak from utterly different standpoints and hence have completely disparate 
expectations as far as the interaction theory-practice is concerned. These different standpoints 
and perspectives are intimately related to the analogy used in the title, namely ―is the glass 
half empty or half full?‖, and will be crucial for the following chapters, when the very 
                                                             
7 It is important to point out, however, that this 1998 book was actually published for the first time in 1993 
under the title O Poder da Tradução (The Power of Translation), and the 1998 edition did not suffer substantial 
changes. This may explain the only brief references to the reception of deconstruction in Brazil, which in the 
early 1990s was certainly a far cry from what it became in the late 1990s (see part II below).    
8 We can understand ―deconstructionist‖ here as a poststructuralist tendency, as it became known particularly in 
the United States but also in Brazil. Nevertheless, Derrida seems to dislike this label, favouring instead an idea 
of antistructuralism, whereby both structuralism and a movement against it (hence ―anti‖) are practised 
simultaneously (see Derrida‘s ‗Letter to a Japanese Friend‘ – DERRIDA [1985] 1988 – translated by David 
Wood and Andrew Benjamin). In the present thesis, references to deconstruction and poststructuralism can be 
understood as explained by Christopher Norris: ―Deconstruction is avowedly ‗post-structuralist‘ in its refusal to 
accept the idea of structure as in any sense given or objectively ‗there‘ in a text. Above all, it questions the 
assumption (…) that structures of meaning correspond to some deep-laid mental ‗set‘ or pattern of response 
which determines the limits of intelligibility‖ (NORRIS [1982] 2002, 3 – his emphasis). For more on this, please 
refer to the Interchapter below.           
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definition of these standpoints will help us to understand dissimilar points of view on 
translation. 
In order to gradually build the notions of translation theory and practice so crucial to 
the present thesis (and ultimately circumscribe the different standpoints implied by these 
notions), this first part will be divided into six chapters. The first (and shortest) chapter will 
be devoted to initial reflections on the supposed conflict between translation theory and 
practice at university, within so-called translation studies courses. Next, the second chapter 
will be dedicated to the role of higher education and research, as well as to the roles that the 
notions of theory and practice play within higher education. In Chapter 3, which will be 
largely based on the abovementioned book Conversas com Tradutores (BENEDETTI and 
SOBRAL [2003] 2007), I intend to develop the notions of translation theory and practice 
further by adding the opinions of the various translators and scholars interviewed in the book.  
By this point, we will have a rather conflicting picture of the subject, with a number 
of diverse, sometimes controversial opinions intertwined. It will gradually become clear, 
however, that these diverse, controversial opinions on translation theory and practice are 
closely related to two main factors. Firstly, the standpoint from which one speaks will be 
fundamental to one‘s understanding of translation theory and practice. In the case of 
translation studies, these standpoints are mainly that of the practitioner and that of the 
scholar or thinker. Secondly, the question of whether one subscribes to a more essentialist 
way of thinking or a more anti-essentialist way of thinking will also play a pivotal role in the 
way one understands translation practice and translation theory.         
So as to shed light on these different outlooks on translation theory and practice, I will 
explore the idea of the different standpoints in Chapter 4, showing that culture also plays an 
important part in the definition of standpoint. In Chapter 5 I will look into Arrojo‘s argument 
of the ―essentialist versus the anti-essentialist‖, mainly developed in her 1998 paper ‗The 
Revision of the Traditional Gap between Theory and Practice and the Empowerment of 
Translation in Postmodern Times‘ (ARROJO 1998b). The point there will be to look at these 
different notions of theory and practice as symptoms of either a more essentialist or a more 
anti-essentialist way of thinking. Similarly, in the sixth and final chapter, Cristina Rodrigues‘ 
Tradução e Diferença (Translation and Difference – RODRIGUES 1999) will help to further 
develop the idea of these two different tendencies in translation studies (i.e. one influenced by 
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more essentialist ideas and the other marked by predominantly anti-essentialist perspectives), 
which in turn ultimately lead to different expectations towards translation theory and 
translation practice. The objective of this last chapter will be to explore the idea of paradigms 
in translation studies and whether the so-called poststructuralist contributions to the area 
inaugurate a new paradigm in the discipline. 
This way, by the end of Part I hope to have drawn an overview of the different 
concepts of theory and practice predominant in translation studies (mostly in Brazil, but not 
exclusively), as well as of the symptoms and motivations behind these different ideas, both in 
terms of a more essentialist and a more anti-essentialist way of thinking, and in terms of 
different standpoints. And here it is important to warn the reader that I have no taxonomic 
intentions as such, and that these factors I propose – i.e. standpoints and (anti-)essentialism – 
should by no means imply watertight categories. In fact, I believe that the conflict between 
translation theory and translation practice involves numerous factors, depending on the point 
of view one takes, and I have simply chosen to concentrate on and flesh out these two issues 
– for reasons that will become clear later in Part I. Moreover, I am convinced that these 
factors not only have rather blurry boundaries, but they often intersect each other, giving rise 
to various possible combinations. In summary, the present thesis is marked by a postmodern 
way of thinking – postmodern in the sense that it has no pretensions to repress contradiction 
or to erase or flatten difference and heterogeneity in favour of unanimity and homogeneity. It 
is as John McGowan puts it (MCGOWAN 1991, 19-20): 
Since reason‘s divisive strategies are taken as its means towards achieving domination, 
postmodernism attacks any number of traditional differentiations, including those 
between literary and other types of discourse, between high and low, between artistic and 
critic, and between signifier and signified. In each case the goal is to unsettle a privilege 
that accrues to one side of their pair and that can be maintained only by a logic of 
separation. (…) Against the modernist obsession with purity, now interpreted as part and 
parcel of the fundamental flaw of Western reason, we find postmodernism‘s celebration 
of heterogeneity.         
Therefore, it is in this sense described by McGowan that I ask the reader to take the present 
thesis as a work with a postmodern orientation.    
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INTERCHAPTER: The “Posts” and “Antis” of this Thesis 
_____________________________________________________ 
Operationally, essentialism is the failure to allow for 
variation. 
Stephan Fuchs 
As addressed in footnote 8 above, terms such as ―poststructuralism‖ and ―deconstruction‖ 
will be extremely important in the present thesis, so I have decided to include this small 
interchapter to clarify the terminology I shall henceforth use. I understand that any attempt to 
group and categorise may run into generalisations and belittlement. Nevertheless, I feel it is 
important to at least try and draw the general contours of the terminology used here, even 
though they are by no means absolute or inflexible, and exceptions and intersections do 
apply.  
In very general lines, and largely based on the works by Norris ([1982] 2002 – see 
footnote 8 above), Best and Kellner (1991), and Sarup ([1988] 1993), I understand 
deconstruction as a poststructuralist tendency, as already argued above. According to these 
authors, generally speaking one can understand poststructuralism as a movement that is not 
only similar, but that in many cases overlaps postmodernism
9
, which in turn is slightly more 
comprehensive than poststructuralism.  
As Sarup explains (SARUP [1988] 1993, 143-144), after World War II a new kind of 
society began to emerge – a society labelled as ―post-industrial‖, ―consumer society‖, 
―society of the spectacle‖, etc. For this society, Marxist theory was ―outmoded‖, and the main 
question at its heart was whether or not the projects and aspirations of the Enlightenment – 
epitomised in the wish for ―objective science, universal morality and law and autonomous 
art‖ – had failed, and whether or not we should stick to them. For Sarup, both postmodernists 
and poststructuralists would claim that the projects of the Enlightenment have indeed failed, 
and should therefore be fiercely criticised. In his view, in comparison with postmodernism, 
                                                             
9 And here we could go further and make a distinction between postmodernism and postmodernity, whereby the 
former refers to the ―cultural sphere, especially literature, philosophy, and the various arts, including 
architecture‖, whereas the latter comprises ―the geopolitical scheme‖ or ―world process‖ (HASSAN 2000). In 
this light, postmodernity would be even more inclusive than postmodernism, embracing ―postmodernism in the 
arts, poststructuralism in philosophy, feminism in social discourse, postcolonial and cultural studies in 
academia, but also multi-national capitalism, cybertechnologies, international terrorism, assorted separatist, 
ethnic, nationalist, and religious movements (…)‖ (idem).  
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poststructuralism has attacked the Enlightenment project ―less stridently, but with more 
intellectual sharpness‖. Furthermore, he maintains that ―post-structuralists like Foucault, 
Derrida and Lyotard are postmodernists‖ because ―there are so many similarities between 
post-structuralist theories and postmodern practices that it is difficult to make a clear 
distinction between them‖. 
Likewise, Best and Kellner assert that ―while the term postmodern was occasionally 
used in the 1940s and 1950s to describe new forms of architecture or poetry, it was not 
widely used in the field of cultural theory to describe artefacts that opposed and/or came after 
modernism until the 1960s and 1970s‖ (BEST and KELLNER 1991, 9-10). For them, by the 
1970s postmodern discourses had been disseminated the world over; nevertheless, it was not 
until then that the ―most significant developments of postmodern theory‖ (idem, 16) took 
place. They refer here mainly to a so-called poststructuralist movement that erupted mostly in 
postwar France. In their view, the rapid changes that happened in social and economic 
spheres in the 1950s and 1960s led to dramatic changes in the ―world of theory‖ (idem, 18), 
whereby the domination exerted by Marxism, existentialism and phenomenology was 
gradually replaced by the ―linguistically-oriented discourses of structuralism‖ (idem). These 
structuralist discourses aimed at ―objectivity, coherence, rigour and truth‖ (idem, 19), and 
therefore claimed that their work was strictly scientific, free from subjectivity and bias.  
Poststructuralism emerged, then, as an attack to these ―scientific pretensions‖ which 
not only ―attempted to create a scientific basis for the study of culture‖, but also ―strove for 
the standard modern goals of foundation, truth, objectivity, certainty and system‖ (idem, 20). 
According to Best and Kellner, in its first moment, this poststructuralist critique was 
articulated in numerous texts chiefly by Derrida, Foucault, Kristeva, Barthes and Lyotard, 
which in turn ―produced an atmosphere of intense theoretical upheaval that helped to form 
postmodern theory‖ (idem). For them, these critiques pervaded literary, philosophical, 
sociological and political spheres firstly in France in the late 1960s and 1970s, and then in 
other countries as well, having a ―decisive impact on postmodern theory‖ (idem).  
Indeed, as far as the relationship between poststructuralism and postmodernism is 
concerned, Best and Kellner believe that (idem, 25) 
Poststructuralism forms part of the matrix of postmodern theory, and while the theoretical 
breaks described as postmodern are directly related to poststructuralist critiques, we shall 
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interpret Poststructuralism as a subset of a broader range of theoretical, cultural and social 
tendencies which constitute postmodern discourses. (…) postmodern theory is a more 
inclusive phenomenon than Poststructuralism which we interpret as a critique of modern 
theory and a production of new models of thought, writing, and subjectivity, some of 
which are later taken up by postmodern theory.    
Moreover, the authors quite rightly stress that the prefix ―post‖ conveys an ambiguity that 
bears explaining. On the one hand, ―post‖ implies a negation, a rupture which, in this sense, 
is similar to the prefix ―anti‖. ―Postmodern‖ and ―poststructuralist‖ would hence mean 
―antimodern‖ and ―antistructuralist‖, both in the sense of liberation from ―old constraints and 
oppressive conditions‖ (idem, 29), and as an assertion of new ideas, new developments, new 
discourses. On the other hand, however, the prefix ―post‖ may convey an idea of dependence, 
continuity and complementariness that by no means implies full rupture and negation. In this 
light, postmodernism and poststructuralism would be similar to ―hypermodernism‖ or 
―hyperstructuralism‖, as in modernism and structuralism taken to their extremes. I believe 
that the challenge lies precisely in taking the prefix ―post‖ in both the meanings described 
above, as opposed to favouring one over the other. As I will discuss at length in the chapters 
that follow, these ―posts‖ can be understood simultaneously as negation and 
complementariness, constituting a paradox of great importance. In fact, the same paradox can 
be read in the term ―deconstruction‖, whereby the ideas of ―undoing‖ and ―decomposing‖ 
exist side by side with the ideas of ―reconstructing‖ and ―redoing‖, and whereby sheer 
―destruction‖ or ―demolition‖ are out of the question (see ‗Letter to a Japanese Friend‘ – 
DERRIDA [1985] 1988 – translated by David Wood and Andrew Benjamin).         
 In the present thesis, the terms ―postmodern‖ and ―poststructuralist‖ shall thus be used 
in the sense described here. Even though in many cases they could be used interchangeably, 
―postmodern‖ should be understood as more comprehensive and general, whereas 
―poststructuralist‖ as more specific and intellectually or scholarly-minded. I do not intend to 
propose a rigid, watertight classification to deal with this issue – firstly because one such 
classification would defeat the very objective of postmodernism, and secondly because 
grouping a large number of theorists and ideas under rigid epithets always risks erasing their 
differences and specificities (as already mentioned above). In this sense, these terms should 
be taken more as approximations used for the sake of my argumentation than as watertight, 
absolute categories.  
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 It is also crucial to take into consideration the fact that these postmodern and 
poststructuralist tendencies are by no means homogeneous and entail in no way some kind of 
consensus or unanimity. Quite the contrary: there are probably just as many quarrels within 
these so-called poststructuralist circles as there are quarrels between these thinkers and those 
outside their circles. It is beyond the scope of the present thesis to explore this heterogeneity 
inherent to postmodern thought – though a few examples will repeatedly point to this lack of 
consensus. In any case, I will return to the question of heterogeneity and consensus in Part 
IV, Chapter 4 below. For now I would simply like to caution the reader against this initial 
impression that poststructuralist thought constitutes a harmonic whole.    
 In addition to ―deconstruction‖, ―poststructuralism‖ and ―postmodernism‖, another 
term will be repeated time and again in this thesis, namely ―essentialism‖. Essentialism (as 
well as ―anti-essentialism‖ or ―nonessentialism‖) is understood here as an even broader term 
than postmodernism, since there are various lines of thought that oppose essentialism without 
being postmodern or poststructuralist as such – as is the case of hermeneutics and new 
criticism, for instance, or even Darwinism. In other words, while the poststructuralist 
perspective is in its multiplicity largely marked by a movement of anti-essentialism, one 
cannot say that only poststructuralist perspectives oppose essentialism. In this sense, 
poststructuralism draws a lot of inspiration from anti-essentialist ideas, whereas structuralism 
can be said to be marked by a predominantly essentialist view – especially when one 
compares it to poststructuralism.     
 What I mean by essentialism in the present context can be synthesised through Brian 
Ellis‘ words (ELLIS 2001, 178): 
If you are a scientific essentialist, than you must believe that the laws of nature are 
grounded in the properties and structures of things. They are intrinsic to things in the 
world, and not imposed on them by God or anything else. You will also believe that 
things belonging to natural kinds must behave as they do because this is how they are 
essentially. 
And though Ellis concedes that ―human laws, institutions, social structures, cultures, political 
organizations, and so on are not members of natural kinds‖ (idem – my emphasis), he insists 
that there can be laws – through an essentialist perspective – governing over both human 
beings and human undertakings.  
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 Another typical trait of an essentialist way of thinking is dichotomic classifications, 
polar oppositions, either-or distinctions, rather than ―variable distinctions in degree‖ or 
―empirical continua‖, as Stephan Fuchs explains (FUCHS 2001, 13). Accordingly, Fuchs 
asserts that the ―preferred mode of operation [of essentialism] is static typologies and rigid 
classifications, whose grids separate things that are everywhere, under all circumstances 
(…)‖ (idem, 15). If we look back at the epigraph above, we will remember that ―Essentialism 
is the failure to allow for variation‖ (idem, 15); in other words, from an essentialist 
perspective, both social and natural phenomena can be fit into watertight, universal, 
unchanging categories.             
 Therefore, while references in this thesis to ―essentialism‖ (together with ―anti-
essentialism‖ or ―nonessentialism‖) and ―modernism‖ (together with ―postmodernism‖) 
should be taken as more general and inclusive, as traits common to countless lines of thought, 
mentions of ―structuralism‖ (and ―poststructuralism‖) ought to be understood as more 
specific, related chiefly to language and discourse. From this perspective, ―deconstruction‖ is 
even more specific because it can be taken as one of the many tendencies within 
poststructuralist thought.     
         
  
25 
1. Who‟s Afraid of Theoretical Reflection? 
_____________________________________________________ 
Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie  
Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum. 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
Although this first and compact chapter may strike one as less ―scholarly‖ and more 
―impressionistic‖, I feel it offers an efficient preamble to the discussion I intend to carry out. 
Moreover, it will unveil some of the motivations behind the present thesis, shedding light on 
the bias underneath the surface of the text. Most of the content presented here stems from my 
personal experience as a BA student at the Universidade Federal do Paraná, then as an MA 
student at the Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (both in Brazil) and, finally, as a PhD 
student and teacher at the Universität Wien, in Austria.   
Ever since I started studying translation, back in 2001, I have been through the 
following experience countless times. A certain professor is giving a lecture on theoretical 
(sometimes even philosophical) aspects of translating, when suddenly s/he is interrupted by 
an impatient student with a specific, practical translation question – such as ―what should I do 
when I come across a typically Brazilian/Austrian word in the text I am translating into 
English?‖ Professors have responded in various ways over the years, but one thing remains 
unaltered: there have always been a number of students who simply do not see the point in 
abstraction, in theorising. Most would probably rather be given some sort of formula or 
model which could solve their pressing problem immediately, even if this formula were so 
limited that they might only be able to apply it to this one case. Indeed, this attitude, on the 
part of the students, seems coherent with the profile one expects of students nowadays, 
restlessly flipping pages of virtual books and hastily shifting from one website to another
10
. 
Regardless of whether the reader thinks this is positive or negative, let us keep in mind this 
                                                             
10 Isaiah Berlin‘s 1953 paper ‗The Hedgehog and the Fox‘ has become increasingly popular in recent times to 
describe the profile of students, particularly after the internet. In a nutshell, the idea is that people tend to 
perceive knowledge and approach information in either of the following ways. Either one is like a hedgehog and 
pursues a single idea thoroughly, or one is like a fox and pursues numerous ideas at once, without spending 
much time on each one. Applied to the contemporary context of education, this idea describes two predominant 
student profiles, with that of the fox prevailing by far over that of the hedgehog. Some claim this has to do with 
the internet and its nonlinear structure, so young people today tend to swiftly skip from one piece of information 
to another in a nonlinear fashion (see, for example, RASMUSSEN and LUDVIGSEN 2009).     
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initial theory-practice conflict I have experienced throughout my academic life while we read 
the following paragraphs.        
 As I will discuss particularly in Chapter 2 below, one of the key questions 
surrounding Brazilian universities – and certainly not only Brazilian universities – is indeed 
whether greater emphasis should be placed on practice, i.e. on exercising technical 
competences that will be needed later in the marketplace, or on theory, i.e. on reflecting and 
exercising critical thinking within a given field, mostly with a view to producing researchers 
and educators. Of course these two movements need not exclude each other; nevertheless, 
there does appear to be a tendency (be it within an entire university, a specific department, a 
course or even a lecture) towards one or the other, which more often than not is a source of 
conflict.   
 Take the Universidade Federal do Paraná, in Southern Brazil, for example. The 
Department of Languages is divided into two subdepartments: one of Linguistics, Classical 
Languages and Portuguese (henceforth Department of Portuguese), and the other one of 
Modern Foreign Languages (henceforth Department of Foreign Languages). The Department 
of Portuguese offers the so-called theoretical courses – mostly on Literary Theory and 
Linguistic Theory, in addition to various different courses depending on the major one takes. 
The Department of Foreign Languages can then take this theoretical foundation for granted 
and concentrate on teaching language and literature – most students do start learning foreign 
languages there from scratch. Recently, however, a conflict broke out and threatened to do 
away with this structure. Concerned about the ever growing need for teachers of Japanese and 
Polish in the state schools of Paraná, the Department of Foreign Languages proposed a plan 
to offer these languages within a major taught independently from the Department of 
Portuguese, i.e. without (at least officially) including much theoretical reflection. Their claim 
was that this kind of exclusively theoretical activity was superfluous to a certain extent, 
particularly considering that they wanted to train teachers for primary and secondary 
education only. In fact their plan was to offer all foreign language majors in this regime in the 
future – whereby any need for theoretical discussions would be fulfilled within their own 
chiefly practice-oriented classes.   
 By the same token, the BA in translation studies offered by the same university has 
been the target of similar criticism. In Brazil, the study of languages, linguistics and literature 
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(and more often than not translation, too) takes place within one course called ―Letras‖, or 
letters. The major I took, for example, comprised nine semesters of Portuguese and English 
(linguistics and literature) with an emphasis on translation studies – which in turn is a joint 
effort of the Department of Portuguese and the Department of Foreign Languages, since 
teachers from both departments teach in it. The available BA emphases are translation 
studies, literary studies and linguistic studies. As it is a BA, its main aim is to train 
researchers and scholars, i.e. professionals that will most likely work at university. 
Nevertheless, many of these BA graduates end up pursuing various different careers that 
involve work with texts – proofreaders, editors, literary critics, writers, journalists, 
translators, interpreters, amongst many others. As for those who wish to work in primary and 
secondary education, instead of taking a BA they take a ―Licenciatura‖, i.e. a teaching 
degree, a major that will grant them a licence to teach in primary and secondary schools. The 
principal differences between this course and the BA are the fact that it (the teaching degree) 
offers no emphases and that it focuses on classroom-oriented pedagogy and psychology 
rather than on research in linguistics, literature and translation studies.  
 With the ever-growing need for translators and interpreters, particularly in Curitiba 
(where the Universidade Federal do Paraná is located), a city home to various multinationals 
such as Renault and Bosch, the BA emphasis on translation studies has been attracting 
increasingly more attention. As I started explaining in the previous paragraph, for obvious 
reasons this emphasis has not escaped the question of whether or not it should be more 
market-oriented, more practice-oriented, including less reflecting and more doing. As it 
currently stands, the emphasis covers seven different courses or lectures, most of which are 
designed to stimulate reflection on the issues surrounding translation studies, with translator 
training playing a secondary role.  
 The merits of this curriculum aside, around Curitiba and in fact almost everywhere in 
Brazil there are no alternatives as far as translator and interpreter training are concerned. This 
is the major argument of those who defend the creation of a new translation curriculum for 
the Universidade Federal do Paraná with a view to training translators and interpreters. 
Those who oppose this and defend the current curriculum contend that a nine semester BA 
cannot provide fully professionalising training, particularly considering the fact that most 
students begin learning a foreign language there. Furthermore, the question of whether the 
university should be the institution to fulfil market demands remains a crucial issue at the 
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heart of this debate. These discussions (and severe conflicts) remain a sensitive issue, and 
indeed they illustrate our discussion about the role of ―theory‖ in higher education. Some 
members of the faculty seem to believe that theoretical reflection is vital, especially 
considering that it is, after all, a BA in translation studies – the only one in Brazil as a matter 
of fact. Others, in contrast, seem to perceive this theoretical tendency as a waste of time 
precisely because of its lack of practical application, hence confirming an image of the 
university as a professionalising institution.  
 Similarly, at the Centre for Translation Studies at the Universität Wien, the curricula 
of both the BA (Transcultural Communication) and the MA (Translation or Interpreting) have 
recently undergone changes that once again illustrate our debate. Because of their alleged 
lack of theoretical content, the former curricula were transformed so as to accommodate more 
translation and interpreting theory – instead of translating and interpreting. As one of the 
main mentors behind this curricular change, Mary Snell-Hornby explains that the intention is 
to provide a more solid theoretical foundation (as a source of reflection and critical thinking) 
so that they can build their practical competence upon it afterwards, outside the university. 
Nonetheless, some claim that the courses have become overly theoretical, not preparing them 
well enough to face the marketplace
11
. As students enter the course with good knowledge 
(level B2 or C1 of the Common European Framework) of at least two foreign languages, 
many believe that the focus at BA level should already lie on translating and interpreting, 
and not so much on theorising. As the example of the Universität Wien illustrates yet again, 
the question of whether the role of the university should be to fulfil market needs remains 
fundamental, and I hope to throw more light on this in the next chapter. What seems even 
more crucial at the moment, however, is how and to what extent this conflict theory-practice 
is established at university, as well as how it fits the perceived role of university.  
Let us focus here on translation studies in Brazil. From a formal, academic point of 
view, this theory-practice conflict seems to be firmly established in translation courses, and 
so does a view of translation research as strictly applied, empirical or practice-oriented. Take 
                                                             
11
 I say this based on countless conversations I have had with my own students at the Centre for Translation 
Studies at the Universität Wien, where I have a teaching assignment and coordinate the Department of 
Portuguese.  
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the Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
 12
, for instance, the first federal university to 
ever have a specific programme for translation studies strictu sensu, first at MA level in 
2003, and then in 2009 at PhD level. The programme is divided into two lines of research, 
namely ―Lexicography, translation and language teaching‖ and ―Translation theory, criticism 
and history‖. In the second semester of 2008, the following courses were offered: Translation 
Theories, Translation Criticism, Corpora and Translation, Translation Practice, Literary 
Translation, Translation and Culture, and finally Translation and Rupture (originally in 
Portuguese). Once the students have successfully concluded a number of courses they must 
write their dissertations. Students are not allowed to write an entirely ―practical‖ work, nor 
can they write an entirely ―theoretical‖ dissertation; ideally they should always combine both, 
aiming to show their interaction – we could speak once again of an ideal marriage of theory 
and practice.  
Especially in the second line of research, ―Translation theory, criticism and history‖, 
supervisors tend to encourage students to balance theory and practice, analysing a certain 
theoretical approach and applying it to a certain practice. Quite often, however, it seemed to 
me that some of the results were not as satisfactory as they could have been precisely because 
most students did not find (or struggled to find) any avowed link between a particular theory 
and the practice they wished to carry out. This practice consisted mostly of translation 
criticism or comparative translations, as well as annotated translations done by the students 
themselves. As a result, students have used Catford‘s theory applied to literary translation, or 
Venuti‘s ideas of foreignising translation applied to the translation of canonical literature in 
English into Brazilian Portuguese, just to mention two remarkable examples. 
I vividly remember that as I was writing my project, I wanted to write a fully 
theoretical dissertation about (roughly summarised) the relationship between the German 
Functional Approach and other translation theories or reflections (initially I had Nida‘s, 
Berman‘s and Venuti‘s). In other words, my object of study was theoretical discourse itself, 
as in the present thesis. Most of my peers, in contrast, seemed to have been motivated to take 
an MA in translation studies by more ―practical issues‖. They felt that the Portuguese 
translation of a particular work was not good enough and therefore wanted to redo and/or 
                                                             
12
 All the information about the Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina was taken from my own experience as 
their MA student in 2006-2007, as well as from their official website – www.pget.ufsc.br (including the theses –
see below).    
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criticise it. Others wanted to write the very first Portuguese translation of a given work. 
Narceli Piuco, for example, both criticised an existing translation and proposed a new 
translation of Madame de Stäel‘s Corinne ou lřItalie; Theo Moosburger, Nana Coutinho, 
Silvânia Carvalho and Fabrício Coelho all presented annotated translations of the following 
works: verses 1 to 609 of the epic Vasileios Digenis Akritis, Bernard Shaw‘s Widowerřs 
Houses, Abel Steven‘s Madame de Stäel: A Study of her Life and Times, and Alexander von 
Humboldt‘s ‗Einleitende Betrachtungen über die Verschiedenartigkeit des Naturgenusses 
und eine Wissenschaftliche Ergründung der Weltgesetze‘, respectively.  
As we advanced our studies, however, it became clear that both they and I would have 
to change our projects so as to accommodate theory and practice simultaneously, and 
―promote‖ their marriage, so to speak. In other words, in my case a fully theoretical 
dissertation might be deemed purposeless without a practical application; as for my peers, 
entirely practical dissertations would be incongruent with the research programme (indeed 
translation studies), which in turn called for theoretical discussions. In the end we all adapted 
our projects and the annotated translations and translation criticism I mentioned above all 
included some sort of theoretical discussion – mostly so as to define and justify criticism and 
translation strategies. As for me, I changed my initial project completely, but kept the 
German functional approach as my main theoretical framework (see LEAL 2007a).        
At that time, I remember debating with peers and professors about the intended aim of 
the MA. As the majority of my colleagues had more practical motivations in mind, different 
professors in various situations warned them that the MA was not professionalising and that 
only a translation or only translation criticism could not make up an MA dissertation. As we 
had a study group together, I followed my peers‘ struggles from up close; indeed, one of our 
objectives was to help one another to find a theoretical framework in which to embed the 
practice they wanted to carry out.  
As for me, the nature of my struggles was quite different since the practice I wished to 
carry out was theoretical. I never quite understood the near obsession with the Popperian 
model of falsifiability and testability as the pillar of the scientific method – which is by no 
means exclusive to the Translation Studies Programme at the Universidade Federal de Santa 
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Catarina, but rather a tendency that seems to have swept across the entire Western world
13
. 
To me, the idea of testing hypotheses on something as abstract and subjective as literary 
translation seemed beyond my capacities as a student. As I came to realise later, mostly 
through the works of those involved in the Science Wars of 1990s (see Chapter 2 below), my 
reservations might not have been so unreasonable after all. In Aronowitz‘s opinion, for 
example, ―the attempt to model social sciences on the methods of the old natural sciences is 
entirely misplaced‖ (ARONOWITZ 1996, 186). Further, he holds that method is the dogma 
underlying the success of science ever since the 17
th
 century. One of the main elements of 
this dogma of method can be explained as follows: ―the way to legitimate and reliable 
knowledge is through the experimental method, the basis of which is our ability to make both 
observational and falsifiable statements‖ (idem, 179 – quoting POPPER [1959] 2002).  
In addition to this question of method, another issue that puzzled me during my MA 
was why the vast majority of my peers seemed to confirm that initial impression I described 
at the beginning of this chapter, namely that students seem indifferent – not to say completely 
apathetic – to theorising, as most of their interests and motivations to take an MA were 
largely practice-oriented. As I have argued elsewhere (see LEAL 2010b), there does appear 
to be a strong tendency for students in translation studies to derive research topics from a 
given practice or practical issue, and then (sometimes unwillingly) search for a theoretical 
framework in which to embed this practice – as already mentioned above. A similar trend 
seems verifiable at the Universität Wien, amongst Snell-Hornby‘s MA and PhD students. The 
vast majority are either working on literary translation criticism – for reasons and interests 
similar to those of my MA peers in Brazil – or on media translation – mostly the dubbing of 
popular American TV-series in Austria.       
In any case, I shall come back to the issue of translation research and the Science 
Wars (see penultimate paragraph above) under 2 below. Before we move on to it, though, I 
would like to quickly summarise the questions (mainly three) raised in this chapter, questions 
which strongly marked my path in translation studies and exerted an enormous influence in 
the composition of the present thesis. Firstly, as already mentioned in the introduction to Part 
                                                             
13 Indeed, according to Niranjana, ―a rapid survey of translation studies would show that for the past few 
centuries thinking on translation has remained within an empiricist-idealist conceptual framework that, 
structured by what Gramsci would call ‗common sense‘, in turn uphold the premises of humanism‖ 
(NIRANJANA 1992, 50 – her emphasis).   
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I above, there seems to be a lack of disposition on the part of some involved with translating 
and interpreting to discuss more abstract, theoretical issues – issues that do not directly refer 
to practical questions. In fact, for these people theory only seems interesting when its 
interaction with practice is successful. This attitude had come up before (see above), as we 
discussed Bohunovsky‘s paper and Katan‘s survey with practitioners, but also as a few 
translation scholars and translators (mostly Benedetti and Britto) expressed their opinion 
about translation theory. In the present chapter, this attitude appeared mainly through the 
unwillingness or lack of interest of many of my colleagues to engage in theoretical debates, 
mostly because their interests lie with practice. Secondly, numerous academic conflicts – be 
it at faculty level or amongst students – appear to stem from the question of whether the 
university should fulfil market needs and therefore tailor its courses to make them more 
practice-oriented. Thirdly and finally, research in translation studies in Brazil (but certainly 
not only there) seems to be predominantly applied and empirical, with Karl Popper‘s model 
of the scientific method at its forefront. I will come back to these questions repeatedly in 
what follows.          
So far these personal impressions and comments on my short experience as a 
translation student and teacher have hardly contributed to understanding the nature of the 
questions raised here. In fact, I believe that they have somewhat emphasised this confusing 
outlook without much clarification. I hope the next chapter, which will be dedicated to the 
role of higher education, can start throwing some light on these issues.           
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2. The Inevitable End of Higher Education   
_____________________________________________________ 
Beware of what opens the university to the outside and 
the bottomless, but also of what, closing it in on itself, 
would create only an illusion of closure, would make 
the university available to any sort of interest, or else 
render it perfectly useless. Beware of ends; but what 
would a university be without ends? 
  Jacques Derrida 
  (translated by Catherine Porter and Edward P. Morris) 
Derrida‘s words invite us to reflect upon the role of higher education in terms of ―ends‖ – as 
in ―goals‖, ―applications‖, ―orientation‖. One should on the one hand beware of ―what opens 
the university to the outside‖ and, on the other hand, prevent it from ―clos[ing] in on itself‖; 
one should at once beware of ―ends‖ and embrace ―ends‖ as the way to the future.     
 As we have briefly seen in Chapter 1 above, while some will claim that the purpose of 
higher education is to teach professional competences to be exercised mostly outside the 
university, thus fulfilling the needs of the market, others will feel that the role of university is 
first and foremost to stimulate reflection and critical thinking within a given field – 
particularly as far as the Humanities are concerned. Caught in this dilemma, the university 
does not seem to know whether it should do away with or embrace ―ends‖, to use Derrida‘s 
words.   
 Transformations and debates like the ones happening at the Universidade Federal do 
Paraná or the Universität Wien (see Chapter 1 above) are probably happening at many 
different institutions for similar reasons. And the role that the notion of theory plays within 
these debates remains manifold. When theory is perceived as a source of reflection without 
direct practical applications, some will deem it essential, crucial to the establishment of 
critical, well-informed students and professionals; others, in contrast, will consider it 
superfluous and vague mainly because, once in the market, these students should primarily be 
functional and efficient. Likewise, when theory is understood as practice-oriented, a means to 
govern over practice, a set of rules and precepts to be followed, some will find it 
indispensable to the teaching of a profession, while others will claim that it is overly 
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minimising and simplistic, leading to the production of uncritical students with merely 
mechanical, technical competences.       
 Jacques Derrida, in his 1983 essay ‗The Principle of Reason: The University in the 
Eyes of its Pupils‘ (DERRIDA 1983 – translated by Catherine Porter and Edward P. 
Morris
14
), explores these ideas. He begins by going to Aristotle and analysing how he 
appeared to understand the notions of knowledge and theory, concluding that, for the Greek 
philosopher, the human drive for knowledge and theoretical thinking is mostly purposeless: 
―the desire to know for the sake of knowing, the desire for knowledge with no practical 
purpose‖ (idem, 4). Derrida identifies more or less the same viewpoint as far as Kant, 
Nietzsche and Heidegger are concerned: ―In modern times, Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger and 
numerous others have all said as much, quite unmistakably: the essential feature of academic 
responsibility must not be professional education‖ (idem, 18). Yet these modern times, 
Derrida maintains, have witnessed the emergence and establishment of oriented, applied 
research. In other words, 
research that is programmed, focused, organized in an authoritarian fashion in view of its 
utilization (in view of "ta khreia," Aristotle would say), whether we are talking about 
technology, economy, medicine, psychosociology, or military power – and in fact we are 
talking about all of these at once (idem, 11 – his emphasis). 
This kind of research would be overshadowing – in terms of both obtaining funds and getting 
attention – ―disinterested research with aims that would not be pledged in advance to some 
utilitarian purpose‖ (idem). 
 Derrida then takes a more political path, going over Kant‘s attempt to define the limits 
between ―the essential and noble ends of reason that give rise to a fundamental science versus 
the incidental and empirical ends which can be systematized only in terms of technical 
schemas and necessities‖ (idem). He arrives at the conclusion that nowadays, as far as 
research and theorising are concerned, we have a different, far more omnipresent kind of 
censorship than ever before:  
Today, in the Western democracies, that form of [traditional] censorship has almost 
entirely disappeared. The prohibiting limitations function through multiple channels that 
are decentralized, difficult to bring together into a system. The unacceptability of a 
discourse, the noncertification of a research project, the illegitimacy of a course offering 
                                                             
14 The epigraph that opens the present chapter was taken from this essay.  
  
35 
are declared by evaluative actions: studying such evaluations is, it seems to me, one of the 
tasks most indispensable to the exercise of academic responsibility, most urgent for the 
maintenance of its dignity (idem, 13). 
The so-called Science Wars and Culture Wars are a corollary of Derrida‘s remarks. Stanley 
Aronowitz explains, for example, that although the awards granted to research projects by the 
US-American Department of Defence did not have ―utility‖ as their main criterion, the vast 
majority of ―funding proposals justified their requests on practical grounds‖ (ARONOWITZ 
1996, 189). Further, he asserts that ―the choice of investigative objects and their promised 
results is ineluctably designed to persuade the funder that the payoff is worth the money‖ 
(idem). Dorothy Nelkin understands this phenomenon in terms of a ―social contract‖ or a 
―marriage‖ between science (or scientific research) and the state since World War II:  
This contract included a set of both tacit and open agreements about the autonomy of 
science. The government would provide research support, relatively unfettered by 
requirements for accountability, if scientists would work in the interest of public progress 
and conscientiously administer and regulate themselves. (…) This relationship was often 
described as a marriage, implying shared assumptions and mutual trust. The unusual 
degree of autonomy granted to science reflected its apolitical image, the reputation of 
scientists as unbiased and "disinterested" and therefore reliable as a source of truth 
(NELKIN 1996, 95 – her emphasis). 
 In this light, the Science Wars appear to have been triggered by a strong desire to 
demystify science and scientific discourse, showing it is subject to numerous influences – 
such as ideology, culture, context and bias – just as any other type of discourse (see 
ARONOWITZ 1996, 178 and FRANKLIN 1996, 141). This process of deconstruction of 
science led to the questioning of everything surrounding it: its methods, its validity, its 
institutions, its motivations, its neutrality. Although the issue of the Science Wars is, for the 
present thesis, a side issue, it shows how far the conflicts underlying the purpose of research 
and higher education have gone. ―Application‖ is key here: application as far as theory is 
concerned, the application of science and reason, the application of university education. Be 
it in terms of producing professionals, producing theories or producing technologies, whether 
or not to directly and openly respond to the needs of the market is probably the crucial 
question surrounding the university at the moment – and in fact whether not responding is 
even a possibility (see epigraph above). And as Derrida very aptly explains, it is a mistake to 
think that this kind of ethical responsibility is relevant only in Natural Sciences (DERRIDA 
1983, 13 – his emphasis): 
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From now on, so long as it has the means, a military budget can invest in anything at all, 
in view of deferred profits: "basic" scientific theory, the humanities, literary theory and 
philosophy. The compartment of philosophy which covered all this, and which Kant 
thought ought to be kept unavailable to any utilitarian purpose and to the orders of any 
power whatsoever in its search for truth, can no longer lay claim to such autonomy. What 
is produced in this field can always be used. 
 Yet the philosopher concedes that ―desiring to remove the university from ‗useful‘ 
programs and from professional ends, one may always, willingly or not, find oneself serving 
unrecognized ends, reconstituting powers of caste, class, or corporation‖ (idem, 18 – his 
emphasis – see epigraph above). For him, a possible way out of the dilemma lies in what he 
calls ―thought‖ – a concept that has very much to do with the idea of theorising as a source of 
awareness, reflection and critical thought. Having been asked by the French government to 
help to set up a College of Philosophy in the 1980s (today the Collège International de 
Philosophie), Derrida insisted upon this dimension of ―thought‖ – something ―not reducible 
to technique, nor to science, nor to philosophy‖ (idem, 16). By stimulating and promoting 
thought, this institution would be able to ―provid[e] a place to work on the value and meaning 
of the basic, the fundamental, on its opposition to goal-orientation, on the ruses of orientation 
in all its domains‖ (idem). In addition to give rise to criticism of philosophy itself, this 
dimension of thought should also  
be accompanied at least by a movement of suspicion, even of rejection with respect to the 
professionalization of the university in these two senses, and especially in the first, which 
regulates university life according to the supply and demand of the marketplace and 
according to a purely technical ideal of competence (idem, 17). 
The ―two senses‖ to which he refers here are the following: (i) ―does the university have as 
its essential mission that of producing professional competencies, which may sometimes be 
external to the university?‖ and (ii) ―is the task of the university to ensure within itself – and 
under what conditions – the reproduction of professional competence by preparing professors 
for pedagogy and for research who have respect for a certain code?‖ (idem).  
 As far as reason is concerned – and here reason should be understood as the principle 
lying beneath science – this dimension of thought should lead to the ―infinite task‖ of 
unmasking ―all the ruses of end-orienting reason, the paths by which apparently disinterested 
research can find itself indirectly reappropriated, reinvested by programs of all sorts‖ (idem, 
16). And here Derrida stresses that ―ends‖, ―orientation‖, ―application‖ should not necessarily 
be perceived as the enemy, but rather that a need has arisen ―for a new way of educating 
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students that will prepare them to undertake new analyses in order to evaluate these ends and 
to choose, when possible, among them all‖ (idem). In other words – and let us look back at 
the epigraph above – the idea would not be to do away with ―ends‖ and ―external 
investment‖, but rather to be more critical or careful about the consequences of these ends 
and investments
15
.  
 Notwithstanding this emphasis on ―thought‖ and criticism, the College of Philosophy 
should be a ―normal‖ institution. ―Normal‖ in the sense that it cannot fiercely reject and 
discard everything it criticises. As he writes his essay, for example, Derrida is prepared to 
submit himself to the principle of reason for the sake of communication, which does not 
mean that he is not prepared to try and transform communication, language, academic 
relationships, approaches to pedagogy, and so on (idem). Accordingly, he demands this 
double gesture of the university as well, i.e. ―to ensure professional competence and the most 
serious tradition of the university even while going as far as possible, theoretically and 
practically, in the most directly underground thinking about the abyss beneath the university‖ 
(idem).  
 Indeed, in face of the university ―crisis‖ (in a way for many of the reasons that 
culminated in the Science Wars of the 1990s), Derrida clings on this double gesture (idem, 20 
– his emphasis): 
In a period of ―crisis‖, as we say, a period of decadence and renewal, when the institution 
is ―on the blink‖, provocation to think brings together in the same instant the desire for 
memory and exposure to the future, the fidelity of a guardian faithful enough to want to 
keep even the chance of a future, in other words the singular responsibility of what he 
does not have and of what is not yet.  
This double gesture is very much in line with his idea of ―double bind‖, as a sort of tension 
that stems from resistance and gives rise ―neither to an analysis nor to a synthesis, neither to 
an analytic nor to a dialectic. It provokes both the analytic and the dialectic to infinity, but in 
order to resist them absolutely‖ (DERRIDA  [1996] 1998, 26 – translated by Kamuf, Brault 
and Naas – his emphasis).       
                                                             
15 And here, if we embrace this dimension of ―thought‖, we might already have a possible answer to the third 
question asked at the end of Chapter 1 above, namely about the predominance of the methods of applied 
research in translation studies. If the university is to be perceived as a place of ―thought‖, an institution that 
fosters the deconstruction of its own premises, then applied research should no longer be a must in any area. In 
any case, I would rather come back to this question towards the end of the present thesis, in Part IV, Chapter 3 
below, as I feel that now it is too soon to start drawing conclusions.   
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 In two later works dedicated to the future of the university, Derrida develops this idea 
further and places great emphasis on the need for a ―university without condition‖, in other 
words a university that is ―capable of deconstruction, beginning with the deconstruction of 
their own history and their own axioms‖ (DERRIDA 2001a, 26). This unconditional 
university would be a place where everyone had ―the principal right to say everything, 
whether it be under the heading of fiction and the experimentation of knowledge, and the 
right to say it publically, to publish it‖ (idem); it would be the ―ultimate place‖ of ―critical 
resistance‖ to ―all the powers of dogmatic and unjust appropriation‖ (idem, 25-26). One such 
―more than critical‖ university would welcome all sorts of critical questioning: of ―the history 
of the concept of man‖, ―the history even of the notion of critique‖, ―the form and the 
authority of the question‖ and ―the interrogative form of thought‖ (idem).  
 More specifically as far as the Humanities are concerned, Derrida believes in that 
double gesture again: preserving and changing at once; rethinking the concepts underlying 
the Humanities but, at the same time, protecting their canons at all costs (DERRIDA 2001b, 
22). For him, the concept of interdisciplinarity plays a pivotal role, as the Humanities must, 
on the one hand, go beyond the borders that delimit their departments and, on the other hand, 
still keep their specificity (idem, 65). Dilek Dizdar understands Derrida‘s advice, as well as 
the role of ―thought‖ (see above) in the Humanities as follows: 
(…) Derrida [verteidigt die] Notwendigkeit einer Widerstandskraft mit 
Widerstandsprinzip. Für diese Widerstandskraft und die Unbedingtheitsprinzip eignen 
sich die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, die Humanities, ganz besonders. Denn sie (…) 
öffnen den Raum für eine Diskussion und Neubestimmung des Prinzips. Diese Bewegung 
stützt sich auf die Möglichkeit der Kritik, des grundlegenden Fragens und der 
Dekonstruktion; denn in den Humanities geht es um den Menschen (…). Die Universität 
und darin besonders die Humanities sind also der Ort, der ein (selbst) kritisches Denken, 
den zivilen Ungehorsam pflegen und entwickeln sollte (DIZDAR 2006, 364-365 – her 
emphasis).       
 Derrida‘s double gesture does not, therefore, imply substantial structural changes, but 
rather a change of attitude on the part of those involved with the university. As far as teachers 
are concerned, Rosemary Arrojo puts this change of attitude as follows (ARROJO 1996b, 
102 – her emphasis): 
Armed with such an awareness and with their compromise to unmask the power relations 
that determine the meanings and the hierarchies that constitute the ―truths‖ that shape 
their classroom, community and, ultimately, also their own history, postmodern teachers 
will start their courses by the very deconstruction of the practices and contents to be 
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taught, as well as of the ―official‖ goals to be met. (…) They will not teach their students 
to follow ―universal‖, ―objective‖ translation rules. Instead, they will show them how 
―rules‖ are always local and unstable (…). In other words, postmodern teachers will not 
give up their ―textual authority‖, but will make an effort to make it as transparent as 
possible, showing their students that this kind of authority, like any other, both inside and 
outside the school, is a form of power that can be overcome.        
 The debate about the future and the purpose of the university is, undoubtedly, a 
multifaceted, complex one. The suggestions made by Derrida (and Dizdar, and Arrojo) are 
certainly feasible, and are probably being carried out by teachers with postmodern affinities 
regardless of the disposition of their colleagues and institutions. And in accordance with 
Derrida‘s double gesture or double bind one could still respond to the demands of the 
marketplace (to go back to the question I raised above about the role of higher education) and 
be critical of this response, reject it, strive to change it. Somehow, however, I do not believe 
that this is the gesture behind measures such as the ones taken by the Department of Modern 
Foreign Languages at the Universidade Federal do Paraná, for example (see Chapter 1 
above), or the motivations behind POSI, Praxisorientierte Studieninhalte für die Ausbildung 
von Übersetzern und Dolmetschern (see next paragraph). Instead, the need to fulfil market 
needs seems to set itself against the questioning, the ―more than critical‖ (see above) attitude, 
the deconstruction of these very demands and their implications.  
 Indeed, as we will see in the next few chapters, many of those involved with 
translation (be they practitioners, scholars or students) seem to perceive the move towards 
university professionalisation as a sign of progress, evolution, a step closer to true science. 
Let us take POSI (see above) as an example. According to Anderman and Rogers, the 
establishment of POSI had a lot to do with ―the problem created by the discrepancy that 
appeared to exist between the priorities of university training programmes and the rapidly 
changing demands placed on translators in the market place‖ (ANDERMAN and ROGERS 
2000, 64). However, as discussions between academics and practitioners began, it became 
clear that ―the perspective of the employers/professionals still cannot be easily reconciled 
with that of the trainers‖, even though both sides have ―better practice-oriented training for 
translators and interpreters as a shared goal‖ (idem). According to the authors, universities 
have to overcome two different ―constraints‖: the heterogeneous nature of the student body in 
terms of their professional future and ―broader considerations of their perceived role in 
society as educators in the humanistic tradition‖ (idem – my emphasis).    
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 The question of whether education should be professionalising, thus meeting the 
demands of the market, has been relevant ever since the onset of the idea of ―education‖. 
According to Frijhoff, ―Aristotle [asked] what exactly was the purpose of education of his 
age: to produce learned men, to educate in virtue, or to satisfy the needs of society. Learning, 
virtue, utility (…)‖ (FRIJHOFF [1996] 2003, 43). In Brazil, this debate became particularly 
heated in the 1970s, mostly due to the gradual softening of the military regime. Alfredo Bosi, 
one of Brazil‘s most important literary critics and historians, would write in 1979:  
O mundo do receituário é a forma formada da cultura dominante e vigora em todas as 
carreiras a que a Universidade dá acesso. É particularmente deprimente quando se 
pensa na passagem, em geral entrópica, da cultura universitária para o meio secundário. 
O que se transmite aos alunos do ginásio (...), o que se estratifica em termos de instrução 
fundamental, é, quase sempre, a fórmula final, reduzida, retificada, da antepenúltima 
tendência da cultura superior (BOSI [1992] 2006, 317 – his emphasis).        
The world of formulae is the way of the dominant culture, manifesting itself in every 
single university course. This is particularly depressing when one thinks about the usually 
entropic passage from university culture to the secondary sector. What is transmitted to 
secondary school pupils (…), what becomes fixed in their minds in terms of basic 
instruction is almost always the final, reduced, rectified formula of an already out-dated 
tendency dictated by the dominant culture.      
His bitter remarks are a response to two main changes that had been taking place more or less 
at that time: firstly the fact that philosophy had been abruptly cut out of the curricula of 
secondary school (idem, 314), and secondly the fact that Latin and Greek were becoming 
ever so unpopular at university level – unlike the previous decades that had seen their golden 
years. Later in this same essay Bosi asserts that university is the place where culture becomes 
prematurely formalising and professionalising; this culture hastily develops formulae, 
nurtures itself on them until new formulae prevail and replace them – ―A Universidade é o 
lugar em que a cultura se formaliza e se profissionaliza precocemente. (…) essa cultura 
chega logo à cunhagem de fórmulas e se nutre dessas fórmulas até que sobrevenham outras 
que a substituam‖ (idem, 320).  
 Going back to the question about whether education should be practice-oriented, 
market-oriented, Bosi replies that education should be (idem, 340).   
(...) uma introdução larga ao conhecimento do Homem e da Sociedade, uma ocasião 
constante de desenvolvimento da própria linguagem, como expressão subjetiva e 
comunicação intersubjetiva (...). Este ideal, que forma o ser consciente das conquistas do 
gênero humano, não pode ser barateado nem trocado por esquemas inertes ou migalhas 
de uma informação científica ou histórica. 
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(…) a large introduction to the knowledge of Man and Society, a constant opportunity to 
develop one‘s own language both as subjective expression and intersubjective 
communication. (…) This ideal results in the awareness of human achievements and 
hence cannot be cheapened or exchanged for inert schemas or scraps of scientific or 
historical knowledge.  
Indeed, as already argued above, if we accept that theory is something generally produced in 
academic settings, for an academic public (―academic‖ here as opposed to ―for laymen‖, 
including students as well), the role of the university becomes crucial in this debate about the 
role and purpose of theory. In Brazil, the concept of university is closely related to the 
concept of research (MENDONÇA 2000, 148): 
(...) a lei 5.540 afirmava explicitamente constituir-se a universidade na forma ideal de 
organização do ensino superior, na sua tríplice função de ensino, pesquisa e extensão, 
enfatizando-se a indissolubilidade entre essas funções, particularmente entre ensino e 
pesquisa, sendo esta última o próprio distintivo da universidade.                  
(…) law number 5.540 clearly stated that the university was the ideal structure in which 
to organise higher education, and that it should fulfil three main functions: teaching, 
research and extracurricular activities. These functions were indissoluble – particularly 
teaching and research, the latter being the distinctive feature of university.  
Although this law was revoked by a new one in 1996 (law 9.394), the role of research 
remained the same
16
.  
 Between the early 1990s, when Bosi published his essay, and today, Brazil has seen 
on the one hand a return to philosophy, Latin and Greek, but on the other hand a significant 
change as far as the ―indissolubility‖ (see above) of research and university is concerned, 
mainly as a result of the establishment of numerous private universities across the country. 
Most of these new universities tend to employ underqualified teachers (at least in comparison 
to public universities), who in turn have different jobs at the same time and thus cannot 
dedicate their time to research. 
 And speaking of research, needless to say that the political and ethical struggles 
behind both the Science Wars and Derrida‘s concerns about the future of university 
(expressed particularly in DERRIDA 1983 – see above) have also become a reality in Brazil. 
This is how Leyla Perrone-Moisés roughly summarises the current situation of the Brazilian 
university:       
                                                             
16 For more on this, please refer to http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L9394.htm#art92 (last accessed in 
September 2010). 
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A situação atual é a seguinte: a universidade está exposta, à venda, ou, para usar de um 
eufemismo, sponsorisée, com objetivos comerciais e industriais. As Humanidades são 
reféns dos departamentos de ciências puras e aplicadas, que concentram os capitais 
rentáveis vindos de fora da universidade (PERRONE-MOISÉS 2006, 28).   
The current situation is the following: the university is exposed, for sale or, to use a 
euphemism, sponsorisée for commercial and industrial purposes. The Humanities are 
hostage to the departments of natural and applied sciences, which in turn receive all the 
investment from outside the university.           
In this sense, a lot of the research being done at the moment is funded through private 
investments and is directly and openly oriented to serving ―utilitarian purposes‖ (see above). 
Furthermore, conflicts in the Humanities – as the one I briefly explained above at the 
Universidade Federal do Paraná – have become increasingly recurrent, whereby the move 
towards full professionalisation appears to represent a goal to be reached (see references to 
POSI above).        
 All in all, the picture drawn in the present chapter is marked by the idea of difference. 
Difference in terms of the way the concepts of theory and practice are understood, differences 
as far as the purpose of higher education is concerned, differences regarding the wherefores 
of research. In fact, this entire part and even this entire thesis will be permeated by the notion 
of difference, and I certainly have no intention of erasing or reconciling these differences. 
More important than reconciliation – because it is not possible, nor is it desirable – would be 
to understand these differences, and this is how I would like to end the present chapter.  
 Derrida‘s suggestion of a dimension of ―thought‖ (see above), he himself remarks, 
―cannot be produced outside of certain historical, techno-economic, politico-institutional and 
linguistic conditions‖ (DERRIDA 1983, 17), which might lead to the reappropriation of his 
idea by forces with which he does not necessarily agree – a risk he, as a ―faithful guardian‖, 
is nevertheless willing to take as it is the risk of the future itself (idem). Indeed, all these 
differences I mentioned in the previous paragraph are products of ―historical, techno-
economic, politico-institutional and linguistic conditions‖, and they all constantly risk being – 
and are – reappropriated. Understanding the disparate standpoints behind these differences as 
well as these movements of reappropriation is understanding the conflicts that derive from 
them – the famous dichotomies such as theory versus practice, oriented or applied versus 
basic research, university for ―virtue‖ versus university for ―utility‖ (see Aristotle‘s quote 
above), and so on and so forth.  
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 As already argued in the introduction to part I above, and as the example of POSI 
illustrates very well (see above), the different outlooks one may have on the dichotomies that 
end the previous paragraph are closely related to one‘s standpoint – amongst other factors, of 
course. As Anderman and Rogers (2000) explain, academics are ―still‖ reluctant to accept 
fully professionalising translation and interpreting courses because of ―their perceived role in 
society as educators in the humanistic tradition‖ (idem, 65), though I am sure that some 
members of academia are not reluctant at all, and they will have their own motivations to do 
so. By the same token, employers and professionals of translation and interpreting are far 
more concerned about practice, hence their wish to make translation training fully 
professionalising and market-oriented. In fact, it makes sense that businesses in general 
should prefer their future employees to receive professionalising training at university, so that 
they do not have to invest in it afterwards – and this concern is as legitimate as the concern of 
the faithful guardian stood at the university gates, to use Derrida‘s allegory.  
 In any case, the question of standpoints will be raised again in chapter 4 below. Let us 
now advance to Chapter 3, in which we will mostly go back to the first question raised in 
Chapter 1 above about the apparent lack of disposition, particularly on the part of 
practitioners and students, to deal with ―theory‖ as a source of reflection with no ―utilitarian 
purpose‖ (see above) in mind, or in other words their keenness on a notion of translation 
theory that fulfils all their practical needs as practicing translators and interpreters.           
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3. Translation Theory and Practice: Married, Divorced or Nonrelated? 
_____________________________________________________ 
By all means marry; if you get a good wife, you'll be 
happy; if you get a bad one, you'll become a 
philosopher.   
Socrates 
As already mentioned in the introduction to Part I above, the book Conversas com Tradutores 
(BENEDETTI and SOBRAL [2003] 2007), or Interviews with Translators, reveals that the 
relationship the different interviewees have with the idea of translation theory is manifold. In 
fact, one of the nine interview questions goes straight to heart of the matter. It reads as 
follows: ―Em sua opinião, que tipo de tradutor (formação, dons pessoais, etc.) exige a 
tradução em geral e a tradução em sua área? Qual a função da teoria da tradução na 
formação do tradutor?‖, or in your opinion, what kind of translator (in terms of education, 
personal qualities, etc.) is most fit for translating in general and for translating in your area? 
What is the role of translation theory in translator training? (idem). Out of the nineteen 
interviewees, most of whom are experienced translators, eight are directly involved with 
university, mostly as language or translation professors. The other eleven are practitioners, 
some of whom with specific translation training (a few are translation masters and doctors), 
and others self-taught translators.  
Most of the translators who also work at university seem to have a positive outlook on 
the role of theory in translator training, with the words ―reflection‖ and ―awareness‖ echoing 
throughout the book.  João Azenha Jr., for example, claims that ―ela nos ensina a ordenar a 
experiência, a recuperar informações valiosas, a criar argumentos (...) para justificar as 
escolhas que são, impreterivelmente, diferentes de tradutor para tradutor‖, or it [translation 
theory] teaches us to organise our own experience, to recall valuable information, to come up 
with arguments (...) to justify the choices that will inevitably vary from translator to translator 
(idem, 48). Similarly, as already quoted on page 13 above, Heloísa Gonçalvez Barbosa 
maintains that 
Embora muitos tradutores profissionais tenham alguma desconfiança da teoria, é ela 
quem me dá segurança (...). A teoria é importante na formação do tradutor, porque lhe 
confere um poder de reflexão sobre sua vida profissional. Dá-lhe mais segurança nas 
tomadas de decisão e nos posicionamentos profissionais que toma. Ao mesmo tempo, a 
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teoria ajuda o tradutor a encontrar seu lugar no mundo, na história (idem, 59 – my 
emphasis). 
Theory is what gives me confidence (...), although many professional translators find it 
questionable. Theory is extremely important in translator training because it grants 
translators the power to reflect upon their work. It provides them with confidence in 
decision-making and helps them to find a professional stand. In addition to that, theory 
helps translators to find their place in the world, in history.           
Quite in the same way, Lúcia Helena França places emphasis on the awareness-raising nature 
of theoretical reflection:  
[A teoria] É extremamente importante, pois conscientiza o aluno-tradutor sobre os 
processos envolvidos no ato tradutório, dando-lhe uma maior consciência da sua 
atuação e da importância de aprimorar seu desempenho, levando-o a refletir sobre o seu 
trabalho (idem, 105 – my emphasis). 
It [theory] is extremely important because it raises the students-translators‘ awareness of 
the processes involved in translation, providing them with greater awareness both of 
their work and of the importance of improving their performance, hence causing them to 
reflect upon their work.  
 Lia Wyler
17
, on the other hand, argues that studying theory can only be fruitful when 
two principles are followed. First of all, translation teachers must take into account ―as 
expectativas do mercado editorial e do leitor brasileiro‖, or the expectations both of the 
publishing market and of the Brazilian reader (idem, 196). Secondly, she adds that ideally 
university students and teachers should evaluate together how the translation theories they 
studied can be applied to the Brazilian culture and language (idem). She concludes her 
answer to this question by saying that  
A desatenção a esses pressupostos não tem produzido bons frutos: o tradutor 
profissional não tem se interessado muito por teorias, e o graduado em tradução não 
tem encontrado no mercado muita receptividade para o que estudou (idem). 
Not following these principles has led to two negative consequences: the professional 
translator has not had much interest in theories and the translation major has had great 
difficulty finding receptivity in the market for what s/he has learnt.   
   Except for one translator-professor, all the other eight ―academic‖ interviewees (see 
footnote below) do not mention any particular theories, nor do they announce affiliations to a 
                                                             
17 Although Wyler is not an academic as such, but has become increasingly more involved in academic activities 
– such as publishing papers on translation and teaching translation courses at university. In Brazil she is best-
known for her translations of Harry Potter. This division I propose here between ―academics‖ and 
―nonacademics‖ is rather flexible as my intention is to point to those interviewees who have some involvement 
with academic activities.     
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certain theoretical standpoint. The exception is Paulo Henriques Britto, whose work as a 
translation theorist, literary translator and poet will be more closely analysed at a later point 
(see Part III below). Even though he believes that theory plays an important role in translator 
training, he has one major restriction. He explains that ―a reflexão teórica é uma coisa boa 
para o tradutor literário‖, or theoretical reflection is a good thing for the literary translator 
(idem, 92), but concedes that the relationships between theory and practice within the field of 
literary translation are not exactly ideal – ―as relações entre teoria e prática no campo da 
tradução literária não são as melhores possíveisŗ (idem). In Britto‘s point of view, 
(...) é preciso reconhecer que a antipatia que muitos tradutores literários nutrem pela 
teoria não é completamente sem razão de ser. De fato, no campo da teoria de tradução 
atual, há alguns posicionamentos teóricos que são francamente irreais, e que não 
parecem resistir à prova dos nove da aplicação à prática. Refiro-me em particular a 
algumas teorias radicais que surgem no campo da desconstrução e do feminismo. Por 
exemplo, alguns teóricos sustentam que a noção de original em tradução é um simples 
mito, e que o tradutor literário deveria ter o mesmo status que o autor do suposto 
Ŗoriginalŗ (palavra que eles sempre colocam entre aspas); a posição secundária da 
tradução em relação ao original seria uma decorrência do capitalismo, do machismo, do 
logocentrismo, da opressão das culturas européias sobre as periféricas, etc. Os 
tradutores contra-argumentam, com toda razão, que os mesmos teóricos que pontificam 
sobre a impossibilidade de se distinguir entre original e tradução, sobre a 
impossibilidade de se ter acesso às intenções do autor, sobre a relatividade radical de 
todo julgamento de valor referente às traduções, quando se defrontam com a tradução 
de um texto por eles escrito, se comportam tal como os autores logocêntricos, 
eurocêntricos e falocêntricos: querem que o tradutor reproduza em suas traduções 
exatamente o que eles queriam dizer, exigindo a mesma noção de Ŗfidelidadeŗ ao 
Ŗoriginalŗ que eles tanto criticam em seus pronunciamentos teóricos. Não admira que, 
diante de tais pronunciamentos, alguns tradutores literários apressadamente concluam 
que a teoria é uma perda de tempo (...). É importante que os tradutores literários percam 
seu preconceito contra a teoria e acompanhem com interesse um campo que é um dos 
mais produtivos e interessantes na área das ciências humanas na atualidade; mas 
também acho importante que alguns teóricos mais radicais façam uma autocrítica e 
reconheçam que há, realmente, uma boa dose de irrealismo em algumas propostas que 
têm circulado nos meios acadêmicos em décadas recentes (idem, 92-93). 
(...) one must acknowledge the fact that the antipathy felt by literary translators towards 
translation theory is not entirely unjustifiable. Indeed, in the field of translation studies 
today there are a few theoretical standpoints that are simply unreal; standpoints which, 
casting out nines, would not be applicable to translation practice. And here I mean 
particularly those theories derived from deconstruction and feminism. Some theorists 
maintain, for example, that the notion of original in translation is a myth, that literary 
translators should enjoy the same status as the author of the allegedly ―original‖ work 
(and in their texts the word ―original‖ always comes between inverted commas); the 
inferior role of a translation when compared to the original text would be a product of 
capitalism, chauvinism, logocentrism, of the oppression imposed by European cultures 
on peripheral cultures, etc. As a response, translators quite rightly claim that these very 
same theorists who defend the impossibility of distinguishing between translation and 
original text, the impossibility of accessing the author‘s intentions, the radical relativity 
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of all and every value judgement of a translation, these theorists, when faced with a 
translation of their own texts, behave in the exact same way as the logocentric, 
Eurocentric, phallocentric authors they criticise: they expect their translators to reproduce 
in their translations exactly what they meant to say, demanding the very same notion of 
―fidelity‖ to the ―original‖ of which they so fiercely disapprove. Unsurprisingly, faced 
with this, some literary translators hastily arrive at the conclusion that theory is a waste 
of time (...). It is important that literary translators reconsider their prejudice against 
translation theory and follow this that is nowadays one of the most interesting and 
productive fields in the humanities. But I also think it is important for certain radical 
theorists to be more self-critical and recognise that in the past few decades there have 
been a great number of unrealistic ideas in the theories discussed in academic circles. 
Most of Britto‘s questioning will be addressed at length in Parts III and IV below. What 
seems curious, however, is the way he and Wyler, though in completely different fashions, 
find the relationship theory-practice so problematic. For Wyler, the role of the translation 
teacher is to evaluate to what extent foreign translation theories may be ―applicable‖ to the 
Brazilian context, publishing market, culture and language. Leaving aside the fact that she 
does not account for Brazilian theories, she concludes her reflection by reinforcing the 
divorce of theory and practice mentioned in this thesis time and again. She seems to believe 
that for this reason, ―professional translators‖ have little to do with theory, whereas those who 
studied translation theory have difficulty ―applying‖ it to the translation market. Here two 
questions seem relevant, namely to what extent can someone be a professional (in whatever 
area) when s/he has no specific education in this area? And should translation students be 
able to directly apply the theories they learnt to the translation market of their country? In any 
case, let us keep in mind that these two interviewees, Britto and Wyler, are well-known 
translators in Brazil – Britto has translated more than 100 volumes of prose and poetry, 
whereas Wyler translated, amongst other works, all the Harry Potter books (I will come back 
to their standpoints in the next chapter).  
Before we come back to these two questions and to Britto‘s long quotation, let us look 
at what the other eleven interviewees, i.e. the ones who have no involvement with academia, 
have to say about the ―role of translation theory in translator training‖ (idem). Erik Borten 
and Claudia Berliner, for example, admit that studying theory may be fruitful, but personal 
qualities and specific knowledge of the area in which one works are far more important 
(idem, 74-75, 82-83). Heloísa Martins Costa seems to have a similar opinion: ―Na minha 
área, que é técnica, é necessário gostar de pesquisar e saber usar as ferramentas que a 
Internet oferece‖, or in my area, which is technical, one must like to research and know how 
to use the tools the Internet offers (idem, 100).   
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Other interviewees emphasise the requirements translation theories have to fulfil in 
order to be valid. Maria Stela Gonçalves asserts that a translated text must be  
uma produção oriunda da língua de chegada e não (...) algo cristalizado, que parece 
dizer ŖSou uma tradução desta ou daquela línguaŗ. Só acredito no que se designa como 
teoria da tradução se esta puder dar conta dessas condições (idem, 114 – her emphasis). 
a production typical of the target language, rather than (...) something crystallised, 
something that appears to say ―I am a translation from this or that language‖. I only 
believe in what is called translation theory if it fulfils these requirements.         
Renato Rosenberg defends that ―toda teoria fica ótima quando é respaldada pela prática‖, or 
every theory can be great when supported by practice (idem, 165). Nilson Louzada 
corroborates this idea by saying that good knowledge of translation theory helps one to 
discuss with and persuade editors about translation choices, but regrets the fact that there are 
not many Brazilian productions in this area (idem, 131).    
Haroldo Netto connects theory and practice by stating that ―se perguntarem a um 
tradutor (...) em plena execução do seu trabalho, o que está aplicando ali da teoria de 
tradução aprendida, muito provavelmente ele não saberá responder de pronto‖, or if you ask 
a translator which translation theories he is applying to a certain text he is translating at the 
moment, he would certainly not be able to reply right away (idem, 137). He quotes a 
colleague, Robert Bonono (idem, 138 – his emphasis), to explain his relationship with 
translation theory: 
Acho que, em termos gerais, os Řtradutores praticantesř não percebem a relevância da 
teoria para o seu trabalho. Suas preocupações primordiais têm a ver com os detalhes 
dos textos (terminologia, significados obscuros) e questões gerais de comércio, como a 
obtenção de trabalho. 
I think that, in general, ‗practical translators‘ do not see the relevance of theory to their 
work. Their main concerns relate to text details (such as terminology, obscure meanings) 
and general business issues, like finding work.   
There are those who concede that although they were not specifically trained as 
translators, this ―theoretical knowledge‖ is (or would be) very welcome. Alfredo de Lemos, 
for instance, claims that he wishes he had a better ―base teórica‖, or theoretical foundation, 
because theory is what helps us to organise and systematise our knowledge – ―organizar e 
sistematizar nosso conhecimento‖ (idem, 126). Similarly, Mauro Sobhie perceives translation 
theory as a way to avoid ―longas horas de sofrimento em dilemas existenciais‖, or hours 
agonising over existential dilemmas (idem, 175). Based on his own experience, he feels that 
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reading translation theory motivates us to reflect upon our role in translation as well as in 
society (―nosso papel na tradução e dentro da sociedade‖ – idem).  
Finally, Vera Pereira admits that she finds it a difficult question seeing as she was not 
trained as a translator at all, but rather learnt by practising, ―errando muito e acertando às 
vezes‖, or often making mistakes and occasionally getting things right (idem, 149). She 
confesses that, when faced with two different translations of the same text, they never seem 
to be the same and that she is unable to tell which one is the right one. Pereira suggests it 
might be up to the author to decide but then confesses, quite puzzled, that she herself has 
already found translation solutions far better than the ones suggested by the author of a 
certain text. She concludes her reflection by saying that ―como autodidata em tradução, sinto 
falta de conhecimentos teóricos (...) e tenho dificuldades que suponho serem menores para 
quem passou anos (...) estudando para o exercício dessa função‖, or as a self-taught 
translator, I wish I had more theoretical knowledge, and I probably have more difficulties 
than those who spent years studying to become a translator (idem, 149-150).   
Indeed, Pereira‘s example of the two different translations of the same text and the 
unproven authority of the author illustrates the comments of the other interviewees who 
defend the awareness-raising character of translation theory. Had Vera Pereira studied 
translation theory, perhaps she would not have to go through ―hours agonising over 
existential dilemmas‖, and she would certainly have better insights as for her ―role in 
translation as well as in society‖ (see the previous paragraphs). However, this does not 
necessarily mean that she is a worse translator because of this lack of theoretical knowledge. I 
will come back to this question (of whether ―truly‖ professional translators must have some 
sort of education in the area) at the end of the next chapter
18
.   
Another work that offers an interesting dialogue between ―practicing translators‖ and 
―academia‖ is Chesterman‘s and Wagner‘s book Can Theory Help Translators? 
(CHESTERMAN and WAGNER 2002), raising similar questions to the ones discussed in 
Conversas com Tradutores. At the very beginning of the book, Wagner, representing 
practicing translators as an EU translation manager, states that 
                                                             
18 Pereira‘s example will come up again in Part IV, Chapter 1 below, where I will close this discussion about 
what makes a translator professional.    
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Most of us had a brief brush with theory in our student days, when we absorbed whatever 
was needed to get us through our exams… and then proceeded to forget it, as we got to 
grips with the realities of learning how to do the job. There can be few professions with 
such a yawning gap between theory and practice (idem, 1).     
She goes on to ask ―Can it [translation theory] help us to become better translators and give 
us a feeling of self-esteem?‖ (idem), to which Chesterman replies that ―translation theory 
SHOULD have this aim‖ (idem – his emphasis). Wagner‘s urge is clearly similar to the 
wishes of the translators just mentioned above, particularly the ones who do not belong to 
academia – but not solely. It is hard to tell whether she and her colleagues really have 
―forgotten‖ what they learnt about translation theory, or whether they have simply 
assimilated it and stopped consciously thinking about it – based on the book, I would say the 
latter.  
In any case, Chesterman‘s response also seems to leave a few questions unanswered – 
―does he believe in practice-oriented theory only?‖ is probably the most important one. 
Judging by his apparent despise of postmodern thought, I believe so: ―I will bypass here the 
deconstructionist argument that there is no objective (…) in the first place‖ (CHESTERMAN 
and WAGNER 2002, 9-10), ―Some postmodern/deconstructivist thinkers (…) stress that (…) 
the author is dead (…). Outside texts: nothing. Further: meanings are not fixed but endlessly 
shifting and deferred, all is indeterminate, everyone interprets a text in their own way (…)‖ 
(idem, 24)
19
.  
 All in all, in Wagner and Chesterman‘s debate it seems quite clear that Wagner does 
not really see a point in translation theory as ―it is‖, and wishes it would at last directly and 
objectively solve her everyday hitches as an EU translator. One could speak of Fish‘s theory 
hope here: ―the hope that our claims to knowledge can be justified on the basis of some 
objective method of assessing such claims rather than on the basis of the individual beliefs 
that have been derived from the accidents of education and experience‖ (FISH [1989] 1999, 
322). In other words, the hope that a theory will one day emerge and establish ―a range of 
standard solutions‖ to all sorts of translation problems everywhere in the world 
(CHESTERMAN and WAGNER 2002, 6) – a view very much in line with what we have 
seen about a few scholars and several practitioners interviewed in Conversas com Tradutores. 
As for Chesterman, though he does not appear to suffer from ―theory hope‖, he makes his 
                                                             
19 I will come back to Chesterman‘s criticism to postmodern tendencies in Part IV, Chapter 4 below.  
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reservations clear as far as postmodern or openly prescriptive approaches are concerned. His 
notion of translation theory seems to be a ―perspective from which to contemplate something, 
so as to understand‖ (idem, 2), but at the same time something that can be directly applied to 
translation practice (idem, especially 131-136).      
By looking at all these opinions on translation theory and practice by people with 
completely different backgrounds and occupations, it seems once again evident that what 
they call ―theory‖ varies greatly from person to person, and so does their notion of ―practice‖. 
For those who stress its awareness-raising nature, theory seems to be a practice justifiable in 
itself. It is not supposed to provide correct answers, applicable to all contexts, all cultures and 
all publishing markets; it is not supposed to directly help one to persuade editors or 
mathematically determine which translation of a particular text is the correct one.  
Nevertheless, for those who stress the immediate bonds between theory and practice, 
theory is supposed to fulfil all the demands made by practice, regardless of how manifold or 
specific this practice may be. Theories must consist of manuals, prescriptive or descriptive 
models applicable to any situation anywhere, as products of large and institutionalised 
translation schools. Perhaps this is due to the fact that a number of so-called translation 
theories in fact attempt to be translation manuals or models – a simple Google search shows 
over 35.000 results for the expression ―translation model‖. Indeed, I can still recall my 
enthusiasm when I first started reading Christiane Nord‘s model of text analysis in translation 
(NORD [1988] 2005). In the Introduction she explains that 
Translation-oriented text analysis should not only ensure full comprehension and 
correct interpretation of the text or explain its linguistic and textual structures and their 
relationship with the system and norms of the source language (SL). It should also 
provide a reliable foundation for each and every decision which the translator has to 
make in a particular translation process (NORD [1988] 2005, 1 – my emphasis).   
Words such as ―full comprehension‖, ―correct interpretation‖, ―reliable foundation for each 
and every decision‖, and all this for every possible text type, culture and translation context 
(idem, 2-3), certainly sound promising. In addition to that, they seem to justify why 
translators expect so much of translation theory, as well as why they can only understand the 
relevance of a certain theory when it is directly applicable to translation practice. For them, 
there should always be a happy marriage between theory and practice. Perhaps it is also 
because of words like Nord‘s that some of the translators mentioned above feel frustrated and 
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suspicious of translation theories, or claim that there have hardly been any Brazilian 
contributions to the field of translation theory – precisely because there are indeed hardly any 
Brazilian translation models in these terms. While it is true that it is not the scope of the 
present thesis to analyse to what extent Nord‘s model fulfils these requirements she sets (for 
more on this, see LEAL 2006 and 2007a), it is also true that even the most essentialist reader 
will find the expressions ―full comprehension‖ and ―correct interpretation‖ extremely 
ambitious, to say the least.  
I hope to shed light on these different perceptions of theory and practice in the 
following chapters, firstly by looking, in Chapter 4 below, at the question of standpoints and 
how they appear to influence one‘s outlook as regards translation theory and translation 
practice. So far, according to the perspective I propose in this thesis, there seems to be a 
predominance of two notions of translation theory, mentioned above various times, and 
whose boundaries often overlap. The first notion presupposes the marriage of theory and 
practice, whereby the former attempts to describe, regulate and govern over the latter. Should 
these attempts fail, then the divorce of theory and practice ensues. This first notion seems to 
be more closely related (but not exclusively) to an idea of translation models, as well as of 
large and institutionalised translation schools. Furthermore, this first outlook on translation 
theory seems to yield a notion of practice that, in turn, is stable and homogeneous enough to 
be fully controlled by theory. Another point of view that seems to be fairly in line with this 
first notion of translation theory is that of professionalising translator and interpreter training, 
within which this type of theory plays a crucial role – as it is through theory and its schemas 
and precepts that pupils will be properly trained to face the marketplace.  
The second notion of theory that seems to be entertained by some of the voices quoted 
here is not practice-oriented, but rather awareness-raising. In fact, the idea of translating as a 
practice plays a smaller role in the big picture since the practice this second perspective 
appears to entail is, indeed, theoretical. For some of those who share this outlook, translating 
is too manifold and heterogeneous to be fully systematised by schemas and rules. For others, 
the focus should lie on critical thinking, on understanding one‘s role in history and society 
rather than on translating. More often than not, this notion of theory is associated with an idea 
of higher education that is not strictly professionalising, and that favours in its structures and 
departments first and foremost the establishment of critical pupils.  
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It is my own eyes as a translation student that reveal, or rather build, these two notions 
of translation theory and practice. Perhaps for a self-taught practitioner these two views I 
propose here are amalgamated into one, whereby some theories may strike him/her as more 
practice-oriented and hence potentially ―useful‖, whereas others may strike him/her as more 
―philosophical‖ and probably ―less useful‖. If one claims that translation theory is pointless 
(as we have seen a few examples above), one may have the first or the second notion of 
theory in mind. In other words, one may have had contact with a model-like, outwardly 
practice-oriented theory that, in one‘s view, did not fulfil all the demands made by one‘s 
practice. Similarly, one may have felt interested in a theoretical reflection with no practical 
aims, but later felt disappointed that this reflection did not directly contribute to one‘s work. 
All in all, these two notions I discuss here are highly specific perspectives that could 
be implied by the words ―theory‖ and ―practice‖ every time they appear, and in this sense I 
warn the reader once again to be careful and take this constant ambiguity into account. In the 
next chapter I will explore this ambiguity as the symptoms of different standpoints, which in 
turn are marked not only by one‘s occupation, but also by one‘s culture.   
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4. To Each his Own Standpoint 
_____________________________________________________ 
Wenn ich mit meiner Relativitätstheorie recht behalte, 
werden die Deutschen sagen, ich sei Deutscher, und 
die Franzosen, ich sei Weltbürger. Erweist sich meine 
Theorie als falsch, werden die Franzosen sagen, ich sei 
Deutscher und die Deutschen, ich sei Jude. 
  Albert Einstein 
Let us begin the present chapter by looking at an allegory often used by Paulo Henriques 
Britto (see long quotation on page 46 above and Part III below) to defend a practice-oriented 
notion of translation theory. A few young people got lost in a forest. It is getting dark and 
they do not know how to get home, nor can they contact anyone to come and rescue them. 
They have no compass but know they must go towards the south. So one of them suggests 
climbing up a tree to see where the sun is setting. If one knows the sun sets in the west, one 
can easily find north and south. Suddenly, however, another member of the group calls the 
group‘s attention to the fact that north, west... those are all human inventions, illusions, a 
mental fabrication. At this point Britto usually asks something along the following lines: ―But 
if one wants to get home, what does it matter if north and south are illusions? Which method 
is more efficient then, climbing up the tree or philosophising about cardinal points?‖20  
 Indeed, Britto‘s question is very pertinent and goes straight to the heart of this chapter. 
If one must get home, reflecting on cardinal points is obviously not the best strategy – it is 
certainly not a strategy at all. Nevertheless, thinking that the cardinal points are absolute 
truths above and prior to mankind is not exactly ingenious either. From the point of view of 
getting home, acknowledging the fact that the cardinal points were invented by human beings 
and do not exist as such makes no difference at all. However, from the point of view of one‘s 
awareness of the world around one, as well as of all the implications of one‘s beliefs, this 
reflection is indispensable. In any case, asking someone who wants to get home to argue 
about this with someone who wants to heighten his/her awareness of the world is 
undoubtedly a bad idea, as these two people will speak from utterly different standpoints.  
                                                             
20 Britto‘s allegory reminded me of Richard Dawkins‘ words: ―Show me a relativist at 30,000 feet and I will 
show you a hypocrite‖ (apud FRANKLIN 1996, 143). In her paper, Franklin uses Dawkins‘ quotation to 
illustrate and criticise what she calls ―the power of science‖ and of ―scientific objectivity‖, and how it manifests 
itself through its claim to ―instrumentalism, its practice, its efficacy‖ (idem).  
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 So far I have argued that the great divorce of translation theory and practice, 
mentioned time again by translation scholars, students and practitioners, may have some of 
its roots in the fact that what one usually means by theory and practice varies greatly. This 
variation may occur for a number of different reasons, depending on the person and on the 
situation. As far as translation studies is concerned, nevertheless, there is one issue that seems 
particularly crucial, and it can be summarised as follows: Where do all these different people 
speak from? What is their standpoint as far as their relationship with translation is concerned? 
Indeed, Britto‘s allegory provides a good illustration to this point.  
 If we look back at the previous chapters and remember discussions carried out in the 
books Conversas com Tradutores (BENEDETTI and SOBRAL [2003] 2007) and Can 
Theory Help Translators? (CHESTERMAN and WAGNER 2002), mainly, we will 
remember that those voices emerge from utterly diverse places, hence circumscribing utterly 
diverse standpoints. Let us take Chesterman and Wagner, for instance. It is only natural that 
they should have different opinions as far as translation theory is concerned: Wagner is an 
EU translation manager and therefore is mostly concerned about nitty-gritty aspects of the 
profession, whereas Chesterman is a scholar, a university professor interested in translation as 
a discipline. However enlightening and thought-provoking their debate may be, one can 
hardly expect them to reconcile their differences – and there is no reason why one should.  
 A similar dynamics appears to take place in Conversas com Tradutores. No wonder 
most interviewees engaged in academia saw translation theory with better eyes, whereas 
those strictly involved with translation/interpreting sounded sceptical or indifferent. When 
one‘s bread and butter is to translate/interpret, one‘s concern will probably be practice-
oriented. Nevertheless, when one‘s job is to reflect about translation/interpreting, to teach it, 
to establish it as a discipline and exercise it in academic settings, theory and theorising 
acquire a whole new dimension.  
 Moreover, all the ―academic‖ interviewees who seemed to have a somewhat negative 
outlook on translation theory and/or imposed a number of obstacles to it (mainly Britto and 
Wyler) are also practitioners, both renowned translators (see Chapter 3 above). No wonder 
they emphasised the irrevocable bonds between translation theory and translation practice, 
and showed great concern for the direct applicability of translation theory to practice. Earlier 
we read that ―the professional translator has not had much interest in theories and the 
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translation major has had great difficulty finding receptivity in the market for what s/he has 
learnt‖, by Wyler (BENEDETTI and SOBRAL [2003] 2007, 196); and ―the relationships 
between theory and practice within the field of literary translation are not exactly ideal‖, by 
Britto, (idem, 92) – see above.   
Likewise, regarding the debate as to whether higher education should be 
professionalising or not (see Chapter 2 above), there seems to be a very general tendency for 
those who speak from inside the university to play the role of Derrida‘s ―faithful guardian‖. 
In other words, however much one may be willing to open the university gates to external 
interests, one is certainly not willing to open them completely – particularly as far as the 
Humanities are concerned. On the other hand, those who speak from outside the university – 
in this case mainly businesses – would probably like to rely on the university to provide 
professionalising training to their future employees (as already argued above), so as to 
exempt them from this extra ―investment‖. Of course these two ―categories‖ are far from 
antagonistic and self-excluding, and we know that numerous examples of intersections 
between the two do exist. Indeed, there are a number of departments within the Humanities 
that are now tailoring the curricula of their courses so as to better fulfil market demands – as 
we have seen through the examples of POSI and the Universidade Federal do Paraná. By the 
same token, surely there are businesses that are interested in taking on people with a broader 
humanistic education rather than with technical training. In any case, the general trend of 
each defending their own standpoint seems to prevail. 
Most of the voices we listened to in Chapter 2 – including mine – are the voices of 
―faithful guardians‖ (see above), i.e. scholars, professors and thinkers dedicated to the 
Humanities. In this sense, it is quite predictable that most of them will defend the 
―autonomy‖ of the university and will try to protect it ―against‖ restricted and exclusive 
―ends‖. Had we listened to different voices stemming from different standpoints (such as that 
of the businessman or the pupil
21
), we would most likely have had access to different points 
of view on the same issue. Taking POSI (see Chapter 2) again as an emblematic example of 
the dynamics between disparate standpoints, one can hardly expect academia and businesses 
to find that many common denominators precisely because their motivations, their interests 
                                                             
21 In fact, the voices of a few pupils – mostly my BA and MA peers and my students at the Universität Wien –
were heard in Chapter 1 and revealed an opposite point of view.  
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and expectations – in other words, their standpoints – are utterly diverse, so any attempt to 
reconcile them completely can only be accompanied by a simultaneous movement of 
criticism of this attempt.  
Another element that contributes to the diversity of the question of standpoints is the 
fact that they take different shapes in different cultures. All of us who have lived in a foreign 
country know that issues such as experience and education are valued completely differently 
depending on the culture. Following some of my friends‘ odyssey looking for jobs in Austria, 
for example, it is quite evident that professional experience is valued over education here, and 
this tendency certainly has a great impact on people‘s mindsets. Take the Universität Wien, 
for example. When I was hired initially to teach a couple of BA courses within the 
Department of Portuguese, at my job interview no questions were asked as regards my 
education, research, participation in conferences or publications in specialised journals. Their 
interest lay strictly in my experience as a teacher – what languages I had taught, in which 
context I had taught, how I went about preparing the syllabi of my courses, whether I 
prepared and marked exams, and so on. A possible consequence of this mindset is the fact 
that the majority of the teaching staff at the university receives the same salary – regardless of 
whether they are masters or doctors. And if this is the situation at the university, one can 
imagine what it is like in the private sector. In contrast, in Brazil even primary school 
teachers get a raise once they have obtained an academic title, and the private sector 
accordingly tends to value education. Unlike in Austria, only very rarely are people without a 
doctorate hired to teach at public universities in Brazil, and the entire application process is 
focused on the candidate‘s research and publications – the candidate‘s experience plays a 
secondary role.  
With these examples I do not mean to say that the situation in Brazil is better than it is 
in Austria, but rather to call the readers‘ attention to difference, to the fact that these questions 
are culture-specific. Let us explore these examples further: an average academic in Austria 
cannot be said to hold the same standpoint as an average academic in Brazil as far as, for 
example, the conflict theory-practice is concerned. Indeed, the way each culture tends to 
perceive each of these notions is simply different. As I have mentioned in Chapter 1 above, 
the curricula of the BA and MA courses of the Centre for Translation Studies at the 
Universität Wien have been adapted so as to accommodate more theoretical reflection. 
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However, as someone who had spent her entire academic life in Brazil – a country which, 
especially as far as universities are concerned, tends to value education over experience – 
these curricula strike me as predominantly practice-oriented. And this point bears repeating: 
the perspectives I propose here are specific and restricted, and they acquire their own 
contours as we move to different cultures and settings.   
The question of standpoints is influenced by yet another factor, a factor that has 
become increasingly common in Brazil, namely the intersection of occupations. Particularly 
in translation studies, the number of professionals engaged both in academia and translation 
is striking. The trend is particularly strong in literary translation and translation of nonfiction 
– nearly half of all translated volumes recently published by Companhia das Letras, probably 
the largest and most prestigious Brazilian publisher, were translated by members of 
academia
22
. Furthermore, in addition to being professors (and hence scholars and researchers) 
and translators, a few are also poets and novelists, Paulo Henriques Britto (see Part III below) 
probably being one of the most renowned examples.   
In this light, it is interesting to observe how the dynamics amongst these multiple 
standpoints work within the same person. As already mentioned above, amongst all 
―academic‖ interviewees from the book Conversas com Tradutores (BENEDETTI and 
SOBRAL [2003] 2007), the only two to overtly stress the importance of the applicability of 
translation theory to translation practice were two well-established translators (Britto and 
Wyler – see Chapter 3 above). In this sense, the idea that the standpoint of the practitioner 
may occasionally exert a stronger influence on them than that of the academic is indeed 
clarifying.    
Let us also consider the involvement of academics in administrative or political 
affairs, which gives rise to new sets of implications. Being engaged in political or 
institutional struggles – be they in terms of obtaining funds, establishing a new department, 
getting a new curriculum through, amongst various other possibilities – certainly sets new 
motivations and interests into motion. Witness, for example, the will to turn translation 
                                                             
22
 This piece of information is available on the publisher‘s website, under ―Lançamentos‖ (new books) – 
http://www.companhiadasletras.com.br/. The remarks I make here are based on the list published there in 
November 2010.   
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studies into an independent discipline, along with the will to grant the work of the interpreter 
and translator the status of a profession in the full sense of the term – both particularly strong 
in Europe during the 1980s, but still very much present. These movements towards 
―independence‖ and ―professionalisation‖ seem to have brought about a notion of translator 
and interpreter training that is strictly applied, largely market-oriented. After all, if translation 
were to become a profession, it had to be taught and perceived as such, which in turn seems 
to have led to a process of professionalisation of university courses. The complete breakup 
with the linguistics and literature departments of the university – which is the case not only of 
the Universität Wien, but also of several European universities that offer translation and 
interpreting courses – has also contributed to this tendency towards professionalisation. This 
is because the vast majority of the time and space that used to be dedicated to those 
disciplines within translation courses has been substituted by subjects deemed more useful for 
the pupils‘ future careers – such as the use of media, terminology, translation technology, 
project management, diversity management, amongst many others
23
.   
In this sense, the process towards the acknowledgement and professionalisation of the 
work of the translator/interpreter (advertently or inadvertently) led to a change of focus as 
regards translator/interpreter training, making it more market-oriented, more practice-oriented 
– even after efforts such as the one recently made at the Universität Wien to make their 
curricula more theoretical, against the advice of POSI, for example (see Chapters 1 and 2 
above)
24
. Political agendas such as this one also have a strong impact on the dynamics of 
standpoints, as this example clearly illustrates. I am sure that many of the scholars behind 
these great European movements to grant independence and autonomy to translation studies – 
Snell-Hornby being an example of it – were not primarily motivated by aspirations such as 
POSI‘s, for instance; on the contrary. However, the interests and motivations behind this 
political agenda – translated mostly through the wish to elevate the status both of the 
discipline and of the profession – brought about changes in translator/interpreter training as 
                                                             
23 These subjects are all taught within the BA in Transcultural Communication of the Universität Wien – its full 
curriculum is available through the following link: http://transvienna.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/ 
user_upload/fak_translationswissenschaft/Studienprogrammleitung/Curr_2007_Aenderung_BA_Transkulturelle
_Kommunikation.pdf (last accessed in December 2010).   
24 For more on this, please refer to Part II, Section 2.4 below. In Rosemary Arrojo‘s view (mostly in 1998a), this 
wish to establish an independent discipline for translation studies goes hand in hand with the belief in objective 
science and universally applicable theories, with science as a means to increase efficiency and with theory as a 
resource to systematise knowledge and make it more practice-oriented.   
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far as the tension theory-practice is concerned. New departments were founded and new 
curricula were passed so as to raise the status of the profession, and the question of ―ends‖ 
(see Chapter 2 above) was somewhat overshadowed by this initial objective, remaining in the 
background. Different countries and different institutions dealt (and are currently dealing) 
with this question of theory-practice in translator/interpreter training in different manners, 
and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse these individual trends
25
.  
In any case, the example of the will to elevate the status of translation both as a 
discipline and as a profession illustrates how political agendas exert a strong influence on 
one‘s standpoint, and in this case specifically, this influence changes the dynamics of the 
conflict theory-practice as well. I wonder what will happen in Brazil in the next few years, 
with increasingly more translation departments being planned to be founded quite 
independently from the linguistics and literature departments – though the vast majority of 
those involved in these changes were trained in literature and linguistics, as was once the case 
in Europe. Will the desire to establish an independent discipline and to grant professional 
status to the translator/interpreter gradually make translation courses more market-oriented? I 
will come back to this question in Part IV, Chapter 3 below. 
All in all, I hope this chapter has called the readers‘ attention to the fact that one‘s 
standpoint exerts a great influence on how one perceives translation theory and practice. 
Additionally, I have argued that, within translation studies, these standpoints are marked by 
numerous factors, the most conspicuous of which being ―occupation‖ – whether one is a 
scholar, a practitioner, a student, and so on and so forth, considering that in some cases 
multiple simultaneous occupations apply. However, one can hardly say that those who share 
the same occupation will invariably share the same point of view as regards translation theory 
and translation practice – as we have seen through various examples in the previous chapters. 
For this reason, we have looked into two different factors that add more dimensions to the 
question of standpoints, namely culture, which is a highly specific and changeable factor to 
be taken into account, and political or institutional interests and motivations, which may lead 
                                                             
25 An important issue here that will be addressed in Part IV, Chapter 4 below, is that of a unified methodology 
for translation studies across the globe. Scholars such as José Lambert (see especially LAMBERT 2007) argue 
for the adoption of a universal translation methodology, regardless of the cultures and languages involved. His 
universalistic ―model‖ has become increasingly influential in Brazil, particularly because of his recent work at 
the Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina as a guest professor.    
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to changes in standpoint. Surely they are additional elements that exert influence on one‘s 
standpoint; nonetheless, in light of the examples presented in this thesis, together with its 
objectives, scope and underlying motivations, the elements explored in this chapter seem 
more conspicuous.     
Yet another factor seems to play a fundamental role in one‘s perception and 
expectations about translation theory and translation practice – a factor not accounted for in 
the present chapter. This factor refers to whether one‘s perspectives are marked by a 
predominantly essentialist way of thinking or a predominantly anti-essentialist way of 
thinking. Indeed, in Chapter 5 below I will look into Arrojo‘s argument of the essentialist 
versus the anti-essentialist, which will then be further developed in Chapter 6.  
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5. (Anti-)Essentialist Theory, (Anti-)Essentialist Practice? 
_____________________________________________________ 
Since language, which Saussure says is a classification, 
has not fallen from the sky, its differences have been 
produced, are produced effects, but they are effects 
which do not find their cause in a subject or a 
substance, in a thing in general, a being that is 
somewhere present thereby eluding the play of 
différance.  
Jacques Derrida (translated by Alan Bass) 
In Rosemary Arrojo‘s view, what seems to be the distinctive feature of translation theories in 
general is whether they subscribe to a more essentialist or a more anti-essentialist line of 
thought, be it overtly or not. In her paper entitled ‗The Revision of the Traditional Gap 
between Theory and Practice and the Empowerment of Translation in Postmodern Times‘ 
(1998b), Arrojo offers great insight on this issue. For her, the ever growing visibility of 
translation studies in recent times has much to do with the ―opening of new undergraduate 
and graduate programmes in universities worldwide‖ (idem, 25), but it is also ―closely related 
to the dissemination of a reflection generally labelled as postmodern, (...) anti-essentialist‖ 
(idem). Furthermore, she claims that this polarity between essentialist and anti-essentialist 
approaches has little to do with ―the division between cultural studies and linguistic inspired 
theories of translation‖ (idem, 26). I will develop these initial ideas in the following 
paragraphs. 
 What Arrojo very aptly describes in this paper is how ―modern, essentialist 
approaches‖ (idem, 27), such as Nida‘s, Catford‘s, Mounin‘s and Wilss‘, rely on what 
Stanley Fish calls ―theory hope‖ (see Chapter 3 above), i.e. ―‗the promise that theory seems 
to offer‘ as a ‗means of salvation‘ against relativism, chaos‖ (idem, 29 – quoting Fish – see 
FISH [1989] 1999). This ―means of salvation‖ is strongly bound to a notion of translation 
practice as a ―form of symmetrical, ideally neutral exchange or interaction between cultures‖ 
(ARROJO 1998b, 29), hence the firm belief of these so-called essentialist theorists in an  
exemplary model or method that could show translators how to find adequate 
equivalents, (...) universally acceptable ethical terms (...), [a model or method that could] 
frame the relationships to be established between original and translation, no matter 
which languages, cultures and interests are involved (...). It is something a practitioner 
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should ideally consult when he ‗wishes to perform correctly‘‖ (idem, 28, 30 – quoting 
FISH [1989] 1999).       
Indeed, this perspective appears to be very much in line with one of the concepts of 
translation theory to which some of the voices quoted in the present thesis seem to refer – 
particularly in Chapter 3 above. I have summarised this perspective of theory as a set of 
precepts that describes and governs over practice, making up a general and universally 
acceptable model. For this notion of theory, practice is stable, homogenous and hence fully 
susceptible to the theory that regulates it.  
 In her paper, Arrojo shows how the attempts in this direction made by theorists like 
Peter Newmark, Wolfram Wilss and Joseph Graham ended up being perceived as impossible 
by their mentors themselves. Newmark begins his 1981 Approaches to Translation by saying 
that his aim is to ―determine appropriate translation methods for the widest possible range of 
texts and text-categories‖, as well as to provide a ―framework of principles, restricted rules 
and hints for translating texts and criticizing translations‖ (NEWMARK [1981] 1986, 19). 
Remarkably similarly, Wills, in his 1982 The Science of Translation Ŕ Problems and 
Methods, set out to write a ―modern translation theory‖ whose main objective was to 
―determine the relationships between the individual constants of the translation process as 
explicitly as possible (...) and regardless of the languages involved‖ (apud ARROJO 1998b, 
28-29).  
 Still at the beginning of the 1980s, Graham opened his article ‗Theory for Translation‘ 
by announcing the development of a ―rigorous theory for translation‖ including ―something 
like a practical evaluation procedure with criteria necessarily specific, though general 
nevertheless‖; a theory ―leaving no implication, no supposition, and thus demanding no 
interpretation at all‖; a theory, in other words, ―absolutely scientific‖ (apud ARROJO 1998b, 
29-30). Therefore, his aims and expectations did not differ much from those of the authors 
examined in the previous paragraph. By the end of his attempt to write one such theory, 
however, he comes to the conclusion that the task is impossible because it is impossible to 
find ―grammatical equivalents across languages‖. He then concludes the paper by asking 
himself ―whether indeed translation really is a subject for theory after all‖ (apud ARROJO 
1998b, 30). I will come back to his question towards the end of the present chapter.  
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 In the aforementioned paper, Arrojo also examines Mounin‘s 1963 Les Problèmes 
Théoriques de la Traduction, and many of his ambitions and frustrations reveal themselves to 
be extraordinarily similar to his ―essentialist‖ successors. Right at the beginning of his book, 
Mounin states that translating would be impossible if one took into account the latest 
developments in linguistics. He then concedes not only that translating seems possible, but 
also that translators and translations do exist and appear to work well, which leads him to the 
well-known conclusion that ―lřexistence de la traduction constitue le scandale de la 
linguistique contemporaine‖ (MOUNIN [1963] 1998, 8). From his point of view, this 
―scandal‖ leaves one with two possibilities: either translation is theoretically condemned 
because of linguistics or linguistics is questioned in the name of translation: 
(...) ou condamner la possibilité théorique de lřactivité traduisante au nom de la 
linguistique (et rejeter ainsi lřactivité traduisante dans la zone des opérations 
approximatives, non scientifiques, en fait de langage) ; ou mettre en cause la validité des 
théories linguistiques au nom de lřactivité traduisante (idem, 8-9).   
 Nevertheless, he chooses neither the former nor the latter and sets out to describe translation 
as a linguistic ―problem‖. At the end of his work, though, he concludes that despite his efforts 
translation is a process that resists systematisation after all (idem, 271). Indeed, as Arrojo 
pointed out in the paper in question, already in the second chapter of the book, Mounin, 
commenting on Bloomfield‘s ―radical‖ conclusion on this matter (idem, 27), had already 
provided great insight as to whether his task would be feasible or not. In Mounin‘s words,  
(…) Bloomfield élimine, en premier lieu, tout recours aux mots pensée, conscience, 
concept, image, impression, sentiment comme autant de notions non encore vérifiées 
scientifiquement. Pour avoir le droit dřutiliser ces mots dans une sémantique scientifique 
(une science des significations) nous devions avoir une psychologie scientifique, cřest-à-
dire, une explication totale des processus dans le cerveau du locuteur et le siège (idem – 
his emphasis).  
Yet, although he admits that in these terms translation is scientifically impossible, his ―theory 
hope‖ (see above)26 persists as he believes that these theoretical problems will be resolved in 
the future, by fully scientific, universal theories. So does Bloomfield, as he regrets the fact 
that ―nous en sommes encore très loin‖ (apud MOUNIN [1963] 1998, 27 – my emphasis) 
from this ―sémantique scientifique‖. This pointing to the future is, according to Arrojo, a 
typical trait of essentialist theorists who, even when faced with the impossibility of the tasks 
                                                             
26 Fish‘s notion of ―theory hope‖ permeates this entire thesis. I will continue mentioning it between quotation 
marks but will stop writing ―see above‖.    
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they assign themselves, still believe some day someone will be able to carry them out 
successfully. Indeed, scientism is an emblematic characteristic of essentialism – and vice-
versa.   
 Arrojo then looks into more contemporary approaches which, from her point of view, 
are still ―essentialist‖ and have the same ―old dilemmas and expectations‖ (ARROJO 1998b, 
34). She takes Mona Baker, for example, in her 1996 paper ‗Linguistics and Cultural Studies 
– Complementary or Competing Paradigms in Translation Studies?‘, and analyses how the 
Egyptian author announces her affiliation to an anti-essentialist perspective, but still derives 
her dilemmas and expectations from essentialism, very much in line with the authors quoted 
in the previous paragraphs. Although Baker admits that meaning is social and conventional, 
produced by history and ideology and therefore not intrinsic to texts, she very contradictorily 
criticises heterogeneity and multiplicity in translation studies. For Baker, this multiplicity and 
heterogeneity prevent the field of translation studies from establishing a truly scientific, 
united and universally accepted methodology (see footnote 25 above). Baker is particularly 
concerned about cultural studies and the fact that it has ―never had a distinct methodology of 
its own‖ since it tends to ―reject absolute values‖, thus ―encourag[ing] an amateurish, 
incoherent and less rigorous approach to its object of study‖ (apud ARROJO 1998, 35). Here 
once again Fish‘s ―theory hope‖ seems pertinent.    
 Arrojo, in contrast, relying on Derrida‘s ideas developed mainly in his essay 
‗Différance‘, perceives this heterogeneity and multiplicity as only human: 
If meaning and values are socially determined, and if different societies and cultures 
have different concerns, different groups within such societies and cultures will always 
be inclined towards heterogeneity rather than consensus. In such a strictly human (or 
Babelic) scenario, where ―language has not fallen from the sky‖ and, therefore, where 
there is no room for the absolute or the transcendental, ―fragmentation‖ is not merely an 
unfortunate accident to be avoided at all costs (...), it is simply the very condition of its 
own possibility (idem – quoting Derrida [1972] 1982)27. 
                                                             
27 I suppose this is more or less the passage in Derrida‘s essay ‗Différance‘ to which Arrojo is referring (refer to 
the epigraph that opens this chapter): ―In a language, in the system of language, there are only differences. (…) 
But (…) these differences play: in language, in speech too, and in the exchange between language and speech. 
On the other hand, these differences are themselves effects. They have not fallen from the sky fully formed, and 
are no more inscribed in a topos noetos, than are prescribed in the grey matter of the brain. (…) Since language, 
which Saussure says is a classification, has not fallen from the sky, its differences have been produced, are 
produced effects, but they are effects which do not find their cause in a subject or a substance, in a thing in 
general, a being that is somewhere present thereby eluding the play of difference‖. (DERRIDA [1972] 1982, 11-
12 – translated by Alan Bass – his emphasis).       
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In other words, she perceives fragmentation as the result of our differences – in terms of 
values, cultures and societies. In this sense, ―the absolute and the transcendental‖ would not 
only be unfeasible, but also undesirable. I will come back to the question of heterogeneity in 
translation studies later in the chapter, as well as in Part IV below. 
 As for the role of theory in translator training, Baker asserts in her 1992 In Other 
Words Ŕ A Coursebook on Translation that ―if translation is to become a profession in the full 
sense of the word, translators will need something other than the current mixture of intuition 
and practice to enable them to reflect on what they do and how they do it‖ (BAKER 1992, 
4)
28
. Indeed, this takes us back to the question I asked above, i.e. to what extent can someone 
be a professional (in whatever area) when s/he has no specific training in this area? It seems 
that Baker‘s reply is reasonable enough, and she makes an interesting analogy between 
translation and medicine, saying that without theory ―we will never be seen as anything but 
witch doctors and faith healers‖ (idem). When she expands on the possible scope of a 
translation theory, she quite suitably maintains that 
Almost every aspect of life in general and of the interaction between speech communities 
in particular can be considered relevant to translation, a discipline which has to concern 
itself with how meaning is generated within and between various groups of people in 
various cultural settings (idem). 
And here she asserts that linguistics is the discipline translators must learn so as to ―acquire a 
sound knowledge of the raw material with which they work‖ (idem).  As Arrojo points out, 
this is where the problem lies. In Baker‘s context, theory and science are ―of course only 
related to essentialist, logocentric, Eurocentric and Western conceptions of science which by 
no means take into account the desire, the history or the circumstances of the scientist‖ 
(ARROJO 1998b, 36). Furthermore, in Baker‘s reflection ―theory is unquestionably only 
essentialist theory, just as translation is only that which such theory is equipped to establish 
or deal with‖ (idem, 37). In this context, Arrojo quite rightly emphasises that if Baker‘s point 
is that translators must learn linguistics in order to be truly professional, then ―we are not at 
all far from Mounin‖ (idem). Another interesting aspect of Baker‘s argumentation is the fact 
that she maintains that this ―theoretical knowledge is itself of no value unless it is firmly 
                                                             
28 I will comment on this allegory in Chapter 1, Part IV below.   
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grounded in practical experience‖ (BAKER 1992, 2). Therefore, her notions of translation 
theory and practice seem to be in line with those of her predecessors analysed above
29
.  
 Taking an instance from cultural studies to show how the essentialist versus anti-
essentialist dichotomy has nothing to do with the linguistics versus cultural studies 
dichotomy, Arrojo looks into Lefevere 1992 Translating Literature: Practice and Theory in a 
Comparative Literature Context. She comes to the conclusion that even though he proposed a 
revolutionary theoretical framework, advocating concepts like ―rewriting‖, ―manipulation‖ 
and ―patronage‖ (which sound anti-essentialist), his concepts of meaning and text are not at 
all different from the ones used in essentialist, linguistic approaches. As an example, the 
Brazilian author mentions Lefevere‘s ―traditional separation between the semantic 
(locutionary) and the pragmatic (illocutionary) levels entertained by linguistics‖ (ARROJO 
1998b, 27). I will come back to cultural studies and Lefevere‘s work in the following chapter. 
For now what is important is Arrojo‘s thesis that however revolut ionary approaches as 
Lefevere‘s may appear to be, they still rely greatly on essentialist, linguistic principles. This 
confirms a notion of ―theory‖ that is ultimately prescriptive, with universal aims, as well as a 
notion of ―practice‖ that must be controlled by theory, that must be as rational and watertight 
as the linguistic categories that permeate it. Lefevere‘s apparently radical and innovative 
proposals, illustrated by words as the ones quoted by Arrojo, lose their strength when he 
bases his theories on the same traditional principles – without further questioning. 
 Another interesting approach with clearly anti-essentialist aspirations but still firmly 
influenced by an essentialist perspective is Peeter Torop‘s – former head of the Department 
of Semiotics at the University of Tartu, in Estonia, after Jurij Lotman. In 1995 Torop 
published his Total´nyj perevod, which was translated into Italian by Bruno Osimo as 
Traduzione Totale in 2000
30
. Very much in line with Toury‘s descriptive studies (whom he 
quotes repeatedly in his book), one of Torop‘s main objectives in his book is to ―evitare 
qualsiasi approccio di carattere valutativo, attenendosi scrupolosamente ai principi 
dellřanalisi descrittiva‖ as well as ―porre al centro dellřanalisi la descrizione del processo 
traduttivo‖, as Bruno Osimo comments in his Prefazione to the book (OSIMO, 2000). 
                                                             
29 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse more recent works by Baker, for example, so as to verify 
whether Arrojo‘s argument of essentialist tendencies remains pertinent. In this sense, Arrojo‘s remarks (and 
mine) should be taken only as far as the works quoted here are concerned.  
30 This Italian translation is available online at www.logos.it. As the online page numbers are not the same as the 
pages in the actual book, when I quote from it I will mention the chapter and section only.  
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Particularly interesting is firstly his emphasis on the need for a thorough description of the 
translation process and, secondly, on the unquestionable importance of the translator‘s 
poetics. Because his aim is solely descriptive, Torop proposes a comprehensive model for 
translation criticism which, as explained by Osimo above, avoids value judgements and 
privileges descriptions of literary translation. Additionally, the translator plays a central role 
in his approach to translation description, as one of the main factors to be taken into account 
is indeed the translator – including his/her background, experience, style and poetics.  
 However, notwithstanding Torop‘s almost unprecedented and detailed 
acknowledgement (at least in so-called ―translation models‖) of the translator‘s personal 
poetics as a key factor in literary translation, he contradictorily insists on the necessarily and 
exclusively scientific nature of translation criticism, thus excluding subjectivity and ideology. 
In Osimo‘s words, another main objective of Torop‘s work is to ―accettare criteri di ricerca 
esclusivamente di tipo scientifico, e adottare un metalinguaggio comune, così che la 
traduttologia in futuro possa svilupparsi in modo produttivo‖ (OSIMO, 2000), thus pointing 
once again to Fish‘s ―theory hope‖. Furthermore, he makes use of traditional linguistic 
categories to refer to text and meaning, such as ―livello sintattico‖, ―livello semantico‖, 
―livello pragmatico‖, ―piano del contenuto‖ and ―piano dellřespressione‖ (TOROP [1995] 
2000, 1.2, 2); yet, he maintains that ―Lřapproccio linguistico (…) non può pretendere di 
avere un ruolo fondamentale nella traduttologia, poiché non abbraccia tutto il complesso dei 
problemi di traduzione‖. Another contradiction that reveals this clash between essentialist 
and anti-essentialist ideas in Torop‘s work is the fact that even though he acknowledges the 
importance of the literary translator‘s poetics, he believes in the possibility of a ―pura 
ricodifica‖ as opposed to a ―libera interpretazione‖ (idem, 2) – as if translating could be 
―pure recoding‖ of the ―pure meanings‖ present in the text. In this sense, however much I 
find Torop‘s contributions to literary translation particularly relevant and innovative31, I have 
to admit that his approach is yet another example of a theory with anti-essentialist ambitious 
which, nevertheless, still makes use of numerous essentialist concepts.     
 Torop‘s or Lefevere‘s example (and Toury‘s too, as we will see under 6 below) 
illustrate Arrojo‘s thesis that although at first sight linguistic theories of translation appear to 
rely on an essentialist perspective, whereas so-called ―cultural theories‖ seem to announce 
                                                             
31 For a thorough analysis of Torop‘s work, please refer to LEAL (2007a).  
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their anti-essentialist affiliation, a closer look will reveal that the latter still relies on 
traditional linguistics, thus unveiling a largely essentialist outlook on language and 
translation. I will expand this argument in the next chapter.                         
 In any case, this reliance on essentialist values can by no means invalidate these 
approaches, as I have argued apropos of Torop‘s example above. This is precisely what 
Arrojo claims in her 1998 paper before she turns to what she calls ―Translation and Non-
Essentialism‖ (ARROJO 1998b, 40). The Brazilian scholar maintains that her criticism of the 
approaches she calls ―essentialist‖ should not ―dismiss their overall validity‖ (idem, 39). Her 
aim, she insists, is to  
(...) point to the illusory character of their most ambitious pretensions and to the basically 
authoritarian, asymmetrical relationship they (wittingly or unwittingly) propose to 
establish between a supposedly comprehensive, rationalist theory and a practice mostly 
viewed as neutral and apolitical (idem).     
Moreover, she claims that these ―scientifically-minded‖ theories, ―in the name of rationality 
and of an allegedly universal ethics‖, simply repeat the ―age-old precept according to which 
the translator‘s work should be invisible and ideally neutral‖ (idem). Equivalence also plays a 
pivotal role in these theories marked by an essentialist perspective (as we will see in the 
following chapter), as Nida‘s allegory of the train very aptly illustrates. Certain ―content‖ 
must be safely transported without any interference, change or loss, regardless of the 
background or ideology of the one who conducts this ―transport‖, or the context in which it 
takes place. Nonetheless, this does not mean that theories such as these do not bring 
important and interesting contributions to the field of translation studies, as Arrojo points out 
quite rightly.  
 Finally, in the last section of her 1998 paper Arrojo moves on to anti-essentialist 
views on translation. For her, the main distinctive feature of the anti-essentialist perspective 
is that translation is no longer perceived as a ―problem‖ or a ―scandal‖ from which linguistics 
or translators must be saved. Similarly, nonessentialist thought does not rely on a ―theory 
hope‖, an all-embracing theory that would finally establish universal truths about translation. 
In this sense, these perspectives she calls ―nonessentialist‖ appear to be fairly in line with the 
second notion of translation theory and practice to which different voices quoted so far seem 
to refer (particularly in Chapter 3 above). I have summarised this notion of translation theory 
as not practice-oriented, but rather awareness-raising. Its aim is not to govern over practice – 
  
70 
which is perceived as manifold and heterogeneous – but rather to stimulate reflection and 
critical thinking.   
 By taking the Saussurean postulates of the arbitrary and conventional sign to an 
extreme, these perspectives that Arrojo calls ―postmodern‖ question the ―possibility of stable 
meanings that could be reproduced and recovered in their sameness‖ (idem, 41), be it through 
translation or simply through reading and interpretation. In this new light, translating is 
perceived as ―regulated transformation‖ (―transformation reglée‖ – DERRIDA 1972, 31) 
rather than ―neutral transferral‖, which in turn raises the question of the translator‘s visibility 
not as a problem to be avoided, but rather as ―the focal point of translation scholarship in 
postmodern times‖ (ARROJO 1998b, 42). In this sense, it would be impossible to ask 
whether translators ―should ideally remain invisible‖ (KATAN 2009, 140-141 – see page 14 
above), as visibility simply is a natural trait of transcultural communication.   
 Seeing translation in this new light takes us back to questions asked earlier in this first 
part of the thesis, such as ―should translation students be able to directly apply the theories 
they learnt to the translation market of their country?‖ (which I myself asked), or Graham‘s 
―[is] indeed translation really a subject for theory after all [?]‖. Here again what ―theory‖ and 
what ―practice‖ do we have in mind? Let us remember the double concept of theory and 
practice I proposed above. If ―theory‖ is prescriptive (or descriptive), model-like, with 
supposedly universally accepted, absolute truths; if ―theory‖ relies on linguistic dichotomies 
such as form and content, signifier and signified
32
 or meaning and form without questioning 
them, then ―practice‖ is perceived as stable and homogeneous. In this context, practitioners 
expect theory to answer all their questions with absolute, indisputable, scientific answers, as 
we saw above. Their practice must ideally be controlled by this ―all-embracing‖ theory – 
which does not usually happen. The lack of success in the interaction between theory and 
practice may be due to the fact that, as pointed out above, theories marked by a 
predominantly essentialist perspective never appear to be able to fulfil all the tasks their 
authors assign themselves. This makes them hope for a better future (as Mounin does), or 
complain about the heterogeneity and multiplicity of translation studies (as Baker does), or 
about the lack of practical applicability of certain theoretical views (as Britto does).  
                                                             
32 For more on the nature of the criticism I propose here, please refer to Chapter 6 below.  
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Translation students hopelessly try to apply these essentialist approaches (and the 
anti-essentialist as well, for that matter) to the translation market of their countries (as I 
myself did several times), but often feel frustrated or, as Wyler puts it, they have ―great 
difficulty finding receptivity in the market for what [they have] learnt‖ (see Chapter 3 above). 
Practitioners and self-taught translators feel these ―theories‖ do not solve their problems, and 
therefore simply discard them for being far less important than talent and technical 
knowledge, as a few translators commented above, or as Britto indicated. If translation 
theory, in Graham‘s words (see above), should ―leav[e] no implication, no supposition, and 
thus deman[d] no interpretation at all‖, then perhaps it is not a subject for theorisation after 
all, since these demands seem impossible to be fulfilled, projecting its impossibility onto 
practice as well. In summary, from a more essentialist point of view, translation practice 
would always involve loss, relegating the translator to his position of traitor; theory, in turn, 
would never be able to comprise practice in its multiplicity ―for the simple reason that, in 
order to be finally finished and absolutely accurate, it would also have to be infinite as it 
would have to reproduce everything that is, was or will ever be associated with translation, 
and, thus (...) would never be controllable or systematized‖ (ARROJO 1998b, 38).  
 On the other hand, what Arrojo calls ―anti-essentialist‖ perspectives – fairly akin to 
the second notion of translation theory discussed here – do not take meanings as stable and 
controllable, but rather as arbitrarily and conventionally produced within languages and 
cultures (or ―interpretive communities‖, to borrow Stanley Fish‘s term – see FISH 1980). 
Therefore, from this point of view interpretation – both in general and in translation – become 
particularly crucial. In this light, the status of translation practice is elevated, as translators 
are perceived as autonomous professionals who produce rather than recover meanings. 
Theory is not designed to provide ubiquitous answers directly applicable to practice, nor is it 
supposed to govern over practice. Instead, theory provides insight, raises awareness, 
stimulates reflection on the role of translation in society and sheds light on questions about 
language and culture. It is as Gillian Lane-Mercier puts it (apud ARROJO 1998b, 43): 
[a] translation theorist or practitioner cannot but position him or herself – aesthetically, 
politically, ideologically (...). Indeed, it is this very positioning, be it overt or covert, 
conscious or unconscious, avowed, unavowed or disavowed, that enables us to go 
beyond dualist conceptions of translation in order to bring to the fore the ethical stance 
which translation both entails and implies.  
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In this sense, translation would be a very fruitful subject for theorisation; a subject which not 
only raises awareness about translation practice, but also sheds light on linguistic, cultural 
and social phenomena in general. Looking for applications to precise aspects of translation 
practice is no longer a relevant question, as the notion of ―theory‖ loses its prescriptive 
nature. In other words, the act of theorising need not be done with a view to its ―utilitarian 
purpose‖ (see Chapter 2), but rather constitutes a practice in itself, a theoretical practice. 
Raising, once again, the question of what a professional translator is (and having 
Baker‘s medical analogy in mind), Baker‘s answer seems indeed quite pertinent: ―if 
translation is to become a profession in the full sense of the word, translators will need 
something other than the current mixture of intuition and practice to enable them to reflect on 
what they do and how they do it‖ (BAKER 1992, 4 – my emphasis – see above). 
Nevertheless, as Arrojo stresses in her 1998 paper, this ―something‖ does not necessarily 
have to be linguistics since, as we have seen, there is far more to it than linguistics. Arrojo 
summarises this point as follows: 
Since it emphasizes the need for translators to take full responsibility for their inevitably 
authorial intervention in the writing of the target text, this kind of anti-essentialist 
research on the ethical implications of the translator‘s visibility and on the notion of 
translation as ―regulated transformation‖ has certainly begun to offer us a much needed 
instrument not only to raise awareness among practicing translators about the conflicting 
relationships they tend to establish both with ―theory‖ or science and with their own 
work, but also to equip aspiring professionals with the critical background which will 
allow them to become fully responsible translators, well aware of their authorial voices. 
It is this awareness and the acceptance of its far-reaching consequences which will begin 
to allow translators to make the difficult transition from sensitive amateurs or talented 
craftsmen to self-conscious writers, who know about their fundamental role in the 
shaping of the cultural and social conditions of their work (ARROJO 1998b, 44). 
From this point of view, translation theory is key to translator/interpreter training, but not 
necessarily as a ubiquitous, prescriptive or descriptive model that will ultimately (even if 
―inadvertently‖, in the case of more descriptive approaches) dictate the rules of practice, but 
rather as a potent stimulus for reflection. And whereas it is true that when it comes to 
professional translation this reflection is not indispensable, it is also true that it makes more 
aware, critical translators. This is what some practitioners very aptly pointed out in Chapter 3 
above, or as Rosemary Arrojo summarises in this last quotation
33
.     
                                                             
33 I will address this question of what makes a translator/interpreter professional at length in Part IV below – 
Chapters 1 and 3.   
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 One last question that seems pertinent – and to which I shall repeatedly return in this 
thesis – is whether these two different notions of translation theory and practice actually lead 
to different practices. Some translators will perceive their practice as inevitably doomed to 
failure, always involving loss and frustration, whereas others will see it as a natural process 
of transformation whereby change, bias and ideology are exercised. The question is whether 
these different perceptions of practice lead to remarkably, overtly different translation 
practices. In other words, do supposedly revolutionary or ―radical‖ theories – as Britto puts it 
and as postmodern approaches are commonly labelled (see Chapter 3 above) – entail 
revolutionary practices as well, whatever ―radical‖34 means?  
 If one expects translation theory to describe a certain practice, it is quite obvious that 
one will also expect that different theories describe different practices. From this point of 
view, a more ―conservative‖ translation theory would perceive translating as a more 
―conservative‖ practice. By the same token, a more ―radical‖ theory would imply that the 
practice it describes is ―radical‖, too. Nevertheless, if we discard the notion of applicability, 
very much in line with the contributions of poststructuralist thought, does this belief in the 
correspondence ―radical‖ theory – ―radical‖ practice, ―conservative‖ theory – ―conservative‖ 
practice make sense at all?    
 I have already hinted at this question earlier, and believe it is important to keep it in 
mind as our discussions advance. The answer to this question is also closely related to the 
analogy of the half empty or half full glass used in the title of the present thesis – but let us 
leave it aside for the time being, until the end of Chapter 6. In the next chapter, I hope to 
further clarify the different notions of theory and practice discussed here, accepting the 
hypothesis that essentialist beliefs and anti-essentialist beliefs lead to different notions of 
translation theory and translation practice, and discussing whether these differences 
circumscribe different paradigms in translation studies.     
 Before we move on to it, nonetheless, I would like to make a final remark concerning 
the association made in the present chapter between, on the one hand, the two notions of 
translation theory and translation practice mentioned time again in this thesis and, on the 
other hand, Arrojo‘s ―essentialist‖ and ―anti-essentialist views‖. Similarly to the question of 
                                                             
34 I will come back to this question of radicalism in Parts II and IV below. 
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standpoints addressed under 4 above, these associations are both generalisations and 
approximations, which means that they in no way imply watertight, absolute categories. 
However much the notion of theory as a set of precepts that rule over practice seems akin to a 
predominantly essentialist way of thinking, whereas the notion of theory as a source of 
reflection and awareness appears to be in line with a largely nonessentialist perspective, I do 
not mean to state that this association is clear-cut and outright. Nor do I intend to say, for 
example, that all those – quoted particularly in Chapter 3 – who perceive translation as a 
potent stimulus for reflection are strictly anti-essentialist thinkers. My intention is rather to 
show how one of the notions of translation theory and practice built from the voices of the 
various practitioners, scholars and students quoted here entails hopes, motivations and 
interests similar to perspectives marked by an essentialist way of thinking. Likewise, the 
other notion of translation theory and practice proposed here involves hopes, motivations and 
interests fairly in line with those of so-called anti-essentialists views. Instead of some sort of 
affiliation to essentialism or anti-essentialism, this argument should be understood simply as 
symptoms of a more essentialist or more nonessentialist way of thinking.        
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6. The Question of Paradigms 
_____________________________________________________ 
There also seems to be a fourth type of progress. I 
mean the one which looks like a zigzagging spiral, 
advancing so to speak by leaps and bounds but at the 
same time going round in a circle, wasting a lot of 
breath and energy in fruitless repetitions, but ultimately 
managing to come to a conclusion some distance away 
from its starting point
35
. 
Hans Vermeer 
In this last chapter of Part I, I will develop Arrojo‘s argument of the essentialist and the anti-
essentialist particularly in terms of their noncorrespondence to linguistic and cultural 
approaches to translation, respectively. By doing so, I intend to examine to what extent these 
approaches can be said to belong to the same paradigm in translation studies, as well as to 
what extent an anti-essentialist perspective of translation inaugurates a new paradigm in the 
discipline. As I have already argued a few times, a more essentialist perspective seems akin 
to a particular notion of translation theory and translation practice, whereas a perspective 
marked by anti-essentialism appears to entail a different notion of translation theory and 
translation practice. In this sense, the present chapter will help to close the discussion about 
the role that essentialist and anti-essentialist views play in translation studies, also helping to 
shed light on the diverse notions of translation theory and practice which, in turn, derive from 
these views.           
 In her Tradução e Diferença (1999), Cristina Rodrigues presents a thorough analysis 
of the impact of an essentialist way of thinking on different approaches to translation. 
Roughly speaking, her work consists of an analysis of the relevance and the contours of the 
concept of equivalence in Catford‘s, Nida‘s, Lefevere‘s and Toury‘s translation theories. In 
spite of these authors‘ completely different departure points, objectives, contexts and 
backgrounds, Rodrigues shows how the notion of equivalence (and hence a tendency towards 
an essentialist view) permeates and, to some extent, works as the basis for their theories.  
                                                             
35
 I first read this excerpt in Snell-Hornby‘s The Turns of Translation Studies (2006, 2). It was originally 
published as a part of a paper (‗Translation Today. Old and New Problems‘) that featured in an anthology 
organised by Snell-Hornby, Kaindl and Pöchhacker entitled Translation Studies: An Interdiscipline (1994).   
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 From a linguistic perspective (i.e. Catford and Nida), Rodrigues explains that ―os 
vários conceitos de equivalência [são] a noção central para a definição de tradução e para 
se determinar o que é uma boa tradução‖, or the various concepts of equivalence work as the 
central notion that defines translation and determines what a good translation is 
(RODRIGUES 1999, 163). As for the theorists who describe literary translation in their 
context of production (i.e. Lefevere and Toury), on the other hand, they question this notion 
of equivalence. However, they depart from the very same essentialist ideas of an original text 
in which all meanings have been intentionally placed by the author and whose effect can be 
measured and then transferred to another language (which, in other words, is a concept of 
equivalence, too). In this sense, 
O paradigma em que os trabalhos se colocam é, portanto, semelhante, pois suas 
propostas decorrem do pressuposto de que há um sentido e uma mensagem presente nos 
textos que podem ser recuperados pelo tradutor ou pelo pesquisador e transmitidos por 
diferentes meios ou por diferentes línguas, sem que se afete sua integridade (idem).   
The paradigm to which these works belong is similar, as their proposals derive from the 
presupposition that there is a meaning and message intrinsic to texts, which in turn can 
be recovered by translators and researchers and then transmitted in their entirety through 
different media or languages.   
 The Brazilian scholar asserts that Nida‘s and Catford‘s approaches are particularly 
similar in one respect, namely they both believe that source and target text have exactly the 
same meaning or, in other words, are equivalent. Therefore, the translation process would 
consist of a phase in which these fixed meanings are determined by the translator, and a 
second phase in which they are rendered, without substantial loss, into the target language 
(idem, 167). They perceive the source text as a whole containing all pertinent meanings and 
maintain that reading is a protective activity whose main objective is to recover these 
meanings correctly. Catford‘s essentialism is revealed through his belief that meanings exist 
before and outside languages, and that each language simply externalises a number of 
concepts which, in turn, are part of an ―estoque universal‖, or ―universal reservoir‖ (idem, 
168) – hence the possibility of perfect equivalence. Nida, in contrast, emphasises the fact that 
meaning is placed in texts by their authors, and can then be recovered through a context and 
linguistic analysis of the text. For him, the key to a successful meaning recovery is to change 
the form so as to obtain the same effect as the original text (idem) or, in other words, so as to 
obtain an equivalent text. 
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 Toury and Lefevere, on the other hand, reject this basic essentialist notion of meaning 
by not having the concept of equivalence as their departure point, as Rodrigues very aptly 
explains. Yet despite that, they both seem to believe in recoverable meanings placed in texts 
by their authors. Lefevere, in his aforementioned Translating Literature: Practice and Theory 
in a Comparative Literature Context (1992), entertains the same notion of ―protective 
reading‖ (see previous paragraph) since he repeatedly advises readers to seek the meaning 
intended by the author or to be careful not to misread the author‘s intentions (LEFEVERE 
1992, 51, 63). Differently from Catford, Nida and Lefevere, Rodrigues points out, Toury is 
the only one to emphasise that source and target text are different texts, and that target texts 
work differently, in different contexts and different cultures compared to their source texts. 
Nevertheless, he places the source text in the very centre of his work as his tertium 
comparationis, i.e. an invariable element based on which translation norms can be fixed and 
target texts can be judged as acceptable or adequate. One such notion of source text can only 
imply, once again, the ―correct‖ reading of a text, ―correct‖ in the sense that it successfully 
recovers the meaning intended by the author. Therefore, Rodrigues asserts that  
Assim como para Catford, Nida e Lefevere, também para Toury o Řtexto-fonteř acaba se 
colocando fora do jogo da linguagem, ou seja, o texto-fonte não estaria sujeito à 
interferência do leitor, do pesquisador, pois é considerado estável, portador de um 
conteúdo imanente (RODRIGUES 1999, 169 – her emphasis).  
Just like for Catford, Nida and Lefevere, the ‗source text‘ for Toury is also located 
outside the dynamics of language; in other words, the source text is not subject to the 
reader‘s or researcher‘s interference as it is perceived as stable, as the receptacle of 
inherent content.  
 Rodrigues‘ main criticism of the essentialist remainders of these four approaches 
stems from the fact that, for her, all four theorists entertain a notion of sign as the product of a 
stable relationship between signifier and signified, whereby form can be opposed to content 
(idem, 173). From this point of view, a sign would be the direct representation of something 
in its absence. Our thought would then be the untainted perception of the world, which in turn 
would mean that language represents things in their essence (idem). This way, absolute 
equivalence between languages would be possible because each language would simply use 
different signifiers to refer to the exact same concept or thing. Taking into account some of 
Louis Kelly‘s considerations in his 1979 The True Interpreter: A History of Translation 
Theory and Practice in the West, Rodrigues argues that theories as Saussure‘s (1917) to a 
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certain extent reinforced the abovementioned notion of sign and language, whereas theories 
as Quine‘s (1959) fiercely questioned it (RODRIGUES 1999, 174).  
 Largely based on linguistic experiments that focus on the question of reference, the 
American philosopher Williard Quine contends that there is not just one possible relationship 
between words and objects, but rather many, which leads the Brazilian professor to the 
conclusion that, when it comes to the objective comparison between languages,  
Qualquer decisão que se toma sobre a referência se liga a aparatos conceituais 
arbitrários, pois o significado não pode ser uma entidade objetiva, na medida em que 
está vinculado ao comportamento dos usuários e à sociedade (idem, 175).  
Any decision that one may make about the question of reference is tied to arbitrary 
concepts because meaning is not an objective entity, but rather is always subject to the 
speaker‘s behaviour and to society.  
Indeed, this takes us back to Bloomfield‘s conclusion that we need scientific semantics before 
we can objectively compare languages (see Chapter 5 above), or even to Saussure‘s assigning 
the ―problem‖ of reference to psychology (SAUSSURE [1917] 1986, 15, 111). Despite (or 
because of) its potential impact on the notion of equivalence, or even on the possibility of a 
definite theory (shall I say science?) of language, Quine‘s ideas seem to have gone unnoticed 
– at least within translation studies – until the early 1990s, as Rodrigues points out 
(RODRIGUES 1999, 175).  
 Concerning Saussure, Rodrigues maintains that he breaks away from the Aristotelian 
and Augustinian tradition of direct association between a word and the perception of reality 
in the world. As Susana Kampff Lages explains, ―A concepção agostiniana partiria, pois, da 
idéia de que haveria dois planos da linguagem: o primeiro originário, dos nomes ou da pura 
nomeação e o segundo, do discurso, derivado do primeiro‖, or the Augustinian concept 
departed from the basic notion of two language levels: the first and original one was the plan 
of names and designations, whereas the second was the plan of speech, derivative of the first 
(LAGES [2002] 2007, 211). Indeed, the Swiss scholar emphasises that languages are not lists 
of terms, and that there is no reality, no pre-established ideas before and outside language. In 
other words, there is no ―essence‖ above words, governing them. From this point of view, 
each language would articulate its own meanings; hence it would be impossible to say that 
two words from two different languages refer to the same perception of the world, the same 
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reality. In this sense, objective equivalence between languages would be impossible 
(RODRIGUES 1999, 186).  
 Another greatly significant element of Saussure‘s theory stressed by Rodrigues is the 
fact that signs cannot be taken individually, seeing as their very definition derives from their 
relationship to other signs and not from an image in the exterior world. This way, signs do 
not contain an essence that can define them, but rather can only be defined through their 
differences to other signs in the system (idem, 187). Once again, if there is no common 
essence, no bond between sign and referent, then one cannot attribute common values to 
words of different languages.  
 Yet somehow the very notion of equivalence in translation seems to have its roots in 
Saussurean structuralism. Rodrigues finds two possible reasons for this, the first one being 
the dichotomic distinction Saussure defends between form and substance. She uses John 
Lyons‘ words from his 1968 Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics to clarify it:  
Just as the same lump of children‘s clay can be fashioned into objects of different shapes 
and sizes, so the substance (or medium) within which distinctions and equivalences of 
meaning are drawn can be organized into a different form in different languages 
(LYONS [1968] 1995, 56 – his emphasis). 
From this point of view, Rodrigues explains, there would be a ―substance‖ of content before 
and outside languages, and each language would simply articulate it differently 
(RODRIGUES 1999, 187). For Saussure, this ―substance‖ should be the object of study of 
psychology rather than of linguistics (see above).  
 According to the Brazilian theorist, the second reason why the claim for equivalence 
between languages is attributed to Saussure derives directly from this first reason, namely ―a 
fala é a representação imediata do pensamento‖, or speech is the immediate representation of 
thought (idem, 188). This would allow for universalism, thus repressing the differences 
between languages in the name of the universality of reason. Indeed, this is what Derrida 
discusses in his De la Grammatologie (DERRIDA 1967), a work of great importance for the 
argumentation developed by Rodrigues. For her (and Derrida), this universalism would 
guarantee the stability of meaning, allowing both for the mutual intelligibility between 
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languages, and for perfect equivalence between languages, as most logocentric
36
 theorists 
would claim.    
 As Derrida asserts, whereas on the one hand Saussure did break away from the then 
dominant notion of sign defined by Aristotle and Augustine, on the other hand he reinforced 
this same tradition by keeping watertight oppositions between signifier and signified, speech 
and writing. Furthermore, Saussure endorsed this age-old tradition by overvaluing speech and 
everything that binds a sign to its sound. From Rodrigues‘ point of view, these are the reasons 
why one normally associates Saussure with the idea of a ―transcendental meaning‖, a 
―substance‖ that ensures the stability of meaning across languages (see above). By referring 
to Derrida, the Brazilian author explains that the articulation between signifier and signified 
is what produces meaning, and that there is no such thing as a pure, material term opposed to 
a conceptual term, precisely because none of these terms can be perceptible or intelligible on 
their own (idem, 191). 
 Rodrigues concedes, however, that the deconstructionist criticism of Saussure is by no 
means radical, as the opposition between signifier and signified is necessary. In Derrida‘s 
words,  
(…) la traduction pratique la différence entre signifié et signifiant. Mais, si cette 
différence n'est jamais pure, la traduction ne l'est pas davantage et, à la notion de 
traduction, il faudra substituer une notion de transformation: transformation réglée 
d'une langue par une autre, d'un texte par un autre. Nous n'aurons et n'avons en fait 
jamais eu affaire à quelque "transport" de signifiés purs que l'instrument ŕ ou le 
"véhicule" ŕ signifiant laisserait vierge et inentamé, d'une langue à l'autre (…) 
(DERRIDA 1972, 31 – his emphasis).        
Therefore, what needs to be questioned is simply how ―pure‖ and ―stable‖ the relationship 
between signifier and signified is, and not the opposition itself. This is why structuralism and 
poststructuralism are simultaneously complementary and opposite, as already mentioned in 
the Interchapter above. Arrojo puts it this way (ARROJO 1996a, 60): 
(...) pode-se dizer que há, entre estruturalismo e pós-estruturalismo, uma relação 
paradoxal que se divide entre uma oposição radical e uma complementaridade. Na 
passagem (sem fronteiras claramente demarcadas) que marca a transição do 
estruturalismo para o pós-estruturalismo, há uma radicalização de insights e 
                                                             
36 By ―logocentric‖ I mean the derogatory term coined by Ludwig Klages in the 1920s and used mostly within 
deconstructionist thought (but also in critical theory) to refer to tendencies that centre all texts and discourses on 
the logos, as in the word or reason. Indeed, a corollary of logocentric thought is precisely the belief in a 
transparent and stable relationship between signifier and signified.     
  
81 
pressupostos que, de certa forma, permite pensar a reflexão pós-estruturalista como uma 
espécie de estruturalismo mais atento e menos iludido.  
(...) one can say that there is a paradoxical relationship between structuralism and 
poststructuralism, i.e. radical opposition and complementariness at the same time. In the 
transition (without clearly established boundaries) from structuralism to 
poststructuralism, a radicalisation of insights and presuppositions takes place, which in 
turn allows one to perceive poststructuralism as a more attentive and less naive kind of 
structuralism.    
By acknowledging that signifier and signified are different and that their relationship is by no 
means pure and stable, one can then perceive translation a sort of controlled transformation 
(see Derrida‘s indented quotation above) whereby this difference, this unstable relationship 
between signifier and signified is practised.  
In this sense (and to a certain extent in line with Rodrigues‘ arguments) these anti-
essentialist perspectives could be said to inaugurate a new paradigm in translation studies; a 
paradigm that places linguistic and cultural approaches (to mention only the approaches 
discussed in the present chapter) side by side, as Arrojo argued in her 1998 paper examined 
in Chapter 5 above. But before we draw any conclusions, let us look at the issue of paradigms 
in our area. It is often said that translation studies went through a great paradigm shift in the 
1980s, thanks particularly to Vermeer‘s Skopostheorie. Mary Snell-Hornby describes it as 
follows: 
In his [Vermeer‘s] model, language is not an autonomous ―system‖, but part of a culture. 
Hence the translator should not be only bilingual, but also bicultural. Similarly, the text is 
not a static and isolated linguistic fragment, but is dependent on its reception by the 
reader, and it invariably bears a relation to the extra-linguistic situation in which it is 
embedded, it is therefore ―part of a world continuum‖. This approach relativises both text 
and translation: the one and only perfect translation does not exist, any translation is 
dependent on its skopos and its situation (…). With this approach a translation is seen in 
terms of how it serves its intended purpose, and the concept of translation, when set 
against the former criterion of SL [source-language] equivalence, is more differentiated 
and indeed closer to the realities of translation practice (SNELL-HORNBY 2006, 52-53).    
Indeed, one could even claim that the turn in translation studies for which the German 
functional approach is (partly) responsible has something to do with the turn caused by anti-
essentialist thought, as Vermeer himself admits in his Preface to Michaela Wolf‘s 
Übersetzungswissenschaft in Brasilien: Beiträge zum Status „OriginalŖ und Übersetzung: 
Seit dem Erscheinen der Oficina [de Tradução, Rosemary Arrojo] wurden weiteren 
Ansätze und Disziplinen, vor allem Dekonstruktivismus und die Psychoanalyse verstärkt 
eingezogen. Es war für mich eine Art Bestätigung meiner Gedanken, daß der Einbezug 
dieser Fächer meine brasilianische Kollegin [Arrojo] zu ähnlichen Folgerungen geführt 
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hat, wie wir sie in Europa vertreten. Dabei gestehe ich gerne zu, daß Arrojos Ergebnisse 
die Schlüsse aus einem funktionalen Ansatz radikaler weiterführen, als dies bisher im 
alten Kontinent der Fall war (VERMEER 1997, 9).     
Needless to say, Vermeer‘s work is largely marked by a hermeneutical perspective, which in 
turn is fiercely criticised by poststructuralist thought. Nevertheless, words such as ―eine Art 
Bestätigung meiner Gedanken‖ or ―Arrojos Ergebnisse [führen] die Schlüsse aus einem 
funktionalen Ansatz radikaler weiter‖ seem to reveal a kinship between Arrojo‘s and 
Vermeer‘s works, however incipient this kinship may be37. Mary Snell-Hornby, for example, 
goes as far as to say that Derrida‘s and Arrojo‘s ideas about translation as transformation and 
as an activity that involves meaning production rather than reproduction ―correspon[d] to that 
of Vermeer, particularly with his image of ‗dethroning‘ the source text, his rejection of the 
static concept of equivalence and his concept of the active role both of the translator and the 
target-text reader‖ (SNELL-HORNBY 2006, 61-62). In fact, she even speaks of a ―mutual 
cooperation‖ (idem, 62-63) amongst Vermeer‘s, Arrojo‘s and Holz-Mänttäri‘s works, with 
Wolf‘s book Übersetzungswissenschaft in Brasilien (see above) as an example of it.        
 Indeed, this movement towards more culture-oriented or skopos-oriented approaches 
can be perceived as an intermediate stage between linguistic approaches and anti-essentialist 
perspectives in translation, as Susana Kampff Lages summarises very well in her 2002 Walter 
Benjamin Ŕ Tradução e Melancolia: 
(...) as reflexões funcionalistas (...) juntamente com os estudos desenvolvidos em Israel 
pela escola de Tel Aviv (...) aparecem igualmente como uma reação a concepções de 
tradução confinadas a limites estritamente lingüísticos, geralmente preocupadas com o 
conceito de fidelidade (...), voltadas sobretudo a uma adequação imediata ao texto de 
partida, que procura eliminar quaisquer marcas da intervenção do tradutor sobre o 
texto. Nesse sentido, elas ocupam um espaço de transição entre a visão tradicional e as 
novas teorizações, no sentido em que trazem para o primeiro plano (...) o contexto 
histórico-cultural da tradução. Elas realizam aquilo que Mary Snell-Hornby chama de 
Ŗvirada culturalŗ nos estudos sobre a tradução. Entretanto, essas correntes 
funcionalistas permanecem, por um lado, tributárias de uma visão segundo a qual seria 
possível compreender em sua totalidade as Ŗintenções comunicativasŗ [Reiß e Nord] de 
determinado autor (...), [visando o] desenvolvimento de uma metodologia e de uma 
teoria que possibilite generalizações (LAGES [2002] 2007, 74-75 – my emphasis).  
(...) the German functional approach, together with the studies developed in Tel Aviv, 
arises as a reaction to strictly linguistic translation approaches, which in turn are mainly 
concerned with fidelity and the immediate adequacy of target text when compared to 
source text, thus disregarding the translator‘s interference with the text. In this sense, 
they [functional approach, etc.] represent the transition between the more traditional 
                                                             
37 For more on the possible intersections between Vermeer‘s ideas and deconstruction, see DIZDAR (2006).  
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perspective [linguistic approaches] and the newer theories [anti-essentialist views] 
because they bring to the fore the historical-cultural context of the translation. They are 
responsible for what Mary Snell-Hornby calls the ―cultural turn‖ in translation studies. 
Nevertheless, these functional theories remain, in a way, tributary to a notion according 
to which one can fully understand the ―communicative intentions‖ [Reiß and Nord] of a 
given author, aiming at developing a methodology and a theory that allow for 
generalisation.       
Nevertheless, the question of whether the term ―paradigm‖ is adequate to describe the 
contributions of anti-essentialist thought to translation studies remains unanswered. In The 
Turns of Translation Studies: New Paradigms or Shifting Viewpoints? (2006), Snell-Hornby 
defines ―paradigm‖ as ―ground-breaking contribution‖, whereas a ―change in position on 
already established territory‖ would simply be a ―shifting viewpoint‖ (idem, ix). For her, the 
great paradigmatic changes in translation studies took place from the late 1970s to the mid-
1980s, whereby the so-called manipulation school and the German functional approach 
represented two different and more or less simultaneous paradigm shifts. On the one hand 
both break with linguistic dogmas and are target-oriented (as opposed to the then traditional 
source-oriented approach). On the other hand they differ in the sense that the manipulation 
school, unlike the German functional approach, claims to be strictly descriptive (idem, 47-
55).  
 In view of the issues addressed under 5 above and in the present chapter, one could 
question (as Lages does – see quotation above) to what extent these approaches really broke 
with linguistic dogmas, as both the theories grouped under the manipulation school and under 
the German functional approach derive many of their methods and terminology from 
linguistics
38
. Similarly, the shift these approaches provoked towards the target text – 
including the target culture and public – is questionable since, as Rodrigues points out (see 
page 77 above), the source text remains to a large extent the tertium comparationis of these 
theories (refer to footnote 38 below). However, in view of the then dominant linguistic 
approaches to translation, of course the manipulation school and the German functional 
approach did represent a colossal change – no wonder Snell-Hornby and many others 
(SNELL-HORNBY 2006, 161-162) perceive these changes as paradigmatic in translation 
studies.  
                                                             
38
 For time and space constraints I will not carry out a thorough analysis of the relationship between the German 
functional approach and so-called traditional linguistic dogmas. For more on this, please refer to LEAL (2006 
and 2007a). I will take for granted here the conclusions drawn in these works.  
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 In this light, Lages‘ argument seems plausible enough – that between a predominantly 
essentialist perspective and a predominantly anti-essentialist perspective the so-called 
―cultural turn‖ of the 1980s represent an intermediate stage (see Lages indented quotation 
above). So one could claim that these anti-essentialist contributions, embodied particularly by 
deconstruction, do make up a new paradigm in translation studies in the sense that their 
rejection of linguistic dogmas is taken to an extreme; i.e. it is carried forward in a more 
radical way (to recall Vermeer‘s words quoted above). 
 If we nonetheless consider deconstruction a poststructuralist movement, and if we 
bear in mind that the relationship between structuralism and poststructuralism is one of 
opposition and complementariness at the same time (see Arrojo‘s indented quotation above), 
the idea of a paradigm shift does not appear to be appropriate. It is as Norris puts it (NORRIS 
[1982] 2002, 30): 
It is not a question, [Derrida] repeats, of rejecting the entire Saussurean project or 
denying its historical significance. Rather it is a matter of driving that project to its 
ultimate conclusions and seeing where those conclusions work to challenge the project‘s 
conventional premises. (…) Saussure is thus not held up as one more exemplar of a blind 
and self-deceiving tradition. Derrida makes it clear that Structuralism, whatever its 
conceptual limits, was a necessary stage on the way to deconstruction.     
Given their close and rather unique relationship, the transition from structuralism to 
poststructuralism is hardly one of paradigm shift. Especially if one has in mind the notion of 
paradigm discussed in KUHN (1970), I personally do not see how perspectives marked by 
poststructuralist thought could proceed to becoming hegemonic – firstly because this would 
require great willingness on the part of countless academics and scientific communities to 
severely criticise their own works, and secondly because hegemony would defeat the very 
objective of poststructuralist thought
39
.  
 All in all, poststructuralist thought cannot be said to inaugurate a new paradigm in 
translation studies because it remains rather close to structuralist views. Much as there 
appears to be a tendency for postmodern theories to be perceived as radical
40
, this is not at all 
the case since these theories do not propose new approaches, methodologies and practices. 
                                                             
39 I will return to the issue of poststructuralist thought and hegemony in Part IV, Chapter 4 below.  
40 Please refer to footnote 34 in Chapter 5 above.  
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The contributions of poststructuralist thought are rather awareness-raising and thought-
provoking, and hence do not extend to translation practice.  
*** 
 If we look back at the paradox described in the Interchapter above, we will remember 
that the poststructuralist trend involves the negation of and the dependence on structuralism 
at the same time – or, as Derrida puts it as far as deconstruction is concerned, it practices 
structuralism and a movement against it simultaneously (see footnote 8 above). Likewise, one 
of the ideas underneath the term ―deconstruction‖ appears to point to ―undoing‖ and 
―redoing‖ at once. As we now approach the end of Part I, I would like to link this discussion 
of paradigms to the title of the present thesis: ―is the glass half empty of half full?‖ This 
paradoxical condition that seems crucial to poststructuralism and deconstruction is also 
fundamental to my title, but perhaps before we try and understand the paradox, let us first 
look at how the present title could be understood through either-or oppositions.      
   In the aforementioned Walter Benjamin Ŕ Tradução e Melancolia, Susana Kampff 
Lages associates the symptoms of melancholia to the movements within translation studies. 
Based on Arrojo‘s ideas about the desperate search for meaning in translation, Lages asserts 
that what characterises ―postmodern theories‖ is their acceptance of the fact that it is 
impossible to recover the allegedly ―lost origin‖, Benjamin‘s Ursprache, transcendental 
meanings. ―Modern theories‖, in contrast, still resent this loss and thus have not given up the 
search for the ―lost origin‖ (LAGES [2002] 2007, 169). In Lages‘ view, both (i.e. modernism 
and postmodernism) seem to fit the pathological description of melancholia, with modernism 
representing the state of severe depression, and postmodernism representing the manic, 
euphoric state (idem).                         
 What Lages calls ―modern theories‖ – and Rodrigues and Arrojo call ―essentialist 
theories‖41 – overtly or covertly rely on a notion of sign as a stable and pure relationship 
between signifier and signified. Even when they admit that this stability or purity is not 
absolute – as would be the case of the German functional approach for instance, or culture-
oriented approaches, as we saw above – they still somehow cling to the belief that the 
                                                             
41
 I do not mean to state that all three thinkers are referring to the exact same theories; my point is rather that 
Lages tends to group theories under the labels ―modern‖ and ―postmodern‖, whereas Arrojo and Rodrigues 
appear to prefer the labels ―essentialist‖ and ―nonessentialist‖.    
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author‘s intention will provide the ultimate meaning, or perhaps the translation brief, or the 
text itself, its words will irrevocably announce which interpretation is more or less suitable. 
These approaches do not fully acknowledge translators and their autonomy, poetics and 
ideology. Projected onto practice, these essentialist views make translating border on 
impossibility as translators desperately seek these stable meanings, these textual meanings, 
these authorial intentions and yet do not seem to concretely find them, or are criticised for 
having found the wrong ones. In this vicious circle, theory promises to scientise and fully 
systematise practice, but still contains large amounts of subjectivity and leaves various 
questions unanswered. Practitioners have no or little interest in theory precisely because it 
does not seem to contribute to their practice; practice seems to insist on being frustrating, 
ambivalent, unscientific. Theory arises once again as the hope to put an end to subjectivity –
let us not forget Fish‘s ―theory hope‖ here.  
 In contrast, the approaches that Lages calls ―postmodern‖ perceive ambivalence and 
subjectivity as natural and human. Translation studies will be subjective to the same extent as 
literature, linguistics, philosophy and history, for example, are subjective. In this light, the 
aim of theory is to stimulate reflection and raise awareness and not to prescribe formulae for 
success. Translators must no longer be semi-gods, possessing both encyclopaedic knowledge 
and the power to read people‘s minds and intentions; instead, translators are only human, 
subject to their background, context and ideology. Translation practice is an activity 
inevitably carried out within this framework (and not these ―constraints‖) since no one can 
dispose of their ideology when reading or translating a text, for example.   
 In this light – and as already mentioned repeatedly – we could speak of theory and 
practice and their interaction in at least two different ways, which I will call ―pessimistic‖ and 
―optimistic‖ for the sake of the analogy proposed in the title of the present work – and let us 
bear in mind that my intention here is to offer an initial either-or interpretation of the title. 
The ―optimist‖ sees the glass half full and perceives translation theory as the (potential) 
answer to his/her questions. Theory is scientific, practice-oriented, objective and neutral – or 
if it is not, it will soon be (remember Fish‘s ―theory hope‖). From this point of view, practice 
is governed by this (seemingly) all-embracing theory, but precisely because theory is not as 
all-embracing as one would wish, practice seems frustrating, incomplete. Still, the optimist 
hopes that things will improve in the future, that science will advance and bring subjectivity 
to an end. And let us not forget the state of ―depression‖ suggested by Lages (see above), 
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because this constant frustration and problematic interaction between a theory that does not 
fulfil its own objectives, and a practice that never meets the requirements imposed by theory, 
make the optimist hesitate. Some will claim theory is, for this reason, useless (when its 
marriage to practice is not prosperous); others will overcome depression and carry on hoping. 
 As for the ―pessimist‖ (shall we say ―realist‖?), s/he has accepted that theory can only 
do so much for one, and that it cannot be neutral, objective and all-embracing. Science will 
never advance to substitute or erase subjectivity, and human undertakings will always be 
inevitably marked by uncertainty and bias. Practice is neither governed nor purely described 
by theory; instead, there is a constant movement of indirect and mutual influence between 
theory and practice. Rather than feeling that theory is missing something, or that practice is 
impossible and incomplete, this ―pessimistic‖ point of view allows one to see possibility 
rather than impossibility in translation. Perhaps Lages‘ ―manic‖ state may be associated 
precisely with this sense of possibility, of openness which, nevertheless, does not lead to 
―theory hope‖, but rather to the sense of resignation that human beings will never be able to 
overcome their human, and hence finite, subjective condition. Therefore, theoretical 
discourse has its roots in philosophical thinking and has no direct practical application, but 
may lead to a more aware, better-informed kind of practice.  
 In this sense, as far as a more essentialist and a more nonessentialist perspective of 
translation theory and practice are concerned, one could easily associate ideas marked by 
essentialism to optimism, to the glass half full. Accordingly, views influenced by 
nonessentialism could be perceived as pessimistic, the glass half empty. Indeed, associations 
between poststructuralist thought and nihilism and/or scepticism abound – see, for example, 
GROSS and LEVITT ([1994] 1998, 71-106)
42
. And these associations are more often than 
not combined with praising remarks of the essentialist precepts criticised by poststructuralist 
thought, as these precepts are useful, optimistic, cheerful and scientific (idem, especially 76 
and 87-88) – hence ―glass half full‖. 
    But let us bear in mind here that we are contemplating the same glass, and that the 
challenge – once again paradoxical – lies precisely in being able to perceive the glass as half 
full and half empty at the same time, as this is the challenge of postmodernism. If we agree 
                                                             
42 I will address the issue of poststructuralist thought and pessimism at length in Part IV, Chapter 2 below.  
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that the contributions of poststructuralist thought do not inaugurate a new paradigm in 
translation studies because of its bonds with structuralism, then so-called poststructuralist 
thinkers do not perceive the glass as constantly and solely half empty. In other words, as they 
practice structuralism (and the glass half full) and a movement against it (the glass half 
empty) simultaneously, they can but conceive both images simultaneously. If we take Lages‘ 
allegory of melancholia, we can understand the state of depression and the state of euphoria 
as aspects of the same illness, presenting similar symptoms.    
 This paradoxical duality that I advocate here may also be perceived in different ways. 
As someone whose affinities lie with poststructuralist thought, I would say that the numerous 
associations made between poststructuralist ideas and pessimism and/or nihilism are highly 
questionable. Particularly in translation studies, the constraints imposed by essentialist ideas 
strike me as extremely demotivating since according to them translators/interpreters are 
expected to be able to read people‘s minds and forget their own history and ideology in order 
to be successful – a success that, nonetheless, never seems attainable. In this light, the 
contributions made by a more poststructuralist perspective seem quite liberating, and would 
thus be more in line with an optimistic way of thinking. But I will come back to this criticism, 
especially to deconstruction, in Part IV, Chapter 2 below. 
 For now what is important is the conclusion that however much a poststructuralist 
perspective brings countless contributions to translation studies, exerting great influence on 
the notions of translation theory and translation practice, it does not inaugurate a new 
paradigm in the area because of its close relationship with structuralism. In this sense, I ask 
the reader to take the challenge of understanding the allegory in the title of the thesis through 
Derrida‘s double gesture or double bind (see Chapter 2 above), i.e. through a movement of 
embracing and rejection at the same time, through a perspective that allows one to see the 
glass both half empty and half full.  
 In Parts II and III below we will look into the works of Rosemary Arrojo and Paulo 
Henriques Britto, respectively, as examples of the issues discussed here. Their work as 
translation scholars and, in the case of Britto, as a translator and poet, illustrates not only the 
question of different standpoints – addressed under 4 above – but also the impact of a more 
essentialist, structuralist way of thinking as opposed to a more anti-essentialist, 
poststructuralist way of thinking – addressed under 5 and 6. Their debate reveals some of the 
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most relevant questions at the moment in translation studies in Brazil (and certainly not only 
there). Also, it unveils very different concepts of translation theory and translation practice, 
thus leading to diverse notions of what the area itself, as well as education in the area, should 
be like. My intention in Parts II and III is hence to exemplify and flesh out some of the issues 
introduced in Part I through the works of Arrojo and Britto.           
  
90 
PART II: ROSEMARY ARROJO  
_____________________________________________________ 
Amável o senhor me ouviu, minha idéia confirmou: 
que o Diabo não existe. Pois não? O senhor é um 
homem soberano, circunspecto. Amigos somos. 
Nonada. O diabo não há! É o que eu digo, se for… 
Existe é homem humano. Travessia. 
João Guimarães Rosa  
Rosemary Arrojo is arguably the best-known Brazilian translation scholar – both in Brazil 
and abroad. Including innumerable papers and book chapters in Portuguese
43
, in addition to 
three books (one of which with five editions at the time of writing – see below), all of which 
on translation studies, Arrojo‘s work is unquestionably one of the most solid and well-
established in Brazilian translation studies. Not to mention her publications in English: 
dozens of papers and book chapters in the most varied translation journals and translation 
anthologies which, together with her participation in international conferences, have granted 
her the status of acclaimed translation scholar the world over. In fact, at this writing her 
works have already been translated several times into German and Spanish, but also into 
Catalan, Turkish, and Hungarian.  
In this part of the present thesis we will firstly examine Arrojo‘s academic life, so as 
to try and sketch the contours of her standpoint in translation studies (Chapter 1). This initial 
reflection will help us to anticipate some of Arrojo‘s motivations and interests as far as 
translation is concerned, throwing light on her theoretical views, which in turn will be the 
object of Chapter 2. Given the enormity of her academic production, it would be impossible 
to address all her works in this thesis. Therefore, I have decided to divide Chapter 2 into four 
sections, so as to accommodate a selection of her publications. Sections 2.1 to 2.3 will be 
devoted to her three books, namely ([1986] 2002) Oficina de Tradução Ŕ A Teoria na Prática 
(Translation Workshop – Theory in Practice), ([1992] 2003) O Signo Desconstruído Ŕ 
Implicações para a Tradução, Leitura e o Ensino (The Deconstructed Sign – Implications for 
Translation, Reading and Teaching), and (1993) Tradução, Desconstrução, Psicanálise 
                                                             
43 By 2001, Arrojo had published about 80 papers – in specialised journals and proceedings of conferences – and 
book chapters – mostly in Brazilian and foreign anthologies on translation studies (see footnote 109 below).  
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(Translation, Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis). Finally, in Subchapter 2.4 we will look 
into a selection of four of her more recent papers (2000a, 2000b, 2000 with CHESTERMAN 
and 2004). The main objective of Chapter 2 will be to draft Arrojo‘s theoretical standpoint in 
translation studies – always in view of her standpoint as an academic.  
As I analyse her works, I will constantly call the readers‘ attention to aspects that I 
find crucial to the debates I propose in this thesis – as I have done so far. Several key 
questions will be raised in this Part II, many of which were already anticipated in Part I above 
– such as the alleged radicalism of poststructuralist thought, the aim of translator and 
interpreter training, the wish to establish an independent discipline for translation studies, 
amongst various others. In order to keep the focus on Arrojo, I will address these questions at 
length in Part IV below – always indicating here, in Part II, when I intend to do so.  
One last clarification before we move on to Chapter 1: I have decided to present 
Arrojo before Britto (see Part III below) for practical reasons. Seeing as Britto dedicates a 
part of his work to directly and openly criticising poststructuralist thought on translation – 
including declared critiques to Arrojo specifically – I thought this structure would facilitate 
the reading. This way, the reader will be well-acquainted with Arrojo‘s theoretical standpoint 
by the time we get to Britto‘s criticism.     
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1. Standpoint as an Academic  
____________________________________________________ 
Antes do doutorado, fiz um mestrado em literatura na 
Inglaterra (Universidade de Essex), e o foco desse 
mestrado era precisamente a teoria e a prática da 
tradução literária. (...) Mas meu interesse primeiro 
sempre foi a literatura. 
Rosemary Arrojo
44
 
Rosemary Arrojo began her academic career in 1969 at the Universidade de São Paulo, 
where she obtained a double degree (a teaching degree and a BA) in English and Portuguese 
(Letras, or literature and linguistics – see Chapter 1 in Part I above) three years later. As is 
the case of most students who take Letras, it is hard to tell whether Arrojo concentrated more 
on linguistics or literary theory. Unfortunately Arrojo had no publications in this period, nor 
is there any information available on whether she wrote a thesis at the end of her degree. In 
any case, she did an MA in theory and practice of literary translation under Arthur Terry at 
the University of Essex between 1975 and 1977. And here it is important to point out that 
Terry was arguably Britain‘s greatest Catalan literary studies specialist, having published 
countless works, including literary translations (HULME 2004). Indeed, his specialities are 
comparative literature and literary translation, hence the mutual interest between him and 
Arrojo. Her thesis was called ‗An Anthology of Brazilian Modernist Poetry in Translation‘ 
and, as far as I know, these translations have never been published, except for one long poem 
by Brazilian poet João Cabral de Melo Neto, ‗O Cão sem Plumas‘, which came out under the 
title ‗The Dog without Plumes‘ in Mundus Artium - A Journal of International Literature and 
the Arts, vol. XVI, in 1983.    
 Between 1982 and 1983 Arrojo obtained two further Master‘s degrees from John 
Hopkins University, one in Humanities and one in Spanish. Unfortunately there is not much 
information available on who her supervisors were, or on whether she wrote theses. At that 
time, however, she was also doing her PhD in Humanities under Eduardo González at the 
                                                             
44 This excerpt is Arrojo‘s reply to an interview question about her interest in translation theory (please refer to 
footnote 48 below). It translates as follows: Before the doctorate, I did an MA in literature in England 
(University of Essex) dedicated precisely to the theory and practice of literary translation. (…) But my primary 
interest has always been literature.    
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same university, for which she received a Fulbright Scholarship
45
. She concluded her 
doctorate in 1984 with the thesis ‗Jorge Luis Borges' Labyrinths and João Guimarães Rosa's 
Sertão: Images of Reality as Text‘. When she started her PhD, González had only recently 
been admitted to John Hopkins University (1981) as a professor of Latin American literature 
and cinema. Having published five books mostly on Hispanic America, he is currently the 
head of the Spanish and Latin American Subdivision of the Department of Romance and 
German Languages and Literatures.  
 But let us concentrate for a moment on Arrojo‘s PhD thesis. The title and key words 
of this work reveal subjects with which she would work for decades to come: Jorge Luis 
Borges (see Subchapters 2.2 and 2.4 below), João Guimarães Rosa (see Section 2.3 below) 
and Deconstruction
46
. Even though this text is not available and, as far as I know, has never 
been published, one can speculate about the motivations behind it. Having worked with two 
specialists in Hispanic Literature, Terry and González (see above), Arrojo may have been 
introduced to Borges‘ works by one of them. As she had a degree in Brazilian Literature, I 
suppose Rosa was already a part of her reading repertoire by then, and deconstruction must 
have come into play as the possible interface between the two works. Let us not forget that by 
the early 1980s the impact of poststructuralist tendencies in the Humanities was far from 
negligible in the USA, a far cry from the situation in Brazil. Indeed, nearly a decade later 
Arrojo would write in the preface of one of her books (ARROJO 1993, 11 – her emphasis): 
No início dos anos 80, nos Estados Unidos, quando procurava um tema e um álibi 
aceitáveis para uma dissertação de doutorado, o reencontro com Pierre Menard, sua 
curiosa biblioteca e sua óbvia modernidade, à luz e sob a sedução das estratégias 
desconstrutivistas de Derrida, foi uma revelação que não cessa de ser renovada. Além de 
uma tese, o Pierre Menard de Borges me propiciou ainda o ingresso Ŗoficialŗ na 
reflexão sobre tradução praticada no País.  
As I was looking for an acceptable subject and alibi for a PhD thesis in the early 80s in 
the USA, the reencounter with Pierre Menard, his curious library and his obvious 
Modernism – both from the point of view and under the seduction of Derrida‘s 
deconstructionist strategies – was an endlessly renewing revelation. In addition to a 
thesis, Pierre Menard provided me with the ―official‖ ingress into the reflections on 
translation taking place in Brazil at the time.   
                                                             
45 For more information on this scholarship programme, please refer to http://www.fulbright.co.uk/.  
46 These key words were taken from her CV and include, in addition to ―Deconstruction‖, ―Jorge Luis Borges‖, 
―João Guimarães Rosa‖ and ―labyrinth‖ (refer to footnote 109 below).     
  
94 
 And here one could speculate further and say that two of her papers published 
between 1984 and 1986 in specialised journals in Brazil derived from her PhD thesis. The 
papers were named ‗‗Pierre Menard, Autor Del Quijote‘: Esboço de Uma Poética da 
Tradução via Borges‘ (‗Pierre Menard, Autor del Quijote‘: A Sketch of Translation Poetics 
via Borges) and ‗O Labirinto Inescapável da Linguagem: Matriz-temática da Obra de J. L. 
Borges‘ (The Inescapable Labyrinth of Language: The Leitmotif of Borges‘ Work). Together 
with two other papers published in the same period – ‗A Tradução como Reescritura: O 
Texto/Palimpsesto e um Novo Conceito de Fidelidade‘ (Translation as Rewriting: The 
Text/Palimpsest and a New Concept of Faithfulness) and ‗Um Áporo e suas Aporias: 
Reflexões sobre um Poema de Carlos Drummond de Andrade‘ (An Áporo and its Aporias: 
Reflections on a Poem by Drummond) – these papers (or at least versions of these papers) 
would later make up a part of the book Oficina de Tradução (see 2.2 below), first published 
in 1986, a book in which Arrojo lays out the foundation for her work on deconstruction and 
translation. 
 It was also in the mid-1980s (1984 to be precise) that Arrojo began working as a 
professor and researcher. She had already worked as a teaching assistant at John Hopkins 
between 1983 and 1984, as a PhD student. There she taught Portuguese and Spanish at 
undergraduate level. Even before then, between 1977 and 1979 – i.e. before her PhD and 
straight after her MA in Literary Translation – she had worked as a teaching assistant at the 
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC/SP), where she taught the following 
undergraduate courses: Contrastive Analysis, English Literature, North-American Literature, 
Translation Practice, English Conversation, and Intensive Reading. In 1984 she was hired 
once again by the same university (PUC/SP) as an assistant professor to teach more or less 
the same courses, together with a course named Translation Theory – a job she abandoned 
four years later. Nevertheless, in 1984 she had also started working as a professor at the 
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), where she remained for about 20 years 
until her retirement. Her main research area was translation theory and teaching, and she 
taught the following courses at undergraduate level: English Language, Literary Translation 
Workshop, Translation Practice, Translation Theory, English Literature, and North-American 
Literature. From 1984 she was engaged in graduate programmes as well, being in charge of 
the courses Introduction to Translation Studies, Translation Theories, Translation Topics, 
Advanced Seminars on Translation, Pragmatics, Topics in A-language, Reading in A-
  
95 
language, Grammatical Theories and Pedagogical Grammars, Introduction to the Theoretical 
Problems of Translation, and Topics in Discourse Analysis. 
 Between 1984, when she started working as a full-time professor in translation 
studies, and the early 2000s, she published just over 60 papers and book chapters, as well as 
two more books, O Signo Desconstruído (1992) and Tradução, Desconstrução e Psicanálise 
(1993) (in addition to the abovementioned Oficina de Tradução, in 1986). Moreover, another 
nearly 20 papers were published in the proceedings of academic events on translation, mostly 
in Brazil but also abroad. All her works are directly dedicated to the issue of translation, the 
vast majority of which through an openly poststructuralist view. Only four of her over 30 
papers published in specialised journals in Brazil in this period include a specific literary 
corpus that works as the basis of her argumentation. These literary texts include the novel O 
Grande Sertão: Veredas (by Rosa), the poem ‗Áporo‘ (by Drummond), the short-story 
‗Pierre Menard, Autor del Quijote‘ (by Borges), and Ítalo Calvino‘s novel Se una Notte 
D'Inverno un Viaggiatore. All the other 30 papers or so are dedicated to ―more 
philosophical‖ questions surrounding translation, such as the issue of literariness, the 
question of faithfulness, translation ethics, translator training but mainly contemporary 
thought on translation (poststructuralism, psychoanalysis, deconstruction, feminism and 
nonessentialism). In fact, even in those four papers in which a specific literary text seems to 
be in the spotlight, the discussion is always oriented towards a so-called theoretical issue. In 
other words, the focus of Arrojo‘s work does not usually seem to lie on translating – as it will 
become clear in the next chapter below – but rather on theoretical issues and discourses about 
translation. I will come back to this question later in this chapter.        
 In this period between the mid-1980s and the early 2000s, she also supervised four 
PhD theses on translation, and all of them approached translation from a poststructuralist 
perspective
47
. As a matter of fact, her four PhD students went on to become professors at 
Brazilian universities, three of whom work specifically on translation studies through a 
poststructuralist perspective – Cristina Carneiro Rodrigues (refer to Chapter 6 in Part I 
above), Maria Paula Frota (see Part IV, Chapter 1 below) and Silene Moreno. In the same 
                                                             
47 Most of the information presented here was taken from her national CV (refer to footnote 109 below), which 
was last updated in 2001, when Arrojo was still working in Brazil. However, a 2009 version of her CV, which 
she kindly sent me upon request, mentions eleven MA and seven PhD theses. As this newer version of her CV 
unfortunately does not include detailed information on these works, I have not taken them into account in the 
analysis above.   
  
96 
period she supervised nine MA theses, all of which were devoted specifically to translation 
through a poststructuralist perspective. Amongst these dissertations, four were predominantly 
theoretical, dealing with the following issues: Antoine Berman‘s theory of translation 
criticism, the dichotomy theory versus practice in translator training, the impossibility of 
machine translations, and the influence of linguistics in the teaching of reading. The other 
five theses, in contrast, incorporated specific corpora, in this case literary texts: Hamlet, A 
Brief History of Time, The Catcher in the Rye, Macbeth and On the Road. Amongst her MA 
students, the majority went on to do a PhD and to work as scholars at different Brazilian 
universities, some of whom specifically in translation studies, others in cognate areas. A few, 
too, dedicate their work to the interface between translation studies and poststructuralist 
thought.     
 Arrojo is currently the director of the Translation Programme at Binghamton 
University, State University of New York, where she has been working as a comparative 
literature professor since 2003. In fact, this programme is the only one dedicated specifically 
to translation in the USA, and Arrojo was taken on precisely to help to set it up
48
. During 
these last years, Arrojo shifted the focus of her research slightly to representations of 
translation in fiction. Although her works still explore the interface between translation and 
contemporary thought (mostly deconstruction, but also psychoanalysis), they do not strike 
one as militant poststructuralist works any longer – I will come back to this question below 
and in Section 2.4. Different works from the late 1990s and early 2000s already signal this 
slight change of interest, such as her 1999 paper ‗Interpretation and Possessive Love: Hélène 
Cixous, Clarice Lispector and the Ambivalence of Fidelity‘, included in the anthology Post-
Colonial Translation: Theory and Practice (edited by Bassnett and Trivedi), and her 2002 
paper ‗Writing, Interpreting and the Power Struggle for the Control of Meaning: Scenes from 
Kafka, Borges and Kosztolányi‘, published in Tymoczko and Gentzler‘s Translation and 
Power.  
                                                             
48 In an interview given to Susana Kampff Lages for the Jornal da UNICAMP, Arrojo comments that ―creio que 
o fato de ter auxiliado a implementar um programa de pós-graduação relacionado à tradução no IEL 
contribuiu para que a Binghamton University me contratasse para implementar o primeiro PhD em estudos da 
tradução dos EUA‖ – I believe that the fact that I helped to set up a postgraduation programme related to 
translation at the Institute of Language Studies [at UNICAMP] motivated Binghamton University to hire me to 
set up the first PhD Programme in Translation Studies in the USA. Unfortunately the year of the interview is not 
displayed in the newspaper, and neither is the year in which that particular issue of the newspaper came out. All 
they mention is ―10 a 16 de Novembro‖, or 10th to 16th November.   
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 Unfortunately there is not much information available on her work at Binghamton 
University, so I cannot depict this last decade with as much detail as I did the previous two
49
. 
According to the webpage of the university, Arrojo has been in charge of various translation 
courses, seminars and workshops, amongst which are Borges and Calvino on Translation and 
Reading; Introduction to Theories of Interpretation; Methods and Masterpieces in 
Comparative Literature; Translation Theory; Introduction to Translation Studies; Postcolonial 
Translation Studies; Translation Workshop (literary and non-literary); Translation and 
Fiction; Representations of Translation in Latin American Fiction; The Translators as Objects 
of Study and the Interests of the Discipline; Translation and Power; Teaching 
Deconstructively; Politics of Translation; The Translator‘s Role in Contemporary 
Approaches to Translator Training; Translation and Ideology; and Translation and 
Globalisation – some at undergraduate and others at postgraduate level.  
 Her recent publications include the following papers and book chapters, all published 
in English: ‗Philosophy and Translation‘ (Handbook of Translation Studies, John Benjamins, 
2010); ‗Translation and Impropriety: A Reading of Claude Bleton‘s Les Nègres du 
Traducteur‘ (TIS – Translation and Interpreting Studies, vol. 1, number 2, Fall 2006); 
‗Translation, Transference, and the Attraction to Otherness – Borges, Menard, Whitman‘ 
(Diacritics Ŕ A Review of Contemporary Criticism, fall-winter 2004, vol. 34, published in 
2006 – see 2.4 below); ‗Tradition and the Resistance to Translation‘ (Kultur, Interpretation, 
Translation, Peter Lang, 2006); ‗The Ethics of Translation in Contemporary Approaches to 
Translators Training‘ (Training for the New Millennium Ŕ Pedagogies for Translation and 
Interpreting, John Benjamins, 2005); ‗The Gendering of Translation in Fiction: Translators, 
Authors, and Women/Texts in Scliar and Calvino‘ (Gender, Sex and Translation, St. Jerome, 
2005); ‗Lessons Learned from Babel‘ (Target vol. 14, number 1, 2002) – in addition to 
various others, as well as a few book reviews. 
 During this last decade Arrojo has worked as a guest professor and key note speaker 
at numerous universities in Europe and the Americas, in countries like Spain, Germany, 
Austria, Turkey, Denmark, the Czech Republic, the United States, Canada, Brazil and 
                                                             
49 The information presented here was taken from her personal CV (see penultimate footnote above) and mainly 
from the following websites: http://www2.binghamton.edu/comparative-literature/index.html and 
http://pic.binghamton.edu/index.htm. Unfortunately I do not know exactly how many publications and how 
many academic works she has supervised in this last decade, but I do know she is very much active in the USA.   
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Argentina. She has also been a member of the advisory and/or editorial board of several 
translation studies journals and anthologies, including the Benjamins Translation Library, 
Translation and Interpreting Studies (journal by John Benjamins), TranScribe (journal on 
translation teaching from the University of Nevada), TTR (Translation, Terminology, Writing 
– journal of the Canadian Association for Translation Studies), Transfer (Revista Electrónica 
sobre Traducción e Interculturalidad – Universitat de Barcelona), in addition to the Brazilian 
journals D.E.L.T.A., Tradução e Comunicação, Tradterm, Cadernos de Tradução, CROP, 
Trabalhos em Lingüística Aplicada, and Alfa. In addition to that, between 2003 and 2006 she 
was a member of the Executive Committee of the MLA‘s (Modern Language Association) 
Discussion Group on Translation. 
 As a comparative literature professor at Binghamton University, she has directed three 
PhD theses since 2003 – other theses are currently underway. All three works have recently 
been published under the titles Gregory Rabassa's Latin American Literature: A Translator's 
Visible Legacy (Maria Constanza Guzman); Delectable Bodies and Their Clothes: Plato, 
Nietzsche, and the Translation of Latin America (Ben Van Wyke); and Blackness, 
Translation and the (In)Visible: Harryette Mullen's Poetry in Brazilian Portuguese (Lauro 
Amorim). All three PhD students are currently engaged at universities in Canada, the USA 
and Brazil, respectively, where they work with translation and different interfaces with 
contemporary thought. Though I have not had access to these works, based on their titles I 
daresay that they represent some of Arrojo‘s favourite topics: representations of translation in 
fiction, translation and philosophy, as well as literary translation.    
 Rosemary Arrojo is certainly one of the best-known, most-read Brazilian translation 
scholars. Although most translation scholars in Brazil are probably not too keen on 
poststructuralist thought, her works remain canonical, making up the syllabi of perhaps all 
translation courses in the country. And here a number of different factors must have 
contributed to the elevated status she enjoys today. Arrojo started writing about translation in 
the mid-1980s, when the area was far from established in academia – one cannot say it is 
well-established today, with the first translation courses emerging only very recently at 
federal universities, so never mind over 25 years ago. As a matter of fact, the whole time that 
Arrojo worked as a translation professor, she was engaged in the Programme in Applied 
Linguistics of UNICAMP which, by the way, is probably one of the most reputable 
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universities in Brazil. So Arrojo is arguably one of the pioneers of translation studies in 
Brazil, possessing one of the most complete, mature oeuvres of the area.  
 Furthermore, her international acknowledgement decisively contributed to her 
recognition in Brazil. There certainly are not many Brazilian scholars whose work not only is 
known abroad, but has also been translated into several languages (for more on this, please 
refer to LEAL 2010b). The fact that she went abroad for her MA and PhD was also a key 
factor for her career and subsequent reputation in Brazil. Surely some of Arrojo‘s references 
whilst she was abroad first entered Brazil through her work, awakening the interest of various 
local scholars. If we take Jacques Derrida, for instance, by the mid-1980s only a couple of his 
works had been translated into Portuguese – the vast majority of the translations of Derrida‘s 
early works available today stemmed from the 1990s. In view of this fact, it seems pertinent 
to assume that numerous translation scholars may have first read about Derrida, for example, 
in Arrojo‘s works50.   
 On account of the brief overview drawn in the present chapter, Rosemary Arrojo 
strikes one as an exemplary academic. She obtained her PhD early in her career and 
established, to a certain extent, the main subjects on which she would work for decades to 
come. This focus, not only on translation studies but also on its interface with 
poststructuralist thought, has been clear from the beginning, underlying her choice of 
universities for her postgraduate education, as well as the courses she teaches both at 
undergraduate and graduate levels, and the academic works she supervises. Her publications 
were and remain a corollary of her academic interests and motivations which, by the way, are 
far from mainstream in translation studies. As already hinted at above, Arrojo faced, in the 
course of her career, far more criticism and disagreement than assentation, which in turn may 
justify a certain radicalism of which her works are constantly accused (see Part III below).  
 On the one hand, the fact that she worked in the Programme in Applied Linguistics of 
the Institute of Language Studies at the prestigious UNICAMP may have been a source of 
difficulty and conflict for her – hence her relentless outcry for the independence of translation 
                                                             
50 I do not mean to belabour this issue much further as it exceeds the scope of this thesis. I believe Silviano 
Santiago might have been the first whose works can be said to represent the reception of deconstruction in 
Brazil, back in the 1970s. In this sense, Arrojo was certainly not the first, but one of the first – and her work 
introduced not only Derrida to numerous Brazilian readers, but also other key thinkers of poststructuralist 
thought.   
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studies particularly from linguistics. On the other hand, UNICAMP is renowned for the 
reception of deconstruction in Brazil, which in turn is a great source of inspiration in Arrojo‘s 
work
51
. Her colleague then, the late Paulo Ottoni, was arguably one of the most 
representative Derrida specialists in Brazil, with nearly 10 books published on 
deconstruction, along with dozens of papers and book chapters. Furthermore, from the early 
1990s to mid-2000s Ottoni coordinated seven different research groups on the interface 
between translation and deconstruction, thus establishing a solid place in Brazil for the 
reception of deconstruction
52
. Moreover, the Institute of Language Studies at UNICAMP is 
renowned for its competent translators and interesting translation projects, particularly in the 
area of classical languages and literatures. A few examples include Odorico Mendes, Trajano 
Vieira and Joaquim Brasil Fontes. In this sense, the role that UNICAMP played in Arrojo‘s 
career may be said to be twofold; perhaps their openness to deconstruction and translation 
was a reason to stay in 1988, and the affiliation to linguistics was a reason to go in 2003. And 
let us not forget that she is now engaged in the Comparative Literature Department of 
Binghamton University. But this is of course pure speculation.  
 So as far as her academic standpoint is concerned, a few elements appear to be 
particularly noteworthy. As already mentioned above, Arrojo seems to have determined the 
areas on which she would concentrate – poststructuralist thought and literary translation – at a 
very early stage in her career. These two issues are unquestionably very close to her heart, as 
she has dedicated over 30 years of her life to them – if we take her MA in literary translation 
as a starting point. Moreover, she appears to have devoted everything to an academic career – 
and not any academic career, but one in translation, in literary translation
53
. She left the 
country in the late 1970s to do her MA, and then again in the mid-1980s to obtain two more 
Master‘s degrees, in addition to a PhD. At that time, leaving Brazil for postgraduate 
                                                             
51 In the same interview quoted in footnote 48 above, Arrojo explains that she had the opportunity and privilege 
to set up an area of concentration within the Postgraduation Programme in Applied Linguistics dedicated to 
translation. In this sense, though ―applied linguistics‖ may initially sound like a constraint, Arrojo did have a 
―safe niche‖ for translation inside it.     
52 Having said that, it is important to emphasise that Arrojo was the one to inaugurate this place for the reception 
of deconstruction at UNICAMP, with Ottoni joining her only years later – he obtained his PhD from the same 
university in 1990. My point here is by no means to imply that they worked closely with each other or even that 
their reception of deconstruction went in the same direction. I rather want to contextualise UNICAMP and its 
renowned relationship with deconstruction and poststructuralist thought as a whole.    
53 Though ―literary translation‖ is probably too narrow a category, as Arrojo has been working on various areas 
surrounding translation and language as a whole.    
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education was by no means common, and probably indicated a wish to pursue an academic 
career. Her subsequent work confirms this trend – Arrojo has certainly dedicated her life to 
academia. From the beginning, she put a lot of effort and time into publishing papers, book 
chapters and books, as well as into taking part in academic events
54
. Her work with MA and 
PhD students also unveils her special dedication to academia, as many of them went on to 
pursue an academic career in the exact same area as well – I believe not by mere chance. 
Though she has worked as a freelance translator (starting in 1977), this does not seem to have 
taken her fancy. In fact, as far as I know she has never translated and published a book, for 
example. She does translate excerpts from texts as examples in her own books and papers, 
and she translates her own papers into English and Portuguese, but she never seems to have 
invested in a career as a literary translator as such. In view of her vast academic production, it 
is quite clear that she preferred the academic path over the career as a translator.    
 In this light, it seems quite clear that the main focus of Arrojo‘s work is by no means 
practice-oriented, and hence has far more to do with that notion of translation theory as a 
source of awareness mentioned time and again in Part I above. Her theoretical affinities, 
together with her career path, appear to reveal first and foremost an interest to reflect about 
translation. And since this interest of hers is far from mainstream in translation studies, a 
certain militant attitude on her part is to be expected – an attitude that, as a matter of fact, is 
also very much in line with poststructuralist thought as a whole. And let us not rule out the 
possibility that, precisely because of these long decades of theoretical struggle with her peers, 
it is only natural that the focus of her work should now have taken a slight turn towards 
representations of translation in fiction. Indeed, within this ―new research object‖ she can still 
work on the interface between translation and contemporary thought, though not in such a 
militant fashion anymore, since she can take much of her previous work for granted. And, by 
the way, her PhD thesis, defended over 25 years ago, already pointed in this direction (of 
representations of translation in fiction), but perhaps back then she felt a greater need to 
introduce and draw the contours of contemporary thought – which remain obscure to many in 
translation studies today, so never mind back in the 1980s. And although this argument is 
rather speculative, I believe it is important to contextualise and try to understand this shift in 
her research. So let us now move on to Chapter 2 and analyse to what extent her academic 
                                                             
54 Unlike some of her peers, as we will see in Part III, Chapter 2 below. At that time, striving for an active 
academic life was not nearly as common as it is today.   
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standpoint, briefly sketched in this chapter, confirms our expectations as for her books and 
papers
55
.                              
                                                             
55 I will come back to the question of her allegedly ―militant‖ or ―radical attitude‖ throughout Part II and in Part 
IV, Chapter 2 as well. As for this shift in her research, I will address it again in Section 2.4 below.   
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2. Works 
_____________________________________________________ 
Ihre [von brasilianischen Wissenschaftlerinnen und 
Wissenschaftlern] Beiträge sollten auf verschiedene 
Fragen eine Antwort versuchen: Was zeichnet die 
Ansätze in der brasilianischen 
Übersetzungswissenschaft aus, wie sie sich im Kontext 
des Poststrukturalismus im vergangenen Jahrzehnt 
entwickelt hat? Welche Schulen, welche Literatur, 
welche philosophischen Zugänge werden dabei 
rezipiert? Wie wird das „Andere― im postkolonialen 
Text repräsentiert? Und wie spiegeln sich diese 
theoretischen Überlegungen in der Praxis des 
Übersetzens wider? 
Michaela Wolf
56
  
In light of Arrojo‘s standpoint as a translation scholar, briefly sketched in Chapter 1 above, 
let us now examine some of her most important works, including her three books (Sections 
2.1 to 2.3) and a selection of four of her more recent papers (Section 2.4). Although 
technically Oficina de Tradução appeared before O Signo Desconstruído – in 1986 and 1992, 
respectively – I have decided to analyse her 1992 book first because in my opinion it is more 
exemplary of Arrojo‘s work and, therefore, will help to lay the foundation for her theoretical 
views. Except for that, her other works will be presented chronologically, as follows: 
Subchapter 2.1 O Signo Desconstruído ([1992] 2003), 2.2 Oficina de Tradução [1986] 2002, 
2.3 Tradução, Desconstrução e Psicanálise (1992), 2.4 Selected Papers (2000a, 2000b, 2000 
with CHESTERMAN and 2004).   
 As for the translations of Arrojo‘s works, I will try and point out whenever one of the 
papers that make up the following sections has been published in different languages as well. 
In fact, Arrojo‘s three books consist largely of collections of papers, the majority of which 
had been published in Brazilian specialised journals before the publication of the books – or 
at least very similar versions of the papers. Some of these papers were later translated into 
various languages and published mostly as book chapters in translation anthologies.     
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 This excerpt was taken from Michaela Wolf‘s Vorbemerkungen in her Übersetzungswissenschaft in Brasilien 
(WOLF 1997, 7). Though these words do not refer exclusively to Arrojo, they refer to her as well. I believe that 
in the present chapter these questions suggested by Wolf will also be of utmost importance.  
  
104 
 The main objective of the present chapter is to evaluate to what extent the 
expectations drawn in the previous chapter – as far as Arrojo‘s standpoint as an academic is 
concerned – are met by her works on translation studies. Before we move on to Section 2.1, 
let us not forget that one of her papers (1998b) has already been thoroughly analysed in Part 
I, Chapter 5 above, which means that the reader is probably already aware of some of her 
theoretical affinities.          
2.1 O Signo Desconstruído       
Apesar de dividido entre o senso moral imposto pela 
sociedade e a força do inconsciente, o homem 
ocidental, forjado no culto ao racionalismo, ilude-se 
com a sua suposta autonomia ―consciente‖ – que não 
passa de uma instância derivada de processos 
inconscientes – e crê poder separar-se do ―real‖, ou 
seja, crê poder olhar o real e o outro com olhos 
neutros; crê, em suma, poder ―descobrir‖ ―verdades‖ 
que não sejam construídas por ele mesmo. 
Rosemary Arrojo
57
 
O Signo Desconstruído (The Deconstructed Sign) consists of a collection of seventeen short 
papers, most of which were written by Arrojo herself, on deconstruction, ―a palavra-chave 
em torno da qual se reúnem os artigos desta coletânea‖, or the key-word around which these 
seventeen texts are organised (ARROJO [1992] 2003, 9)
58
. According to the author, the 
deconstructionist project devised by Derrida is devoted to the nearly obsessive unmasking of 
the moments of aporia, blind spots and subliminal contradictions underlying all and every 
dichotomy or hierarchy based on which we elaborate our sciences, theories and world-views 
– ―desmascaramento quase obsessivo dos momentos de aporia, dos pontos cegos e das 
contradições subliminares que se instalam nas bases de qualquer dicotomia ou hierarquia a 
partir das quais elaboramos nossas ciências, nossas teorias e nossas visões de mundo‖ 
(idem). Amongst these dichotomies and hierarchies, she highlights two which the precision of 
                                                             
57 This excerpt is quoted and translated later in this section (please refer to page 112 below).  
58 Most of the papers I will examine in this section were written by Arrojo alone, with the exception of four, 
which were written together with her UNICAMP colleague Kanavillil Rajagopalan. Therefore, his name will 
obviously be mentioned every time I refer to one of these four papers, but in order to keep the references short, I 
will mention Arrojo‘s name only, as I will quote the book as a whole rather than all ten papers individually. 
Rajagopalan‘s individual work will not be analysed in this thesis, but his works with Rosemary Arrojo will 
make up an important part of the present section.      
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Derrida‘s deconstructing scalpel has affected (―que a precisão do bisturi desconstrutor de 
Derrida tem atingido‖ – idem, 10), namely subject and object, and signifier and signified. 
The main aim of the papers is thus to examine the impact of the deconstruction of these 
dichotomies on translation, reading and teaching.  
In the present subchapter, I will examine all the papers written by Arrojo herself, as 
well as those written in cooperation with Kanavillil Rajagopalan (see footnote 58 above) – 10 
papers in total. The analysis of these essays will help to unveil the foundation of Arrojo‘s 
work as a translation scholar, which will then be developed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. The 
papers are rather short and not well inundated with references, which makes it very fitting for 
students or those not well-acquainted with poststructuralist thought.        
In the paper entitled ‗O Ensino da Leitura e a Escamoteação da Ideologia‘ (Reading 
in School and the Theft of Ideology), Rosemary Arrojo, together with her colleague from the 
Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Kanavillil Rajagopalan (see footnote 58), analyses the 
impact of the deconstruction of the dichotomies subject-object and signifier-signified on 
reading. Curiously, they make use of another dichotomy to get to the heart of the matter, 
namely poststructuralism and what Derrida calls logocentrism (see footnote 36 above). By 
opposing these two theoretical points of view, the authors assert that when faced with a 
reading task, readers have two options. Their first option is to believe that the meaning of the 
text, or the meanings of the words in the text are ―independentes do sujeito, da história e das 
circunstâncias de leitura‖ or independent of reader, history and reading circumstances (idem, 
88). The second option, in contrast, is to believe that that meaning is inevitably imposed, 
attributed to objects rather than discovered in them – ―significados [são] inevitavelmente 
atribuídos, impostos aos objetos e não descobertos neles‖ (idem).  
The first option refers to a point of view largely derived from Saussurean ideas, which  
pressupõe (...) a possibilidade da neutralidade e da ausência de perspectiva como marca 
da relação leitor texto; pressupõe, em outras palavras, a possibilidade de que um leitor, 
no exato momento da leitura, pudesse se esquecer de tudo que o constitui como sujeito: 
seu inconsciente, sua história, sua cultura, sua ideologia (idem).  
presupposes the possibility of both neutrality and absence of perspective as marks of the 
relationship reader-text; in other words, it presupposes that readers could, throughout the 
course of the reading process, forget everything that constitutes them as subjects, i.e. 
their unconscious, their history, their culture and their ideology. 
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The opposite perspective (i.e. the second option presented above), largely taken from 
Derridean ideas, maintains that 
(...) o significado não se esconde nem se embute no texto à espera que um leitor o 
decifre, compreenda ou resgate; o significado é produzido pelo leitor a partir de suas 
circunstâncias e das convenções que organizam e delimitam suas instituições, inclusive a 
linguagem (idem). 
(...) meaning is not hidden or inherent to texts, waiting for readers to decipher, 
understand or recover it; meaning is produced by readers according to the circumstances 
and the conventions that shape their institutions, including language. 
From the latter point of view, a particular interpretation cannot be deemed fully correct or 
incorrect, but simply acceptable or unacceptable according to a given situation or perspective.  
Based on this Derridean view, the authors argue that a new teaching method must be 
adopted in schools, whereby teachers become aware both of their own ideology – which will 
inevitably shape their choices, interpretations and judgements – and their important role as 
meaning-shapers in the classroom. This last issue is particularly important since ―no âmbito 
de sala de aula, cabe ao professor determinar quais significados e qual perspectiva serão 
aceitos para a realização de qualquer leitura‖, or in a classroom environment it is up to the 
teacher to determine which meanings and perspectives are acceptable for a particular reading 
task (idem, 90). This new method should then equip students with a greater awareness of 
their autonomy first as readers, but also as citizens who play different roles within institutions 
and communities and have the power to change them – since they are human construes.  
All in all, in this first paper there appears to be a call for action by Arrojo and 
Rajagopalan, particularly as far as school teachers are concerned – as the title indicates. As 
they embrace the deconstructionist perspective on reading, and thus largely discard the so-
called traditional idea of neutrality and lack of perspective associated with reading, they 
demand that school teachers not only become aware of these perspectives and bias, but also 
render them as clearly and transparently as possible to their pupils. This way, pupils should 
be able to understand why certain interpretations tend to be privileged over others – not 
because these interpretations are the correct ones in absolute terms, but rather because they 
reflect the values of that teacher, that institution, that community at that moment. 
Consequently, pupils would also become aware of the active role they play in society, since 
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these values that inform correct interpretations, for example, are established by them as well 
– and not by some exterior force to which they must necessarily bow.  
In a similar line of thought, Arrojo examines the history of translation theory as it is 
presented in Steiner‘s renowned After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation 
(STEINER [1975] 1998). The paper is called ‗As Questões Teóricas da Tradução e a 
Desconstrução do Logocentrismo: Algumas Reflexões‘, or Reflections on Translation Theory 
and the Deconstruction of Logocentrism
59
 (idem, 71-79). Analysing the four-period division 
of the ―literature on the theory, practice and history of translation‖ proposed by Steiner 
(STEINER [1975] 1998, 248), Arrojo agrees with his conclusion that ―over some two 
thousand years of argument and precept, the beliefs and disagreements voiced about the 
nature of translation have been almost the same‖ (idem, 251 – commenting on Knox‘s On 
English Translation). For Arrojo, these recurring ―beliefs and disagreements‖ essentially 
surround two issues, namely that of fidelity, and the relationships between original and 
translation (ARROJO [1992] 2003, 73).  
In her view, the problem does not lie in the solutions for the question of fidelity in 
translation, as proposed by countless translation scholars over these two millennia; rather, she 
asserts, the problem lies first and foremost in the very formulation of the question of fidelity 
(idem). In other words, within the limits of what she calls ―logocentrism‖, it would be 
impossible to find answers to the questions derived from it. These logocentric limits are 
largely responsible for the emergence of questions such as ―is this translation faithful to its 
original?‖, but have not yet produced unanimous, objective answers to a single translation 
example. And in order for logocentrism to be able to produce adequate answers for the 
questions it sets forth, Arrojo believes that both man and reality would have to be centred on 
some sort of suprahuman, unchanging rationalism and logic in the same way that 
logocentrism is (idem, 77). In this light, what Arrojo believes needs reformulating is not the 
answers to the questions, but rather the questions. 
Therefore, in Arrojo‘s opinion, instead of four periods, translation theory can be said 
to have undergone just two periods, marked by two key tendencies. The first tendency is 
                                                             
59
 This paper featured in Wolf‘s anthology Übersetzungswissenschaft in Brasilien under the title ‗Gedanken zur 
Translationstheorie und zur Dekonstruktion des Logozentrismus‗ – translated by Hans Vermeer (WOLF 1997, 
65-70).  
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preponderant and enjoys millennia of tradition; it asks time and again the same unresolvable 
questions, relentlessly. The second tendency, in contrast, is far from mainstream, but 
embraces the human, contextual, historical and local aspects of translation, and therefore is 
apt to reformulate the age-old questions repeated incessantly within the first tendency (idem, 
79). In other words, one could speak of an essentialist trend opposed to an anti-essentialist 
one marked by poststructuralist thought.                      
 Similarly, in another essay, named ‗A Desconstrução do Logocentrismo e a Origem 
do Significado‘ (The Deconstruction of Logocentrism and the Origin of Meaning), Arrojo 
examines once again how so-called essentialist theories perceive the issue of the origin of 
meaning, as opposed to how anti-essentialist perspectives deal with the same issue. In 
addition to that, she analyses how the question of literariness is handled within both 
theoretical standpoints.  
According to the Brazilian scholar, faced with the question ―where is meaning?‖, the 
theories labelled logocentric would reply outside the subject or reader (idem, 35). In this 
view, meaning is unquestionably embedded in the signifier (i.e. the word itself) and in the 
author‘s intentions, hence the possibility both of literal meanings (i.e. meanings that exist 
before interpretations and outside contexts) and of literariness as a textual feature. In this 
light, readers are ―receivers‖ – as Jakobson‘s term60 very aptly illustrates – whose main task 
is to find meanings in the text, including the literary, the ironic, the poetic or the literal ones 
(idem).  
If one places more emphasis on the role of the author‘s intentions, the receiver‘s task 
is now to find out what the author meant to say. The author, in turn, is perceived as a 
patriarchal, authoritarian figure who holds the ―direito indiscutível de determinar os destinos 
e contornos da sua Řproleř‖, or the unquestionable right to determine the fate and shapes of 
his ―offspring‖ (idem, 36 – her emphasis). Nevertheless, whether the emphasis lies on the 
signifier or on the author‘s intentions, the role played by the word remains the same: 
(...) o significante (a palavra, o texto) funciona novamente como o invólucro duradouro e 
resistente capaz de aprisionar através dos tempos e em qualquer circunstância o 
significado autoral conscientemente pretendido. Ao leitor/receptor cabe apenas, nesse 
enredo, um papel filial e passivo (idem). 
                                                             
60 For more on Jakobson‘s use of the term ―receiver‖, please refer to JAKOBSON and HALLE ([1956] 2002).   
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(...) the signifier (the word, the text) works once again as the long-lasting and sturdy 
wrappings that imprison the author‘s conscious meanings through time and under all 
possible circumstances. In this context, what is left to the reader/receptor is merely a 
passive, filial role.               
The main weakness of these theories, Arrojo contends, lies in the fact that even 
though they place so much emphasis on the word and on the notion of transcendental 
meanings, they cannot clearly point out intrinsic textual distinctions between literal and 
figurative language, ironic and non-ironic passages, literary and non-literary texts. Indeed, the 
work of the North-American critic Eric Hirsch is emblematic of this weakness. In his 1976 
The Aims of Interpretation, when faced with the task to determine clear distinctions between 
literary and non-literary texts, he admits that ―the distinction can never be successfully 
formulated‖. Despite this impossibility, he argues that this distinction, as well as any other 
relevant ―classifications of written speech‖, is in any case ―ethically governed by the 
intentions of the author‖ (apud ARROJO [1992] 2003, 36). However, as Arrojo very aptly 
points out, what Hirsch does not clarify is how one should proceed to find these intentions.  
Relying mainly on the works of the French-speaking philosophers Jacques Derrida, 
Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes, Arrojo finds an alternative to the dilemma of the origin 
of meaning in poststructuralist reflection. As Saussure had already pointed out, signs are 
simultaneously arbitrary and conventional (see Part I, Chapters 5 and 6 above), the products 
of tacit agreements made amongst people within communities. Therefore, to think about the 
origin of meaning is inevitably to think about this pact, this tacit agreement from which the 
production of meaning derives. In this sense, one need not pay any vital respect to the text, as 
Barthes explains (BARTHES 1979, 78 – translated by Josué Harari)61.  Similarly, one need 
not pay any vital respect to the author, as Foucault argues: 
The author is not an indefinite source of significations which fill a work; the author does 
not precede the works, he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one 
limits, excludes and chooses; in short by which one impedes the free circulation, the free 
manipulation, the free composition, decomposition and recomposition of fiction 
(FOUCAULT 1979, 159 – translated by Josué Harari). 
                                                             
61 In this same text, Barthes reminds us of the etymology of the word ―text‖ to claim that the level of polysemy 
of a given text does not depend on how ambiguous its contents are: ―The Text‘s plurality does not depend on the 
ambiguity of its contents, but rather on what could be called the stereographic plurality of the signifiers that 
weave it (etymologically the text is a cloth; textus, from which text derives, means ―woven‖) (idem, 76 – his 
emphasis)‖.  
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Indeed, Foucault stresses that the role that authors have traditionally played has been 
changing drastically in recent times (idem): 
Although, since the eighteenth century, the author has played the role of the regulator of 
the fictive, a role quite characteristic of our era of industrial and bourgeois society, of 
individualism and private property, still, given the historical modifications that are taking 
place, it does not seem necessary that the author-function remain constant in form, 
complexity and even in existence
62
.  
 In this light, Arrojo tries to sketch a new answer to the question of the origin and 
location of meaning. Rejecting both the thesis of the text as the receptacle of stable meanings 
and the idea of the authorřs intentions as the protective cotton wool wrapping meanings, she 
then turns to individual readers and explains that it is not up to them either to determine the 
meanings of a particular text. Instead, she defends the thesis of the conventional sign and thus 
attributes the production of meaning to social conventions, very much in line with Stanley 
Fish‘s notion of ―interpretive communities‖ (see Section 3.1 in Part III below). For her, in 
addition to shaping meanings, this intricate network of social conventions also determines the 
reader‘s own profile, wishes, circumstances and limitations (ARROJO [1992] 2003, 39).  
 To answer the question she implicitly asks in the title of the paper (where is 
meaning?), I suppose she would respond that it is not in the word, as words change across 
times and their meanings shift according to contexts; neither is it in the authors‘ intentions, as 
one hardly has any access to them, and even authors themselves may be doubtful about 
them
63
; neither is it readers, as they alone cannot be responsible for these tacit agreements 
and conventions that underlie language (see footnote 120 below); instead, meaning is located 
                                                             
62  Perhaps the so-called Pirate Parties of various EU member-states (and a few countries outside the EU as well) 
are already a sign of Foucault‘s and Barthes‘ ―prophecy‖ in Europe regarding the role of authorship and 
ownership in our culture. Having obtained more than 7% of the votes in the 2009 European elections, thus 
beating a number of well-established parties, the Swedish Pirate Party was granted a seat in the EU Parliament, 
which later increased to two seats after the Lisbon Treaty came into force. Two of their chief proposals are that 
copyright term should be reduced to only 5 years, and that patents should be largely abolished. They claim that 
the current copyright laws are unbalanced and jeopardise the access to and exchange of information (for more 
on the Pirate Party International, please refer to http://www.pp-international.net/). So perhaps in the same way 
as the Enlightenment saw the birth of the author, according to Foucault, our contemporary times will witness his 
gradual fading. This phenomenon is already to be seen in online platforms such as Wikipedia, for example, in 
which the entire notion of scholarship, authorship and power has been subverted. Various contemporary thinkers 
have been dedicating their works to this issue, linking the aims of libertarianism to the World Wide Web 
precisely because of its structure that seems to resist authority. For more on this, refer to works by Clay Shirky 
and Aleks Krotoski, for instance.       
63 For a curious example of an author who was unaware of her own intentions, please refer to LEAL (2006) or to 
Chapter 1 in Part IV below.  
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precisely in these tacit agreements and conventions, hence the conventionality of signs 
advocated by Saussure.    
 Before we move on to the next papers that make up the anthology O Signo 
Desconstruído, I would like to make a short remark about these first three papers analysed 
here. Arrojo‘s strategy to oppose a traditional, dominant tendency – usually labelled 
essentialist, structuralist and/or logocentric – to a novel, fresh trend – commonly referred to 
as nonessentialism, poststructuralism and/or deconstruction – may incur difficulties. For 
those readers less acquainted with poststructuralist thought, her remarks may sound like an 
attempt to propose yet new sets of dichotomies, of absolute oppositions, of antagonistic and 
self-excluding extremes. It is without doubt understandable that a certain level of 
generalisation and categorisation are necessary for one to be able to write a so-called 
scientific paper – as we all know only too well. Furthermore, it is expected that Arrojo‘s 
attitude should be perceived as radical or exaggerated at times, seeing as the views she 
defends are far from prevailing. I nonetheless believe that these generalisations and 
polarisations require more caution, as they are precisely what poststructuralist thought strives 
to relativise.              
 Besides the issues of the origin of meaning and its impact on the processes of reading, 
interpretation and translation, Arrojo examines some of the other main issues that make up 
the core of postmodern thought, as she announces in the Introduction to the aforementioned 
book (see above). In ‗A Noção do Inconsciente e a Desconstrução do Sujeito Cartesiano‘, or 
The Unconscious and the Deconstruction of the Cartesian Subject, the Brazilian scholar 
explains that Nietzsche and Freud are the most important precursors of poststructuralist 
thought particularly because they were the first to deconstruct the notions of ―truth‖, ―reason‖ 
and ―reality‖. 
 As Arrojo points out, Nietzsche‘s most paramount contribution was to question the 
autonomy of the intellect and the subsequent illusion of the truth of things in themselves, as 
well as all other illusions that derive from this main one. Mostly taking into account 
Nietzsche‘s 1873 article entitled ‗Über die Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne‘, 
Arrojo analyses how the German philosopher first deconstructs the intellect: ―Denn es gibt 
für jenen Intellekt keine weitere Mission, die über das Menschenleben hinausführte. Sondern 
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menschlich ist er, und nur sein Besitzer und Erzeuger nimmt ihn so pathetisch, als ob die 
Angeln der Welt sich in ihm drehten‖ (NIETZSCHE 1873, 1).   
 Similarly, it is Freud who demonstrates how illusory the notion of the consciousness 
is, given the fact that it is always subject to the unconscious and its countless processes. 
Arrojo remembers the well-known metaphor of the horse and rider, whereby the horse is the 
id – i.e. the animal-like force – and the rider represents the ego, which in turn can be strong or 
weak, skilful or clumsy. This way, the rider can either control the horse and take it where he 
wants to go, or be controlled by the horse and be taken despite his own will (ARROJO [1992] 
2003, 14-15). Furthermore, the Brazilian theorist stresses the power of the superego, which 
the rider has to control in addition to the untamed horse (idem, 15). She summarises the 
question of the power of both the intellect and of the unconscious as follows: 
Apesar de dividido entre o senso moral imposto pela sociedade e a força do 
inconsciente, o homem ocidental, forjado no culto ao racionalismo, ilude-se com a sua 
suposta autonomia Ŗconscienteŗ Ŕ que não passa de uma instância derivada de 
processos inconscientes Ŕ e crê poder separar-se do Ŗrealŗ, ou seja, crê poder olhar o 
real e o outro com olhos neutros; crê, em suma, poder Ŗdescobrirŗ Ŗverdadesŗ que não 
sejam construídas por ele mesmo (idem – her emphasis)64. 
Though divided between the moral sense imposed by society and the power of the 
unconscious, Western man, who was forged in the worship of rationalism, eludes himself 
with the alleged autonomy of ―consciousness‖, which in turn is nothing but a derived 
instance of unconscious processes. He believes, thus, he can detach himself from what is 
―real‖, he can look at ―reality‖ and other men with neutral eyes; he believes, in summary, 
he can ―find‖ ―truths‖ that he himself did not invent.                   
Moreover, she emphasises the human need to live in society and to form communities as 
Nietzsche defends it, i.e. as a sort of urge both to survive against others and to live socially in 
the herd. And in order to live socially, a sort of ―peace treaty‖ is required, as the German 
philosopher explains: 
Dieser Friedensschluss bringt etwas mit sich, was wie der erste Schritt zur Erlangung 
jenes rätselhaften Wahrheitstriebes aussieht. Jetzt wird nämlich das fixiert, was von nun 
an „WahrheitŖ sein soll, das heißt, es wird eine gleichmäßig gültige und verbindliche 
Bezeichnung der Dinge erfunden, und die Gesetzgebung der Sprache gibt auch die ersten 
Gesetze der Wahrheit: denn es entsteht hier zum ersten Male der Kontrast von Wahrheit 
und Lüge (NIETZSCHE 1873, 2). 
To summarise the point, Arrojo turns again to Nietzsche and his conclusions in his ‗Über die 
Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne‘: 
                                                             
64 This quotation is the epigraph of the present section.   
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Was ist also Wahrheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, 
Anthropomorphismen, kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die, poetisch und 
rhetorisch gesteigert, übertragen, geschmückt wurden und die nach langem Gebrauch 
einem Volke fest, kanonisch und verbindlich dünken: die Wahrheiten sind Illusionen, von 
denen man vergessen hat, dass sie welche sind, Metaphern, die abgenutzt und sinnlich 
kraftlos geworden sind (…) (idem).  
In other words, even though so much attention appears to be paid to the notion of truth and its 
implications, one must acknowledge its construed, illusory character. As a human product, 
the truth is highly changeable, easily manipulable and finite. In this sense, the gesture of 
accepting ―the‖ truth should be accompanied by a movement of questioning this very truth.     
In this paper, though very briefly, Arrojo demonstrates how Freud and Nietzsche are 
the greatest precursors of postmodern thought, and how their ideas can help us to rethink the 
premises and assumptions upon which we build our sciences and theories. After all, if one 
acknowledges that all our sciences and knowledge derive from unconscious impulses, and 
that they are nothing but linguistic construes – which in turn is all our human condition 
allows us – one must then be more critical of one‘s ―truths‖. 
In the paradoxical ‗A Noção de Literalidade: A Metáfora Primordial‘ (Literalness: 
The Primordial Metaphor), Kanavillil Rajagopalan and Rosemary Arrojo argue that the vast 
majority of institutionalised disciplines dedicated to language share a common premise, 
namely the possibility of an objective and decontextualised opposition between literal 
meanings and metaphorical meanings (idem, 47). Indeed, the authors first examine how the 
concept of metaphor is defined within synchronic linguistics by analysing the work of the 
American linguist Jerrold Sadock. Taking his 1979 paper ‗Figurative Speech and Linguistics‘ 
into account, the Brazilian scholars demonstrate how Sadock defines figurative speech as a 
phenomenon outside linguistics: ―All nonliteral speech (...), including metaphor, falls outside 
the domain of synchronic linguistics‖ (SADOCK [1979] 1993, 42). According to Sadock, the 
reason why ―the study of metaphor (...) would not be a proper subject for synchronic 
linguistics‖ is the fact that ―the basis of metaphor is a kind of indirection that is shared with 
nonlanguage behavior‖ (idem – see ARROJO 1992 [2003], 47). For the linguist ―the 
underlying principles governing metaphor are of a general psychological sort and are thus not 
specifically linguistic‖ (idem – both SADOCK and ARROJO).  
Based on Sadock‘s reflections, taken here as exemplary of synchronic linguistics, 
Rajagopalan and Arrojo derive three main underlying presuppositions, as follows: (i) there 
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are clear distinctions between literal and non-literal, linguistic and psychological, synchronic 
and diachronic, as well as between language and thought; (ii) literal meanings, which are the 
object of synchronic linguistics, are evident in themselves and are thus immune to context or 
interpretation shifts; and (iii) there are neutral and transparent subjects who can carry out 
literal acts without revealing their time and circumstances. Here I would add the division at 
which Sadock hints in the quotation above, namely metaphor or ―indirect speech‖ is 
psychological whereas ―literal‖ or ―direct speech‖ is not psychological – hence its affiliation 
to linguistics.  
Having made these initial remarks on linguistics, the Brazilian thinkers set out to 
demonstrate how other institutionalised disciplines dedicated to language appear to share 
these very same presuppositions. The first work they take into consideration is David 
Rumelhart‘s 1979 paper ‗Some Problems with the Notion of Literal Meanings‘. Although the 
cognitive scientist‘s reflection is somewhat similar to Sadock‘s, he accounts for elements 
largely neglected by Sadock, as the Brazilian scholars stress. They also emphasise the fact 
that Rumelhart, despite coming from a completely different area (he worked as a psychology 
professor), endorses the idea of a clear opposition between literal and metaphorical meanings, 
and assigns the task of investigating figurative speech to psychology (RUMELHART [1979] 
1993, 78-79 and ARROJO [1992] 2003, 49). Nevertheless, in spite of his evidently 
essentialist matrix (he does place great emphasis on the ―transmitted meaning‖ as something 
stable and intrinsic to the utterance), Rumelhart calls attention to other elements that may 
play a role in interpretation as a whole: 
Linguistic utterances are always interpreted in some context. The context of utterance, 
along with any knowledge available to the listener, may potentially be employed in the 
process of constructing an interpretation of the utterance. Moreover, I suspect that this 
knowledge is not employed in any ad hoc way, say simply as a filter in choosing among 
the various possible readings a sentence might have. Rather, these elements play a central 
role in determining what interpretations are possible for a given utterance 
(RUMELHART [1979] 1993, 76).  
 In addition to that, Rumelhart investigates the use of metaphors by children and, as the 
Brazilian professors point out, comes to conclusions that briefly border on postmodernism. 
The American theorist turns to the process of language acquisition to justify the importance 
of figurative language, not as a ―special aspect of linguistic or pragmatic competence‖, but as 
the ―very basis for this competence‖ (idem, 73). He explains that the use of figurative 
language is very much present during the process of language acquisition, thus discarding the 
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linguistic proposition of literal meanings being the main ones or the first ones to be learnt, 
and non-literal meanings being secondary and derivative (RUMELHART [1979] 1993, 73 
and ARROJO [1992] 2003, 51-52).                 
To take another discipline dedicated to language into account, Arrojo and 
Rajagopalan scrutinise John Searle‘s view on the matter, particularly in his 1979 book 
Expression and Meaning. Differently from Sadock, Searle does not propose an opposition 
between literal and metaphorical meanings: ―Many writers on the subject (...) think there are 
two kinds of sentence meaning, literal and metaphorical. However, sentences and words have 
only the meanings that they have‖ (SEARLE 1979, 77). For Searle, the secret lies in the 
speaker‘s attitude or intention: 
Strictly speaking, whenever we talk about the metaphorical meaning of a word, 
expression, or sentence, we are talking about what a speaker might utter it to be, in a way 
that departs from what a word, expression or sentence actually means. We are, therefore, 
talking about possible speaker‘s intentions (idem).   
Therefore, the American philosopher proposes a distinction between what speakers mean by 
uttering certain words or sentences – ―speaker‘s utterance meaning‖ – and what words or 
expressions actually mean – ―word‖ or ―sentence meaning‖ (idem). For the Brazilian 
theorists then, Searle‘s new approach based on speech acts is not exactly that ―new‖ when 
one compares it to Sadock‘s or even Rumelhart‘s (ARROJO [1992] 2003, 50). The difference 
is that for Searle ―o poder da intenção do autor é (...) tão absoluto que resiste ao tempo ou a 
qualquer outra mudança‖, or the author‘s intention is so powerful that it endures time as well 
as any other change (idem, 52). 
 From the point of view of literary theory, the Brazilian thinkers assert that even 
though the distinctions and dichotomies applied to ―literal‖ and ―metaphoric meaning‖ have 
different names, they are nothing but obvious masks for the same linguistic categories. 
Kenneth Burke, for instance, distinguishes between ―poetic meaning‖ and ―semantic 
meaning‖ (idem, 50). Not surprisingly, the former refers to the speaker‘s or author‘s emotions 
and subjective attitude, whereas the latter concerns neutral, emotionless utterances (idem). 
Therefore, based on the categorisation proposed by Burk, one could easily draw very similar 
underlying presuppositions to the ones Rajagopalan, Arrojo and I suggested above (see 
previous page), based on Sadock‘s categorisation.  
  
116 
 Another element that appears to be common to all the theorists analysed in the paper 
in question is the fact that, when looking at specific examples, they all have great difficulty 
sticking to the categories they themselves propose (idem, 50-52). Moreover, both traditional 
linguistics and literary theory seem to share the hope (the ―theory hope‖) that one day a clear 
distinction between literal and non-literal speech will be devised: ―Como a lingüística 
tradicional que, em vão, persegue o algoritmo da literalidade, a teoria da literatura se 
empenha em encontrar a fórmula infalível que pudesse esclarecer para sempre a 
especificidade da linguagem poética‖, or in the same way as traditional linguistics perceives 
the algorithm of literalness in vain, literary theory strives to clarify the specificity of poetic 
language once and for all (idem, 53). 
 At the end of their paper, Rajagopalan and Arrojo turn once again to Nietzsche, Freud 
and Derrida. From the aforementioned essay ‗Über die Wahrheit und Lüge im 
außermoralischen Sinne‘, they take a very interesting quotation in which the German 
philosopher defends that the meaning taken as literal today was once a metaphor created – 
and not discovered – by man (idem): 
Erste Metapher. Das Bild wird nachgeformt in einem Laut! Zweite Metapher. Und 
jedesmal vollständiges Überspringen der Sphäre, mitten hinein in eine ganz andere und 
neue. Man kann sich einen Menschen denken, der ganz taub ist und nie eine Empfindung 
des Tones und der Musik gehabt hat: wie dieser etwa die chladnischen Klangfiguren im 
Sande anstaunt, ihre Ursachen im Erzittern des Saite findet und nun darauf schwören 
wird, jetzt müsse es wissen, was die Menschen den »Ton« nennen, so geht es uns allen 
mit der Sprache. Wir glauben etwas von den Dingen selbst zu wissen, wenn wir von 
Bäumen, Farben, Schnee und Blumen reden, und besitzen doch nichts als Metaphern der 
Dinge, die den ursprünglichen Wesenheiten ganz und gar nicht entsprechen. Wie der Ton 
als Sandfigur, so nimmt sich das rätselhafte X des Dings an sich einmal als Nervenreiz, 
dann als Bild, endlich als Laut aus (NIETZSCHE 1873, 2).   
 To complement Nietzsche‘s thought-provoking proposition, the authors mention 
Freud and his paramount contribution to the relativisation of things because of the 
unconscious. After Freud, one cannot speak of sciences, truths and ―literal‖ meanings that are 
not products of interpretations, mediations between man and the world. In this light, 
propositions such as Sadock‘s, Rumelhart‘s, Searle‘s and Burke‘s would be unacceptable. To 
finish their paper, the authors comment on Derrida‘s 1982 essay ‗White Mythology: 
Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy‘ (translated by Alan Bass), which first came out in 1972 
under the title ‗La Mythologie Blanche (la Métaphore dans le Texte Philosophique)‘: 
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(...) esse Ŗhomem brancoŗ de que fala Derrida empreende uma busca quixotesca daquilo 
que nunca encontrará fora de si mesmo. Portanto, a literalidade Ŕ a neutralidade, a 
razão, o puramente objetivo Ŕ é a grande metáfora, a metáfora primordial criada pelo 
homem que, entretanto, precisa se esquecer de que a inventou para não se lembrar de 
sua finitude e de suas limitações humanas (ARROJO [1992] 2003, 55). 
(...) this ―white man‖ about whom Derrida speaks has embarked on a quixotic search for 
something he will never find outside himself.  Therefore, literalness – neutrality, reason 
or pure objectivity – is the great metaphor, the primordial metaphor created by man who 
must forget he created it in order not to remember his own finitude and human 
limitations. 
   Therefore, it is in this sense that Arrojo and Rajagopalan defend the notion of 
literalness as the ―primordial metaphor‖ – let us not forget the title of the paper: Literalness: 
The Primordial Metaphor. As Nietzsche asserts (see indented quotation above), strictly 
speaking the entire use of language can be perceived as metaphorical, as there is no intrinsic 
relationship between the world and language – signs are indeed arbitrary, as Saussure would 
say. These ―metaphors‖, which – let us not forget – were created by man, gradually become 
canonical and widespread to the extent that man seems to forget that he himself created them 
and promoted their establishment; to the extent that man feels the need to look for them 
outside himself, as something that exists prior to and beyond his own existence. In this light, 
it seems that the main aim of this paper is to ask readers to take the so-called pillars of our 
society – ―neutrality, reason and pure objectivity‖ (see above) – with a large pinch of 
postmodern salt.  
 And perhaps this aim, or rather the way it is presented in this text and not only in this 
text (see above), could give rise to criticism both from those who defend poststructuralist 
views and (particularly) from those who oppose them
65
. For in their effort to deconstruct the 
works of those perceived as essentialist, they appear to fully dismiss these works. In the paper 
in question, it seems as though their aim were to fully discard the distinction between ―literal‖ 
speech and ―figurative‖ speech – though they never actually say it with these words. In the 
hands of readers with little knowledge of poststructuralist thought, their paper could well be 
interpreted as an attempt to completely abolish this distinction as it cannot be formulated in 
absolute terms. But rather than the promotion of full invalidation, the point appears to be to 
simply call the readers‘ attention to the illusory, fragile character of allegedly objective 
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 I will come back to the issue of the multifaceted character of poststructuralist thought in Part IV below, 
mentioning examples of thinkers who would probably go as far as to argue that Arrojo‘s and Rajagopalan‘s 
attitude reveals a misreading of poststructuralist ideas.     
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distinctions such as literal meaning versus metaphorical meaning, to demand a more critical 
attitude, on the part of the reader, towards such distinctions. As we will see in different 
papers below as well, Arrojo‘s (and Rajagopalan‘s) words seem to imply a radicalism which, 
in the hands of those who oppose poststructuralist tendencies, becomes a powerful 
―counterattack‖ weapon. But let us not dismiss here the possibility of an intentional 
radicalism, typical of scholars who want to establish new tendencies in a given field, who 
want to oppose mainstream, canonical ideas. Indeed, a radical, militant attitude is very much 
in line with Arrojo‘s standpoint, as already argued in Chapter 1 above. I will come back to 
this question later in this chapter.  
 But let us look back for a moment at the discussion Arrojo and Rajagopalan carry out 
on Searle‘s propositions. The debate between Searle and Derrida on speech act theory (see 
Part III, Subchapter 3.1 below) stretched from the 70s to the 90s (see footnote 115 below) and 
indeed raised many of the questions discussed in this last essay by the two Brazilian 
professors. In yet another paper, entitled ‗Searle e a Noção de Literalidade‘ (Searle and the 
Notion of Literalness), Arrojo and Rajagopalan address Searle‘s language theory specifically. 
They begin the essay by announcing that, as far as Searle‘s work is concerned, their 
impression is that the American philosopher has strived to develop first and foremost a theory 
of literalness (idem, 113): 
Há diversos momentos críticos na evolução do pensamento filosófico de Searle que 
revelam um desejo subliminar de encontrar um valor constante, um elemento qualquer 
que pudesse ser estável e irredutível, através do qual se tornasse possível a compreensão 
desse fenômeno tão volúvel que chamamos de linguagem (idem).    
There is a series of critical moments in the development of Searle‘s thinking that unveil a 
subliminal desire to find a constant value, an element of stable and irreducible nature that 
would allow for the understanding of this ever so changeable phenomenon we call 
language.               
They then list three of these moments perceived as critical, namely (i) Searle‘s disagreement 
with Austin as far as illocutionary acts are concerned, (ii) his disagreement with Keith 
Donnellan‘s propositions about the issue of reference, and (iii) the combination of Grice‘s 
pragmatics and the speech act theory, which in turn led to the notion of indirect speech act 
(idem). 
 As for (i) his disagreement with Austin, Searle was the first to suggest, back in the 
late 60s, that the distinction between locutionary acts and illocutionary acts was not sound 
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because they were not self-excluding; in other words, there were many cases in which 
illocutionary acts comprised locutionary acts. For Arrojo and Rajagopalan, the problem lies 
in the evidence he brings forth to prove his point that signification itself sometimes suffices 
to determine the illocutionary force of a sentence. When analysing an utterance and showing 
that its illocutionary force is already clear on the so-called locutionary level, Searle warns 
that this utterance must be serious and literal, as opposed to metaphorical or sarcastic. For the 
Brazilian authors, Searle reached an impasse, closed a vicious circle: for in order for his 
proposition to be true, in order for a locutionary act to be able to reveal, by itself, its entire 
signification, it depends on its literalness – but its literalness also depends on the ability of the 
locutionary act to unveil its full meaning, and on it goes (idem, 114-115). However, Searle 
appears to find solace under his principle of expressibility, whereby ―whatever can be meant, 
can be said‖ (SEARLE 1979, 68). This principle, claim the Brazilian scholars, is more of a 
linguistic dogma as it is largely taken for granted within Searle‘s theory. For them, this 
principle is an apologia to literalness, a metaphysical commitment to the notion of literalness 
(ARROJO [1992] 2003, 115). In this sense, this first instance taken from Searle‘s work 
reveals indeed a ―subliminal desire‖ (see indented quotation above) to define and establish 
literalness as a constant, universal value. 
 Similarly, (ii) Searle‘s disagreement with Donnellan, years later, appears to point 
towards this wish for a theory of language centred on a notion of literalness, of fully objective 
meanings. In 1966, Donnellan claimed to have solved the problem of reference by devising 
two categories, two uses of definite descriptions, namely attributive and referential 
(DONNELLAN 1966, 364): 
A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something 
about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description 
referentially in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to enable his audience 
to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or 
thing. In the first case the definite description might be said to occur essentially, for the 
speaker wishes to assert something about whatever or whoever fits that description; but in 
the referential use the definite description is merely one tool for doing a certain job (…)   
 Searle‘s objection is expressed in his 1979 paper ‗Referential and Attributive‘, in 
which he proposes yet another set of categories, this time more comprehensive than 
Donnellan‘s: the pure, objective meaning of an utterance versus the meaning intended by the 
speaker. Rajagopalan and Arrojo demonstrate how Searle departs from this basic distinction 
to fully discard Donnellan‘s views on reference, once again centring the discussion on these 
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constant, literal meanings – which, in the view of the Brazilian scholars, Searle does not 
really demonstrate, but simply takes for granted as some sort of dogma.  
 As for (iii) Searle‘s indirect speech acts (see SEARLE 1975), Rajagopalan and Arrojo 
explain that his very defence of a first, objective speech act that leads to the performance of 
this same speech act, as opposed to a speech act that performs a further speech act indirectly, 
unveils once again his strong belief in literal meanings as a constant value in linguistics. 
Indeed, this expectation is confirmed not only by these three instances taken from Searle‘s 
work, but also by two papers dedicated specifically to the question of literal meanings – 
‗Literal Meaning‘ (1978) and ‗Metaphor‘ (1979). For the Brazilian thinkers, even though 
Searle announces in both papers that he intends to challenge the mainstream ideas associated 
with the question of literalness, he ends up endorsing these ideas as he believes first and 
foremost in the possibility of solely objective, self-explanatory and ambiguity-free meanings. 
For them, Searle disregards Freud‘s propositions about the unconscious, also neglecting the 
fact that utterances are invariably interpreted by listeners who, in turn, are not capable of 
recovering the speaker‘s intentions in their totality (ARROJO [1992] 2003, 120). 
 In conclusion, it seems that however much Rajagopalan and Arrojo agree that Searle‘s 
contribution may have had a great impact on contemporary linguistics, they remain very 
critical of these contributions. Their criticism stems from Searle‘s obstinate defence of literal 
meanings without much consideration or questioning, a concept – however ill-defined –
around which he structures most of his propositions. They quite rightly assert that Searle‘s 
project is an instance of a logocentric project, a project based on words that can function out 
of context and whose meaning can be defined regardless of the sender and of the situation.  
        In another joint paper entitled ‗A Crise da Metalinguagem: Uma Perspectiva 
Interdisciplinar‘ (The Crisis of Metalanguage: An Interdisciplinary Perspective) Kanavillil 
Rajagpopalan and Rosemary Arrojo analyse once again the way in which linguistics and 
literary theory describe the same phenomenon, which in this case is language in a broader 
sense (or more specifically metalanguage). According to the authors, institutionally speaking 
linguistics and literary theory have language as their main object of study, but despite this 
apparent confluence of aims there is hardly any conflict between the two disciplines because 
―o tácito acordo mútuo faz com que cada lado se preocupe com justamente aquilo que os 
seus vizinhos tendem a descartar como menos relevantes‖, or their tacit, mutual agreement 
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allows them to worry about the issues that their neighbours discard as less relevant (ARROJO 
[1992] 2003, 57). In the case of linguists, they claim to have the key to the language enigma, 
whereas those in literary studies take pride in its allegedly exclusive access to the aesthetic 
values of language (idem). Departing from this tacit agreement, Arrojo and Rajagopalan 
explain that their objective is to show how the two disciplines are not that far away from each 
other as they claim to be, particularly because their metalanguages cannot be as hermetically 
isolated and impermeable as they appear to be (idem, 58).    
 By looking at the issue of metalanguage within linguistics, the Brazilian professors 
assert that the main belief that permeates the entire discipline is the possibility of a neutral 
metalanguage – neutral in the sense that it has not been contaminated by everyday language. 
For them, Bloomfield‘s position on this matter is a corollary of this belief. Indeed, the 
American linguist defends, in his 1944 paper ‗Secondary and Tertiary Responses to 
Language‘, that one must distinguish between what laymen say in a certain language and 
what they say about a certain language (idem). In other words, the metalanguage of 
linguistics cannot be contaminated by what Bloomfield calls ―folk linguistics‖ (apud 
ARROJO [1992] 2003, 58); rather, it must be purely and rigorously scientific. As the 
Brazilian authors very clearly demonstrate, this anxiety to find a metalanguage ―livre dos 
males que afligem seu próprio objeto de estudo‖, or free from the evils that afflict its own 
object of study (idem), has its roots in logic tradition. Their thesis is that today linguists still 
seem to be trying to accomplish, in natural language, what can only be done in formal 
languages, as the Polish logician Alfred Tarski proved in the 1930s. Tarski‘s conclusions may 
be roughly summarised as follows: in order for one to formulate the truth of a given system, 
one must resort to a different system, more complex and complete than the first one. From 
this point of view, in order to be fully scientific, linguistics would need to come up with a 
system more complex than natural language, which would then work as its metalanguage. 
However, one such task is impossible because natural languages work as their own 
metalanguage. As the Brazilian scholars summarise (idem, 59): 
(...) para Tarski, estava definitivamente descartada a possibilidade de se definir, na 
língua natural, a noção de verdade sem cair em paradoxos, pois a língua natural 
continha sua própria metalinguagem (o que, em última análise, equivale a reconhecer o 
caráter auto-referencial da língua natural).           
(...) for Tarski, the possibility of defining the notion of truth in natural languages without 
meeting paradoxes was fully discarded because natural languages contained their own 
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metalanguage (which in other words is the same as acknowledging the self-referential 
character of natural language).   
          Yet, despite Tarski‘s evident pessimism, linguistics appears to have found consolation 
in the works of the British anti-formalist John L. Austin, particularly in his distinction 
between the ―serious‖ (speech-acts intended to work literally) and the ―non serious‖ (speech-
acts of actors and poets); not surprisingly, with the former being his object of study (idem, 
60). I will come back to Austin‘s categories further in this section.  
The way literary theory approaches its metalanguage is, according to Arrojo and 
Rajagopalan, strikingly similar, particularly within North-American new criticism. Critics as 
William K. Wimsatt, for example, advocate a clear distinction between the literary or poetic 
language and the language the critics use to describe it (idem, 61). It is as Christopher Norris 
summarises it:  
New Critical method was rational enough in its mode of argumentation but kept a firm 
distance between its own methodology (...) and poetic language. (...) The poem in short 
was a sacrosanct object whose autonomy demanded a proper respect for the difference 
between it and the language that the critics used to describe it (NORRIS [1982] 2002, 8). 
From this point of view, as the Brazilian authors assert, these apparently completely different 
disciplines seem to have embarked on the same logocentric quest for scientific distinctions 
between language and metalanguage, poetic language and common language; they seem to 
nurture the same illusion whereby man would be able to look at the world and not become 
mixed with it (ARROJO [1992] 2003, 61), which Freud and Nietzsche have already proven to 
be impossible.  
 Arrojo and Rajagopalan conclude their paper by mentioning Derrida‘s deconstruction 
of important texts on philosophy, linguistics, literary theory and psychoanalysis, as well as its 
subsequent impact on the Humanities since the early 1970s. Besides, they mention the 
contributions of three other theorists whose works cannot be labelled as deconstructionist but 
as poststructuralist, namely Foucault, Barthes (the ―last‖ one) and Fish. Thanks to the works 
of these theorists, interdisciplinarity is no longer a mere effort of good will, but rather a 
necessity, an inevitable condition (idem, 62). As their arguments in this short essay illustrate, 
linguistics and literary theory (to mention only two areas within the Humanities) appear to 
share the same logocentric matrix, some of the same dilemmas and illusions. In this sense, 
given its more overtly interdisciplinary character, translation studies is an area where the 
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―crisis of metalanguage‖, as the Brazilian authors put it, together with the logocentric 
dilemmas and illusions, is made more evident. 
 In view of their conclusions in this particular paper, one wonders whether the 
institutional and academic separation of linguistics, literary studies and translation studies – 
as it is observed at numerous European universities, for instance – is indeed mutually 
beneficial (as already addressed under 2 in part I above). If interdisciplinarity is no longer ―a 
mere effort of good will‖, but rather an ―inevitable condition‖, would it not make more sense 
to have these areas actively collaborate? I will come back to this issue in sections 2.3 and 2.4, 
as well as in Part IV, Chapter 3 below.  
 For now let us look at another short paper, entitled ‗Compreender X Interpretar e a 
Questão da Tradução‘ (Understanding vs. Interpreting and the Question of Translation). 
Arrojo begins the paper by listing the countless dichotomies produced by ―our logocentric 
tradition‖, amongst which understanding versus interpreting is one of the most influential in 
translation studies (idem, 67). As she explains, from an essentialist point of view, 
―understating‖ and ―interpreting‖ would be different activities, the former being the 
objective, neutral decoding of words and texts, and the latter the subjective, derivative of the 
first. In other words, one would first have to understand a certain text correctly, without 
interfering with its original meanings, in order to be able to interpret it afterwards, thereby 
revealing one‘s own ideology.  
   Arrojo stresses that this recovery of stable meanings is largely taken for granted in 
the Western world, permeating most of our notions of knowledge and language (idem, 68). 
Nevertheless, it is in translation theory that the opposition between understanding and 
interpreting becomes particularly problematic. This issue has already come up in Part I 
above, where Arrojo‘s paper ‗The Revision of the Traditional Gap between Theory and 
Practice and the Empowerment of Translation in Postmodern Times‘ (1998b) was the basis of 
the discussion about translation theory. In this 1998 paper, Arrojo mentions the works of 
theorists belonging to different areas (Mounin, Newmark, Baker, Lefevere, amongst others) 
and how all of them appear to partake in this very notion of stable meanings and neutral 
readings of texts (understanding rather than interpreting). Here, in the paper in question 
(ARROJO [1992] 2003, 67-70), Arrojo mentions a Brazilian example of a translation model 
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devised in 1984 and whose objectives and limitations resemble the ones labelled 
―essentialist‖ in her 1998 paper.  
 In 1984, Francis Aubert (see Chapter 3 in Part 1 above) published a paper called 
‗Descrição e Quantificação de Dados em Tradutologia‘ (Data Description and Quantification 
in Translatology) in the Brazilian journal Tradução e Comunicação Ŕ Revista de Tradutores 
(no. 4). According to Arrojo, although Aubert acknowledges the limitations of linguistics, as 
well as its difficulty in dealing with subjectivity, he believes that in the future these 
constraints will be unravelled thanks to the advances made in the so-called ―linguistic 
science‖ (ARROJO [1992] 2003, 69). Therefore, relying on his underlying belief in the 
dichotomy understanding versus interpreting, Aubert sets out to execute his project of 
translation systematisation, which in turn should lead ―at least‖ to the following 
consequences:  
(1) o estabelecimento de correlações significativas entre as modalidades de tradução e a 
tipologia das línguas envolvidas; 
(2) o estabelecimento de correlações significativas entre as modalidades de tradução e a 
tipologia textual; e 
(3) a delimitação do escopo de liberdade do tradutor dentro dos limites impostos pelas 
restrições estruturais, culturais e textuais, ou seja, determinar a margem de variação 
inter- e intra-individual (apud ARROJO [1992] 2003, 69).  
(1) the establishment of significant correlations between translation types and the 
typology of the languages involved; 
(2) the establishment of significant correlations between translation types and text 
typologies; and 
(3) the scope delimitation of the translator‘s freedom within the constraints posed by 
structure, culture and text; in other words, the establishment of the inter- and intra-
individual margins of variation.                            
 Not surprisingly, by the end of the essay Aubert concedes that the current version of 
his model still contains a number of limitations particularly because it cannot deal with the 
subject of creativity in translation. As Arrojo points out, he admits that the data he gathered 
does not allow for the generalisations he intended to make; hence he himself perceives his 
model as not yet ready to contribute to translation teaching and practice (idem, 70).  
 Projects such as Aubert‘s66 – or Newmark‘s, Graham‘s, Mounin‘s, amongst others, as 
Arrojo discusses in ARROJO (1998b – see Chapter 5, Part I above) – are exemplary of the 
                                                             
66 Let us bear in mind here that the paper by Aubert that Arrojo analyses was published in 1984, and that since 
then he has written numerous different papers. It is beyond the scope of the present thesis to examine to what 
extent these essentialist tendencies of which Arrojo speaks remain in Aubert‘s work until today.   
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logocentric tradition, and the enormous gulf between their objectives and their achievements 
illustrates how illusory the possibility of neutral understanding as opposed to subjective 
interpreting is. Indeed, Arrojo summarises the question as follows: 
O projeto logocêntrico está fadado à frustração e ao insucesso pois ignora a 
temporalidade, a finitude e a mortalidade de todos os empreendimentos humanos e trata 
categorias inevitavelmente marcadas pelo tempo e produzidas por sujeitos sempre 
situados em algum contexto sócio-cultural como instâncias Ŗdivinasŗ, acima de 
qualquer perspectiva ou interesse subjetivo (idem). 
The logocentric project is doomed to failure and frustration because it takes temporality 
for granted, as well as the finite and mortal condition of every human enterprise; it 
perceives as ―divine‖ and above individual perspectives and subjective interests 
categories that are inevitably marked by time and produced by people inserted in a given 
socio-cultural context.   
 In other words, research in the field of translation studies – as well as any kind of 
research for that matter – should always have this finite, human perspective in its horizons. 
From this point of view, translation studies is actually an extremely fruitful field largely 
unexplored. Indeed, this is what Arrojo discusses in another paper entitled ‗A Pesquisa em 
Teoria da Tradução ou o que Poderia Haver de Novo no Front‘ (Research in Translation 
Theory: What is New on the Front‘). The Brazilian scholar begins the penultimate essay of 
her book O Signo Desconstruído by scrutinising the dichotomy theory versus practice. This 
basic opposition, which is taken for granted in most fields of knowledge, is perceived as 
particularly problematic in translation studies (see Part I above) precisely because of the 
uniqueness of the translational act (idem, 107). 
 Arrojo suggests that the etymology of the words theory and practice alludes to the 
image of the observer and the object that is observed. ―Theory‖, from Greek and Latin, would 
be closely related to the verbs ―observe‖, ―examine‖, ―investigate‖, whereas ―practice‖, from 
Greek, is somewhat similar to the idea of ―action‖ (HOUAISS 2001). As already discussed in 
Part I above, one tends to associate different ideas to the notions of theory and practice 
precisely because, as the Brazilian scholar very aptly explains, one cannot establish an 
objective and clear division between theory and practice. In other words, different theories 
will actually create different objects (or practices), and not simply and neutrally describe the 
same objects (ARROJO [1992] 2003, 108).  
 The dichotomy theory versus practice goes straight to the heart of one of Derrida‘s 
most central deconstructionist efforts, namely the dichotomy subject versus object which, 
  
126 
together with the question of the signifier and the signified, makes up the core of his work 
(see the beginning of 2.1 above). As Gayatri C. Spivak explains in the translator‘s preface to 
the English version of Derrida‘s De la Grammatologie (Of Grammatology), 
The opposition of the subject and the object, upon which the possibility of objective 
descriptions rests, is also questioned by the grammatological approach. The description 
of the object is as contaminated by the patterns of the subject‘s desire as is the subject 
constituted by that never-fulfilled desire. We can go yet further and repeat that the 
structure of binary oppositions in general is questioned by grammatology (SPIVAK 
[1976] 1997, lix). 
Therefore, as subject and object, theory and practice mutually and constantly define and 
shape each other, with ideology playing a major role in this process. Back to Arrojo‘s paper, 
after a brief analysis of the conflict theory versus practice, she returns to the question she 
asked in the title of her essay, i.e. what are the new research possibilities in translation 
studies? For her, what seemed particularly auspicious at the time (i.e. the early 1990s) was, 
indeed, ideology, as the set of values and convictions that permeates the production of 
meanings in a particular place and moment in time, and makes up the perspectives through 
which one theorises and classifies the world. She is interested, in other words, in the way 
every theory (or science) redefines its objects of study and creates its own truths (ARROJO 
[1992] 2003, 111-112). She closes this essay by mentioning Thomas Kuhn and his 1970 book 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in which he advocates that new theories and sciences 
do not arise and become a new paradigm because they ―find‖ new ―truths‖, but rather because 
of their persuasiveness and ability to identify with the needs and interests of the community 
to which it is targeted (idem, 112 – see Chapter 6 in Part I above). In this sense, Arrojo 
appears to be interested precisely in these underlying motivations and interests that make 
translation theories canonical or not.   
 The last paper we will analyse in the present section is actually the antepenultimate 
paper of the book O Signo Desconstruído, entitled ‗O Ensino da Tradução e seus Limites: 
Por uma Abordagem Menos Ilusória‘ (or The Limits of Translator Training: Towards a Less 
Illusory Approach). Arrojo opens the essay with a classroom experience she went through in 
a translation course within the BA in English (Translation Studies) at the PUC-SP (Pontifícia 
Universidade Católica de São Paulo). In short, the anecdote goes as follows: one of her 
students was translating a computer manual and, not having found a number of words and 
expressions she needed to translate, the student turned to the teacher (Arrojo) with a list of 
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words, requesting her to provide correct translations. Perplexed, Arrojo asked the student 
why she believed Arrojo should have the answers to her questions, to which the student 
replied that, as a translation specialist, Arrojo should know the Portuguese words that 
matched those English terms (idem, 99).  
 Arrojo then explains how her student‘s attitude is very much in line with ―our 
logocentric tradition‖, whereby the expectation towards translator training is precisely to 
enable students to translate anything – as long as from and into the languages they have 
mastered – anywhere, anyhow – even a list of words detached from a context, as was the case 
of the manual in question (idem, 100). The Brazilian thinker speaks of the term ―logocentric‖ 
as defended by Derrida, i.e. as a strong underlying belief in stable meanings, which in turn 
allows for the perfect and clear-cut distinction between subject and object; in other words, it 
allows for the idea that meanings can function regardless of the context in which they are 
embedded and regardless of the subject that makes use of them. Another consequence of this 
belief is the idea of literal meanings, meanings inherent to words and words only, once again 
completely apart from contexts and subjects, as pure, detachable objects.  
 For her, this ―Cartesian‖ notion of language is strongly predominant in translation 
studies, as Nida‘s famous metaphor of the train very aptly illustrates (idem, 101 – refer to 
page 69 below). Seen from this perspective, translating (or interpreting) should first and 
foremost be free from the translator‘s interference, from his/her interpretation as such. In this 
light, the main objective of translator and interpreter training should be to have students 
acquire as many translation pairs, as many equivalent words and expressions as possible. 
Devising glossaries and word lists would thus be an efficient method to assist students in this 
task, and so would translation exercises that focus primarily on these transferences – rather 
than on the translation process itself (idem, 103).  
 As Arrojo quite rightly asserts, one such notion of translator and interpreter training 
implies that all one needs in order to translate is the knowledge of the languages involved and 
a suitable glossary or dictionary. Further, one such notion of translator and interpreter 
training may imply that (idem) 
profissionais em formação (…) são (…) colecionadores de significados congelados e 
intercambiáveis de uma língua para outra e de um texto para outro e, o que é ainda mais 
grave, a alienação, o não-reconhecimento de seu papel essencial de autor e construtor de 
significados.  
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professionals in training (…) are (…) collectors of frozen and interchangeable meanings 
from one language or text to another; but what is even worse is the alienation, the 
nonacknowledgement of their essential authorial role as meaning builders.     
For her, these implications are very much in tune with her student‘s expectations. Because 
Arrojo was an experienced translator and translation professor, her student thought it was 
only natural for Arrojo to know a far larger number of equivalent expressions (in their case in 
English and Portuguese) than she did.  
 The Brazilian professor then describes what, to her, should be the aim of translator 
and interpreter training. The starting point should always be the questioning of stable 
meanings and activities or theories that imply the existence of stable meanings. In Arrojo‘s 
view, pupils must first and foremost learn that readings, interpretations and translations 
inevitably reflect not only the subject-reader or translator, but also the time and cultural 
community in question (idem). In this light, more than mastering one-to-one correspondence 
between languages, translators should know their cultural community well, the tendencies 
and characteristics that are perceived as adequate in that community at that moment (idem). 
 As for her student, Arrojo believes that the starting point of her translation task should 
have been, rather than the search for exact matches, the familiarisation with that text type 
within that community – the acceptable format, the jargon, the style. Surely at some point she 
would have to look for glossaries and specialised dictionaries, but this step should by no 
means constitute the out-and-out translation process. 
 As regards the limitations of translator and interpreter training, Arrojo concedes that 
no course can embrace each and every career possibility offered within the area of translation 
and interpreting. In contrast, nevertheless, one can build awareness within a translation or 
interpreting course – awareness of the role that translators and interpreters play in society and 
in history; awareness of the attitude expected of these professionals, and so on and so forth 
(idem, 105). As an example of an awareness-raising activity, she suggests the critical 
comparison of canonical translations and translations done by students, aiming at showing 
how each text seems to be bound to a certain ideology, a certain moment in history, a certain 
interpretation (idem). Finally, Arrojo admits that this awareness-raising process can be rather 
painful and laborious as one must constantly question and challenge ―common sense‖, well-
established precepts produced by our age-old ―logocentric tradition‖ (idem). 
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 The issue of translator and interpreter training has already been addressed in Part I 
above, and will be discussed in detail in Part IV below as well. Arrojo‘s reasoning in this last 
paper seems very much in tune with poststructuralist thought in general, particularly in terms 
of the idea both of a structure of higher education that questions its ―utilitarian purposes‖ and 
of a theory that is suspicious of its ―utilitarian purposes‖ as well (see Chapter 2, Part I above). 
Theory and higher education are more awareness-raising than practice or market-oriented.      
 It is interesting to notice that Arrojo‘s propositions in this last essay are not at all 
radical. Thinking about it, much of what she says is undoubtedly a reality, at least to a certain 
extent, even in the classroom of the most essentialist professor. Surely every glossary, for 
example, is a product of circumstances and time and must be updated from time to time – and 
both teachers and pupils do realise it. Dictionaries are not immortal either, and most students 
are certainly aware of the need to have new, up-to-date dictionaries. Furthermore, I suppose 
many pupils probably know that they should be suspicious of dictionaries, that language is far 
more dynamic than a dictionary allows it to be and that the actual use of language may be a 
far cry from dictionary definitions. I am also convinced that countless translation teachers use 
Arrojo‘s translation comparison exercise and probably even arrive at similar conclusions. 
 The difference, however, lies in the perspective – is the glass half full or half empty? 
Arrojo‘s intention seems to be to stress this finiteness, this instability, to put it in the spotlight 
instead of simply brushing the issue in passing. For even if the most essentialist person may 
be aware of the finiteness of glossaries and dictionaries, many certainly do not take this 
finiteness beyond that level and apply it to language as a whole, to translation, to science, to 
human undertakings in general. As for the translation exercise proposed by Arrojo, even 
though numerous translation teachers (whose affinities are not necessarily poststructuralist) 
may use it in a similar fashion and even come to similar conclusions, I imagine their 
objective would not be to show how translations reflect personal choices, cultural 
communities and ideology; rather, the purpose of one such exercise would probably be to 
determine which translation is better, without much consideration of the whys and 
wherefores of these conclusions (for a specific example of this attitude, refer to Chapter 3 in 
Part III below).  
 As already mentioned above, although many of Arrojo‘s works may often (sometimes 
unfairly) be criticised for their radicalism, this last essay could be criticised for not bringing 
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many new contributions. But once again, let us not forget that the relationship between 
structuralism and poststructuralism (see Chapter 6 in Part I above) is one of 
complementariness as well, and therefore full radicalism is not in question. The point is more 
often than not to call attention to a shift in existing perspectives – as is the case of this paper 
by Arrojo – instead of proposing entirely new perspectives. 
 The question of the radicalism often expected of so-called poststructuralist thinkers 
will come up time and again in Part III below and will be addressed in Part IV as well – and 
so will the question of the relationship between structuralism and poststructuralism. Let us 
now look at the second book by Arrojo, originally published six years before O Signo 
Desconstruído, in which some of the issues discussed here will be brought up again.                                         
2.2 Oficina de Tradução 
Nossa tradução de qualquer texto, poético ou não, será 
fiel não ao texto ‗original‘, mas àquilo que 
consideramos ser o texto original, àquilo que 
consideramos constituí-lo. 
Rosemary Arrojo
67
 
Oficina de Tradução (or Translation Workshop) is perhaps one of the most well-known 
books on translation in Brazil. It is part of the syllabus of a number of translation courses 
both at BA and MA level. Even those professors who do not fully agree with Arrojo‘s 
allegedly radical propositions seem to find the book an excellent classroom resource (I will 
come back to this question later). This book also makes up a section of the anthology 
organised by Michaela Wolf in 1997, entitled Übersetzungswissenschaft in Brasilien: 
Beiträge zum Status „OriginalŖ und Übersetzung, as some of its chapters are German 
versions of chapters in Arrojo‘s book.   
 Oficina de Tradução first came out in 1986 and was in its 5
th
 edition in 2010. Unlike 
O Signo Desconstruído (see section above), which might be perceived as a more theoretical
68
 
book, Oficina de Tradução is meant to be more practice-oriented. As the author explains in 
the first chapter (ARROJO [1986] 2002, 7-10), the name of the book was taken from a course 
                                                             
67 This excerpt is quoted and translated later in this section (please refer to page 138 below). 
68 Here I mean ―theoretical‖ in the sense of a discourse that stimulates reflection rather than a discourse that 
openly refers to a particular practice (please refer to Part I above).  
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she had done at the John Hopkins University in 1981, which was indeed called ―Translation 
Workshop‖. This course was mostly practice-oriented, and the main task of its six 
participants was to compare and discuss their own translations, along with canonical 
translations of literary works (idem, 9). Therefore, it is in this ―hands-on‖ mood that Arrojo 
sets out to write this very short book – its 9 chapters comprise just over 80 pages. 
 Notwithstanding its practical character, the first few chapters of the book – 
particularly chapters 2, 3 and 4 – are more theoretical and philosophical, very much in line 
with O Signo Desconstruído (see section above). The abundant use of examples, however, 
makes these chapters sound less abstract. In Chapter 2, named ―A Questão do Texto Original‖ 
(or On Original Texts
69
), the author departs from traditional views on translation, namely 
Catford‘s, Nida‘s and Tytler‘s, to build the notions of ―original‖ and ―translation‖ (idem, 11-
13). Given the target public Arrojo has in mind (i.e. mainly translation students), she explains 
these authors‘ views very carefully by using allegories and examples. Then she turns to a 
short-story by the Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges, called ‗Pierre Menard, Autor del 
Quijote‘ (BORGES 1986, 17-22 – see Chapter 1 above and Sections 2.3 and 2.4  below), in 
order to relativise these traditional concepts of translation and originality proposed by the 
abovementioned translation scholars.  
 In Borges‘ story, a first-person narrator tells the reader about the works of Pierre 
Menard, a fictitious Frenchman of letters. The analysis of a recently published catalogue of 
Menard‘s works reveals his evident affinity with authors such as Descartes, Leibniz, John 
Wilkins, Ramón Lull and George Boole, who in turn had dreamt of and devised projects for a 
non-arbitrary, universal language. Menard‘s works point towards his ambitious dream of 
reaching truth as an absolute, objective concept found in language; in other words, they point 
towards his vision of a language capable of neutralising ambiguities and immune to different 
interpretations, contexts and timeframes. Nevertheless, his very bibliography is enough to 
prove the impossibility of his aspirations since he himself appears to have produced different 
translations of the same text, as well as different versions of the same text, thus showing just 
how non-objective language can be (ARROJO [1986] 2002, 18).  
                                                             
69 In Wolf‘s anthology this chapter was translated as ‗Pierre Menard und eine neue Definition des ŖOriginalsŗ‘ 
by Johanna Klemm (WOLF 1997, 25-34).  
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 Yet it is not Menard‘s bibliography (his ―obra visible‖, as Borges‘ narrator puts it – 
BORGES 1986, 17) that makes the impossibility of his dream evident. Instead, it is his 
unique work, the one beneath the surface, the endlessly heroic one (―la subterránea, la 
interminablemente heroica, la impar‖ – idem, 19). This invisible work, as Arrojo calls it, 
consists of the reproduction of Cervantes‘ Don Quijote and is invisible because it was neither 
published nor concluded, in spite of its utmost importance (ARROJO [1986] 2002, 19). As 
the narrator explains, Menard 
no quería componer otro Quijote Ŕ lo cual es fácil Ŕ sino el Quijote. Inútil agregar que 
no encaró nunca una transcripción mecánica del original; no se proponía copiarlo. Su 
admirable ambición era producir unas páginas que coincidieran Ŕ palabra por palabra 
y línea por línea Ŕ con las de Miguel de Cervantes (BORGES 1986, 19 – his emphasis). 
did not want to compose another Quixote – which is easy – but the Quixote itself. 
Needless to say, he never contemplated a mechanical transcription of the original; he did 
not propose to copy it. His admirable intention was to produce a few pages which would 
coincide – word for word and line for line – with those of Miguel de Cervantes 
(BORGES 1964, 39 – translated by James E. Irby). 
In other words, all Menard had to do in order to accomplish his mission was to know Spanish 
well, to restore Catholic faith, to fight against Moors or Turks, to completely forget the 
history of Europe between 1602 (when Don Quijote first came out) and 1918 (when Menard 
lived) and, finally, to be Miguel de Cervantes (idem). Nonetheless, despite his efforts and 
optimism, all he managed to do was to copy Cervantes‘ words, one by one. Yet, this 
reproduction, however exact and accurate, still sounded different when compared to 
Cervantes‘ original precisely because the times were also different, hence the impossibility of 
perfect equality, perfect equivalence. Menard‘s undertaking was a total failure, as the narrator 
explains, because Cervantes‘ words did not have the same impact as they had had three 
centuries before, giving rise to different interpretations by different, ―contemporary‖ readers 
(idem, 21-22). 
 Menard‘s wish to achieve perfect totality, free from subjectivity and ambiguity, and 
then his subsequent confrontation with reality reminds me of a one-paragraph story also 
written by Borges, called ‗Del Rigor en la Ciencia‘ (BORGES 1972, 143). In this very short-
story a certain empire developed its cartography to such an advanced level of perfection that 
the map of the entire empire, for instance, coincided with the empire itself, both being exactly 
the same size. Given the uselessness of one such map, future generations ―lo entregaron a las 
inclemencias del Sol y de los Inviernos. En los desiertos del Oeste perduran despedazadas 
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Ruinas del Mapa, habitadas por Animales y por Mendigos‖ (idem) – ―abandoned it to the 
Inclemencies of the Sun and of the Winters. In the deserts of the West some mangled Ruins 
of the Map lasted on, inhabited by Animals and Beggars‖ (translated by Harold Morland and 
Mildred Boyer – BORGES 1985, 90).      
 In Arrojo‘s book, Borges‘ short-story ‗Pierre Menard, Autor del Quijote‘ works as an 
allegory of the traditional views on translation represented, in this case, by Catford, Nida and 
Tytler. According to the Brazilian thinker, Borges‘ story teaches us first to question 
traditional outlooks on language and then to perceive translation as far more than the mere 
transfer or transport of stable meanings through languages because, as our fictitious Pierre 
Menard showed us, even within a single language meanings can only be determined 
temporarily, within a given context and timeframe and according to a particular interpretation 
(ARROJO [1986] 2002, 22-23). In this sense, the image of the text as a receptacle of 
meanings is replaced by the image of the text as a palimpsest. The definition of the noun 
―palimpsest‖ reads as follows: ―a parchment or the like from which writing has been partially 
or completely erased to make room for another text‖ (Random House Unabridged 
Dictionary). As Arrojo puts it, ―o Řpalimpsestoř passa a ser o texto que se apaga, em cada 
comunidade cultural e em cada época, para dar lugar a outra escritura (ou interpretação, ou 
leitura, ou tradução) do Řmesmoř texto‖, or the ―palimpsest‖ is the text that is erased 
according to time or place so as to give rise to a new writing (or reading, or interpretation, or 
translation) of the ―same‖ text  (idem, 23-24 – her emphasis). The Brazilian theorist closes 
this chapter on original texts by stressing both the production of meanings inherent to any 
reading (or translation) task and the impossibility of protecting so-called ―original‖ meanings, 
as Borges‘ Menard illustrates so well (idem, 24). 
 Chapter 3, entitled ―A Questão do Texto Literário‖ (or On Literary Texts70), opens 
with a justification of the importance of literary texts in translation studies. For Arrojo, 
literary translation appears to be the Achilles‘ heel of any translation theory, neglected both 
by translation studies and literary theory – hence its significance for her work. Perhaps the 
initial and crucial hindrance lies in the difficulty in telling literary and non-literary texts apart 
(see section above), but she will come back to this issue later in the chapter. At first, she 
                                                             
70 This chapter featured in Wolf‘s anthology under the title ‗Eine neue Definition des Literarischen‘, translated 
by Annette Wußler (WOLF 1997, 35-42).   
  
134 
presents the opinions of different writers on translation, all of which are negative – despite 
their completely different backgrounds. As she clarifies, these authors (Robert Frost, Paul 
Valéry, Heinrich Heine, Vladimir Nabokov and Marion Sorescu) perceive translation as an 
inferior undertaking because it is incapable of capturing the ―soul‖ of literary texts (idem, 25-
27). 
 As Arrojo did in the previous chapter, she places these poets and writers side by side 
with Pierre Menard and the so-called ―traditional‖ translation theorists (Catford, Nida and 
Tytler), for whom translations do not (or should not) alter original texts in any way. Catford, 
for example, will go as far as to say that ―yes‖ is not an appropriate translation of ―oui‖ 
because in French one can say ―si‖ as well, thus indicating that it would be impossible to find 
a ―perfect equivalent‖ in this case (CATFORD 1965, 41). Indeed, this view seems in 
agreement both with Menard‘s line of thought and with the abovementioned writers‘ 
expectations when it comes to literary translation.  
 The Brazilian theorist then tries to sketch an alternative to this traditional view by 
rethinking the very notion of ―literary‖. She asks herself how two texts as distinct as Milton‘s 
Paradise Lost and Pound‘s ‗In a Station in the Metro‘, for example, can both be 
acknowledged as poems. By drawing inspiration from Stanley Fish, particularly from his 
paper ‗How to Recognize a Poem When You See One?‘ (refer to Section 3.1 in Part III 
below), she suggests that the answer lies in the reading strategy adopted by readers rather 
than in the texts themselves – seeing as Pound‘s and Milton‘s aforementioned examples 
hardly bear any textual resemblance. 
 In order to clarify her point, Arrojo proposes a small experiment which I have used 
with my translation students repeatedly with great success
71
. The experiment, as I normally 
carry it out, consists of dividing the class into two groups and asking them to translate a short 
text in a way that works well in the target culture (in my case, I usually hand them Portuguese 
translations of the texts below and ask them to translate them into German, as my students are 
mostly Austrians learning Portuguese as a foreign language). The first group receives the 
following text, which is a note written by a guest to his host: 
                                                             
71 I first read Arrojo‘s Oficina during my BA at Universidade Federal do Paraná. In fact, this experiment she 
proposes was carried out by one of my professors, Maurício Cardozo, within a translation course in 2004.  
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This is just to say I have eaten the plums that were in the icebox and which you were 
probably saving for breakfast. Forgive me, they were delicious: so sweet and so cold 
(ARROJO [1986] 2002, 32). 
As regards the other group, they must work with the following poem by William Carlos 
Williams (1934)
72
: 
This is just to say  
 
I have eaten  
the plums  
that were in  
the icebox  
 
and which  
you were probably  
saving  
for breakfast  
 
Forgive me 
they were delicious  
so sweet  
and so cold  
(idem, 32-33) 
The results are simply impressive: even though the two excerpts are the ―same‖ text, the 
reading strategy adopted by the students, which in turn is strongly influenced by the way each 
text is presented to them, shapes the way the entire task is carried out. Whereas the first group 
tends to finish rather quickly and have no further questions about the text, the second group 
needs a considerably longer amount of time and often asks various questions about the 
possible connotations certain words may have. Indeed, their translations reflect their reading 
strategy, i.e. the ones who believe to be faced with a note translate it in a prosaic fashion, 
without any further concerns. As for the ones who believe they have a poem in front of them, 
their translation usually strives to create sonorities (as the sibilants that permeate the English 
text) and rhythm (marked by the division into verses and stanzas). In addition to that, their 
attitude reveals their concern about the English (or Portuguese) words ―plums‖ and ―cold‖, 
especially, and their possible double meanings and allusions.  
 As Arrojo very aptly explains in this chapter, our reading expectations and strategies 
tend to adapt to the reading context. When faced with a note, we know what kind of 
                                                             
72
 This poem by Williams has been used by countless thinkers both to defend and oppose poststructuralist 
perspectives in literary theory – for more on this, refer to the debate Altieri and Fischer (ALTIERI 1979 and 
FISCHER 1979), as well as to Neil Easterbrook‘s paper (EASTERBROOK 1994).   
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structures and what kind of style to expect, so we read the note with these expectations in 
mind, which in turn derive from our vast note-reading experience. In contrast, when we are 
faced with a poem, the ―same‖ elements may strike us as poetic rather than prosaic precisely 
because we read poems with ―poetry-seeing eyes‖ (FISH 1980, 326). Needless to say, these 
reading strategies will then play a fundamental role in the interpretation and hence the 
translation we make of a particular text. The Brazilian author emphasises the impact of the 
word ―plums‖ in both cases, for instance, claiming that in the note they are taken literally, 
matter-of-factly, while in the poem they acquire symbolic, metaphoric meanings. In fact, 
most English dictionaries will mention the fact that plums may refer to ―an excellent or 
desirable thing, as a fine position―, or even to ―an unanticipated large increase in money or 
property, as an unexpected legacy; a windfall‖ (Random House Unabridged Dictionary). 
Moreover, Arrojo calls the readers‘ attention to the fact that when one thinks of ―plums‖ in 
Brazil, what first springs to mind is ―prunes‖, which are dark and dry, hardly bearing any 
resemblance to ―plums‖. To make matters worse, most Brazilians would probably think of 
―prunes‖ as an effective home remedy for intestinal disorders, an interpretation far from 
traditionally poetic. In this sense, a functional translation into Portuguese would have to take 
these elements into account and perhaps replace ―plums‖ with another fruit – like ―apples‖, 
―cherries‖ or ―peaches‖.  
 Therefore, this little experiment shows that literariness is not produced by means of 
textual elements, it is not necessarily intrinsic to texts, but rather a product of our 
interpretation, of the reading circumstances and strategies we adopt. Indeed, the experiment 
shows how neither the author‘s intention nor the text itself retain literary features as such; 
after all, if they did, the group who thought they had a silly little note before their eyes should 
have ―detected‖ these literary textual features, these products of the ―author‘s intentions‖, and 
yet they did not – and do not every time I repeat the experiment in class. So to conclude this 
chapter on literary texts, Arrojo advocates the importance of interpretation, particularly when 
it comes to translation. Every translation is inevitably the result of an interpretation, which is 
always conditioned by its general circumstances.  
 What the author nonetheless fails to acknowledge is the paramount role played by the 
translation brief, the skopos of a given translation. Indeed, when it comes to the everyday life 
of translators, the translation brief (or ―Übersetzungsauftrag‖, in Vermeer‘s words – see REIß 
and VERMEER 1984) will help to shape most of the reading and translation strategies 
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employed, which does not mean to say that the translator‘s ideology and circumstances can 
be forgotten. Nevertheless, the translation brief will certainly help the translator to choose 
what interpretation to privilege in his or her translation. Arrojo maintains that ―qualquer 
tradução de ‗This is just to say‘ seria necessariamente o reflexo da interpretação que, por 
alguma razão, decidíssemos privilegiar‖, or any translation of ‗This is just to say‘ would 
inevitably reflect the interpretation, for whatever reason, one decided to privilege (ARROJO 
[1986] 2002, 36 – my emphasis). Well, in most cases of professional translation this ―reason‖ 
is provided by the initiator of the translation process and should be accommodated as well as 
possible by the translator. In any case, overlooking the contributions of the German 
functional approach is by no means exclusive to Rosemary Arrojo; unfortunately, the lack of 
translations into Portuguese (or even into English) of the works by the functionalists has led 
to the scarce knowledge many Brazilian theorists appear to have of it – and here I would go 
as far as to say that this scarce knowledge seems to be predominant outside the German-
speaking world as a whole (please refer to LEAL 2010b).  
 The last chapter in Arrojo‘s Oficina de Tradução to deal with more abstract issues is 
Chapter 4, entitled ―A Questão da Fidelidade‖ (or On Fidelity73). The author returns to 
Borges‘ Pierre Menard to emphasise that readers (as well as translators) cannot prevent their 
contact with texts from being mediated by their own socio-historical context, their 
circumstances, their ideology (idem, 38). In order to make this point clearer and to link it to 
the notion of fidelity in translation, Arrojo presents a rather unexpected example, namely a 
―Cleopatra Costume Contest‖ taking place in São Paulo in the 1920s. Although the efforts of 
the contestants would definitely be invested in reproducing the most faithful version of 
Cleopatra possible, these ―Cleopatras‖ would inevitably be marked by the style and trends 
dominant in São Paulo in the 1920s. In other words, the winner of one such contest would 
probably bear little resemblance to the winner of a similar contest taking place in the 1920s in 
New York, or in São Paulo in the 1990s. As Arrojo stresses, if this contest were to take place 
today and one tried, through historical research, to create the ―one and only‖ Cleopatra, it 
would only be one possible version, permeated by one‘s own idiosyncrasies and beliefs. Not 
to mention the dominant trends and style of one‘s culture and time, in addition to other 
technical issues, such as the types of fabric available, the kind of film in which the images of 
                                                             
73 In Wolf‘s anthology, this chapter was translated as ‗Eine neue Auffassung von Treue‘ by Annette Wußler 
(WOLF 1997, 43-48).   
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the contestants would be captured, the kind of jewellery found in the market, and so on and 
so forth.  
 In spite of its triviality, the example illustrates the condition of any translator when 
faced with a translation task: even if one‘s sole purpose is to reproduce the so-called author‘s 
intentions or the so-called ―original text‖, these intentions or this text is nothing but our 
construction of it, which is strongly influenced by our personal history and context. Going 
back to the example of the costume contest, the Cleopatra perceived as the most ―original‖ in 
a particular place and time will be the product of the predominant assumptions surrounding 
Cleopatra in that particular interpretive community. In this light, fidelity is strongly 
relativised and no longer refers exclusively to an ―original‖ concept or intention. As Arrojo 
explains, ―nossa tradução de qualquer texto, poético ou não, será fiel não ao texto Řoriginalř, 
mas àquilo que consideramos ser o texto original, àquilo que consideramos constituí-lo‖, or 
our translation of any text, poetic or not, will not be faithful to the ―original‖ text, but rather 
to what we think the original text is, what we think constitutes it (idem, 44 – her emphasis)74. 
 The title of Chapter 5 indicates the shift from theoretical to practice-oriented 
discussions: ―A Teoria na Prática‖ (idem, 46), or Theory in Practice. In this chapter, Arrojo 
thoroughly analyses a poem by Brazilian poet Carlos Drummond de Andrade (arguably the 
best Brazilian poet) and an English translation by John Nist. At the end of the chapter, she 
proposes her own English version of the poem.  
 Unlike her theoretical reflections, her analysis of the poem does not contain any so-
called ―radical‖ or extraordinary elements, quite the contrary75. She begins by carefully 
examining the title of the poem, ‗Áporo‘, studying its Greek etymology and its vocabulary 
entries in Brazilian dictionaries. As Arrojo remarks, her interpretation reflects her willingness 
to read the poem ―poetically‖ and to attribute poetic meanings to the words and phrases so as 
to build a sort of puzzle. For her, the first and perhaps most important piece of this puzzle is 
indeed the title, which guides her interpretation throughout the process (idem, 47-48). One by 
one she analyses the verses bearing in mind the tone and the motif set by the title. Without 
                                                             
74 This quotation was used as epigraph to the present section.  
75 As already indicated above, the issue of ―radicalness‖ will be addressed at length in Part IV, Chapter  2 below. 
As it is a manifold issue, I would rather leave it in suspense for the time being. The reader should bear in mind, 
however, that when I speak of Arrojo and radicalness, I mean first and foremost perceived radicalness – rather 
than radicalness de facto.   
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breaking the poem into the traditional linguistic levels (such as form and content, meaning 
and form, extra and intratextual elements, etc.), Arrojo examines all poetic features at once –
including the rhyme scheme, rhythm and sonorities – along with their impact on the poem as 
a whole. 
 During the course of her analysis, the Brazilian thinker often refers to the poem as a 
meaning machine (―máquina de significados‖ and ―máquina de significação‖ – idem, 52), 
and by perceiving it as such she quite rightly asserts that 
O jogo de leitura poética não deve descartar nenhum fragmento que possa ser 
empregado na construção de uma interpretação. Como nesse jogo não há lugar para 
acidentes ou casualidades, a máquina de significados, em que se transforma um poema 
no momento em que é lido, deve tentar incorporar aos seus mecanismos todos os 
elementos, mesmo aqueles que aparentemente nada significam (idem). 
The game of poetic reading should take into account each and every element that may 
help to build an interpretation. In this game there is no room for chance or accident; 
hence the meaning machine, represented by the poem the moment it is being read, must 
try and embody as many elements as possible, including those that may seem, at first 
sight, meaningless.  
This way, what she tries to do is incorporate as many elements into the analysis as possible, 
often remarking that such and such an element might enrich her interpretation even more 
(―tal interpretação pode ser ainda enriquecida‖ – idem, 53).  
 When she gets to the translation done by John Nist, Arrojo claims that the translator 
privileged elements that she did not privilege in her interpretation, hinting not only at the fact 
that his choices were different than hers, but also that his translation flattens the ambiguities 
and polysemy (―achata as duplicidades e ambigüidades‖ – idem, 55) so crucial to her reading 
of the poem. Her reading of Nist‘s translation points towards a literal translation strategy, 
whereby most poetic features (including metre and rhyme) are not recreated and most 
ambiguities are eliminated. Yet, in spite of her overall disapproval of his translation, she does 
not use overly negative words, nor does she claim that Nist‘s translation is wrong or 
inadequate. Instead, Arrojo often stresses that it simply differs from her interpretation and her 
expectations. Not once does she say what would be correct or incorrect, or what Drummond 
might have intended to say.  
 Perhaps due to her dissatisfaction with John Nist‘s translation of Drummond‘s poem, 
she suggests her own translation, this time a version ―Řfielř à leitura de ŘÁporoř que 
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apresentei‖, or ―faithful‖ to the interpretation presented (idem – her emphasis). What is 
particularly striking about Arrojo‘s translation is that she keeps the source text title, i.e. 
―Áporo‖, and adds a footnote after the poem explaining the possible meanings of the word in 
that particular context. This way, she hopes to offer her reader the same ―key‖ she was 
offered when she read the poem in Portuguese. The reasons why she opts for this strategy are 
as follows: firstly because the poem was published in an English anthology of Drummond‘s 
poems, thus indicating that the potential target public would probably be willing to read 
foreign poems and would even expect to encounter a few foreign words in the book; and 
secondly because even those readers whose mother tongue is Portuguese would need to check 
different dictionaries to be able to follow the reading she proposes of the poem (idem, 56).  
 As regards the rest of the poem, she maintains more or less the same structure as 
Nist‘s version, altering certain words, expressions and verb tenses, and explaining why she 
thinks her particular choices seem ―better‖ than his. Although she does not use the word 
―better‖, she does admit that when one has the interpretation that she proposed in mind, her 
translation offers more possibilities to the reader (idem, 57). 
Before we look into the remaining chapters, I must say that Chapter 5 points towards 
one of the key questions of the present thesis, a question that has already come up several 
times: do different translation theories necessarily imply different translation practices? (see 
Part I above). While on the one hand Arrojo‘s theoretical discussions may be perceived as 
radical and overly complex (please refer to footnote 75 above), her work as a translator or 
translation critic is not at all radical. The most striking difference between what Arrojo does 
and what other theorists perceived as more ―traditional‖ do can be summarised by the word 
awareness. Awareness about the notion of sign, meaning and reading, about the status of 
original texts and translations, about the power of interpretation. Her translation critique does 
not consist of a list of mistakes, unlike most translation critiques found in the media, or unlike 
the works of other translation theorists, translators and critics – as we will see in detail in Part 
III below. What Arrojo may see as a mistake in Nist‘s translation, though never accompanied 
by the word ―mistake‖, usually consists of a difference between her personal reading of the 
poem and the reading Nist appears to suggest through his translation. A difference that is 
recognised as such and not necessarily as a problem. These differences are only considered 
problems when Arrojo tries to recreate, re-enact her personal reading of Drummond‘s poem 
and does not find the required means to do it in Nist‘s translation.     
  
141 
Not once does she say that her choices are ―better‖ than Nist‘s, ―better‖ in absolute 
terms. They may be considered ―better‖ for her intended purposes. Nor does she speak of 
what the poem actually means or what Drummond actually must have meant. Rather than 
that, Arrojo makes it clear from the beginning that reading a poem is, for her, a game of 
signification. In this light, any element can and should be taken as meaningful, as another 
essential piece to the poem-puzzle – see the last indented quotation above. Nevertheless, this 
meaningfulness is not necessarily attributed to the text or to the original author, but rather to 
her interpretation. This may appear trivial at first sight but gains increasing importance when 
one remembers that most of what is called translation criticism nowadays consists of – if 
anything – lists of alleged mistakes made by translators. Furthermore, we still have 
translation teachers and students speaking freely and naively about authors‘ intentions and 
actual textual meanings, and basing their work on these factors. In this sense, Arrojo‘s 
―method‖ of translation criticism is not at all radical, but rather coherent with the postmodern 
notion of ethics underlying her work as a translation theorist; a notion of ethics that still 
remains alien to most of our logocentric tradition.  
Furthermore, I find the possible relationship between Arrojo‘s reflections and those of 
the German functional approach highly interesting, as already pointed out above. In her 
theoretical texts, such as the ones that make up O Signo Desconstruído, the Brazilian author 
tends to disregard the role the translation brief plays in translation, privileging other key 
factors instead, like the translator‘s background, context and ideology. Despite that, in 
Chapter 5 of Oficina de Tradução she does justify the insertion of footnotes and the use of 
foreign words by mentioning the type of edition in which the poem would come out and 
hence the most probable target audience and their expectations. It is these elements that 
determine and guide her translation strategies. These elements (type of publication and target 
reader) are far more palpable than the translator‘s background and ideology and play just as 
big a role. Of course one must take into account that this book first appeared shortly after the 
―cultural turn‖ (SNELL-HORBY 2006) took place. In any case, in view of the dialogue that 
was later established between Arrojo‘s and Vermeer‘s work (see Chapter 6 in Part I above), I 
believe that this unacknowledged affinity is worth mentioning – I will come back to this 
question later in this chapter.   
Chapter 6, named ―Exercícios de Tradução‖ (Translation Exercises), invites the 
reader to analyse two more poems and their translations – ‗Poema de Sete Faces‘, again by 
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Carlos Drummond de Andrade, and ‗Seven-sided poem‘, by American poet Elizabeth 
Bishop; and Sylvia Plath‘s ‗The Rival‘ and Luis C. de Brito Rezende‘s Brazilian version 
‗Rival‘. The objective is ―tentar estabelecer as principais diferenças de significado entre 
nossa leitura do Řoriginalř e a leitura sugerida pelo texto traduzido‖, or to try and establish 
the main differences in meaning between our interpretation of the ―original‖ and the reading 
suggested by the translation (ARROJO [1986] 2002, 58 – her emphasis). Therefore, similarly 
to Chapter 5, Arrojo studies each text thoroughly and then carefully points out these 
―differences in meaning‖, later inviting readers to come up with their own translations.  
―Recado ao Tradutor/Aprendiz‖ or ―Message to the Translator/Translation Student‖ is 
the name of Chapter 7 (idem 76-78), which summarises the entire book. In this chapter, 
Arrojo stresses that when it comes to the complex activity we call translation, there are no 
magic rules or absolute models, as she hopes to have shown in her book. Side by side with 
language competence, she emphasises the importance of knowing how to read and knowing 
how to write. And here reading and writing must be understood as activities that entail 
constant meaning production, rather than meaning protection or reproduction. It is, therefore, 
a job that involves great responsibility and requires a thorough knowledge of the interpretive 
community in which one lives and its intrinsic rules. However, as the Brazilian theorist very 
rightly stresses, knowing these rules does not mean blindly following them, but rather having 
privileged access to them in order to, at some point, change or influence them somehow – I 
will come back to this issue below. Finally, she closes the chapter by saying that translation 
theory is also a key element to which all so-called professional translators should pay 
attention to in order to be fully professional and well-informed, aware of the nature of their 
work and their paramount role in society
76
. 
Chapters 8 and 9 contain a very small glossary (with only four entries) and a short 
commentated bibliography, respectively. Given the popularity of the book, updating and 
expanding these last two chapters would be very useful for translation teachers and students – 
though I do not know whether the editorial arrangements in question would allow for that. All 
in all, in spite of its old age, the book remains a classic of Brazilian translation studies, 
perhaps the most popular in translation courses at all levels all over the country. It is certainly 
                                                             
76 This argument sheds light on the question of what professional translations should be like, an issue already 
raised several times in Part I above and to which I shall come back in Part IV, Chapters 1 and 3 below.     
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one of the very few Brazilian books on translation to have got five new editions over a 20-
year period of time
77
.     
Perhaps it is precisely its lack of radicalism that makes this book such a useful 
classroom resource for translation teachers. Those teachers who share Arrojo‘s postmodern 
views will emphasise the importance of interpretation and the notions of translation criticism 
and ethics that derive from it. On the other hand, the more ―traditional‖ teachers will 
overlook the emphasis placed on the power of interpretation, stressing that Nist‘s translation, 
for instance, is inaccurate and poor, saying it requires corrections, etc. I myself know a 
number of translation teachers working at different Brazilian universities who either openly 
disagree with Arrojo‘s view (such as Paulo Henriques Britto – see Part III below) or have 
little or no knowledge of poststructuralist thought and deconstruction. Yet these teachers use 
Arrojo‘s Oficina de Tradução and find it very handy. 
In the next section, we will look into Arrojo‘s 1993 book on the interfaces between 
translation, deconstruction and psychoanalysis (Tradução, Desconstrução e Psicanálise). 
Before we do so, though, let us remember the questions raised in the present section, 
questions to which I will come back in Part IV below: the idea of radicalism and 
poststructuralist thought (already brought up in Section 2.1 above), the interface between the 
German functional approach and some of Arrojo‘s reflections, as well as the requirements to 
establish so-called professional translators (a question first raised in Part I above).    
2.3 Tradução, Desconstrução e Psicanálise 
The only realistic approach to the teaching of 
translation should concentrate on efforts to provide 
future professionals with the critical apparatus that will 
allow them to discover what kind of strategy should be 
employed in each translation project that they decide to 
undertake. This critical apparatus can be better 
developed (…) with a group of students that are willing 
to analyze and debate their own methods of producing 
meanings and exercising power, and to give up the 
futile mission of finding the definitive dictionary or 
glossary, or the unanimously exact equivalent to a 
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 Together with Paulo Rónai‘s Escola de Tradutores (see Part I above), originally published in 1952 and in its 
sixth edition in 2010. John Milton‘s Tradução: Teoria e Prática (MILTON 1998) was in its third edition in the 
same year.     
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word or expression, or even absolute fidelity to an 
original, or, perhaps, the immortal translation of a text. 
Rosemary Arrojo
78
 
Similarly to O Signo Desconstruído (see 2.1 above), Tradução, Desconstrução e Psicanálise 
(1993) is a collection of papers dedicated to the interface between translation and 
deconstruction, but also between translation and psychoanalysis – and more often than not the 
interface amongst all three. Unlike the 1992 anthology of essays, however, all 10 papers that 
make up Tradução, Desconstrução e Psicanálise were written by Arrojo. The Brazilian 
scholar justifies her choice for deconstruction and psychoanalysis as follows: ―tanto a 
psicanálise quanto a desconstrução Ŕ ao praticarem uma reflexão que parte da 
inevitabilidade de uma teoria da interpretação que não se tece em torno de um enredo de 
perdas e ganhos Ŕ se encontram dentro dos limites generosos da pós-modernidade‖ 
(ARROJO 1993, 10), or both psychoanalysis and deconstruction can be placed within the 
flexible boundaries of postmodernism since both entertain reflections whose starting point is 
the inevitability of a theory of interpretation – a theory that is not formulated in terms of 
gains and losses. Precisely because the question of interpretation is so crucial for Arrojo, 
deconstruction and psychoanalysis seem to offer two similar channels, two cognate sets of 
lenses through which Arrojo can contemplate translation. In other words, deconstruction and 
psychoanalysis constitute two powerful instruments to question the essentialist notions of 
stable meanings and pure objectivity because they both value interpretation so much – as 
something individual, subjective, strongly influenced by the unconscious and subject to 
numerous factors.  
 However theoretical or philosophical the title of her book may sound, Arrojo stresses 
that her ideas are not destined to remain limited to the pretentious realms of theoretical 
reflections (―não são destinadas a ocupar apenas o espaço reduzido e pretensioso da 
reflexão teórica‖ – idem); instead, the aim of her papers is also to discuss and question 
practical issues surrounding translation, its professionalisation and teaching (―têm como 
objetivo explícito também discutir e problematizar as questões práticas de tradução, de sua 
profissionalização e de seu ensino‖ – idem).    
                                                             
78 This excerpt is quoted on page 163 below.  
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 In the first of such papers, entitled ‗A que são Fiéis Tradutores e Críticos de 
Tradução? Ŕ Paulo Vizioli e Nelson Ascher Discutem John Donne‘ (What are Translators and 
Translation Critics Faithful to? – Paulo Vizioli and Nelson Ascher on John Donne), Arrojo 
addresses the question of translation criticism from a deconstructionist point of view
79
. She 
takes a dispute that took place in Brazil in 1985 over two Brazilian anthologies of John 
Donne‘s poems. The quarrel started when Ascher published a not very flattering review of 
Vizioli‘s translated anthology of the abovementioned poet in the newspaper Folha de São 
Paulo, to which Vizioli replied a week later, and finally, another week later Ascher published 
his counterreply – both in the same newspaper (idem, 15). Arrojo proposes to investigate to 
what extent translator (in this case, Vizioli) and critic (here Ascher) regard the same text as 
the original text.         
 In the next section of her paper (idem, 16-20), the Brazilian professor briefly sketches 
the deconstructionist view on the issue of meaning. Drawing a concise overview of the so-
called traditional outlook – that presupposes stable, objective and unchanging meanings – and 
then quoting Nietzsche as the first thinker to relativise these views and defend the fictitious 
character of the concepts of ―truth‖ and ―meaning‖, Arrojo comes to the following 
conclusion: 
Assim, nenhuma tradução pode ser exatamente fiel ao Ŗoriginalŗ porque o Ŗoriginalŗ 
não existe como um objeto estável, guardião implacável das intenções originais de seu 
autor. (...) De maneira semelhante, ao avaliarmos uma tradução, ao compararmos o 
texto traduzido ao Ŗoriginalŗ, estaremos apenas e tão-somente comparando a tradução à 
nossa interpretação do Ŗoriginalŗ que, por sua vez, jamais poderá ser exatamente a 
Ŗmesmaŗ do tradutor (idem, 19-20 – her emphasis). 
Therefore, no translation can be absolutely faithful to the ―original‖ because the 
―original‖ does not exist as a stable object, as the undefeatable guardian of its author‘s 
―original‖ intentions. (…) This way, when one assesses the quality of a translation, when 
one compares the translated text to its ―original‖, all one does is compare the translation 
to one‘s interpretation of the original which, in turn, can never be the exact same 
interpretation as the translator‘s.      
Quoting various passages from Ascher‘s review, Arrojo states that the source of 
Ascher‘s dissatisfaction with Vizioli‘s translation appears to stem from the critic‘s preference 
for yet another translation of the same poems done by the celebrated poet Augusto de 
Campos several years earlier. For Ascher, Vizioli‘s translation is too scholarly, literal and 
                                                             
79 This paper by Arrojo is taken as a starting point in Britto‘s ‗Fidelidade em Tradução Poética: O Caso Donne‘ 
(BRITTO 2006b – refer to Subchapter 3.3 in Part III below).  
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old-fashioned, whereas Campos‘ translation is creative, is the true work of a poet (idem, 20). 
Furthermore, in Ascher‘s opinion Vizioli‘s style prevents him from capturing the essence of 
Donne‘s poetry, which Campos, on the other hand, accomplishes masterly. In his reply to 
Ascher, Vizioli argues that his translations sound old-fashioned and scholarly on purpose – 
he was, after all, translating a 16
th
 century poet. He also very rightly questions Ascher‘s 
criteria to determine that his translation is inferior to Campos‘, seeing as Campos seems to 
have taken far more liberties with the text than he did. What Vizioli finds particularly 
questionable in Campos‘ translation and Ascher‘s subsequent praise is the fact that Campos 
famously inserted in Donne‘s poem ‗The Apparition‘ a verse of a popular Brazilian song by 
Lupicínio Rodrigues (for more on this, refer to LEAL 2010a – idem, 21). 
Arrojo does not take Ascher‘s counterreply into account, but rather focuses on 
criticising Ascher‘s review by taking into consideration some of Vizioli‘s arguments in his 
reply. She firstly quotes T.S. Eliot, Ben Jonson, John Dryden and Samuel Johnson to show 
how the reception of Donne‘s work is rather diverse, and that there has never been a 
consensus as far as the so-called ―essence‖ of his poetry is concerned (see above – idem 22). 
She then analyses a few examples taken from Campos‘ and Vizioli‘s translations and arrives 
at the conclusion that the translators appear to have privileged different factors in their 
translations. For her, Campos seems to favour Donne‘s wit, irony and paradoxes, as well as 
his use of puns and plays on words. Vizioli, in contrast, openly privileges the awful dualism 
of Donne‘s times, as he himself mentions in the preface to the anthology in question (idem, 
23-24). And here Arrojo very rightly points out that both the wit and the dualism are features 
commonly attributed to Baroque literature (idem, 24). 
The Brazilian scholar also makes a few remarks on Campos‘ and Vizioli‘s standpoints 
as far as poetry and literary translation is concerned, trying to show that they speak from 
different standpoints – hence their different preferences and standards as well. Whereas 
Vizioli thinks that a 16
th
 century poet must be presented to a 20
th
 century reader as a 16
th
 
century poet, Campos, on the other hand, appears to believe that Donne‘s poetry should speak 
to the poets of the present – hence the newer vocabulary and insertion of references from 
popular music. Arrojo concludes that ―tanto Paulo Vizioli quanto Augusto de Campos são 
Ŗfiéisŗ às suas concepções teóricas acerca da tradução e acerca da poesia de Donne e, (...) 
tanto as traduções de um, como de outro, são legítimas e competentes‖, or both Vizioli and 
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Campos are ―faithful‖ to their notions of translation and of Donne‘s poetry, and both 
translations are legitimate and competent (idem, 25 – her emphasis).  
Indeed, it is as José Garcez Ghirardi argues in his John Donne e a Crítica Brasileira: 
Três Momentos, Três Olhares [John Donne and Brazilian Criticism: Three Moments, Three 
Views] (GHIRARDI 2000, 85-106): Campos saw Donne as ―the newest new‖ and proposed 
to update and renew his work through Ezra Pound‘s poetics (idem, 85). Vizioli, in contrast, 
strived to understand Donne‘s work as a product of his controversial times, for which ―love‖ 
and ―death‖ (―amor‖ and ―morte‖) were the cardinal points – hence Vizioli‘s choice of title 
for his anthology: John Donne: O Poeta do Amor e da Morte (idem, 96).  
And let us not forget that the types of publication in which both anthologies appeared 
are utterly different. Augusto de Campos certainly chose to translate Donne as a part of his 
poetical project. It is beyond the scope of the present thesis to fully flesh out the context in 
which Campos‘ translations of Donne‘s poems were published; suffice to say that by 1978, 
when his anthology came out, Campos had already translated Pound, Mallarmé, Joyce, 
Cummings, Blake and Mayakovski, as well as published dozens of other volumes of his own 
poetry, along with essays on poetry and literary criticism. In this sense, and in light of his 
colossal literary production and impact in Brazilian literature, his translations of Donne were 
undoubtedly a key part of his oeuvre, arguably in an unprecedented way in Brazilian 
literature. Most readers of one such anthology were probably far more interested in Campos 
than in Donne; they probably wished to see how Campos incorporated the English poet into 
his own poetics. One could, therefore, speak of a strong sense of independence, or 
reinventing, or liberty by Campos. 
Vizioli, conversely, probably received a translation assignment from J. C. Ismael, a 
renowned Brazilian critic who commissioned the translation and publication of a few English 
poets, including Blake and Donne. The anthology was bilingual, presupposing a target reader 
whose interests probably involve the comparison between translation and original; a 
cultivated reader, therefore, who would possibly be keen on historical factors surrounding 
Donne‘s life and work. In this sense, this translation project strikes one as far more dependent 
on the so-called original than Campos‘ translation project. Surely Vizioli kept in mind the 
idea of a possible contrast between his translation and Donne‘s original, hence his toil both to 
maintain the translation as close as possible to the source text and to grant the text an old-
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fashioned tone, very much in tune with the reception of Donne‘s original today, centuries 
later. 
All in all, Arrojo‘s argumentation in this first chapter of Tradução, Desconstrução e 
Psicanálise is not only highly interesting, but also careful. She takes a rather touchy issue in 
translation studies, i.e. the assessment of translation quality, and demonstrates how a 
deconstructionist perspective can help to unveil the differences between two translations. 
These differences are perceived as such, and not as signs of inferiority or superiority. Instead 
of attempting to prove which translation is better, she strives to understand the possible 
nature of the differences between the translations – what motivated them, what interests lie 
beneath them, and so on and so forth. In this sense, one could even say that the strengths and 
weaknesses of both translations are rendered clear, but never in absolute terms; rather, these 
strengths and weaknesses are changeable, varying according to the context and the situation 
of reception. Let us take Campos‘ intertextuality between Brazilian popular music and 
Donne‘s poetry (see above): depending on the reader‘s context, expectations and motivations 
(amongst various other factors), this liberty on the part of Campos may be perceived either as 
a pro or as a con – as Arrojo very aptly explains. 
And here once again the argument of the German functional approach seems 
pertinent, even though Arrojo never mentions the translation brief, the scope of both 
translations. As argued above, Campos and Vizioli certainly had completely different readers 
in mind, with utterly diverse interests and motivations. The translations were published in 
entirely different editions as well, which inevitably influences the translators‘ strategies. Of 
course the translators‘ personal history and style are key factors equally at stake here; 
nonetheless, one cannot ignore the impact of the potential target audience, for example.  
The second paper of Tradução, Desconstrução e Psicanálise is dedicated to yet 
another sensitive issue in translation studies, namely its institutionalisation and the 
professionalisation of translators/interpreters. Since this issue has repeatedly come up in the 
present thesis, and will arise again in Section 2.4 and in Parts III and IV below, I will only 
address it here briefly. The paper is entitled ‗As Relações Perigosas entre Teorias e Políticas 
de Tradução‘, or Translation Policies and Theories: A Dangerous Relationship (ARROJO 
1993, 27-33). Her main argument in this essay is that from an essentialist point of view there 
is a dangerous confluence of the concepts of translation generally entertained by common 
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sense, linguistics and translation theory. According to Arrojo, in all three there is a strong 
belief in a fully stable original text, completely independent from interpretations, contexts 
and circumstances – even though all three are confronted daily with the illusory character of 
one such conviction (idem, 28).  
This basic premise deemed logocentric by Arrojo leads to two main consequences: 
firstly, there is a tendency to assume that all one needs in order to translate or interpret is the 
knowledge of at least two languages. If translating means recovering the stable, objective 
meanings present in the so-called original text, speaking two languages fluently is more than 
enough. Secondly, precisely because linguistic knowledge is all one needs, translation finds 
no exclusive niche at higher education, being relegated to a significantly inferior post within 
cognate areas (idem, 31). As for translation theory, the Brazilian scholar maintains that a 
similar attitude applies. Because most theories are essentialist, they too relegate the 
translator‘s activity to an inferior post, filled with frustration and unsuccess, and thus confirm 
the status attributed to translation both by linguistics and common sense (idem, 30). 
For Arrojo, the way out of the dilemma is fairly simple: translators must first become 
aware of their power, their unavoidable interference with what they translate. This would be 
the first step towards a more honest relationship amongst the instances that inform translation 
– such as theory or even common sense (idem, 32). As already indicated above, it remains 
unclear whether Arrojo would endorse a full process of independence for translation studies 
in the terms that it occurred at various European universities, for example (see Chapters 1 and 
2 in Part I above).  
More important than that, however, is whether her remarks remain relevant today, 
nearly two decades later – and if so, in what terms? I am convinced that even the most 
essentialist translation scholar would disagree with the ―logocentric‖ views suggested by 
Arrojo (see previous paragraphs). Nowadays it seems relatively ―common sense‖ that 
translation amounts to more than transferring meanings – we can thank the so-called ―cultural 
turn‖ for that (see Chapter 6 in Part I above). Despite that, both the translator and translation 
remain fairly marginal, unacknowledged, relegated to inferior posts in the most varied realms 
of society. Numerous universities across the globe do offer a safe niche for translation 
studies, but this awareness of the translator‘s authorial role that Arrojo advocates seems far 
from achieved. In other words, the establishment of an exclusive niche to translation studies 
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at university has not led to a significant elevation of the status of translation. Could it be 
perhaps because the vast majority of translation theory dominant today remains rather 
essentialist, and so does the attitude of most of those involved with translation? Let us keep 
these ideas in mind as we advance into the next papers and chapters, where these same issues 
will be brought up again. 
The first paper in Tradução, Desconstrução e Psicanálise to deal with the interface 
amongst these three cardinal points that guide her work is called ‗Laplanche Traduz o Pai da 
Psicanálise: As Principais Cenas de um Romance Familiar‘, or Laplanche Translating the 
Father of Psychoanalysis: Scenes of a Family Romance (idem, 35-50)
80
. Arrojo puts 
Laplanche‘s eminent translation project of Freud‘s complete works in the spotlight, using 
psychoanalysis and deconstruction to guide her through Laplanche‘s endeavour, and 
eventually drawing important conclusions for translation studies – particularly as far as 
fidelity in translation is concerned (idem, 35-36). 
In a nutshell, Arrojo takes Freud‘s notion of Family Romance81 and projects it onto 
the relationship between Laplanche, Lacan and Freud. According to her, Laplanche openly 
wanted the translations of Freud‘s complete works to fully escape all possible ―external‖ 
interferences – particularly Lacan‘s, which Laplanche fiercely opposed. Indeed, in the first 
volume of the Œuvres Complètes de Freud/Psychanalyse, Laplanche does state that his aim 
is to restore Freud back to Freud, to render his words absolutely faithfully, using a Freudian 
French that should allow the French audience to relate to his writings in French in the exact 
same way as the German audience related to his original texts (idem, 36-37 – quoting 
Laplanche). In this context, Lacan is perceived by Laplanche as a key antagonist not only 
because of their theoretical disagreements, which are made clear in Arrojo‘s paper, but also – 
and more importantly – because of their similar ambitions. After all, one could say, as Arrojo 
                                                             
80 A version of this paper was published in English in 2004 in the book Übersetzung, Translation, Traduction: 
Ein internationales Handbuch zur Übersetzungsforschung vol. 1 (edited by Armin Frank, Harald Kittel and 
Norbert Greiner) under the title ‗Translation as an Object of Reflection in Psychoanalysis‘.    
81 According to Freud, during a particular phase of their lives children are prone to gradually replacing the blind 
adoration they have for their parents with a feeling of rejection, revenge against them or even rivalry – 
especially with the parent of the same sex. This process would be the result of the child‘s developing intellect 
and newly-acquired abilities to compare and relativise. Freud argues that it is often a mild, temporary process 
that in fact hides the child‘s longing for the days when its parents seemed flawless and noble (FREUD 1959, 74-
78).  
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very aptly points out, that both wanted to be Freud‘s sole legitimate heir in French-speaking 
territory (idem, 44). This noble right to heritage, nevertheless, is not without its perversities: 
Seu [de Laplanche] desejo explícito de ser o verdadeiro porta-voz de Freud em francês 
não implica somente a eliminação de seus rivais e mestres próximos; esconde também 
uma fantasia mais poderosa, a fantasia de se colocar no lugar privilegiado de Freud (...), 
deixando de ser apenas um dos muitos recipientes da teoria psicanalítica (idem).     
[Laplanche‘s] explicit wish to become Freud‘s true spokesperson in French does not 
solely entail the elimination of his rivals and close masters, but it also hides an even more 
powerful fantasy, namely the fantasy of seizing Freud‘s privileged place (…), and no 
longer being a mere recipient of psychoanalytical theory.     
It is, therefore, in this light that Arrojo proposes the motif of the Family Romance. Indeed, 
she understands Laplanche‘s translation project as an oedipal gesture towards Freud‘s text 
and goes as far as to claim that one such oedipal gesture is common to all translations, since 
all translations attempt to simultaneously replace a given original text and lengthen its life by 
introducing it in another language, culture and time (idem, 47). And here she draws a witty 
parallel with Freud‘s famous misunderstanding of an autobiographical text by Leonardo da 
Vinci, thoroughly discussed by Alan Bass in his 1985 paper ‗On the History of a 
Mistranslation and the Psychoanalytic Movement‘. The details of this misunderstanding are 
beside the point here; the idea that is crucial for Arrojo is Bass‘s argument that Freud‘s 
mistake was actually motivated by his strong will to develop his theories on infantile 
sexuality. Therefore, it is as though Freud had found an excuse in da Vinci‘s text to develop 
his theories further the way he wished to do it – we see what we want to see, do we not? 
Similarly, both Lacan and Laplanche use the pretext of absolute fidelity to Freud to rewrite 
psychoanalysis through their own point of view (idem).    
 On account of this rather thought-provoking reflection proposed by Arrojo, the 
consequences for translation seem evident. Accepting the impact of these ideas on translation 
means accepting that any interpretation is, to a certain extent, fetishist as it is the product of a 
relation of transference – and transference here should be taken in a Lacanian way (idem – 
see below). So from a psychoanalytical and a deconstructionist perspective, original texts do 
not contain stable meanings, but rather are always subject to the reading and interpretation of 
an individual who, in turn, is strongly marked by both his unconscious and his circumstances, 
perspectives and motivations (idem, 48). The desire for absolute faithfulness in translation 
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masks all sorts of other conscious and unconscious desires that cannot be ignored any longer, 
particularly not in translation studies.  
 In this paper, Arrojo also comments on the outcome of Laplanche‘s translation project 
of Freud, claiming that countless critics deemed it unfaithful – notwithstanding his declared 
intentions of being ―absolutely‖ faithful (idem, 41-42). She quotes Catherine David, for 
instance, for whom Laplanche‘s translation exaggerates the use of neologisms, making the 
text sound artificial (idem, 42). Other critics quoted by Arrojo, such as Rubens Volich, argue 
that Laplanche inserts far too many changes to the text than actually necessary (idem). The 
Brazilian author then concedes that many of these critiques might be influenced by ―sibling 
rivalry‖ (idem), but still they show how relative the notion of faithfulness is.    
 Another interesting element in Arrojo‘s paper is François Roustang‘s remarks on the 
attempt to establish Freud‘s true words unanimously within a culture – in this case, the 
French culture. For Roustang, one such attempt can only be a misunderstanding 
(ROUSTANG [1976] 1986, 14 – translated by Ned Lukacher – see Arrojo 1993, 45-46): 
If one looks for the effects of psychoanalysis, one can see them in that any group of 
psychoanalysts carries within it the principle of its own disintegration. If the group is 
stable and functions well, however, it is a proof of the contrary: it has definitely 
abandoned the Freudian discovery. In this sense, psychoanalysis is basically asocial (…).     
In this light, one can perceive Laplanche‘s translation project and particularly its results as an 
example of Freud‘s ―savage horde‖ (apud ROUSTANG [1976] 1986, 14), for whom 
unanimity is an impossibility. Should that not be the case in translation studies as well, an 
area in which the disagreements appear to escalate at the same rate as the wish for unity and 
global theories? I will come back to this question in Part IV, Chapter 4 below
82
.   
 The fourth essay that makes up this anthology is entitled ‗A Tradução como 
Paradigma dos Intercâmbios Intralinguísticos‘ (or Translation as a Paradigm of 
Intralinguistic Exchange
83
) and opens with an epigraph by Octavio Paz in which he compares 
translating to the process of producing utterances or reading in one‘s mother tongue 
(ARROJO 1992, 51). Arrojo takes this initial idea to develop a stimulating reflection on the 
                                                             
82 For more on this wish for global theories, please refer to LEAL (2010b).  
83 This paper featured in Michaela Wolf‘s Übersetzungswissenschaft in Brasilien (WOLF 1997, 71-88) under 
the title ‗Die Übersetzung als Paradigma der intralingualen Kommunikation‘ (translated by Helga Ahrens).   
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allegedly intermediary role played by translators. For the Brazilian professor, the key 
question is how these mediators can keep the meanings they inevitably manipulate intact 
(idem, 55). And here she remembers Mounin‘s famous conclusion about translation being the 
scandal of contemporary linguistics (see Chapter 5, Part I above) and asks, very much in tune 
with Paz‘s epigraph, whether any reading, any paraphrase, any linguistic exchange and any 
process of oral and written communication would not be equally doomed to this ―scandal‖ 
(―Não estariam condenadas a esse Řescândaloř toda leitura, toda paráfrase, todo intercâmbio 
linguístico e todo processo de comunicação oral e escrito?‖ – idem – her emphasis). Indeed, 
it is as Steiner reminds us (STEINER [1975] 1998, 263 – his emphasis):  
No two speakers mean exactly the same thing when they use the same terms; or if they 
do, there is no conceivable way of demonstrating perfect homology. No complete, 
verifiable act of communication is, therefore, possible. All discourse is fundamentally 
monadic or idiolectic. This was a shopworn paradox long before Schleiermacher 
investigated the meaning of meaning in his Hermeneutik.    
 Departing from these preliminary ideas, Arrojo then looks into the deconstructionist 
perspective on language – taking mainly Derrida‘s ‗Des Tours de Babel‘ into consideration. 
For the Algerian-born thinker, as for Arrojo, the ―multiplicité irréductible des langues‖ is a 
reality within one language too, as no meaning can be fully determined, not even inside a 
―single‖ language (DERRIDA 1985 – see ARROJO 1993, 56). Because of this ―confusion 
babélienne‖ (DERRIDA 1985), translation makes up a paradigm in deconstruction. In other 
words, the logocentrism that Derrida does his utmost to deconstruct is nothing but the dream 
of a universal language, nostalgia for the origin, i.e. the opposite of what the myth of Babel 
teaches us. In this light, Arrojo maintains that within the deconstructionist reflection on 
translation, instead of a secondary operation coming after its original, translations even 
precede the so-called originals as their (the original‘s) very possibility (ARROJO 1993, 58 – 
quoting Peggy Kamuf, Derrida‘s translator)84.          
 Along with deconstruction, Arrojo draws inspiration from pragmatic philosophers like 
W. V. Quine, for whom a linguistic theory should not contemplate language as a faithful 
reproduction of reality – as both common sense and numerous philosophical tendencies do 
                                                             
84 For more on the notion of translation as the possibility for the original to survive, please refer to Derrida‘s 
‗Des Tours de Babel‘ (DERRIDA 1985): ―Telle survie [la traduction] donne un plus de vie, plus quřune 
survivance. Lřœuvre ne vit pas seulement plus longtemps, elle vit plus et mieux, au-dessus des moyens de son 
auteur. Le traducteur serait-il alors un récepteur endetté, soumis au don et à la donnée dřun original? 
Nullement‖ (his emphasis).   
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(idem, 59). Based mostly on Quine‘s 1969 Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Arrojo 
comments on the different linguistic experiments carried out by the American philosopher 
that led to his well-known thesis of the indeterminacy of meaning and, hence, the 
indeterminacy of translation (idem, 63). In her view, ―a compreensão, a recepção, a 
apreensão (...) do discurso do outro envolve um ato de Řinterpretação radicalř já que não 
encontra outra âncora a não ser a observação, o julgamento, a crença do intérprete-
receptor‖, or speech comprehension, reception or apprehension (...) entails a process of 
―radical interpretation‖ since it finds no other anchor than the interpreter-recipient‘s 
observation, judgement and belief (idem – her emphasis – quoting Quine)85. For this reason 
Quine‘s disciple Donald Davidson defends the interdependence between meaning and belief 
(idem).  
 Fleshing out this bond between meaning and belief, Quine and Davidson develop Neil 
Wilson‘s Principle of Charity further, claiming that any kind of linguistic exchange 
(including translation) involves a certain disposition on the part of the interactants, and this 
disposition may be perceived as a sort of charity. In other words, in order for people to 
communicate, a tacit pact must precede the actual communication, a pact whereby all parties 
involved confirm their willingness to play the language game and assume that their 
interlocutors are telling the truth, are making valid arguments (idem, 64)
86
. In Arrojo‘s 
opinion, this notion of charity or solidarity is an antiessentialist move by these new 
pragmatists. In comparison to so-called traditional philosophy, what thinkers like Davidson 
and Quine do is attack the notion of truth as a precise and suprahuman concept, and substitute 
the notion of objectivity with the notion of solidarity (idem, 65 – quoting Rorty‘s 1991 
‗Solidarity or Objectivity?‘). And here Arrojo goes further and links this notion of solidarity 
to Nietzsche‘s idea of the ―Allzumenschliches‖ inasmuch as both reflections defend the 
illusory character of the platonic notion of truth – whereby meanings would be immune to 
perspectives and circumstances (idem, 66-67 – see Section 2.1 above).     
                                                             
85 This reminds me of Arthur Schnitzler‘s story ‗Ich‘, in which the protagonist is caught in bewilderment at the 
complexity of language, feeling suddenly compelled to attach signs to everything and everyone stating their 
names. It is as though he were indeed trying to provide language with this ―anchor‖ it does not possess, thus 
freeing it from mere belief and observation and bringing uncertainty and changeability to an end. The story ends 
in a remarkable fashion: fearing that the protagonist has gone mad, his wife calls a doctor and, upon his arrival, 
the patient is wearing a sign that says ―ich‖ (SCHNITZLER [1961] 2006, 304-311).   
86
 For more on Davidson‘s and Quine‘s works and on how their perspectives differ from those of so-called 
traditional philosophy, please refer to John Murphy‘s 1990 Pragmatism: From Pierce to Davidson (a book 
Arrojo quotes repeatedly in the paper in question).   
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 Arrojo ends this inspiring paper by asserting that it is this solidarity that defines 
textuality and allows for the very existence of language (idem, 67). So going back to the 
initial idea proposed by Paz of a parallel between translation and communication within a 
mother tongue, translators – like individuals engaged in communications of any sort – can no 
longer be perceived as neutral mediators, as they too make these tacit agreements that enable 
language to function. As any individual, translators have their own interests and motivations 
which, in turn, play a pivotal role in these silent pacts, in their willingness to charity and 
solidarity towards their interlocutors. If there is any truth, any meaning, then it lies precisely 
there, in these pacts, in this solidarity. 
 In ‗A Tradução Passada a Limpo e a Visibilidade do Tradutor‘ (Translation 
Reviewed and the Translator‘s Visibility87), Arrojo departs from the tricky relationship 
between sign and referent (from the point of view of classical semiotics) and proposes an 
interesting parallel concerning the relationship between translation and original (from a 
predominantly essentialist perspective). This ultimately leads her to the review or 
reformulation of the concept of translation outside the boundaries of essentialism, which then 
brings her to the conclusion that the translator‘s visibility is not an aim to be achieved, but 
rather an inevitable element entailed by translation.  
 Largely based on Derrida‘s essay ‗Différance‘ (DERRIDA [1972] 1982, 1-28), Arrojo 
discusses the ―problem‖ of the referent in semiotics, asserting, like the Algerian-born 
philosopher, that for semiotics the sign works as a kind of simulacrum of the actual thing, of 
reality. Viewed in this light, signs would be secondary and provisory in relation to reality, 
being relegated to the position of mere mediator (idem, 9 – see ARROJO 1993, 72). 
Strikingly similar is the relationship between original and translation from a more essentialist 
point of view, as we all know only too well. Translation – like signs – would work as a sort of 
simulacrum of the original text, the mighty primary source – like reality. Arrojo maintains 
that from this perspective this origin, this thing in itself is always postponed, deferred in the 
name of a promise of presence that is never fulfilled (ARRJO 1993, 74). Indeed, in the 
abovementioned work, Derrida explains that there is no way out of this language labyrinth 
since signs refer solely to other signs in an endless process of postponement and deferment – 
                                                             
87 In Michaela Wolf‘s 2007 anthology, this paper was translated as ‗Die Endfassung der Übersetzung und die 
Sichtbarkeit des Übersetzers‗ by Helga Ahrens (WOLF 1997, 117-134).  
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hence his coinage of the word ―différance‖, whereby one of the issues hinted at is precisely 
this idea of deferment, from ―différer‖ in French88.  
Applying this idea to translation, Arrojo suggests that ―desconstruída e passada a 
limpo, a reflexão sobre tradução abre mão do sonho da transferência intacta do Řmesmoř de 
uma língua para a outra, tão passionalmente perseguido pela metafísica do logos, e abre-se 
para a presença ubíqua do outro na (e da) linguagem‖, or deconstructed and reformulated, 
the reflection on translation gives up the dream of intact transference of the ―same‖ from one 
language to the other – a dream so passionately pursued by the metaphysics of the logos – 
and opens up to the ubiquitous presence of the other in (and from) language (idem, 77 – her 
emphasis). 
 In this newer light, Arrojo remembers the contributions made by Lawrence Venuti, 
particularly in the sense of advocating the translator‘s visibility as a tool to invert power 
relations, as well as by Lori Chamberlain, who draws an interesting parallel between the 
marginality of translation and the position of women in society. Arrojo‘s reservations about 
these contributions aside, she ends this paper by defending the translator‘s visibility as a sign 
of the acceptance of the ―other‖ in the translated text. This acceptance means that translators 
no longer unrealistically pretend to be neutral and absent, innocent and faithful, but rather 
acknowledge their unavoidable interference. This movement, Arrojo predicts, would help (or 
even is helping) to establish a new translation tradition located outside the age-old essentialist 
boundaries that associate translation to invisibility and guilt. The Brazilian theorist goes 
further and argues that ―quanto mais visível se tornar a presença do tradutor no texto 
traduzido, quanto maior sua visão acerca do processo do qual é agente e promotor, menores 
serão as chances de que seja ignorado, marginalizado e indignamente remunerado‖ – the 
more visible the presence of translators in translated texts, or the greater their awareness of 
this process in which they are agents and promoters, the fewer the chances of their being 
ignored, marginalised and poorly paid  (idem, 85).  
 So in conclusion, even though Arrojo stresses that the translator‘s visibility is but an 
inevitable mark of any translation, she insists that it is imperative that translators become 
aware of this visibility, that they acknowledge it not as something to be avoided, but as the 
                                                             
88 Derrida‘s ―différance‖ may hint at numerous elements in addition to the idea of deferment. For more on the 
coinage of this term, please refer to his homonymous paper (DERRIDA [1972] 1982, 1-29).    
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reason for the very possibility of translation. For her, it is this awareness and 
acknowledgement that will help to improve the working conditions of translators. And, as she 
argues in different papers (see above), the chief aim of translator training should be precisely 
to raise and foster this kind of awareness.     
 Another paper that intertwines translation, poststructuralist thought and 
psychoanalysis is called ‗Sobre Interpretação e Asceticismo: Reflexões em Torno e a Partir 
da Transferência‘, or On Interpretations and Asceticism: Transference as a Source of 
Reflection and Point of Departure (idem, 91-114)
89
. As in several other papers of hers, Arrojo 
begins this one by opposing the so-called modern project, with its promises of objectivity, its 
scientific ambitions and its asceticism, to the deconstructionist project, which in turn openly 
recognises a will and a desire behind this alleged asceticism (idem, 92-93). Thanks to this 
deconstructionist perspective, claims Arrojo, we can question and rethink some of the 
implications and objectives of the modern project.  
 As an example, Arrojo takes Saussure‘s contributions to so-called modern linguistics 
– already thoroughly discussed under 6 in Part I above – adding Jean-Jacques Lecercle‘s 
views (mainly in his 1990 The Violence of Language) together with Derrida‘s observations 
(taken especially from his Positions – DERRIDA 1987). In Arrojo‘s opinion, both Lecercle 
and Derrida point towards a ―residue‖ (―resíduo‖, in Arrojo‘s words) in Saussure‘s theory, 
whereby everything that ―does not concern‖ the structure he proposes – i.e. the parole, 
diachrony, the social, the history and so on – is simply left outside language and linguistics. 
For both thinkers, this residue, this reject is precisely where language takes place and 
therefore cannot be ignored any longer.  
Arrojo adds that a further issue that the modern tradition would rather keep ignored 
and outside its structures and sciences is the unconscious (idem, 98). She very opportunely 
quotes Lacan‘s brilliant neologism linguisterie, a term that conveys the interference of 
subjects and their desires in and together with language. The Brazilian scholar warns, 
however, that recognising interference, acknowledging the influence of human desire and 
opening up to the ―residues‖ of language entails by no means the acceptance of chaos or the 
                                                             
89 This paper featured in Wolf‘s anthology Übersetzungswissenschaft in Brasilien with the title ‗Interpretation 
und Askese: Weitergehende Gedanken zur Übertragung‗ (translated by Hans Vermeer – WOLF 1997, 141-164).  
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abandonment of science. For her, it entails instead coming out of our platonic refuge and 
giving up our ascetic notion of science (idem, 100-101). 
 Exploring the unconscious a bit further, Arrojo remembers Lacan once again and 
adverts to the fact that the unconscious should not be perceived as opposed to consciousness, 
but rather as the difference between consciousness and itself, the inherent and irreducible 
difference (idem, 102 – quoting Shoshana Felman). In this sense, the unconscious is not 
merely an object of study, but it constitutes the subject as well, the one who studies (idem, 
101). And as Lacan famously remarked, ―the unconscious is the discourse of the other‖, 
which in a way is crucial to Freudian psychoanalysis, as Arrojo defends (idem, 103). The 
patient‘s symptoms are to be translated by the patient, to which the analyst reacts and replies. 
These reactions and replies come to constitute the patient‘s unconscious – as the discourse of 
the other (see above) – through the process of transference. In the context of psychoanalysis, 
transference is key between analyst and patient because the latter assumes that the former 
knows all the answers, holds the keys that will lead to a cure – in the same fashion as children 
believe their parents possess all knowledge. Arrojo explains that this is how transference 
takes place, and this is how the discourse of the other (see above) comes to form one‘s 
unconscious (idem, 105). 
 This relation of transference, argues Arrojo, can be found in our relationships with 
texts. Quoting Shoshana Felman again, the Brazilian professor claims that, in this context, 
critics or readers play the role of patient, whereas texts are like analysts – i.e. the ones who 
supposedly hold all truths and answers patients or readers wish to attain. And here Arrojo 
turns to Harold Bloom in his 1973 The Anxiety of Influence and associates the idea of 
transference to love (as Lacan does, too) and to influence (idem, 107). Arrojo explains that in 
Bloom‘s view, poems, for example, are but the response, the reaction to other poems to the 
same extent that poets are the response to other poets, or people in general are the response to 
their parents (see epigraph in Section 3.2, Part III below). In Bloom‘s reflection, in order to 
overcome this influence and write, poets have to indulge in misreading, in being critical, in 
antithetically completing their precursor‘s poems. In Arrojo‘s point of view, an interesting 
instance of this process is the relationship between Freud and Nietzsche, thoroughly 
discussed by Derrida in his ‗Spéculer Ŕ Sur Freud‘. In summary, though one would say that 
the influence of Nietzsche on Freud is without doubt patent, not only does the father of 
psychoanalysis not admit it, but he also vehemently denies it (idem, 109-110). For Bloom, 
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Arrojo clarifies, ―strong‖ readers like Freud must disguise the violence of their reading and 
the extent of their debt to their precursors – ―dissimular (…) a violência de sua leitura e o 
tamanho do seu débito‖ (idem, 110). 
 At the end of the paper, Arrojo insists once again – this time quoting Bloom in his A 
Map of Misreading – that after Freud‘s and Nietzsche‘s contributions, one can no longer 
speak of interpretation as a meaning recovery activity, of pure relationships between subjects 
and objects (texts), of relationships that do not leave residues (see above) behind (idem, 111-
112). So in this paper Arrojo proposes a thorough revision of the idea of interpretation, 
discarding the wish for asceticism and embracing the undeniable effects of transference – as 
it is understood in psychoanalysis. 
 In ‗A Literatura como Fetichismo e Algumas Consequências para uma Teoria da 
Tradução‘ (Literature as Fetishism: Consequences for Translation Theory), Arrojo proposes a 
similar kind of revision and reformulation, this time taking the psychoanalytical concept of 
fetishism as a starting point to reformulate the notion of literary texts. At the beginning of her 
paper, Arrojo draws an overview of the so-called traditional outlook on literature and its 
relationship with translation. She quotes writers as disparate as Dante Alighieri and 
Benedetto Croce as examples of this traditional view, whereby literary translation would 
involve falsification and loss (idem, 115-116 – refer to 2.2 above). The Brazilian author holds 
that these views derive from a conviction that literary texts possess intrinsic, constant features 
which, in turn, make them literary. So she takes examples from literary theory to show how 
different theorists have tried – and failed – to define the nature of poetry and literature in 
general. And here she quotes Wellek and Warren in their classic A Theory of Literature, 
along with the American philosopher Monroe Beardsley, as instances of these failed attempts 
(idem, 117).  
 Another example of this view that Arrojo deems traditional is to be found in Edgar 
Allan Poe‘s acclaimed essay ‗Philosophy of Composition‘, a text which, in Arrojo‘s opinion, 
represents the dream to reach a ―pre-babelic state‖ (―estado pré-babélico‖), to find an area of 
linguistic and artistic stability that escapes the arbitrariness of signs (―área de estabilidade 
linguística e artística [que] escap[a] da arbitrariedade do signo‖ – idem, 118). For the 
Brazilian thinker, attitudes such as Poe‘s reveal the desire to create a fictitious universe and 
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remain its lord forever, the one and only that can dictate rules and establish meanings (idem, 
120). 
 In this light, this traditional view described by Arrojo has much in common with 
Freud‘s idea of the ―Kastrationskomplex‖ and the ―Penisneid‖ (FREUD [1905] 2001, 96 – 
see ARROJO 1993, 120-121). According to Freud, male children tend to believe that both 
boys and girls possess a penis. Facing the fact that their mother, for example, has no penis, 
means facing a strong ―Kastrationskomplex‖, whereby boys believe that their mothers have 
been castrated and that the same fate might befall them as well (idem – both FREUD and 
ARROJO). And here Arrojo adds, using Freud‘s words, that amongst children of both sexes 
the male genitalia appear to be the only ones that matter, the only ones that truly exist. But 
this primacy is not of the genitalia themselves, but rather of the phallus (ARROJO 1993, 
121). For the Brazilian thinker, Lacan‘s interpretation of this particular element of Freud‘s 
theory of infantile sexuality is key: for the French psychoanalyst perceives the phallus first as 
a simulacrum, as a signifier (idem). In this sense, castration in psychoanalysis entails the loss 
of this imaginary plenitude, the perception of an essential incompleteness (―perda de uma 
plenitude imaginária, percepção de uma incompletude essencial‖ – idem, 122).      
 It is in these terms that Arrojo proposes an interesting parallel between this notion of 
castration and the production of literature and translation. For her, writing implies embracing 
this castration, accepting the imaginary character of our hopes for plenitude and completeness 
in language. Denying this linguistic castration would be the same as denying that ―one‘s 
language is doomed to never being more than a good translation‖, in Jane Gallop‘s words 
(GALLOP 1984, 98 – see ARROJO 1993, 122). This attitude of denial would lead to what 
Arrojo calls fetishism, i.e. the excessive adoration of something that is not present, that is not 
―there‖. In other words, the attempts, such as Poe‘s, to keep one‘s text untouched, or the 
attempts on the part of critics to protect a certain canonical reading of a particular text is 
nothing but fetishism, the adoration of constant meanings that, in fact, are not physically 
―there‖. The Brazilian scholar adds that this fetishism is one of the multiple expressions of 
narcissistic love reflected onto the objects that we decide to favour over others (―amor 
narcisístico refletido nos objetos que decidimos privilegiar sobre os outros‖ – idem, 124).   
 Towards the end of this essay, Arrojo briefly discusses the concept of fetishism in 
Marx‘s work. In short, Marx defends the idea that value is something collectively attributed 
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to objects within a certain community, raising their status in this community. In other words, 
objects do not possess any intrinsic, inherent value. From this point of view, perceiving 
economy, for example, as something natural and purely objective is mere fetishism, as 
economy does not possess any essential value but only the value we attribute to it (idem, 
125). In this light, Arrojo returns to Poe in his ‗Philosophy of Composition‘ and argues that 
Como o fetichista de Freud, Poe se enreda nos domínios do simulacro à medida que 
constrói um substituto para um original que não pode existir fora de seu próprio desejo e 
de sua perspectiva e que, precisamente por isso, tem que ser protegido dos olhos 
reveladores do outro. Como o fetichista de Marx, Poe também se encontra enredado no 
campo ilusório das propriedades e dos valores inerentes (...) (idem, 126).  
Like Freud‘s fetishist, Poe is caught within the limits of simulacrum in that he builds a 
substitute for an original that cannot exist outside his own desire and perspective and, 
precisely for this reason, this substitute must be protected from the revealing looks of the 
others. Like Marx‘s fetishist, Poe is also caught in the illusory field of inherent properties 
and values (…).    
Arrojo closes the paper by stating that Poe‘s wish for a mathematical language simply 
transcends the limits of human language because, as the historian John Forrester advocates, 
the aim of mathematical languages is to achieve equality, whereas human language 
communicates what is different (idem, 128)
90
. So for Arrojo reading and translating are 
perfectly possible activities as long as one acknowledges the undeniable impact of one‘s own 
desires (idem, 129), instead of defending inherent values and illusory meanings.  
 Arrojo demands a similar attitude from translation teachers and students in the paper 
‗Desconstrução, Psicanálise e o Ensino de Tradução‘ (Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis and 
Translator Training
91
). Based upon Stephen Straight‘s 1981 essay ‗Knowledge, Purpose and 
Intuition: Three Dimensions in the Evaluation of Translation‘, Arrojo claims that the 
traditional knowledge categories ascribed to translator training – in this case Straight‘s six 
categories: ecology, material culture, technology, social organisation, mythic patterns and 
linguistic structures – imply that translating is a suprahuman activity (idem, 133-134). In her 
view, the traditional, essentialist way of thinking has imposed ―embarrassing constraints‖ 
                                                             
90 We have previously seen another argument against the idea of an exact, mathematical natural language in 
Section 2.1 above, proposed by logician Alfred Tarski.     
91 A version of this paper was published in English in the American journal TranScribe in 2005 (number 1). The 
title Arrojo chose for the paper is ‗Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis and the Teaching of Translation‘. Moreover, 
Hans Vermeer translated this paper into German in Wolf‘s 1997 anthology Übersetzungswissenschaft in 
Brasilien, where it was published under the title ‗Dekonstruktion, Psychoanalyse und Translationslehre‘ 
(WOLF 1997, 165-182).   
  
162 
(―limites constrangedores‖) to the activity of the translator, unsurprisingly associating it to 
failure and incompetence (idem, 135). Arrojo maintains that this attitude has brought about 
two main consequences. Firstly, translation has not found a niche at universities precisely 
because of its potentially subversive character, along with its stubborn resistance to 
systematisation and taxonomy. Secondly, what we call translation theory does nothing but 
inform students of how secondary their future job will be, as well as of how unattainable the 
demands of this job are (idem, 137)
92
. 
 Within the so-called deconstructionist reflection, in contrast, translation is not only a 
feasible activity, but it also deserves a special place, or rather it is in the very spotlight of 
contemporary thought on language and culture. But this acknowledgement of the 
fundamental importance of translation is not without its difficulties, since poststructuralist 
thought proposes revolutionary changes in the way one perceives translation and translator 
training. To begin with, knowledge is by no means understood as a set of static information 
contained in books and dictionaries waiting to be objectively apprehended by pupils (idem, 
140). As Arrojo remarks, after Nietzsche and Foucault, knowledge is no longer a property 
that can be rationally discovered, acquired or passed down without regard for history and 
ideology (idem – quoting Michael Ryan). Similarly, the university is no longer conceived as a 
body of universal knowledge that should be preserved and transmitted to future generations 
(idem, 141).  
 In fact, when it comes to ―passing down‖ knowledge, Arrojo defends the 
psychoanalytical concept of transference (see above) once again. In order for students to 
―acquire‖ knowledge, a mechanism of transference has to be set in motion the same way as in 
the context of psychoanalysis. Only when pupils establish a relationship of transference with 
their teachers will they engage in learning, in having passion and eagerness for knowledge 
(idem, 142-144). But is transference not an inevitable aspect of the teacher-pupil or 
psychoanalyst-patient relationship? Yes, answers Arrojo, but the difference is that in 
postmodern times both pupils and teachers should become aware of transference, should 
openly analyse it and challenge it. It should become clear, for example, that transference is 
ambivalent – instead of blind adoration, it entails perverse feelings of dispute as well (idem, 
144 – see above). Viewed in this light, learning and teaching become relentlessly self-critical 
                                                             
92 For a similar discussion on translator training, please refer back to Section 2.1 above.  
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undertakings – as already addressed under 2 in Part I above. Arrojo emphasises that rather 
than learning a set of truths that will guide their future work, pupils should become aware of 
the mechanisms and power struggles underneath these truths; they should become aware of 
the forces of transference that underlie their relationships with teachers and so-called original 
authors and texts; they should become aware of the (tacit) rules that organise their profession 
so that they can change them and make them more human, realistic and decent (idem, 145-
147). This is the tone of Arrojo‘ call for action at the end of the paper (and here I quote her 
directly in English): 
the only realistic approach to the teaching of translation should concentrate on efforts to 
provide future professionals with the critical apparatus that will allow them to discover 
what kind of strategy should be employed in each translation project that they decide to 
undertake. This critical apparatus can be better developed in the context of a classroom 
and with a group of students that are willing to analyze and debate their own methods of 
producing meanings and exercising power, and to give up the futile mission of finding the 
definitive dictionary or glossary, or the unanimously exact equivalent to a word or 
expression, or even absolute fidelity to an original, or, perhaps, the immortal translation 
of a text (ARROJO 2005, 33 – see ARROJO 1993, 147-148)93. 
 In the penultimate paper that makes up Tradução, Desconstrução e Psicanálise 
Arrojo revisits recurring issues not only in this book, but also in her work as a whole. So the 
psychoanalytical notions of unconscious and transference, Borges‘ character Pierre Menard, 
along with Bloom‘s concept of ―strong reader‖ are some of the main subjects of ‗A Tradução 
e o Flagrante da Transferência: Algumas Aventuras Textuais com Dom Quixote e Pierre 
Menard‘ (Translation and Quixote‘s and Pierre Menard‘s Textual Adventures: Transference 
Caught Red-Handed)
94
.  
 Departing from Borges‘ story ‗Pierre Menard, Autor del Quijote‘, Arrojo briefly 
discusses how the protagonist, Pierre Menard, seems to embody the key features of the so-
called modern project (please refer to 2.1 above or 2.4 below) in his wish to write Don 
Quijote again, as if it were the first time (idem, 151-154). However burlesque or caricatural 
this character may be, Arrojo finds that he has a lot in common with numerous contemporary 
critics, linguists, translation scholars and translators, particularly as far as their strong belief 
in stable meanings is concerned. As an example, she mentions the English Cervantes 
                                                             
93 A part of this quotation is the epigraph of the present section.  
94
 A Spanish version of this paper featured in the journal Debats (number 75, 2001/2002) under the title 
‗Algunas Aventuras Textuales con Don Quijote y Pierre Menard: La Traducción y lo Flagrante de la 
Transferencia‘, translated by Javier Mallo Martínez.  
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specialist Anthony Close who, Arrojo quotes, speaks of Cervantes‘ intentions in Don Quijote 
as if he had had direct access to them, going as far as to explain what purposes Cervantes had 
in mind when he wrote the book and openly condemning interpretations that do not fit his 
analysis (idem, 154-155 – quoting Close in his 1972 paper ‗Don Quijote and the 
―Intentionality Fallacy‖‘).  
 Faced with Menard and Close‘s remarks as typically modern, essentialist remarks, 
Arrojo builds a bridge between their general way of thinking and contemporary thought, 
beginning with Foucault‘s comments on Cervantes‘ Don Quijote from Les Mots et les 
Choses. As I will argue in detail in 2.4 below, the character Don Quixote is himself a 
convinced believer in stable meanings. No wonder Foucault calls him ―le héros du Même‖, 
Arrojo remembers very opportunely (FOUCAULT 1966, 60 – see ARROJO 1993, 156). As 
Foucault maintains about Quijote (FOUCAULT 1966, 60), 
en sa réalité de pauvre hidalgo, il ne peut devenir le chevalier qu'en écoutant de loin 
l'épopée séculaire qui formule la Loi. Le livre est moins son existence que son devoir. 
Sans cesse il doit le consulter afin de savoir que faire et que dire, et quels signes donner à 
lui-même et aux autres pour montrer qu'il est bien de même nature que le texte dont il est 
issu. Les romans de chevalerie ont écrit une fois pour toutes la prescription de son 
aventure. Et chaque épisode, chaque décision, chaque exploit seront signes que Don 
Quichotte est en effet semblable à tous ces signes quřil a décalqués.     
In short, Arrojo explains, both Quixote and Menard (and Close) rely on the strict, universal 
and unchanging correspondence between language and reality, and are both defeated by the 
arbitrariness of signs and the impossibility of full repetition (ARROJO 1993, 156). So much 
for our heroes ―du même‖ (see above).     
 The Brazilian thinker then moves on to deconstruction, claiming that one of its chief 
contributions to the debate of language and meaning is the acknowledgement of the desire 
inherent to any reading (idem, 157). And here Arrojo finds the contributions by 
psychoanalysis particularly fruitful as well, since this desire of which Derrida, for example, 
speaks, is intimately related to the psychoanalytical notions of unconscious and transference. 
As already indicated above, if one understands the unconscious not as the other extreme of 
consciousness, but rather as an irreducible difference between consciousness and itself, one 
can no longer clearly distinguish the one who reads from what is read (idem, 158 – quoting 
Shoshana Felman). By the same token, one cannot exempt any interpretation, any reading, 
any writing or any translation from transference (idem – see above).  
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 Very similarly to her reasoning in ‗Sobre Interpretação e Asceticismo: Reflexões em 
Torno e a Partir da Transferência‘ (see above), Arrojo fleshes out the implications and 
mechanisms of transference in literary criticism, again turning to Harold Bloom‘s concept of 
―strong reader‖ to justify a certain violence inherent to any reading (idem, 162 – quoting 
Bloom‘s A Map of Misreading): 
Como a escritura, a leitura é uma forma de violência (...) contra o próprio texto/autor 
com quem o leitor pode estabelecer uma relação, já que esse texto/autor jamais será 
repetido ou resgatado num processo impessoal ou desinteressado, e sim tomado, 
possuído e transformado pelo desejo e pelas circunstâncias do leitor que com ele se 
misturar. (...) Os escritores e leitores Ŗfortesŗ (…) são aqueles que têm a coragem de 
supor que Ŗapagaramŗ o rastro do pai/precursor e inventaram um lugar e um estilo 
próprios para si mesmos (...). 
Like writing, reading is a form of violence (…) against the text/author with whom the 
reader may establish a relationship, since this text/author shall never be repeated or 
recovered through an impersonal, disinterested process; instead, it can only be seized, 
possessed and transformed through its reader‘s desires and circumstances. (…) ―Strong‖ 
readers and writers are those who have the courage to suppose that they have ―erased‖ the 
father‘s/precursor‘s traces and have established their own place and style (…).   
 Viewed in this light, the translators‘ claims to invisibility and neutrality make them an 
exemplary Oedipus, claims Arrojo, caught between guilt and desire, between the 
consummated crime against the father/author and the need to conceal this crime and remain 
incognito (―preso entre a culpa e o desejo, entre o ato consumado da eliminação do pai/autor 
e a necessidade de esconder esse ato e de se manter incógnito‖ – idem). One such feeling 
may be illustrated through a very curious example Arrojo quotes in this text, namely Lacan‘s 
English translator, John Forrester, and his difficulty to tell ―his own‖ ideas from Lacan‘s: 
The problems of being Lacan‘s translator over the past few years have led to a singular 
intellectual phenomenon for me: an incapacity to remember whether certain ideas, when 
expressed in English, are ‗mine‘, my version of Lacan‘s ideas, or my translation of 
Lacan‘s French. Perhaps it is not surprising that this has been my lot, given that the act of 
translation is specifically aimed at repressing the original and replacing it with an exact 
replica (FORRESTER [1990] 1994, 373 – see ARROJO 1993, 164).  
 Finally, Arrojo goes back to Menard and carefully examines the chapters of Don 
Quijote that our fictitious Frenchman of letters wanted to ―reproduce‖, following the lead left 
by Borges in the prologue to his Ficciones, according to which the allusion to certain texts 
was not arbitrary (idem, 163). Indeed, many of Menard‘s desires and much of his 
transference relationship with Cervantes and his text are unveiled through Arrojo‘s careful 
analysis. The Brazilian scholar ends her paper brilliantly by claiming that one such analysis 
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that strives to grasp the intricate network of desires and ambivalent feelings inherent to any 
human endeavour can only be carried out outside the boundaries of logocentrism (idem, 170).  
 The last paper of Tradução, Desconstrução e Psicanálise, ‗Maria Mutema, o Poder 
Autoral e a Resistência à Interpretação‘ (Maria Mutema, Authorial Power and the Resistance 
to Interpretation), is somewhat similar to the penultimate paper in that it explores 
representations of translation and language in fiction. Maria Mutema is a character in João 
Guimarães Rosa‘s O Grande Sertão: Veredas, or rather she is a character in a subnarrative in 
Rosa‘s novel. But in her paper, which is indeed the longest by far, Arrojo does not merely 
stick to this subnarrative. Instead, she presents a thorough analysis of the entire novel from 
the point of view of psychoanalysis and deconstruction, investigating issues such as the 
struggle and impact of power both in the novel and as metaphors for language, reading, 
writing and translation.  
 Because Arrojo‘s analysis of the novel is rather lengthy and detailed, and because I 
suppose most readers are not well-acquainted with Rosa‘s Grande Sertão, I will limit myself 
to a brief commentary on some of the ideas she investigates. The leitmotif of her analysis 
appears to be the power of speech, the power of words. The Brazilian thinker finds numerous 
examples in the novel of characters who exert a powerful influence over others through their 
use of language – Maria Mutema‘s being perhaps the most fierce, as her words literally lead 
to a man‘s death. Furthermore, she provides various instances of how the protagonist, 
Riobaldo, strives to attain power through his use of language.  
 The psychoanalytical vein of her analysis is also very prominent, as Arrojo comments 
on countless instances of the oedipal desire to take the leader‘s or father‘s place and authority 
in the characters‘ relentless struggle for power. Moreover, the idea of the family romance (see 
above) is also very much present, as a few characters (especially Riobaldo) seem to be caught 
in a twofold relationship of love and rivalry with some of their leaders and role-models. In 
this sense, Arrojo argues that the novel can be understood as Riobaldo‘s arduous attempt to 
leave these precursors, these father figures behind, thus establishing his own identity, 
establishing himself as a leader.  
 Another issue that permeates both the novel and Arrojo‘s analysis is that of absolute 
opposites. A common version of the main subject of the novel points precisely towards this 
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direction: good versus evil, god versus the devil, the truth versus lies and falsifications, and 
so on and so forth. What Riobaldo realises in his long and tortuous journey is that such clear 
oppositions cannot be sustained in real life and, even more importantly than that, that they 
only exist and can only be found inside ourselves, and not as given, external facts. In this 
sense, Arrojo asserts that the novel is about the subversion of these absolute opposites so vital 
to the essentialist tradition (idem, 182). 
 All in all, Arrojo finds in O Grande Sertão: Veredas many thought-provoking 
examples of feelings and attitudes that are intimately related to the activities of the translator 
– reading, interpreting, writing. The ambivalent and manifold relationship between translator 
and author and the desire to simultaneously faithfully repeat and violently replace the 
translated text; the difficulty in sticking to extreme oppositions such as subject-object and 
signifier-signified, which in translation insist on remaining changeable and inconstant; the 
power of words and discourse that incessantly overwhelms those who work with texts; in 
summary, the issues that arise as soon as one perceives language and translation outside the 
belittling and claustrophobic limits of essentialism make up the core of this inspiring analysis 
of O Grande Sertão: Veredas through the lenses of contemporary thought. 
*** 
 As I hope this analysis of Arrojo‘s Tradução, Desconstrução e Psicanálise has 
shown, the interface between translation, deconstruction and psychoanalysis leads to various 
thought-provoking issues, such as the power of interpretation; the influence of the 
unconscious on the human mind; the role played by transference and fetishism in human 
relationships; the instability of the notions of truth, objectivity, meaning and science; the 
hierarchies and power relationships typical of human organisations; the role of higher 
education in postmodern times; the place of translation studies at university; amongst 
numerous others. Many of these issues will come up again in what follows; some will be 
addressed at length in Part IV below – such as the role of higher education, the place of 
translation studies at university, the instability of certain concepts associated with translation, 
and the power relationships typical of human organisations. 
 Similarly to 2.1 and 2.2 above, in section 2.3 Arrojo‘s work was the source of 
stimulating reflections, leaving me with very little room for disagreement. The radicalism of 
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which Section 2.1 might be accused appears somewhat softened here, but it certainly remains. 
However, unlike O Signo Desconstruído, this book seems less likely to fall into the hands of 
less experienced readers, considering that the level of difficulty of the book seems 
considerably higher. In O Signo Desconstruído, Arrojo‘s papers are short and usually less 
dense in terms of references; in Tradução, Desconstrução e Psicanálise, in contrast, 
references are abundant and various concepts are largely taken for granted. In this sense, even 
though some of her propositions may still strike one as relatively radical, this appears to be 
less potentially ―harmful‖ than in 2.1 above (please refer to footnote 75 above).  
Last but not least, it seems unclear to me what Arrojo‘s position as for the 
institutionalisation of translation is. While on the one hand she appears to defend it, claiming 
an exclusive place for translation quite apart from linguistics, on the other hand, one such 
exclusivity would go against poststructuralist thought, which in turn favours 
interdisciplinarity over exclusive disciplines closed in on themselves (please refer to Chapter 
2 in Part I above). This question will be brought up again in what follows, and I shall address 
it in detail in Part IV, Chapter 3 below. Let us now move on to the last section of the present 
part, where a few of Arrojo‘s more recent papers will be examined.                                  
2.4 Selected Papers 
¡Más bien por imposible! dirá el lector. De acuerdo, 
pero la empresa era de antemano imposible y de todos 
los medios imposibles para llevarla a término, éste era 
el menos interesante. Ser en el siglo veinte un novelista 
popular del siglo diecisiete le pareció una disminución. 
Ser, de alguna manera, Cervantes y llegar al Quijote le 
pareció menos arduo por – consiguiente, menos 
interesante – que seguir siendo Pierre Menard y llegar 
al Quijote, a través de las experiencias de Pierre 
Menard. 
Jorge Luis Borges
95
 
                                                             
95 This excerpt was taken from Borges‘ ‗Pierre Menard, Autor del Quijote‘. James E. Irby‘s translation reads as 
follows: ―Rather as impossible! my reader will say. Granted, but the undertaking was impossible from the very 
beginning and of all the impossible ways of carrying it out, this was the least interesting. To be, in the twentieth 
century, a popular novelist of the seventeenth seemed to him a diminution. To be, in some way, Cervantes and 
reach the Quixote seemed less arduous to him – and, consequently, less interesting – than to go on being Pierre 
Menard and reach the Quixote through the experiences of Pierre Menard‖ (BORGES 1964, 40).  
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In this final section of Part II we will examine four papers by Rosemary Arrojo published in 
Portuguese and English-speaking journals on translation studies. As all of her works analysed 
up until now stemmed from the 1980s and 1990s, I have decided to include four more recent 
papers (2000s) in the present chapter, all on relatively different issues. The first paper we will 
look into, entitled ‗Modernidade e o Desprezo da Tradução como Objeto de Pesquisa‘ 
(Modernity and the Contempt for Translation as a Research Object), was published in the 
Brazilian journal Alfa in 2000, and is dedicated to the issue of research, or rather the object of 
research of translation studies – an issue already raised in Part I above. The second paper, 
named ‗Shared Ground in Translation Studies‘, was written together with Andrew 
Chesterman (see Chapter 3, Part I above) and came out in issue 12 vol. 1 of the journal 
Target in 2000 as well. This paper is somewhat similar to the first one, but focuses more on 
the nature of translation studies.  
Next, the third paper, ‗O Tradutor Invisível por ele Mesmo: Paulo Henriques Britto 
entre a Humildade e a Onipotência‘ (The Invisible Translator by Himself: Paulo Henriques 
Britto between Humility and Omnipotence), is dedicated to a different issue altogether. 
Having first appeared in the year 2000 in the Brazilian Journal Trabalhos de Linguística 
Aplicada, this paper is a response to Paulo Henriques Britto‘s fierce criticism of both 
Arrojo‘s work and poststructuralist thought as a whole – see Section 3.1 in Part III below. 
Although Britto‘s work will first be introduced in Part III below, when the motivations 
behind his criticism will become clearer, many of his objections to poststructuralist 
tendencies can be easily anticipated.  
Finally, the fourth paper that makes up this section is called ‗Translation, 
Transference and the Attraction to Otherness: Borges, Menard, Whitman‘ and featured in the 
journal Diacritics in 2004. Not only is this the most recent work by Arrojo analysed in the 
present thesis, but it also exemplifies the latest developments in her research as the paper 
explores representations of translation in literary texts.  
In her 2000 paper ‗Modernidade e o Desprezo da Tradução como Objeto de 
Pesquisa‘ (ARROJO 2000a), Arrojo addresses the issue of research in translation studies 
firstly by drawing a general overview of the discipline from a postmodern point of view. She 
maintains that even though there may have been various tendencies and theoretical 
standpoints within translation studies in the past four decades or so, their main concern has 
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always been the same: to establish appropriate methods applicable to the widest possible 
range of text types, as well as strict rules and principles for translating and assessing the 
quality of translations (idem, 71 – quoting Newmark96). For her, this concern is very much in 
line with the modern aspiration to systematise knowledge with a view to increasing efficiency 
– a view derived from the enlightenment philosophy of the 18th century. In the case of 
translation studies, this would mean the establishment of a set of universal precepts fully 
immune to human circumstances and the limitations of science; the establishment, in other 
words, of a true translation theory (idem, 72 – quoting Aubert97).   
Arrojo then mentions two pioneer works in translation studies that epitomise this wish 
to bring to an end the ―it-depends-on-the-case‖ philosophy commonly associated with 
translation (which I will take for granted here): Andrei Fedorov‘s 1953 Vvdenie v Teorju 
Perevoda and Vinay and Darbelnet‘s 1958 Stylistique Comparée du Français et de l'Anglais 
(idem, 73). She then goes on to explain that 
A modernidade nos estudos da tradução se associa não apenas à possibilidade de 
transformar tanto a teoria quanto a prática em objetos de uma ciência (...) puramente 
objetiva e, portanto, universalmente aplicável, mas também à suposta superioridade da 
teoria e dos teóricos Ŕ sobretudo da linguística e dos linguistas Ŕ em relação ao 
empirismo de tradutores e comentaristas comprometidos com outras áreas do 
conhecimento (idem, 74).  
Modernity in translation studies is associated not only with the possibility to turn both 
theory and practice into the objects of a (…) purely objective and hence universally 
applicable science, but also with the alleged superiority of theory and theorists – 
particularly of linguistics and linguists – over the empiricism of translators and thinkers 
from other areas.   
From her point of view, therefore, modernity has brought to translation studies an urge to 
scientism which is still very much present today (please refer to Part I above). She 
nonetheless believes that this scientistic impulse has not given rise to a single instance of 
universally applicable knowledge – neither in translation theory nor in translation practice 
(idem, 75). Despite this, many of the theorists engaged in translation studies do not appear to 
have been affected by this failure and remain optimistic for a better future (their glass 
certainly seems half full):  
                                                             
96 Newmark‘s Approaches to Translation (1988).  
97 Aubert‘s As (In)fidelidades da Tradução: Servidões e Autonomia do Tradutor (1993).  
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(...) as tentativas de eleger algum ramo dessa disciplina [linguística] para servir de base 
para a elaboração de um conjunto de conhecimentos pretensamente "objetivos" e de 
aplicação universal, quaisquer que sejam as circunstâncias e as línguas e culturas 
envolvidas, continuam atraindo a grande maioria dos pesquisadores da área (...) (idem – 
her emphasis). 
(...) the attempts to elect a branch of this discipline [linguistics] to work as the basis of 
pretentiously ―objective‖ and universally applicable knowledge, irrespective of the 
circumstances, languages and cultures involved, still appeal to the vast majority of the 
researchers in the area.   
As examples of this attitude, Arrojo mentions Wolfram Wilss, Julianne House and Joseph 
Graham, quoting some of their works from the early 1980s. She then mentions Mona Baker 
(1992) and Newmark again (1988
98
) as examples of translation scholars who defend (or at 
least defended in the works in question) linguistics as the discipline to which translation 
studies should ideally be affiliated because, for these researchers, translation is predominantly 
a linguistic phenomenon.  
 To quote a more recent thinker then, who appears to have a tendency towards 
scientism and who defends linguistics as the ―science‖ to which translation studies belongs, 
Arrojo remembers Peter Fawcett‘s 1997 Translation and Language, in which he claims that 
―since linguistics (…) has produced such powerful and productive theories about how 
language works, and since translation is a language activity, it would seem only common 
sense to think that the first had something to say about the second‖ (FAWCETT 1997, 1 – his 
emphasis – see ARROJO 2000a, 76). The Brazilian author then compares Fawcett‘s 
theoretical undertakings and his subsequent humble accomplishments – at least as far as an 
absolute and universally applicable theory of translation is concerned – to those of Mounin, 
as already thoroughly discussed in her 1998 paper (see Chapter 5 in Part I above). Indeed, 
Arrojo asserts, some of Fawcett‘s conclusions are very similar to those of Mounin thirty years 
earlier, pointing to the allegedly chaotic, almost rebellious nature of translation and how it 
seems to resist systematisation (idem, 77-78). 
 Towards the middle of the paper Arrojo briefly takes the discussion in a more political 
direction, asserting that this obsession with scientism in translation studies (and not solely 
translation studies) ends up transcending the avowed objective to study translation 
mechanisms and becomes the representation of the autonomy and dominance interests of the 
                                                             
98 Please refer to the penultimate footnote above.  
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scientists (idem, 78). She finds in Lyotard (mostly [1988] 1992) a source of clarification for 
this phenomenon, as he explains that modernism has in its heart the idea of both the project as 
a will and an objective, and of legitimation, of a need for universal truths – hence its 
conspicuous scientism. Legitimation can only take place through the universal, the 
permanent, the unchangeable. Lyotard (translated by Julian Pefanis, Morgan Thomas and 
Don Barry) goes further and asserts that   
Scientific reason is not examined according to the (cognitive) criterion of truth or falsity, 
on the message/referent axis, but according to the performativity of its utterances, on the 
(pragmatic) axis addressor/addressee. What I say has more truth than what you say, since 
I can ―do more‖ (gain more time, go further) with what I say than you can with what you 
say (LYOTARD [1988] 1992, 64 – his emphasis – see ARROJO 2000a, 78)99.      
In this light, Arrojo feels that countless scholars engaged in translation studies are far more 
concerned with establishing a science, and thereby strictly controlling the activity we call 
translation – which is rather utopic – than about observing the actual reality of translation 
(idem, 79 – see Chapter 4 in Part I above).  
She then draws a parallel between translation studies and literary theory from the 
point of view of this difficulty with its own research object. For her, new criticism is an 
example of a similar process whereby a discipline, in this case literary theory, tried to become 
scientific and strictly objective – indeed very much in line with the process through which 
translation studies has been going. Nonetheless, this project also seemed to be doomed to 
failure as very few developments were actually made in the sense of finding the essence of 
poetry, delimiting the functions and contours of literary theory, establishing the 
distinguishing features of literary texts, and so on and so forth – and here she quotes I. A. 
Richards and Schorer et al. as examples of these unfulfilled scientistic ambitions (idem, 80).        
 In the next few pages (idem, 80-83), Arrojo analyses I. A. Richards‘ 1948 ‗Science 
and Poetry‘ more closely, aiming at showing that however much translation studies and 
literary theory appear to have gone through a similar process of allegedly scientific and 
objective systematisation, there is a difference of paramount importance between the two 
processes. For her, unlike in translation studies, in literary theory there is hardly a desire to 
control, to discipline, to chastise their research object, i.e. literary texts. Much as they may 
wish to formalise and systematise the analysis and criticism of their object of study, there is 
                                                             
99 A part of this quotation was used in the epigraph of Chapter 3 in Part III below. 
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first and foremost a strong feeling of acceptance of literary texts as they are – rather than an 
obsession to control the production of these texts, as is the case in translation studies.  
 Towards the end of the paper (idem, 83-85), Arrojo briefly draws a parallel between 
translation studies and linguistics once again, claiming that, ever since Mounin, there has 
been a hope that one day linguistics will finally save translation studies from illegitimacy, 
that a branch of linguistics will uncover the key that will allow translation studies not only to 
become a fully independent discipline, but also to have the right instruments to control its 
research object adequately. The Brazilian scholar then mentions a few examples of 
intersections between literary theory and linguistics (amongst which is Michael Riffaterre‘s 
‗Describing Poetic Structures: Two Approaches to Baudelaire‘s ‗Les Chats‘‘), showing that 
the influence of the latter over the former does not compare with the influence of linguistics 
over translation studies. Riffaterre‘s well-known conclusion in the abovementioned paper is 
that structural linguistics is the one that would have to adapt in order to be able to 
accommodate the needs imposed by literary texts (idem) – an attitude scarcely to be expected 
of translation scholars.   
 Arrojo concludes the paper by stating that both translation studies and literary theory 
have inherited a problematic relationship with their research objects from modernism, a 
relationship based upon the utopic notions of infinity and immortality. For her,  
Tanto para os estudos da tradução, como para os estudos literários, de vocação 
essencialista, o grande apelo da modernidade e suas promessas de objetividade e 
universalização parece ser a possibilidade de validar seus próprios pressupostos e 
expectativas referentes à possibilidade de significados perfeitamente estáveis e 
características textuais intrínsecas (idem, 85).    
Both for translation studies and literary theory – with an essentialist vein – the great 
appeal exerted by modernity and its promises of objectivity and universalisation seems to 
be the possibility to validate their own expectations as far as perfectly stable meanings 
and intrinsic textual features are concerned.  
In view of this obsession with universalisation and the flattening of differences, Arrojo 
believes that the myth of Babel remains the best narrative to illustrate the so-called modern 
ambitions. Having been condemned to difference (and translation) by an infuriated god, 
modern man is still trying, through his supposedly objective measures, to defeat and take the 
place of this god. In this light, it is up to postmodern man, she asserts, to prepare the 
epistemological ground that will allow us to recognise the ineluctably human nature of our 
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divine aspirations – and hence their impossibility as well – accepting language as a space 
where difference is exercised (idem, 86).  
 By now I suppose the reader is well-acquainted with Arrojo‘s arguments and style, so 
this paper probably strikes one as typical of her. By dissecting the research object of 
translation studies and comparing it to those of linguistics and literary theory, all of which 
through a poststructuralist lens, she strives to expose their differences and similarities, 
weaknesses and – if any – strengths. Her attack on scientism is very much in tune with 
poststructuralist criticism as a whole, and so is her suspicion of attempts to embrace the 
universal and permanent.  
 However, what is not clear from her argumentation is her attitude towards the 
relationship amongst translation studies, literary theory and linguistics. She does make it 
crystal clear that she by no means believes in linguistics as the be-all and end-all of 
translation. In fact, she even seems to claim that the influence of linguistics on translation 
studies is more of a harmful one. As for literary theory, she appears to criticise it for its 
obstinate hope of one day finding the missing piece of the puzzle that will allow them to 
finally reach full objectivity – very much in line with translation studies. On the other hand, 
though, Arrojo seems to admire literary theory for at least accepting, embracing its object of 
study as it is – unlike in translation studies, as the aim of numerous scholars is precisely to 
control their object of study. But still a few issues remain unclear to me. 
 Surely it is only natural that translation studies should have a more submissive attitude 
towards linguistics than, say, literary theory, because translation studies is a significantly 
younger field, having produced fewer canonical works and enjoying less acceptance or even 
awareness on the part of nonspecialists. I do not mean to say that translation studies should 
not question linguistics as, for example, literary theory does (see above), but rather that I do 
not find it particularly noteworthy that the attitude of translation studies towards linguistics 
should more often tend to compliance. More importantly than that, nevertheless, is the 
question of whether these cognate areas should not be attempting to work together. Arrojo is 
keen on defending the independence of translation studies, particularly from the evil 
influence of linguistics – and I do agree with her to a certain extent. But let us not forget that 
relativising something is not the same as abolishing it. Certainly linguistics is not the all-
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important part of translation studies, but would the study of linguistics actually harm 
translator and interpreter training? I will return to this question in Part IV below. 
In another paper published two years earlier (‗Os ŘEstudos da Traduçãoř como Área 
de Pesquisa Independente: Dilemas e Ilusões de uma Disciplina em (Des)Construção‘ – 
―Translation Studies‖ as an Independent Research Area: Dilemmas and Illusions of a 
Discipline in (De)Construction – ARROJO 1998a), Arrojo addresses this question more 
directly, though without bringing forth suggestions as for how (or even whether) translation 
studies should interact with cognate areas. In this paper, largely based on Steiner in his well-
known After Babel, she very carefully and thoroughly explains (and mentions examples) that 
the wish to establish an independent discipline (called translation studies) and the belief in 
truly objective, ubiquitous translation theories go hand in hand (see Chapter 4 in Part I 
above). Further, she is convinced that until today numerous translation scholars still derive 
most of their reflections from linguistics – despite the alleged independence of translation 
studies – and essentialism. As examples she quotes Mona Baker, Susan Bassnett, Andre 
Lefevere, Kirsten Malmkjaer, Basin Hatin and Ian Mason, all in works from the 1990s 
(except for Lefevere, whose cited work is his 1978 ‗Translation Studies: The Goal of the 
Discipline‘). Similarly to her 2000 paper (ARROJO 2000a), in this earlier essay she 
emphatically states that despite their ambitious objectives and declared scientism, these 
theories linked with linguistics and essentialism have not been able to formulate a single 
translation universal, a single objective, unquestionable and universally applicable translation 
rule. She does end the paper on a cheerful note, though, attributing the recent boom of 
translation journals, academic events and translation courses to reflections labeled 
poststructuralist. Let us bear these issues in mind for now as we advance to the next papers by 
Arrojo. Since I cannot address them here at length, I will come back to them in Part IV 
below.  
 The paper ‗Shared Ground in Translation Studies‘ (ARROJO and CHESTERMAN 
2000) is an attempt towards a compromise between Arrojo and Andrew Chesterman as far as 
translator and interpreter training is concerned – a question raised time and again in this 
thesis. More than a compromise between these two scholars, nevertheless, this joint paper 
appears to point towards a compromise (or ―reconciliation‖, in their words) between what the 
authors call ―essentialism‖ and ―non-essentialism‖, or ―postmodern cultural studies‖ and ―an 
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empirical approach‖ (idem, 151). After a brief introduction, what follows is a list of 30 theses 
on translation and translation studies that represent their shared ground.  
 The first half of these theses (idem, 152-154) concerns the definition of translation 
and the aims of translation studies. Even though the authors agree that translation studies 
―seeks to understand the phenomenon of translation‖, they do not propose a definition of the 
term ―translation‖; instead, they favour an idea of multiplicity and changeability according to 
the scholar behind the definition (idem, 152). Accordingly, they concede that the word 
―translation‖ may acquire different connotations in different languages, or even within the 
same language, and that investigating these differences constitutes a valid research topic. 
Similarly, they agree that examining what is perceived as translation in different cultures at 
different times is one of the aims of translation studies. As far as data are concerned, they 
defend their ineluctably subjective nature and their mandatory character simultaneously – 
since one cannot do research without data (idem).  
 In addition to studying what is labelled as translation, Arrojo and Chesterman assent 
that translation studies concerns what gets to be translated and what does not, as well as who 
gets to do translations in different cultures across times (idem, 153). Also, defining what 
kinds of translations are labelled as ―more central‖ or ―more peripheral‖ is another aim of 
translation studies. Likewise, the discourse on translation produced within different cultures 
at different moments in time constitutes an interesting research topic in the area, particularly 
in terms of the metaphors different thinkers use in order to convey their ideas (idem). As far 
as translation types are concerned, both scholars maintain that devising typologies is 
paramount, ―both within a culture/period and more generally‖ (idem, 153-154). Finally, 
Arrojo and Chesterman explain that the definition of translation is closely related to the 
notion of quality; therefore, another goal of translation studies is to analyse how diverse 
cultures perceive the issue of translation quality, seeking to determine whether there are 
common criteria amongst cultures across times.   
 As for the question ―why is this (kind of) translation like this?‖, the two thinkers come 
up with seven more theses (idem, 154-155). In summary, they claim that explaining the 
phenomenon of translation should be one of the objectives of translation scholars, but one 
such explanation need not follow a specific format, but rather can take into account as many 
aspects as possible (idem, 154): 
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the translator‘s personality, gender, cognitive state, personal experience, decision 
processes; the influence of the client, of the skopos, of features of the translation situation 
itself, the source text, the source and target languages, the implied readers; socio-cultural 
and historical factors, ideological factors, values, ethical considerations…   
Moreover, they concede that, as a human activity, every translation is unique, at least to a 
certain extent. Despite that, however, they claim that by observing numerous translations one 
can identify certain patterns and thus derive general statements about these regularities (idem, 
155). 
 The last nine theses address the question ―what consequences do translations have?‖ 
(idem, 155-156). In a nutshell, Chesterman and Arrojo call the readers‘ attention to the 
potential effects of translation, both in the sense of influencing cultures (as originals do) and 
in the sense of triggering value judgements from recipients and/or critics. Analysing these 
influences and value judgements is a part of translation studies. Furthermore, prescriptive 
statements about the ―desirable effects‖ of translations may be useful for translation trainers 
and trainees, though the question ―desirable to whom?‖ remains pertinent (idem, 156). 
Finally, the last thesis states that the issue of translation raises countless questions 
surrounding the notion of ethics – examining those should also be an aim of translation 
studies (idem). 
 Having established their ―shared ground‖, Chesterman and Arrojo move on to their 
own individual codas (156-159). Chesterman begins by defending the notion of ―interpretive 
hypotheses‖ as crucial elements of descriptive research. And here he provides the following 
definition for ―interpretive hypotheses‖: ―they are hypotheses which claim that it is useful (in 
some way) to interpret translation in this way‖. For him, this is the starting point of ―any 
conceptual analysis‖ (idem, 156). Arrojo, in contrast, begins by stressing that if it is 
impossible, in translation research, to depart from a pre-established, universal definition of 
translation, research on translation will invariably be marked by the researcher‘s subjectivity 
and context. She adds that, for similar reasons, however descriptive one‘s intentions may be, 
it is impossible not only to fully distinguish between the descriptive and the interpretive, but 
also to formulate a universal translation theory (idem, 158).   
Chesterman proceeds by adding that unstable though meanings may be, some are 
more stable than others, more context-bound than others (idem, 156). Arrojo, conversely, 
emphasises that meanings are always unstable and context-bound, and that this factor is of 
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utmost importance for the understanding of the finite, local character of any translation 
(idem, 158). 
As for translation norms, Chesterman argues that ―statements of norms‖ are not 
prescriptive but rather descriptive, as opposed to norms, whose connotation tends to be 
exclusively prescriptive (idem, 156-157). Arrojo does agree with his remarks, but warns that 
statements of norms are not solely descriptive either, as they invariably reflect the perspective 
of the one who describes. Moreover, she stresses that norms can never be ―universally valid 
or applicable‖ (idem, 159). Still on the issue of norms, Chesterman admits that attempts to 
describe so-called translation ―regularities or universals‖ may strike one as prescriptive. He 
nonetheless believes that these statements can ―function as explanations‖. In other words, 
instead of being read as norms to be followed, these norms can be understood as justifications 
for the translator‘s behaviour (idem, 157). Arrojo then replies that regardless of their 
prescriptive or descriptive character, these norms (or ―regularities and universals‖) cannot be 
detached from the context that gave rise to them, from the interpretive influence of the 
researcher. In this sense, norms are construes marked by a specific viewpoint. Therefore, 
calling them ―universals‖ is, in Arrojo‘s view, an authoritarian gesture, because it entails an 
imposition of values and a disregard for other perspectives (idem, 159). 
Finally, regarding translation theory, Chesterman defends the idea of a set of what he 
calls ―predictive hypotheses‖ based on translation conditions. The better the hypotheses, the 
better its application to translation practice. And here Chesterman warns readers that these 
predictive hypotheses are not prescriptive since they ―do not impinge on the translator‘s 
freedom to make choices‖. He ends his coda by defining translation theory: ―a logically 
linked set of well-corroborated hypotheses (interpretive, descriptive, explanatory and 
predictive hypotheses)‖. In conclusion, he concedes that one such theory should always 
remain open to ―new refinements‖ and will always be subject to replacement by a better 
theory (idem, 157). In response, Arrojo argues that translation theory should not make 
predictions; instead, it should raise the students‘ awareness about their responsibility and 
active role ―in the establishment of all sorts of relationships between cultures‖ (idem, 159).  
At the end of the paper, the authors invite readers to write responses to their debate. In 
fact, this discussion became a forum that stretched over three issues of Target, attracting all 
sorts of responses from different areas of translation studies – for more on this debate, please 
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refer to Target vol. 13:1, 13:2 and 14:1.  Furthermore, various replies appeared in different 
journals across the globe as well, so the debate was not restricted to Target. But let us now 
focus a bit longer on the debate between Arrojo and Chesterman. 
Frankly speaking, Arrojo‘s acceptance to establish ―shared ground‖, to ―reconcile‖ 
(see above) predominantly essentialist and predominantly anti-essentialist perspectives strikes 
me as odd. Was it perhaps a good-neighbour gesture? In any case, by looking at their codas at 
the end of the paper, I hardly think they have managed to establish any shared ground at all – 
in spite of the fact that the 30 theses were devised four-handedly. In fact, these theses appear 
to address neither Chesterman‘s nor Arrojo‘s interests in translation studies, as their codas 
make evident. Various examples could be drawn from their debate to illustrate this point, but 
because of time and space constraints I will focus on the one that speaks closest to the present 
thesis, namely the issue of translation theory. Chesterman may even concede that translation 
theories cannot be universal, but he still speaks of translation ―universals and regularities‖ 
across times and cultures; similarly, Arrojo may even concede that translation theory may 
comprise so-called general translation typologies, but she still contends that the purpose of 
translation theory should be to raise awareness about the role of translation and translators in 
society (see above).  
Even if we take for granted that reconciliation is not possible here, nor is it desirable – 
as I have argued in Part I above – Chesterman and Arrojo do not appear to be speaking of the 
same thing when they refer to, for example, translation theory. I am sure this comes as no 
surprise to the reader half way through this thesis, especially if we remember those two 
notions of translation theory repeatedly mentioned in Part I. If we accept that Arrojo‘s notion 
of theory is more awareness-raising, whereas Chesterman‘s is more practice-oriented, we will 
understand that they cannot – will not and need not – establish ―shared ground‖. However 
enlightening their debate may be, I fear it may strike one as misleading since all it does is 
reveal their irreconcilable differences – which is by no means a problem, but it is certainly no 
consensus either. The expression ―shared ground‖ seems indeed to point to an idea of 
consensus, and their use of words such as ―reconciliation‖ does confirm this impression. 
Their debate has shown that a space where both perspectives can live in relative harmony 
may even exist, but reconciliation seems out of the question.   
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Chesterman himself addresses these questions and expresses his doubts in a 2005 
paper entitled ‗Consilience and Translation Studies‘ (CHESTERMAN 2005). As already 
mentioned above, different scholars have expressed their opinions and doubts as to how 
―shared‖ and how relevant their ―shared ground‖ is – one example is Tirkkonen-Condit, 
Mäkisalo, Jääskeläinen, Kalasniemi and Kujamäki‘s paper ‗Do we Need a Shared Ground?‘ 
(published in Target 13:2, 2002). What concerns me is that some of these discussions seem to 
end in a ―theory hope‖ note, pointing towards a bright future in which there will be a 
universal consensus and translation studies will be ―one‖. Chesterman, for instance, 
comments in the abovementioned paper: ―So although we are still far from a shared 
philosophical paradigm, we can perhaps see the beginnings of the basis for one‖ 
(CHESTERMAN 2005 – my emphasis). If we look back at Roustang‘s indented quotation in 
2.3 above, we will remember that not having shared ground (in the sense of consensus) is 
perhaps crucial for the existence of poststructuralist thought. So whether Arrojo was 
convinced of that, but decided, nevertheless, to formulate these shared theses anyway remains 
a mystery to me. Perhaps for her the idea of ―shared ground‖ referred chiefly to a common 
space for these disparate views to cohabit rather than to formulate unanimous theses. Some of 
the issues in Arrojo‘s debate with Chesterman will reappear in her debate with Britto in Part 
III below. Moreover, I will also specifically address some of these questions in Part IV.  
On a very different note now, let us examine the short paper ‗O Tradutor Invisível por 
ele Mesmo: Paulo Henriques Britto entre a Humildade e a Onipotência‘ (The Invisible 
Translator on his Own: Paulo Henriques Britto between Humility and Omnipotence), 
published in Brazil in 2000. Part III below will be devoted to Britto and his work as a 
translation scholar and translator. Suffice to say he is one of the best-known contemporary 
Brazilian translators, having published over 100 translated works. Arrojo bases this essay on 
a newspaper interview with Britto entitled ‗As Aspas da Tradução‘ (The Quotation Marks of 
Translation), published in Folha de São Paulo on 27
th
 February 2000.  
As it will become clearer in Part III below, by the year 2000 Britto and Arrojo had 
already had a few academic quarrels, mostly over the issue of the impact of poststructuralist 
thought on translation studies. So Arrojo‘s choice of this particular interview is by no means 
random. The title of the newspaper interview, ‗As Aspas da Tradução‘, is due to Britto‘s 
claim that translators are actually authors between quotations marks, and that in order to be a 
translator, one must be humble – hence the quotations marks (quoted in ARROJO 2000b, 
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161). Needless to say, this affirmation triggers Arrojo‘s entire response, whose work has been 
largely dedicated to the elevation of the status of the translator as a result of his/her 
ineluctably authorial role in translation. But Britto seems to perceive this issue differently, as 
he claims that he tries to interfere as little as possible with the text, thus remaining as 
invisible as he can (idem). When asked about whether he is affiliated to a particular 
translation movement, he says that he is first and foremost a translator and not really a 
scholar, but is very much aware of the theoretical discussions in the area
100
. He then declares 
that he strongly disagrees with Venuti‘s overall argumentation on the translator‘s visibility 
and much prefers Pym‘s view, whereby the place of the translator is restricted to prefaces and 
footnotes, and remaining invisible is an objective to be pursued
101
 (idem). 
Arrojo briefly comments on and quotes Venuti‘s The Translatorřs Invisibility (1995), 
adding insight from poststructuralist thought (similarly to her other papers) to clarify some of 
the views of the American scholar. For her, remaining invisible is not only undesirable, but 
also impossible, since the translators‘ choices constantly reveal their personal history, their 
ideology, their unconscious processes, and so on. In her view, the introductory paper written 
by the interviewer in question, Maurício Santana Dias, endorses her argument. Dias 
maintains that Britto is responsible for the Brazilian accent of authors such as Henry James 
and Salman Rushdie, and adds that this accent is not only Brazilian, but also clearly 
―carioca‖, or from Rio de Janeiro (the city where Britto comes from – idem, 160). 
So to return to the subtitle of her paper, ―Paulo Henriques Britto between Humility 
and Omnipotence‖, Arrojo‘s final argument is that by claiming to be an author between 
quotation marks, Britto is not being humble at all. In fact, he is being quite authoritarian 
because he believes himself capable of ―suprahuman omnipotence‖ (―onipotência 
sobrehumana‖ – idem, 164). For Arrojo, and for poststructuralist thought in general, not 
leaving one‘s marks, one‘s residues (see Section 2.3 above) in any reading or writing task is 
simply inhuman. In this light, Arrojo takes Britto‘s claim to humility as a fairly arrogant 
gesture – as though he were somehow able to erase himself when he translates. Being humble 
in translation means, as Arrojo explains, admitting that one can but interfere, that one can but 
leave traces behind, and that this is the very possibility that our human condition allows us 
                                                             
100 This affirmation is the epigraph to Chapter 2 in part III below.  
101 I will take for granted here that the reader is acquainted with Venuti‘s and Pym‘s reflections. For similar 
remarks on the issue of invisibility by another translator, please refer back to the introduction to Part I above.  
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(idem). Being humble is, therefore, accepting this human finiteness whereby meanings are 
attributed to words only temporarily, in a particular context and under numerous personal and 
subjective influences. By calling himself an author between quotation marks, Britto is saying 
that he has found the correct and faithful meaning of the original, and has transparently and 
mechanically rendered it into Portuguese. In Arrojo‘s opinion, one such attitude is far more of 
omnipotence than it is of humility (idem). I will address Britto and Arrojo‘s disagreements at 
length in Part III below. Let us bear in mind these initial divergences as we head towards the 
end of Part II.                                
 Let us now move to the last paper we will analyse in Part II, entitled ‗Translation, 
Transference and the Attraction to Otherness: Borges, Menard, Whitman‘ (ARROJO 
2004)
102
. As already mentioned above, recently Arrojo‘s research has been dedicated chiefly 
to representations of translation in fiction, with the works of Borges, Kafka, Poe, Saramago, 
Guimarães Rosa, Calvino and Kosztolányi at its forefront. Indeed, Arrojo is currently 
preparing two books to be published on her recent undertakings. In this 2004 paper, she 
investigates not only how the idea of translation is conveyed in Borges‘ short-story ‗Pierre 
Menard: Autor del Quijote‘ (please refer to 2.2 above), but also the ―relationships that are 
generally established between translators and authors‖ (ARROJO 2004, 31). Her main aim is 
indeed to provide possible answers to the following questions (idem, 31-32 – her emphasis): 
Understood as an intrinsically performative textual activity, translation is generally 
viewed, in Borges's terms, as a form of rewriting which is not in any sense neutral or 
secondary to the original. If, in such terms, both the so-called original and the translated 
text seem to enjoy a similar status, what kind of exchange might there be between the 
two? And, at the same time, if translators cannot, in any sense, be "invisible" in their 
translations, and, like authors, at least on some level, do mean what they say, what might 
it represent, for a translator, at a certain point, to choose a certain text to translate?
103
 
Indeed for her, Borges‘ story is ―a story about translation and transference, or translation as 
transference, or, even, translation as a response to influence‖ (idem, 35), and here the term 
―transference‖ is used in a Lacanian fashion (idem, 34 – see Section 2.3 above).   
Initially, the Brazilian scholar takes the relationship between the protagonist, Pierre 
Menard, and the author he wishes to ―translate‖, Miguel de Cervantes, and compares it to 
                                                             
102 This paper was also published in 2006 in the proceedings of the ―Conferencia Internacional Traducción e 
Intercambio Cultural en la Época de la Globalización‖ (held at the Universitat de Barcelona), under the title 
‗La Traducción Literaria en la Época Contemporánea‘. 
103 This issue will be brought up again, this time by Paulo Henriques Britto, in Part III, Section 3.2 below.  
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Borges‘ relationship with Walt Whitman. In a few side notes, Arrojo does mention that the 
story brilliantly illustrates the absurdity of absolute faithfulness in translation, an issue far 
from resolved in contemporary translation studies. She even suggests that the story may be 
read as a sort of ―ironical criticism of the call for faithfulness and invisibility typically 
associated with traditional translation theories and practices‖ (idem, 32). Nevertheless, her 
interest seems to lie closer to this analogous relationship between the pairs Menard and 
Cervantes, and Borges and Whitman.   
 In the story, Menard is obsessed with becoming Cervantes somehow – so much so that 
his ―visible‖ work, his own published texts, did not free him from the dominance of the 
persistent idea of repeating Cervantes. And here let us not forget that Quixote, too, was 
obsessed with ―becoming‖ what he had been reading, which places Menard into a quixotic 
mission as well. Occasionally turning to psychoanalysis, Arrojo sees in Menard‘s strong 
desire to become Cervantes a wish to escape his own self, geography, native language, age 
and, most of all, ―his petty bourgeois life as a minor writer and obscure scholar‖ (idem, 35). 
More than becoming Cervantes, Arrojo asserts, perhaps Menard wished to replace him, to 
outwit him, and though he never used the words ―translation‖ or ―translator‖, he rather 
controversially tried incredibly hard to remain faithful to Cervantes‘ text (idem, 36).    
 According to Arrojo‘s research of Borges‘ biography and bibliography, this particular 
short-story brings forth ―Borges's most profound meditation on the vicissitudes of writing and 
translating literary texts under the influence of a strong precursor‖ (idem, 38), a fact she does 
not take as accidental, since the story appears to have been written in a rather critical moment 
of the Argentine‘s life. Indeed, his father – ―his first important precursor‖ – had died a few 
months earlier, and Borges himself had recently recovered from a life and death experience 
caused by an accident that had taken place in 1938 (idem, 39). For Arrojo, Menard represents 
much of Borges‘ own father, a mediocre writer, but also Borges‘ own fear of confining his 
literary career to such unexceptional bounds – as both his father and Menard had done. In this 
sense, the story can be interpreted as a milestone in Borges‘ life, a kind of liberation from 
these psychological ―constraints‖.  
 As for the leitmotif of translation, Arrojo understands it as a way not only to imitate, 
but also to provisorily take over the authorial position of those we admire (idem, 41 – refer to 
Section 2.3 above). It is known that Borges, having been brought up in a bilingual (English-
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Spanish) environment, began translating at the age of nine, with the publication of the 
Spanish translation of Wilde‘s story ‗The Happy Prince‘ (idem, 31). He then went on to 
translate Kafka, Virginia Woolf, Joyce, Faulkner, Poe, Whitman, Hart Crane, Chesterton, 
Apollinaire, Browne, Papini, Novalis, and Hawthorne, amongst others (idem). But his story 
with Walt Whitman is far more complicated than that, as he could not simply translate 
Whitman. In fact, he announced that he would translate his Leaves of Grass in 1927, but the 
translation only actually came out in 1969 (Hojas de Hierba – idem, 42).  
 At this point, Arrojo speculates about the reason for such a delay. In 1919 Borges‘ 
first poem, ‗Himno del Mar‘, was published in Europe. The Brazilian professor carefully 
examines the poem to show how Whitman‘s work appears to be the ―subterranean 
motivation‖ (idem – quoting ‗Pierre Menard‘) behind it. His autobiographical accounts and 
criticism do confirm Arrojo‘s suspicions, as Whitman was indeed considered the great 
influence in Borges‘ entire career – even by Borges himself. In addition to that, Borges‘ first 
poem seems to have been received as an ―obvious‖ instance of this strong influence exerted 
by Whitman in his works. In this light, Arrojo goes on to conclude that ―if Cervantes was ‗the 
subject presumed to know‘ in Menard's biography, Whitman represented for the younger 
Borges the desirable, idealized possibility of a life devoted to writing‖ (idem, 45 – her 
emphasis). Perhaps this is the reason why, Arrojo conjectures, it took Borges 42 years to 
finally conclude his translation of Leaves of Grass. Perhaps Borges needed to wait until he 
felt confident enough about his own career, until he had lost the fear that the critics would 
forever compare him to Whitman and thus restrict his work to ―an echo of other echoes‖, as 
Menard‘s was (idem, 45, 47 – quoting Borges‘ ‗Pierre Menard, Autor del Quijote‘). For 
Arrojo, it was important for the young Borges to ―emulate his own idealized version of 
Whitman‖ through his ‗Himno del Mar‘, whereas the older Borges seemed to be ―interested 
in turning the American poet into a reflection of himself, as he seems to find comfort in the 
idea that Whitman's real life was perhaps not very different from his own‖ (idem, 47). 
Borges‘ publication of Whitman‘s Spanish translation may indicate that the Argentine had 
finally overcome his infatuation with Whitman seeing as, by 1969, Borges was 
unquestionably a major author (idem).  
 To conclude her paper, Arrojo returns to the notion of translation as a means to deal 
with influence, with transference (see above), and explains that 
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Even though his [Borges‘] long-lasting love affair with Whitman's work and persona was 
obviously more productive – and had a happier end – than Menard's unacknowledged 
obsession with Cervantes, in both cases translation seems to have played a fundamental, 
even therapeutic, role in helping these two ambitious, Quixotic readers deal with the 
conflicts of influence and act out their desire to be someone else (idem, 48). 
Moreover, Arrojo sees translation as an instrument to allow one to escape oneself temporarily 
which, in Borges‘s case, ―might have helped [him] escape Borges and the Borgesian, 
[allowing him] to pretend to be an-Other and, in the Other's name, to write, in his native 
Spanish, that which he was unable to address in his own texts and in his own name‖ (idem). 
 Arrojo‘s reflection in this paper appears to be very much in line with what she herself 
– as well as other scholars whose affinities lie with poststructuralist thought, such as 
Rodrigues, for instance (refer to Chapter 6 in Part I above) – defends as interesting and 
somewhat new research in translation studies. Even though numerous avid Arrojo readers 
may feel disappointed that she appears to have abandoned her somewhat militant defence of 
deconstruction, or attack to essentialism, it seems understandable that she should want to shift 
her focus slightly after decades of almost belligerent struggle – whose outcome remains fairly 
negligible considering how much translation studies has grown in recent years (I will address 
this question in what follows and in Part IV, Chapter 4 below).   
 By carefully analysing Borges‘ biography and oeuvre and drawing an interesting 
parallel between that and his own short-story ‗Pierre Menard, Autor del Quijote‘, Arrojo 
touched on several thought-provoking issues surrounding the notion of translation – such as 
what is the nature of the relationship between author and translator, what is the impact of 
translation on the translator, what role does translation play in the life of an author, how does 
one manage one‘s admiration for the work one is about to translate, what is the impact of 
transference (see above) in the work of a writer and/or translator, amongst various others. 
And by doing so, Arrojo very openly and freely spoke of speculation or personal opinions, 
and thus hinted in no way at absolute truths and verifiable theses. More importantly than that, 
she did not attempt to derive a set of rules from this analysis of hers, allegedly objectively 
determining exact and universal answers to the questions I suggest above. Instead, her 
reflections are avowedly limited, personal and subjective, and these characteristics by no 
means jeopardise her argumentation. Indeed, one finds in her paper a great source of 
inspiration, of awareness-raising insight, very much in tune with the idea of translation theory 
repeatedly discussed in Part I above – as a practice in itself with no direct commitment to 
  
186 
translation practice. Her paper is certainly not useful as far as translation practice is 
concerned, but nevertheless (and because of it) it remains a powerful source of reflection.  
*** 
 This chapter on Rosemary Arrojo‘s work has certainly confirmed the expectations 
drawn in Chapter 1 above, dedicated to Arrojo‘s academic life. I hope that this analysis of a 
selection of her texts has shown how multifaceted her work is, sometimes focusing on the 
interface between translation and psychoanalysis, sometimes emphasising a deconstructionist 
perspective on translation; sometimes dealing with translator training, sometimes addressing 
literary translation; sometimes speaking of the Humanities as a whole, sometimes focussing 
on translation studies as a discipline; sometimes studying the links between translation and 
linguistics, sometimes between translation and literary theory; sometimes drawing inspiration 
from representations of translation in fiction, sometimes finding allegories for translation in 
psychoanalysis.  
 Indeed, her work addresses various crucial issues in translation studies at the moment, 
including what the purpose of translator training should be, whether translation theory should 
be practice-oriented, how the subjectivity and unconscious of the translator may work, the 
(un)importance of linguistics in translation studies, the issue of the translator‘s (in)visibility, 
the issue of translation criticism and quality assessment, amongst many others. Radical 
though her work may appear to some, it is undeniably thought-provoking and in-depth. 
 Speaking of radicalism, as this question has been raised several times in Part II, I will 
limit myself to only briefly closing it here (and then raising it again in Part IV, Chapter 2 
below). I do understand that the entire atmosphere surrounding postmodern thought is one of 
upheaval, hence the radicalism of which countless thinkers – not only Arrojo – are accused. 
Accordingly, I do concede that opposing millennia of tradition, as is case of Arrojo in 
translation studies, requires a certain militant attitude. And let me make it clear here that for 
some trends of poststructuralist thought her work is not at all radical and militant but, at the 
same time, radicalism – or perceived radicalism – is the only way for her to get her ideas 
across.  
  
187 
 Nevertheless, I tend to find her emphasis of certain extremes, for example, 
particularly dangerous. By relentlessly opposing structuralism to poststructuralism, 
essentialism to anti-essentialism, logocentrism to deconstruction, as well as (more 
generically) old and traditional to new, Arrojo appears to endorse the very age-old tradition 
she criticises, a tradition that believes in extreme, independent opposites. And however often 
she reminds the reader that the relationship between structuralism and poststructuralism is 
one of complementariness as well, she certainly places them on seemingly antagonistic sides 
far more often. Similarly, even though she may sometimes take the context of the thinkers 
she so fiercely criticises into account – such as Mounin or Newmark – she usually appears to 
largely neglect their times and contexts and discard their contributions. Finally, it is true that 
she sometimes concedes that their contributions do have some relevance, but mostly she 
groups all these scholars labelled essentialist together and flattens their differences, their 
heterogeneity.  
 But then again, by defending these thinkers‘ contributions despite their essentialist 
tendencies, by addressing them in their variety despite their similarities and, finally, by 
emphasising the constant complementariness between structuralism and poststructuralist 
thought, Arrojo would probably not have attracted the amount of attention she did by being 
arguably radical. And I suppose this is to a certain extent one‘s lot when one chooses the non-
mainstream path – as Arrojo did.  
 So all in all this question of radicalism is at least twofold. There is the radicalism 
potentially perceived especially by those less acquainted with poststructuralist thought, for 
whom some of Arrojo‘s propositions may sound like an outcry for the full abolishment of the 
notions of truth, reality, reason and so on, along with the full disregard for the works of 
countless thinkers she labels essentialist. On the other hand, there is the radicalism that any 
thinker whose affinities lie with poststructuralist thought might perceive in her work. And 
―radicalism‖ is perhaps not the most adequate term to designate this, since it refers to a 
certain exaggeration, a certain emphasis on polarities that, in view of the first notion of 
radicalism above, may result in the very defeat of her ultimate objectives. So here again the 
idea of a double gesture appears to be pertinent: a certain radicalism (in the first sense above) 
is required to break with traditional views; excessive radicalism, in contrast, is not even in 
question since deconstruction has nothing to do with destruction. In other words, her work 
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can but sound radical to some, even though radicalism is simply out of the question (please 
refer to Part IV, Chapter 2 below).         
 Another expectation drawn in Chapter 1 above concerned the slight shift in her 
research in recent times. I find this question particularly relevant because I know that for 
some of those who have been following her career this change might appear disappointing at 
first sight – though I completely disagree with that. As Arrojo participated in the 2009 
Semana do Tradutor (Translators‘ Week)104 some of my colleagues who were present 
expressed this feeling of disappointment to me, claiming that her speech revealed an 
unexpected and somewhat unfortunate contrast to her usually energetic – and radical, to some 
– speeches. They confessed that, having read Arrojo throughout their academic lives, they 
expected her speech to be another powerful and pungent call for action against essentialist 
ideas, and yet she spoke of representations of translation in fiction.    
 Though I was not present then, I am convinced that this shift in Arrojo‘s research in 
recent years is an interesting development. It is as though Arrojo no longer felt the need to 
relentlessly – sometimes ―radically‖ and even repeatedly – defend poststructuralist thought, 
to attack essentialist tendencies. Those issues that seem to have always been close to her heart 
– contemporary thought, literary translation, representations of fiction in translation (see 
Chapter 1 above) – remain very much present, but the balance amongst them has changed, 
making her work sound less ―militant‖, as some would claim. In the meantime perhaps 
Arrojo has grown tired of so much opposing, or perhaps she now feels that poststructuralist 
thought is not as alien to academia as it used to be, say, two decades ago – though some claim 
to have no knowledge of it whatsoever, as I have argued elsewhere (LEAL 2010b).  
 Many of the questions listed in the first paragraphs of these final remarks (see above) 
will be brought up again in Part III below, dedicated to Brazilian translator and translation 
scholar Paulo Henriques Britto. Britto‘s standpoint and theoretical views will offer a thought-
provoking counterpoint to Arrojo‘s standpoint and theoretical views. I feel that Britto‘s work 
not only represents the resistance to poststructuralist tendencies in translation, but it also 
resembles the works of numerous other scholars (outside Brazil as well) who either oppose or 
remain listless to poststructuralist thought. Yet, even though Arrojo‘s and Britto‘s works may 
                                                             
104 This event takes place annually at the Universidade Estadual Paulista in São José do Rio Preto, Brazil.  
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strike one as antagonistic at first sight, I ask the reader to beware of antagonisms – after all, 
our glass should be half empty and half full.                                  
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PART III: PAULO HENRIQUES BRITTO  
_____________________________________________________ 
Que precisão tem o amor de linhas retas 
se paralelas afinal são nada mais 
que a garantia do infinito desencontro? 
Paulo Henriques Britto 
Paulo Henriques Britto is one of the most prominent contemporary literary translators in 
Brazil. Indeed, he has translated over 100 volumes mostly of prose and poetry originally in 
English, including authors as diverse as Ian McEwan, Emily Dickinson and Lord Byron. He 
currently translates almost exclusively for Companhia das Letras, one of the largest and most 
prestigious publishers in Brazil. Additionally, he has been working as a translation professor 
at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro since the late 1970s. As an 
academic, he has written numerous papers in Portuguese and English mainly on literary 
translation. As a translator and writer, he has won nine different literary awards in the past 
fifteen years, most of which for his own poems and short-stories. In fact, Britto has been 
attracting increasingly more attention for his work as a writer, with five poetry volumes, one 
of short stories and one of nonfiction at the time of writing – in addition to an English 
translation of some of his poems, and a Portuguese edition of one of his poetry collections.  
In this part, I will look into Britto‘s life and work so as to try and understand the 
standpoint from which he speaks as a translation theorist. Let us first examine, in Chapter 1, 
how he became involved with literature and translation, as well as his career as a writer and 
literary translator. After that, in Chapter 2, we will look into his academic career – his 
education, the courses he teaches at university, his research groups and the theses he has 
supervised over the years. These initial chapters will help to sketch the outlines of the 
standpoint from which he speaks as a translation scholar. Finally, in the last and longest 
chapter (3), we will listen to his voice as a translation scholar by analysing some of his papers 
on translation.    
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1. Standpoint as a Writer and Translator  
_____________________________________________________ 
O poeta é um fingidor. 
Finge tão completamente 
Que chega a fingir que é dor 
A dor que deveras sente. 
Fernando Pessoa 
In an interview given to Bernardo Mello Franco (FRANCO 2010), Britto says that he fell in 
love with poetry at about the age of 10, when he first lived in the USA:  
Na verdade, descobri a poesia em língua inglesa, quando morei nos Estados Unidos (...). 
Quando era menino, no Brasil, os modernos eram ignorados na escola. Só lia Olavo 
Bilac, Gonçalves Dias... Poesia era uma chatice, que a gente tinha que decorar para ler 
no Dia das Mães. (...) Nos Estados Unidos, me deram Shakespeare, Emily Dickinson, 
Walt Whitman. Foi um choque. Quando voltei ao Brasil é que descobri, com Fernando 
Pessoa, que também existia poesia boa em língua portuguesa. 
Actually, I first discovered poetry in English, when I lived in the United Sates (…). When 
I was a boy, modernist poets were ignored in Brazilian schools. All we read was Olavo 
Bilac, Gonçalves Dias... Poetry was boring, something we were forced to memorise for 
Mother‘s Day. (…) In the USA they gave me Shakespeare, Emily Dickinson, Walt 
Whitman. It was a shock for me. When I came back to Brazil I realised, thanks to 
Fernando Pessoa, that there was also good poetry in Portuguese.  
He then went on to read Hawthorn, Dickens, Poe, Conan Doyle and Chesterton. Back in 
Brazil, he started reading Machado de Assis and, as a teenager, came across Fernando Pessoa, 
which was a ―true revelation‖ (―verdadeira revelação‖ – LEÃO 2010) to him, making him 
want to write poetry seriously, with literary aspirations – and not simply for fun, as he had 
been doing ever since he was six (idem). This serious interest in poetry, together with the 
discovery of poetry in Portuguese, led him to Carlos Drummond de Andrade and Manuel 
Bandeira, our most important modernist poets.    
 When he was about 17 he became ever so interested in music, particularly in Caetano 
Veloso, Gilberto Gil (Tropicália was at its peak) and Chico Buarque, as well as in Bob Dylan 
and Jim Morrison. This interest led him to Augusto de Campos‘ Balanço da Bossa, a book 
―fundamental na minha formação, que me levou a me interessar por crítica e teoria‖, or 
essential to my development – it awakened my interest in literary criticism and theory (idem). 
Yet more writers would influence him greatly in the years to come: Freud, Kafka (his 
favourite), Joyce, Beckett, Clarice Lispector, Graciliano Ramos, Cortázar, Gombrowitz, 
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Sartre, Mário de Andrade, and Campos de Carvalho. Still in his youth, in a period he calls 
―development phase‖ (―fase de formação‖ – idem), he read various linguists and thinkers, 
such as Chomsky, Popper and especially Wittgenstein, but also novelists like Dostoyevsky, 
Tolstoy, Melville, Flaubert and, above all, Proust. Four poets/critics were equally important 
to him, namely Eliot, Pound, Haroldo de Campos and Augusto de Campos. Finally, the poets 
Wallace Stevens and João Cabral de Melo Neto were the last to strongly impact and mark his 
work for decades to come (idem). 
 In the early 1970s Britto moved to the United States again to study cinema at the San 
Francisco Art Institute, but dropped out and went back to Brazil to do an English and 
Portuguese teaching degree at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro – 
between 1975 and 1978. After he got his degree, he was hired by the same university mostly 
to teach English, English literature and translation in the same course he had just taken. At 
this point he had already been working as a translator and had a few published works. In 1979 
he began his MA in linguistics, which he concluded in 1982 with a thesis on Portuguese 
semantics (‗Conectivos Oracionais do Português: Uma Proposta de Análise Semântica‘ – 
Portuguese Conjunctions: A Semantic Analysis).   
 Also in 1982 he published his first collection of poetry, entitled Liturgia da Matéria. 
Unfortunately there have not been many reviews of this book so far, and to make matters 
worse it is sold out. Between 1982 and 1989 he published more than 40 different translations 
– most of which of entire books – by authors such as Chomsky, Jack Kerouac, Wallace 
Stevens, Raymond Chandler, Thomas Brown, John Donne, Susan Sontag, Lord Byron and 
Naipaul, amongst many others. In 1989 his second volume of poetry came out: Mínima 
Lírica. By the way, in 1986 he began translating for Companhia das Letras, one of the most 
renowned and prestigious Brazilian publishing houses, and until today, more than 20 years 
later, Britto writes and translates almost exclusively for them. 
 However, it was not until 1997 – 50 more translations later, including Emily 
Dickinson, Henry James, Gertrud Stein, Virginia Woolf, John Updike, Salman Rushdie, 
Charles Dickens, Dylan Thomas, George Orwell, D. H. Lawrence and E. L. Doctorow 
(awarded the ―Prêmio Paulo Rónai‖), amongst various others – that his third collection of 
poetry came out, this time attracting more attention. Trovar Claro was awarded the ―Prêmio 
Alphonsus de Guimaraens‖ and called the attention of critics for its metalinguistic vocation 
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(―vocação metalinguística‖ – CAMPOS 2010). Indeed, Jorge Lúcio de Campos maintains 
that ―Seus poemas remoem a si mesmos em interrogações e contra-interrogações que os 
mantêm sempre tensos e acesos. Ali o poeta e poema se interrogam e avaliam: para que 
sirvo, senão para ser nada?‖, or his poems ruminate themselves through questioning and 
counter-questioning, a process that keeps them constantly tense, alight. In them, poet and 
poem question each other, ponder: what am I for other than nothing? (idem). Similarly, Izacyl 
Ferreira speaks of a ―lírica indagadora‖ (FERREIRA 2010), or inquiring lyricism, and 
Pessôa adds that ―Se o poeta testemunha o seu próprio ofício enquanto o executa, para além 
do como se faz, perguntamos: o que é desse ofício?‖, or if the poet witnesses his own craft 
while exercising it, we ask, in addition to how he does it, what is of this craft? (PESSÔA 
2010).  
 Between the release of Trovar Claro and his next poetry volume, Macau, six years 
went by in which he published more than 20 different translations. A few new names he 
translated during this period include Thomas Pynchon, Philip Roth, Elizabeth Bishop and Ian 
McEwan, amongst others. With Macau he won the ―Prêmio Portugal Telecom‖, one of the 
most esteemed and financially rewarding Brazilian literary awards. The title of the book, 
Macau, is an extraordinary metaphor that Ferreira understands as follows: ―língua nada 
hegemônica é o nosso idioma, arte nada popular é a poesia, espécie nada privilegiada é o 
homem se não tem a proteção de um deus, uma utopia, qualquer esperança de redenção‖, or 
our language [Portuguese] is not at all hegemonic, poetry is not at all a popular kind of art, 
men are not at all privileged unless they have divine protection, a utopia or some kind of hope 
for redemption (FERREIRA 2010). Furthermore, Ferreira speaks of ―Niilismo, humor e 
metapoesia‖, or nihilism, humour and metapoetry (idem). In other words, his ―metalinguistic 
vocation‖ (see above) seems to persist, and nihilism and humour go hand in hand setting the 
tone of most of the poems, without, nevertheless, unleashing neither misery nor bliss (―não 
chegam, um a desatar o riso, outro a desatar o pranto‖ – idem). For Manuel da Costa Pinto, 
columnist of the Folha de São Paulo, Macau is ―humor e rigor, subjetividade e racionalismo, 
lírica e antilírica. Não é fácil definir "Macau". Um livro, enfim, que acumula várias camadas 
de leitura, às quais devemos acrescentar ainda vestígios da atividade de Britto como tradutor 
(...)‖ (PINTO 2003 – his emphasis) – Macau is humour and rigour, subjectivity and 
rationalism, lyric and antilyric. It is not easy to define ―Macau‖ – a book with various reading 
layers to which one must also add traces of Britto‘s work as a translator.                
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 Between 2003 and 2010 Britto published another three books: Paraísos Artificiais 
(2004 – short-stories), Tarde (2007b - poetry) and Eu Quero é Botar meu Bloco na Rua (2010 
– nonfiction). As far as his work as a translator is concerned, in the last seven years he has 
published a few more books by Roth, Updike and Pynchon, along with many other authors – 
more than 20 books in total. His collection of short-stories, Paraísos Artificiais, received the 
prestigious ―Prêmio Jabuti‖ (second place), and so did Tarde (third place), along with a 
second ―Prêmio Alphonsus de Guimaraens‖. Moreover, his Macau received a Portuguese 
edition
105
 in 2010, and some of his poems were translated into English by Idra Novey and 
published in the United States (BOA Editions) in 2007 under the title The Clean Shirt of it Ŕ 
Poems by Paulo Henriques Britto.   
 As I hope this very brief account of Britto‘s works as a writer and translator has 
shown, his production is undoubtedly impressive. When questioned about the long intervals 
between his own books (1982, 1989, 1997, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2009), he explains that  
Escrevo nas horas vagas. No máximo, seis poemas por ano. É um trabalho muito 
esporádico, passo meses sem abrir o caderno. Gostaria de ter mais tempo para a poesia, 
mas ainda tenho que preparar aulas, corrigir provas... (FRANCO 2010).  
I write in my spare time. Six poems a year at the most. I do it sporadically – I spend 
months without touching the jotter. I would like to have more time for poetry, but have to 
prepare classes, mark exams…    
Britto is arguably one of our most prominent contemporary translators and writers. Folha de 
São Paulo uses the epithet ―transformer‖: Britto [is a] poet, and one of the great transformers 
from English into Portuguese – ―poeta e um dos grandes transformadores do inglês para o 
português‖ (MACHADO 2002). The newspaper O Globo speaks of a ―poeta premiado, 
tradutor prestigiado‖, or award-winning poet, celebrated translator (O GLOBO 2009). 
Indeed, Britto was one of the four Brazilian writers to take part in the renowned 
Internationales Literaturfestival Berlin in September 2010, a festival that ―present[s] a wide 
literary variety of contemporary prose and poetry from around the world‖. According to the 
organisers of the event, Britto is ―one of Brazil‘s most distinguished translators‖ and ―a cult 
poet in Brazil‖ 106.  
                                                             
105 Brazilian books cannot be sold in Portugal. In order for the sale of Brazilian books to be allowed in Portugal, 
a Portuguese publisher must edit the book there, which was the case for Britto‘s book.   
106 The information about the festival was taken from their webpage – http://www.literaturfestival.com/ (last 
accessed in December 2010).  
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Unfortunately, because the main focus of this thesis is translation theory, I have not 
given his literary works the attention they deserve. I hope the reader understands that, due to 
time and space constraints, we will have to leave his vast production – more than 100 literary 
translated books, in addition to his own books – as it is. In Chapter 2 below I hope to shed 
light on Paulo Henriques Britto as an academic, someone engaged at university for more than 
30 years now, with scholarly production certainly not comparable to his colossal literary 
production. 
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2. Standpoint as an Academic 
_____________________________________________________ 
Na verdade, não sou um estudioso da teoria da 
tradução, embora esteja a par das discussões mais 
recentes. 
Paulo Henriques Britto
107
 
As briefly pointed out above, Britto started working at university in 1978, already as a 
―professor‖ – though he would have been the equivalent of a ―lecturer‖ in the UK when he 
first began. At the time, it was very common for Brazilian universities to hire students who 
had just finished their major, as was Britto‘s case. Of course nowadays there is hardly a field 
in which one can apply for a position at university without an MA and a PhD (perhaps only 
those fields in which specific education is still scarce), but until the late 1990s this was by no 
means rare in Brazil. He then went on to do his Master‘s already as a lecturer, between 1979 
and 1982. In 2002 he was awarded a ―Notório Saber‖ by the same university, which is 
equivalent to a doctorate and accredits knowledge and experience acquired outside the 
university.   
 Curiously, Britto chose to do his MA in linguistics – though the programme itself, 
which we call ―Letras‖ in Brazilian Portuguese, involves literature and linguistics, and 
increasingly more translation studies as well (see Chapter 1 in Part I above). In those days, 
his academic production as such was far from vast: one article on Portuguese conjunctions 
published in a Brazilian journal in 1980, together with a few reviews and short essays 
published in newspapers and magazines. Having said that, one must also acknowledge the 
fact that university faculties were not nearly as pressured to publish back then as they are 
today. CAPES (Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior – Agency for 
Further Development of Staff in Higher Education) and Cnpq (Conselho Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico – National Agency for Scientific and 
Technological Development), our most important research funding agencies, now have 
complex evaluation systems whereby universities and individual professors receive 
acknowledgement (and funding) according to the number and nature of academic activities 
they carry out, amongst which scientific publications rank the highest.  
                                                             
107 Please refer to ARROJO (2000b, 161) or to Section 2.4 in Part II above.  
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 In any case, it was not until the mid-1990s that Britto started publishing papers in 
specialised journals, as well as book chapters – just under 50 works altogether108. Similarly, it 
was not until the mid-2000s that he began supervising BA and MA theses – perhaps because 
before then he did not have a PhD or equivalent degree. Therefore, one can say that by the 
time his academic activity became more intense, he had already translated dozens of books, 
published a few of his own books and been awarded a few times for his work as a literary 
translator and poet. In this light, the impact that his career as a translator and writer must have 
had on his work as an academic was probably strong.  
 Indeed, the vast majority of his papers published in specialised journals between 1995 
and 2010 are about literary translation. Some approach his own endeavours as a literary 
translator, whereas others are about the craft of poetry translation (which, all together, 
delineate a model of poetry translation or criticism of poetry translation). Finally, some 
compare the work of the writer to the work of the literary translator. As for his papers on 
issues other than literary translation specifically, the most recurrent topic is his fierce 
criticism of poststructuralist ―approaches‖ to translation, with a few papers having been 
written in direct response to Stanley Fish and Rosemary Arrojo (refer to Part II above). As 
addressed in footnote 108 below, many of the book chapters and newspaper articles published 
by Britto consist of his own poems, as well as of translation and literary criticism. In this 
sense, one can say that most of his publications are not specifically devoted to translation 
studies as such, and this is probably the reason why Britto claims not to be a translation 
scholar (please refer to the end of Section 2.4 in Part II above). We will at any rate analyse 
many of his papers on translation more closely in Chapter 3 below.  
 But before we move on to the next, longer chapter, dedicated to the analysis of these 
papers, let us briefly look at his work as a professor, focusing mainly on the courses he has 
taught over the years, as well as on the theses he has supervised and the research projects in 
which he has taken part. According to his national CV
109
, he has been teaching more or less 
                                                             
108 I last accessed his CV (see next footnote below) in January 2011. It is important to take into account that 
most of the approximately 25 book chapters published by Britto consist of anthologies of his own poems, as 
well as literary translation criticism and literary criticism. In addition to these nearly 50 papers and book 
chapters, Britto has published, since the early 1980s, nearly 30 newspaper and magazine articles and reviews, 
mostly on literature and literary translation, including some of his own poems.  
109 Most of the information presented here about his publications, awards, education and academic work in 
general were taken from this source, this so-called ―national CV‖. In Brazil, all scholars have their CV on a 
public platform called ―Lattes‖, which in turn is monitored by the chief funding agencies we have in Brazil 
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the same undergraduate courses since 1978, all within the BA and teaching degree in English 
and Portuguese. In addition to the English language (Syntax, Semantics, Contrastive 
Linguistics), he has been in charge of Poetry in English, Creative Writing, Linguistics, 
Semantics, Portuguese for Translators, as well as several translation courses – Technical 
Translation, Literary Translation, Translation into Foreign Languages and Introduction to 
Translation. Furthermore, he has been teaching the courses Literary Translation and Poetry 
Translation within the Specialisation in Translation offered by the same institution.   
 On the website of the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro his name 
features amongst the supervisors of BA and Specialisation theses on translation. Between 
2003 and 2004 he concluded the supervision of nine specialisation theses. Additionally, he 
completed the supervision of three MA theses in 2007, and then another four in 2010. At the 
time of writing he is supervising two MA theses, as well as his first PhD thesis
110
. Taking all 
these different works into account (19 in total), most are about literary translation (eight), 
with a specific corpus – such as poems by Hilda Hilst and Elizabeth Bishop, a short-story by 
D. H. Lawrence, amongst many others. Another seven theses are dedicated to translation in a 
broader sense, including specific linguistic phenomena in English and Portuguese, the use of 
dictionaries in translation, as well as various others. Finally, four theses discuss poetry and 
music, with no avowed relation to translation. Out of the seven MA students who had 
defended their theses by 2010, two went on to do a PhD under his supervision (see footnotes 
110 and 111 below), one on poetry translation (Hilda Hilst, Adília Lopes and Ana Cristina 
César), and the other one on contemporary Lusophone poetry
111
.     
 As for his engagement in research projects, Britto has taken part in the following: 
Non-representational Approaches to Meaning: Aporias and Perspectives (from 2003 to 2005); 
Transformations in Contemporary Brazilian Poetry (from 2007 to 2009); Translation Studies: 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
(CAPES and Cnpq – see above). The link to Britto‘s Lattes is the following: 
http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.jsp?id=K4701673J9, and it was last accessed in November 
2010.   
110 Though his national CV (see previous footnote) mentions only one PhD supervision underway, the national 
CV of one his former MA students, Beatriz Cabral Bastos, mentions Britto‘s name as her current PhD 
supervisor (last accessed in January 2011).  
111 For this particular student, named Mariano da Silva Perdigão, the situation appears to be the opposite of the 
one described in the previous footnote: though Britto‘s CV mentions his name as his only current PhD student 
since 2008, Perdigão‘s CV does not mention anything about a PhD at all (last accessed in January 2011). 
Nevertheless, these small inconsistencies are perhaps negligible, as many students and professors simply do not 
get round to updating their CVs as often as they should – I, for example, have not updated mine in years.      
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Linguistic and Cultural Aspects (from 2004 to date); Cultural and Linguistic Interfaces: 
Translation, Teaching and Bilingualism (from 2004 to date); and Poetry Translation (from 
2006 to date) – all originally in Portuguese. The main aim of these projects is to foster 
research within a single university, as well as between different universities
112
. The members 
of the group may organise events (such as conferences and colloquia) and publications 
together, engaging not only experienced scholars, but also students. The activities carried out 
by these groups also contribute to the abovementioned evaluation system devised by CAPES 
and Cnpq to award recognition and funding to universities.   
 Furthermore, Britto worked as a member of the editorial board of the following 
Brazilian journals on literature and/or translation: Fragmentos, PaLavra, Tradução em 
Revista, Eutomia and Cadernos de Tradução. He is currently a member of the editorial board 
of the last three journals. Further, he has taken part in dozens of academic events on 
translation and literature, often as a guest or keynote speaker, both in Brazil and abroad.      
This first look into Britto‘s academic career reveals an atypical academic in a number 
of different ways. Firstly, it is quite striking that he has not got a PhD while most of his 
colleagues have at least a doctorate – many have a post-doctorate as well. Secondly, his 
academic production, not only in terms of theses supervised, but also as far as publications on 
translation studies are concerned, is not particularly numerous. Nevertheless, in light of his 
colossal literary production (see Chapter 1 above), one can hardly expect his academic work 
to achieve the same magnitude. In this sense, and taking into consideration the main subjects 
of his papers, together with the subjects on which his students have been working, Britto 
strikes one as somebody whose interests lie far closer to translation practice than to 
translation theory, in a more academic sense. Even though he is a professor in the full sense 
of the term, his performance as a translator and as a writer simply does not compare with his 
academic achievements. My intention here is by no means to belittle his academic work, 
which indeed is highly interesting and relevant – as the next chapter will reveal. However, 
these considerations are crucial to help to delineate the standpoint from which he speaks.  As 
our discussion advances and we start looking into the way Britto perceives translation and 
translation studies, awareness about his standpoint will be of fundamental importance.  
                                                             
112
 The reader will have noticed that I have not mentioned any research projects for Arrojo, in Part II above. 
These projects have become increasingly popular in the last decade or so, but were quite rare before the turn of 
the century, when Arrojo was still engaged at a Brazilian university.  
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 His engagement in research projects somehow confirms this idea of someone whose 
affinities lie with more ―practical‖ or practice-oriented issues. Furthermore, it unveils his 
dedication to linguistics as well, and so do the courses he teaches both at undergraduate and 
postgraduate levels. Judging by his career turns, one could expect his interest to have drifted 
from linguistics, when he did his MA back in the early 1980s, to literature, after he had 
translated dozens of literary works and written a few of his own as well. His academic career 
as a whole appears nonetheless to indicate that linguistics remains one of his chief areas of 
concentration. Indeed, according to his national CV (see footnote 109 above), the main areas 
of research in which he is engaged are the following: Translation, Teaching and Bilingualism; 
Translation Studies; Linguistic Theory and Analysis; and Sociolinguistics and Dialectology. 
In light of this piece of information only, one could hardly imagine that this researcher is also 
one of the most prominent literary translators of a huge translating country like Brazil. So in 
this sense Britto is also atypical – in terms of his academic interests (largely influenced by 
linguistics) and his work outside academia (as a celebrated literary translator whose specialty 
is poetry translation).           
 Yet being ―atypical‖ is by no means a problem, but simply a trait we should take into 
account as we move on to the next chapter. However necessary, any attempt to define Britto 
would certainly run into generalisations and stereotypes, so as I try and carve the contours of 
his standpoint, I am also critical of this very attempt, in a Derridean double gesture (please 
refer to Chapter 2, Part I above). This ―carving of contours‖ should of course be understood 
in a very limited way – the contours for me, within the scope of the present thesis and 
according to my argumentation.  
 From an academic point of view, Britto would probably be labelled as a linguist – on 
account of his education and academic career as a whole. And let us bear in mind that, in 
Brazil, most of the scholars engaged in translation studies would either be labelled as 
linguists or literary theorists since most of them do tend to have training in either one of these 
areas – seeing as there are only a few translation studies programmes in the country, most of 
which newly-founded. For the media, however, he is chiefly a superb translator and writer. 
His production as a literary translator and writer (particularly as a poet) unquestionably 
outshines his academic production. Indeed, his countless interviews fill search engines and 
platforms like ―YouTube‖, for example. Therefore, as far as literary translation is concerned, 
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these two elements – namely the fact that he can be said to be a linguist and that his 
experience as a translator surpasses his work as an academic – make him come across as a 
practitioner, and/or an academic whose main concerns are probably practice-oriented. As for 
the combination of linguistics and translation studies, my expectations are very much in line 
with the history of this ―marriage‖ in previous years, as addressed both in Part I and Part II 
above. In very general terms, there seems to be a tendency for linguists engaged in translation 
studies to have a rather ―scientific‖, strict outlook on the discipline, seeking to devise models 
and precepts with a view to translation practice – very much in tune with that notion of 
translation theory as a set of precepts, as repeatedly argued in Part I above. Of course these 
conclusions concerning Britto are more expectations than assertions, and the next chapter will 
help to reveal to what extent they may or may not be pertinent.            
 Let us then study, in Chapter 3 below, some of Britto‘s papers on translation and 
translation studies. As already pointed out above, bearing in mind the outlines of his 
standpoint briefly sketched in these initial chapters will help to understand his views.  
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3. Works 
_____________________________________________________                 
What I say has more truth than what you say, since I 
can ―do more‖ (gain more time, go further) with what I 
say than you can with what you say.  
  Jean-François Lyotard 
While it is true that amongst translation students Paulo Henriques Britto is best-known for his 
countless translations of authors such as Philip Roth, John Updike, William Faulkner, Ian 
McEwan and Elizabeth Bishop, it is also true that his academic quarrels with Rosemary 
Arrojo (see Part II above) have received a lot of attention in academic circles. Furthermore, 
his model of analysis and criticism of poetry translation has divided the Brazilian academic 
community. In the present chapter, I will examine some of his papers published in specialised 
journals. For organisational reasons, I have divided them into three categories, as follows: 3.1 
Criticism of Poststructuralism (three papers), 3.2 The Craft and Art of the Poetic Translator 
(two papers), and 3.3 Translation Criticism (five papers). Although these three main issues 
tend to feature in most of his papers, there appears to be a focus towards one or the other, so 
this was my criterion in devising this structure.  
 Even though Britto‘s production as a translation theorist is solid and emblematic of 
Brazilian criticism of poststructuralism in translation, his works have not been compiled into 
a single volume yet. Instead, most of his papers have been published in different Brazilian 
journals, which is indeed the case of many translation scholars today given both the difficulty 
in publishing books and the profusion of (mostly electronic) translation journals in Brazil. 
Having said that, in view of this enormous literary production, I believe that translating and 
writing literature are probably his priority. 
 Similarly to Part II above, dedicated to Rosemary Arrojo, I will describe and comment 
on his papers simultaneously, making clear what aspects strike me as conspicuous. 
Additionally, whenever possible I will try and refer back to his standpoint, aiming at 
anticipating and justifying some the motivations and interests lying beneath his theoretical 
undertakings. As in Parts I and II above, a few issues raised here – the more lengthy or 
  
203 
intricate ones – will be discussed in detail in Part IV below, so that in this part the focus can 
remain on Britto‘s work.          
3.1 Criticism of Poststructuralism  
Diante da constatação de que Deus não existe, uns se 
tornam ateus; outros, porém, nostálgicos, preferem 
criar uma nova igreja, com teologia, liturgia, ritos, 
sacerdócio e tudo o mais, em torno de um altar onde 
está entronizado o grande deus Nada. Para estes, o fim 
dos absolutos torna-se o novo absoluto. 
Paulo Henriques Britto
113
 
In the present section we will examine three papers in which the author presents a direct 
critique of poststructuralist thought on translation. For the sake of organisation, I will use 
reverse chronological order (2007, 2001 and 1995) as Britto‘s first and second papers (1995 
and 2001) are direct responses to papers by Rosemary Arrojo and Stanley Fish, whereas the 
third one (2007a) is a general reflection on ideas perceived by Britto as poststructuralist. This 
way, this most recent paper will offer a preamble to the discussions carried out in the two 
earlier papers, in which more specific issues of so-called poststructuralism and deconstruction 
are addressed.  
 ‗É Possível Avaliar Traduções‘ (Is it Possible to Evaluate Translations?) is largely 
based on a lecture given at the conference ―Etnografia e Tradução‖ (Ethnography and 
Translation) at the Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro in 2005. As we will see under 
3.3 below, Britto has been working on a methodology for criticism of poetry translation for a 
number of years now. In the paper in question, as the title indicates, Britto asks himself 
whether one such criticism or evaluation is at all possible or even desirable, particularly in 
view of the ever growing dissemination of theoretical perspectives labelled 
poststructuralist
114
.   
 Britto starts his paper by describing what, to him, the goal of translation criticism is. 
Quoting Lefevere (1975, 3 – apud Britto 2007a, 1), he claims that translation criticism is not 
                                                             
113 This excerpt is quoted and translated later in this section (please refer to page 206).  
114
 For a discussion of literary translation criticism informed by poststructuralist values, please refer back to the 
first paper analysed in Section 2.3 in Part II above, entitled ‗A que são Fiéis Tradutores e Críticos de Tradução? 
Paulo Vizioli e Nelson Ascher Discutem John Donne‘ (ARROJO 1993, 15-26). 
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up to the average reader, since s/he is probably making use of a translation precisely because 
s/he does not speak the source language. In this sense, it would be up for translation critics to 
avaliar as traduções de poesia, com o fim de orientar o consumidor de traduções de 
poesia disponíveis no mercado, do mesmo modo que se espera dos especialistas em 
informática que orientem os consumidores de computadores e software, comparando os 
diferentes produtos e avaliando-os (BRITTO 2007a, 1).  
evaluate translated poetry so as to guide consumers through the translations available on 
the market – in the same way as one would expect computer specialists to guide software 
consumers, comparing and assessing the different products available.        
And for him one such comparison and assessment should be carried out through rational and 
reasonably objective methods (―métodos racionais e razoavelmente objetivos‖ – idem), 
despite the so-called postmodern reservations to objectivity and rationality. Indeed, he 
summarises the allegedly poststructuralist argument against translation criticism as a strong 
will to abolish all kinds of value judgement due to their ineluctable, underlying subjectivity 
and lack of absoluteness (idem, 4). Britto then goes on to explain that his aim as a translation 
critic is to 
analisar o mérito de uma tradução de poesia com base nos recursos utilizados pelo 
tradutor em comparação com os usados pelo autor do original, sem a interferência de 
fatores subjetivos ŕ os pressupostos teóricos tomados como ponto de partida, as 
simpatias e antipatias pessoais, as preferências emocionais por certas palavras em 
detrimento de outras, etc. (idem – my emphasis).     
analyse the merits of a translated poem based on the comparison of the resources used by 
the original author to those employed by the translator without the interference of 
subjective factors – such as theoretical perspectives used as starting point, personal 
empathies and antipathies, emotional preferences for particular words instead of others, 
etc. 
The Brazilian scholar then concedes that full objectivity is certainly unattainable, 
which in turn does not by any means make him embrace the supposedly poststructuralist idea 
that, because full objectivity is impossible, it should not be strived for at all, it should be fully 
discarded. As an example of what, to him, is a hasty conclusion often drawn by 
poststructuralist thinkers on these grounds is the famous quarrel between Derrida and Searle 
over the distinction between ―normal‖ and ―parasitic speech acts‖115. In Britto‘s view, just 
because one cannot distinguish fiction from reality through unanimously universal and 
                                                             
115 For more on the Derrida/Searle debate, see, for example, MOATI (2009) and DERRIDA ([1988] 1992 – 
translated by Alan Bass, Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman).  
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absolute criteria, it does not mean that one should completely do away with this distinction. 
For him, abolishing such distinctions represents an outrage not only to common sense, but 
also – and perhaps more importantly – to science, to the basic parameters of scientific work 
(―parâmetros básicos do trabalho científico‖ – idem, 6).  
As an instance of the harm poststructuralist ideas could do to science, Britto mentions 
the problem of absolute zero in physics. As it happens, it is impossible to reach an absolute 
zero temperature (-273.15°C); nevertheless, because carrying out experiments at absolute 
zero is key in various different areas, scientists do their best to get as close as they can to it, 
and then make the necessary adjustments on the results obtained. However, Britto maintains, 
if scientists were influenced by poststructuralism, they might come to the conclusion that, 
since reaching absolute zero is impossible anyway, carrying out experiments that require this 
temperature is a waste of time – ―se os físicos fossem pós-estruturalistas, talvez eles 
concluíssem que, como não é possível atingir o zero absoluto, seria perda de tempo formular 
experimentos que envolvam essa temperatura‖ (idem). 
Britto then goes on to discuss the issue of scientism (see Chapters 1 and 2 of Part I 
above) in the Humanities. Firstly, he contends that ambiguity and incompleteness are normal 
parts of scientific work. But then he stops for a moment and questions whether the scientific 
method, the method of the so-called Natural Sciences, is indeed appropriate for the 
Humanities after all: ―De fato, o fenômeno da linguagem natural humana levanta (...) 
questões de ordem muito diversa das que são encontradas no mundo natural, e é de se 
esperar que as ciências humanas recorram a princípios e métodos diferentes dos das 
ciências naturais‖, or indeed, the phenomenon of natural languages raises utterly different 
questions than the ones found in the natural world, and so it is only natural that the 
Humanities should make use of principles and methods that are different from those of the 
Natural Sciences (idem, 7). Despite this, however, he believes that anti-scientism is not a 
solution either, particularly when it takes poststructuralist contours. For him, poststructuralist 
anti-scientism stands for the idea that because science cannot rely on an absolutely 
metaphysical foundation, it is not at all a suitable basis for reliable knowledge (idem).  
To emphasise his point, he resorts to a generalisation and an allegory: ―a inexistência 
de uma diferenciação entre duas categorias A e B que seja inteiramente livre de 
ambigüidades é razão suficiente para abolir todo o sistema de categorizações que leva à 
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criação de A e B (?)‖, or the impossibility of a fully ambiguity-free distinction between two 
categories A and B is enough to abolish the entire categorisation system from which A and B 
stem (?) (idem, 8). The allegory to illustrate his argument is the following: if trying to 
constantly stay healthy is impossible because we are all doomed to sickness and eventual 
death, should we arrive at the conclusion that taking care of our health is useless? – ―Se a 
meta de se conservar sempre saudável é inatingível, já que todos nós estamos fadados a 
adoecer e morrer em algum momento, devemos concluir que cuidar da saúde é inútil?‖ 
(idem).      
Towards the end of the paper, Britto, still focused mostly on the question of scientism, 
draws an overview of linguistics from the 1960s and 70s onwards. He explains that however 
much the desire to model linguistics after the Natural Sciences, including mathematical 
language and rigorous logics, dominated the field initially, it was gradually replaced by a 
feeling of suspicion of these same aspirations. And though in linguistics these scientific 
ambitions were not completely discarded, in literary theory they attracted their most radical 
opposition. In Britto‘s opinion, nevertheless, just because a mathematical formula or strictly 
logical postulate cannot comprehend a particular issue in its entirety, it does not mean that the 
scientific method, that pure reason cannot offer adequate methods to analyse this issue. In this 
light, he seems to perceive this anti-scientism in the Humanities – and especially in literary 
theory – with scepticism, as another instance of a hasty conclusion typically drawn by 
thinkers with poststructuralist affinities.     
Britto then attacks deconstruction more specifically, claiming that  
Diante da constatação de que Deus não existe, uns se tornam ateus; outros, porém, 
nostálgicos, preferem criar uma nova igreja, com teologia, liturgia, ritos, sacerdócio e 
tudo o mais, em torno de um altar onde está entronizado o grande deus Nada. Para estes, 
o fim dos absolutos torna-se o novo absoluto (idem, 9-10). 
Faced with evidence that God does not exist, some become atheists; others, however, 
become nostalgic and set up a new church – with theology, liturgy, rites, priesthood and 
all the rest, around an altar where the great god Nothing is enthroned. For them, the end 
of the absolute becomes the new absolute.     
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In other words, in Britto‘s view deconstruction does away with numerous traditional dogmas 
only to elect new ones to replace them – nihilism and scepticism116 being perhaps the most 
conspicuous elements of this ―new dogma‖.  
 At the very end of the paper, Britto proposes yet another analogy, this time featuring 
an experienced and diligent literary translator who, after years of hard and meticulous work 
with texts, comes across a paper on poststructuralist perspectives on translation. Suddenly our 
hypothetical translator finds out that, as it happens, the texts s/he has been working on for 
decades do not contain any meaning (―não contêm nenhum significado‖); that, in fact, texts 
actually mean nothing (―afinal de contas, os textos nada significam‖); that originals are 
nothing but a pretence derived from the Enlightenment (―o conceito de Řoriginalř não passa 
de uma contrafação iluminista‖); that the dichotomies original-translation and author-
translator are mere ideological construes (―as oposições original/tradução e autor/tradutor 
são meros construtos ideológicos‖); that in a nonsexist and nonimperialist world there should 
be no distinction between the work of the translator and the work of the author (―num mundo 
não-sexista e não-imperialista não haveria qualquer distinção entre o trabalho de autoria e o 
trabalho de tradução‖ – idem). In Britto‘s opinion, this archetypical translator will at best 
listen to these assertions with a smile on his/her face (―nosso hipotético tradutor só poderá 
encarar tais afirmativas com, na melhor das hipóteses, um sorriso nos lábios‖ – idem, 10). 
He then explains, as already indicated in Chapter 3 in Part I above, that the suspicion and lack 
of interest with which practitioners tend to look at translation theory is due to allegedly 
poststructuralist positions as the ones quoted in this paragraph, and that exaggerated and 
hasty though their rejection of theory may be, it is not without justification
117
.  
 Finally, Britto goes back to the question he asks in the title of his paper (is it possible 
to evaluate translations?) and states that objectively evaluating and criticising translations is 
indeed possible and desirable, and that the starting point should always be the very critique of 
these poststructuralist ideas – particularly of the idea that, without absolute values, there are 
no values at all (―na ausência de absolutos, não resta nenhuma valor‖). He then ends the 
paper with a call for action: ―Ousemos discordar: restam valores relativos, o que não é a 
                                                             
116 And here, inspired in Martha Nussbaum‘s paper ‗Skepticism about Practical Reason‘ (1994), Britto explains 
that this scepticism is not like Hume‘s – it is Sextus Empiricus scepticism, like Pyrrhonism.   
117 Please refer to the long indented quotation by Britto in Chapter 3, Part I above.  
  
208 
mesma coisa que nada‖, or let us dare disagree: there are relative values, which is by no 
means the same as nothing (idem, 11 – his emphasis).   
 In this paper, Britto‘s final allegory reminds us very vividly of his own standpoint. 
This experienced and diligent literary translator, who faces poststructuralist discourse on his 
work with a smile on his face and feels suspicious of translation theory, could be interpreted 
as himself. As I will repeatedly argue in this chapter, Britto‘s criticism of poststructuralist 
thought on translation has two main components. Firstly, he speaks from the point of view of 
the practitioner; in other words, he appears to presuppose the marriage of theory and practice 
(see Part I above) and finds so-called poststructuralist contributions to translation relatively 
useless, as they do not address, never mind systematise or simplify, translation practice. 
Secondly, he expects a radicalism of perspectives labeled poststructuralist which is simply 
not pertinent – though it is typical of those who oppose deconstruction and other 
poststructuralist tendencies. I will develop these two arguments below, as we look into two 
other papers by Britto on the same issue. As for his remarks on scientism and the adequacy of 
the methods of the Natural Sciences to the Humanities, I will address them at length in Part 
IV below – though these issues will come up again in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.        
The second paper we will analyse in this subchapter, entitled ‗Why deconstruct?‘ 
(‗Desconstruir para quê?‘ – BRITTO 2001)118, is a direct critique to one of Arrojo‘s papers 
on deconstruction, included in the abovementioned 1992 collection O Signo Desconstruído 
(see Section 2.1 in Part II above). The name of Arrojo‘s paper is ‗As Questões Teóricas da 
Tradução e a Desconstrução do Logocentrismo: Algumas Reflexões‘ (Reflections on the 
Theoretical Questions of Translation and the Deconstruction of Logocentrism).  
Britto‘s main criticism is the fact that, in her paper, Arrojo very contradictorily 
censures so-called logocentric perspectives on translation but, at the same time, makes use of 
a number of these very same logocentric perspectives of which she disapproves to get her 
message across. In the paper in question, Arrojo summarises the so-called logocentric 
tradition into three assumptions, devised according to Ronald Knox‘s work. The first 
                                                             
118 Britto translated most of his published papers himself and made them available on his personal webpage 
(http://phbritto.org/ - last accessed in December 2010). Even though the references to his texts (including years 
of publication and page numbers) will take the Brazilian published versions into account, I will make use of his 
own translations here. Therefore, whenever I quote him directly in English, this means that the text in question 
has been translated by Britto himself.   
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assumption refers to the possibility of (i) perfect equivalence between original and 
translation; the second maintains that original texts contain (ii) stable meanings that can be 
identified with the author‘s conscious intention; and the third assumption refers to the (iii) 
clear separation between a text‘s meaning and its style (BRITTO 2001, 42-43 and ARROJO 
[1992] 2003, 74).  
While Arrojo asserts that a translation can by no means be considered (i) equivalent to 
its original, Britto maintains that she acts as though she thought translations and originals 
were equivalent,  
For the passages by Nietzsche and Mounin she quotes were not written by Nietzsche or 
Mounin: they are taken from texts written in Portuguese by Brazilian translators. Or are 
the translators Portuguese rather than Brazilian? They might be, for all we know; Arrojo 
does not name them, clearly because she thinks this detail is irrelevant to her purposes. It 
is the meaning of the passages that she is interested in, the ideas that Nietzsche and 
Mounin express in their texts; and she believes that these meanings, or ideas, have been 
transposed into Portuguese in the translations she quotes from in a reasonably reliable 
way. By treating translations as if they were originals and attributing them to the authors 
of the originals, Arrojo is clearly assuming the logocentric notion, [i.e.] translations are 
texts that are equivalent to their originals (BRITTO 2001, 43). 
As Britto quite rightly points out, by not mentioning the names of Mounin‘s and Nietzsche‘s 
translators – neither in the text nor in the bibliography – Arrojo does subscribe to the 
logocentric tradition she fiercely criticises, since she does not acknowledge the work done by 
these translators. From Britto‘s point of view, this is the same as saying that original and 
translation are equivalent, as she does not find it relevant to mention the names of the 
translators precisely because she seems to think that original and translation are the same, 
regardless of who translated it.   
 Nowadays, not mentioning translators‘ names is simply inexcusable in all sorts of 
publications, never mind in papers on translation studies – and even worse in those whose 
main subject is the importance and autonomy of the translator. Regardless of their theoretical 
standpoint, it is high time all involved with translation started paying more attention to who 
translated what. In the specific case of this book by Rosemary Arrojo, however, it is curious 
that only four of the papers (out of 17) do not include the translators‘ names in the 
bibliography; the other 13 do, some of which mentioning the very same books by Nietzsche 
and Mounin to which Britto refers (see above). Therefore, it is not that the entire book 
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neglects translators, but some chapters do, even though the book is in its second edition at the 
time of writing. 
 In addition to that, one must consider that certain editorial decisions are not up to the 
translator. I, for example, have just had a negative experience with a Brazilian publisher, who 
hired me to translate Syd Field‘s new edition of his 1979 book Screenwriting into Brazilian 
Portuguese. The author mentions a number of books by English-speaking authors (such as 
Fitzgerald, Shakespeare, Henry James, amongst others), all of which are available in 
Brazilian editions. Therefore, what I did was mention the Brazilian titles of these books as 
well as the names of their translators – both in the text and in the index. To my surprise, the 
editor informed me later that the names of the translators had been deleted due to their 
apparent irrelevance to the target reader. In spite of all my efforts first to find the names of all 
translators, and then to persuade the editor of how unethical his suggestion was – not to 
mention absurd, because without the translators‘ names it appears as though Shakespeare and 
James had written in Portuguese – the book does not include the names of any of the 
translators. This is by no means an attempt to find an excuse for Arrojo‘s lapse; rather, the 
point here is to call attention to the fact that translators hardly have any autonomy when it 
comes to what will be published and how. I will probably be criticised for not mentioning the 
names of my peers when I myself defend the importance and autonomy of translators; yet, 
there simply was nothing I could do.          
 But let us look back at Britto‘s critique of Arrojo‘s paper. He then moves on to the 
second assumption Arrojo censures (see above). His argument is that by using expressions 
such as ―Mounin believes‖, for example, she appears to endorse the second logocentric 
assumption, too. In other words, if she says that Mounin believes in something according to a 
text written by Mounin in French a long time ago and then translated into Brazilian 
Portuguese, it is because she believes that ―meaning is a stable property of a text, which can 
be identified with the author‘s conscious intention in writing it, and which does not depend 
on the reader‘s actual circumstances‖ (BRITTO 2001, 44). 
 Accordingly, Britto claims that Arrojo seems to follow the third assumption as well, 
considering that in the paper in question she ―assumes that meaning can be considered an 
object distinct from the style of the text in which it appears‖ (idem). From his point of view, 
if she did not think so, she would have quoted Nietzsche and Mounin in German and French, 
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respectively, and not in Portuguese. Indeed, he goes further and says that ―by using a 
translation of the passage by Nietzsche (…) she makes it clear that the only thing she is 
interested in is the meaning, this object that can be conveniently detached from the text, and 
so necessarily from the author‘s style‖ (idem).  
 These last two arguments go straight to the heart of the polarity structuralism ―versus‖ 
poststructuralism. Let us once again look at the way Arrojo perceives the relationship 
between these two lines of thought (refer to Part I, Chapter 6 above): 
(…) one can say that there is a paradoxical relationship between structuralism and 
poststructuralism, i.e. radical opposition and complementariness at the same time. In the 
transition (without clearly established boundaries) from structuralism to 
poststructuralism, a radicalisation of insights and presuppositions takes place, which in 
turn allows one to perceive poststructuralism as a more attentive and less naive kind of 
structuralism (ARROJO 1996a, 60 – my emphasis).    
Drawing her conclusions from Derrida‘s work, Arrojo makes it clear that the aim of 
poststructuralism is not to fully break with structuralism. Rather, one should complement the 
other. In Chapter 6 of Part I, for example, we saw how the division between signifier and 
signified is necessary and yet the nature of this division must be questioned. Therefore, it is 
not that one should get rid of the division altogether; instead, one should perceive it more 
critically.  
 If poststructuralism were taken to an extreme (and structuralism too, for that matter) 
and completely broke with structuralism, communication would be far more chaotic than it 
actually is. In order for Arrojo to be able to write her paper, for instance, and be as radical 
and extremist as Britto appears to expect her to be, she would have to say ―According to my 
reading of the translation of Mounin‘s text done by this particular translator‖. That, however, 
would probably not suffice, seeing as she would have to account for the background and 
ideology of the author, of the translator and of herself which, again, would be impossible, as 
everything would always be what she perceives them to be at a given moment in time. By 
advocating the instability of meaning or the importance of the translator‘s ideology, for 
example, deconstruction, as I read it, is not saying that communication is impossible and 
translations are completely different texts when compared to their originals. As the 
relationship between signifier and signified exemplifies, what seems to be the point is to 
question just how stable meanings are, or how negligible and neutral translators can actually 
be.      
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 However potent Britto‘s arguments may be, they presuppose a radicalism which 
would completely break with structuralism and relegate language to the realms of impossible 
tasks. By not completely breaking with structuralism and simply looking at some of its core 
principles ―more attentively‖ and ―less naively‖ (see above), communication is still possible 
– one would certainly not need a theory to show that communication is possible – and one 
can still say ―Mounin believes‖ rather than ―I believe, according to my background, ideology 
and intentions, that one can read Mounin‘s text in this or that way at this moment in this 
place‖. Nevertheless, in postmodern times, saying ―Mounin believes‖ does not by any means 
imply that ―I can tell exactly what Mounin was trying to say by reading his text and decoding 
the meanings he intentionally placed in it‖ (as Britto himself admits – see below).  
 It seems to me that without the radicalism that Britto expects of translation theories 
labelled as poststructuralist, what he says is rather similar to what Arrojo says. His conclusion 
in the paper in question is an excellent example of this theoretical similarity (BRITTO 2001, 
48 – my emphasis):   
To conclude, I would like to return to the point that to relativize is not the same thing as 
to abolish. Deconstructive critique forces us to relativize a number of concepts — that is, 
to take them for what they are, fictions and not realities. But we cannot do without these 
fictions (…). Such concepts as ―meaning,‖ ―original‖ and ―equivalence‖ are 
indispensable assumptions of most textual practices, however imperfect they may be 
shown to be. We must criticize them, we must be aware of their constructed nature, but 
we still need them. The name of the logocentric game is language. To refuse to play it is 
to condemn oneself to silence.       
Indeed, Arrojo claims that relativising and criticising structuralism is not the same as 
abolishing it, whereas Britto claims that relativising and criticising poststructuralism is not 
the same as abolishing it. It is almost as though one of them saw the glass half empty and, the 
other, half full. Just how important a role these ―fictions‖ play in Britto‘s work will become 
clearer in Subchapter 3.3 below. It is nonetheless evident that Britto appears to expect Arrojo 
to ―refuse to play‖ what he calls ―the logocentric game‖, or the language game, and thus 
―condemn [her]self to silence‖, which she obviously does not do and does not intend to do. 
Likewise, taking Britto‘s theoretical standpoint into account, one could quite rightly expect 
him to argue that his translations are the neutral and transparent renderings of the original 
author‘s intentions, which he does not, either. I will develop these initial arguments in what 
follows.   
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 Another of Britto‘s papers written in response to ideas labelled ―poststructuralist‖ is 
called ‗Lícidas: Diálogo Mais ou Menos Platônico em Torno de ŘComo Reconhecer um 
Poema ao Vê-loř, de Stanley Fish‘ (Lycidas: A More or Less Platonic Dialogue on Stanley 
Fish‘s ‗How to Recognize a Poem When You See One‘), first published in 1995 in the 
journal PaLavra (no. 3), from the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. As its 
name suggests, this essay is a direct critique of Stanley Fish‘s paper ‗How to Recognize a 
Poem When You See One‘, which in turn was published two years earlier in Portuguese in 
the same journal (PaLavra no.1) under the title ‗Como Reconhecer um Poema ao Vê-lo‘ 
(translated by Sônia Moreira). The original English version had first appeared in Fish‘s 1980 
Is There a Text in this Class? Ŕ The Authority of Interpretive Communities (FISH 1980, 322-
337).  
  In his paper, which was originally delivered as a lecture, Fish emphasises the 
importance of his so-called interpretive communities, this time not only in terms of the 
production of meaning, but also in terms of the ―recognition‖ of different text types – in this 
particular case, poems. As the American theorist explains in the introduction to his 1980 
book, ―it is interpretive communities, rather than the text or the reader, that produce meanings 
and are responsible for the emergence of formal features‖ (idem, 14). Therefore, for him texts 
do not contain intrinsic, stable meanings, nor do individual readers have total freedom to 
interpret texts as they wish
119
. The secret would lie in these interpretive communities and the 
tacit agreements their members constantly make. According to Fish, 
Interpretive communities are made up of those who share interpretive strategies not for 
reading but for writing texts, for constituting their properties. In other words these 
strategies exist prior to the act of reading and therefore determine the shape of what is 
read rather than, as is usually assumed, the other way around (idem).  
From this point of view, Fish ―dethrones‖ the text (to quote Snell-Hornby referring to 
Vermeer and his Skopostheorie – SNELL-HORNBY 2006, 54) and favours readers and their 
interpretive strategies without, however, granting them full autonomy, which in turn would 
make them ―independent agents‖ (FISH 1980, 14) and thus sabotage communication120. 
                                                             
119 In Section 2.1 in Part II above Arrojo came to a remarkably similar conclusion as for the location and origin 
of meaning – refer to pages 110-111 above.  
120 One such ―sabotage‖ may be comparable to what happens to the protagonist of Peter Bichsel‘s short-story 
‗Ein Tisch ist ein Tisch‘ (BICHSEL 1968). In the story, he gradually attributes new words to the world 
surrounding him – ―Dem Bett sagte er Bild. Dem Tisch sagte er Teppich. Dem Stuhl sagte er Wecker. Der 
Zeitung sagte er Bett. Dem Spiegel sagte er Stuhl. Dem Wecker sagte er Fotoalbum. Dem Schrank sagte er 
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Indeed, these reading (or writing) strategies do not belong to individual readers, but rather (as 
pointed out in this last indented quotation above) to the interpretive community of which 
readers are members, since these communities ―at once enable and limit the operations of [the 
readers‘] consciousness‖ (idem).  
 In his ‗How to Recongnize a Poem When You See One?‘, Fish shows the impact of 
these communities on the ―reception‖ of text type. He bases his reflections on a more or less 
accidental classroom experiment that took place at the University of New York in 1971. In 
short, what happened was that between the first and the second course he used to teach (the 
first one on stylistics and the other one on English religious poetry), he had left the names of 
five linguists on the board, the last of which followed by a question mark because he was not 
sure about its spelling (idem, 322-323). As the English religious poetry class began, Fish told 
his students that the list on the board was actually a poem, and so they immediately began to 
apply the interpretive strategies they had learnt to analyse what, to them, was the poem 
written on the board. It was not before long that they had ―found‖ meanings to all the names 
on the board, in addition to a number of poetic devices
121
.  
 Going back to the question he very aptly asks in the title (―how to recognize a poem 
when you see one?‖), he replies that the common sense answer, ―to which many literary 
critics and linguists are committed‖, holds that ―the act of recognition is triggered by the 
observable presence of distinguishing features‖ (idem, 325-326), i.e. intrinsic and clear-cut 
characteristics on the text surface. However, as his little experiment reveals, one such 
response would be inadequate because the list on the board ―contained‖ no ―distinguishing 
features‖ and yet his students managed to find these poetic features anyway. In other words, 
what triggered their poetic interpretation was not the fact that the text contained poetic 
features, but rather the fact that the teacher had told them that they had a poem before their 
eyes. As the American critic explains, ―the meanings of the words and the interpretation in 
which those words were seen to be embedded emerged together, as a consequence of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Zeitung. Dem Teppich sagte er Schrank. Dem Bild sagte er Tisch. Und dem Fotoalbum sagte er Spiegel‖ (idem) 
– until he reaches a point in which he is fully isolated from other human beings, as he understands no one and no 
one understands him (for more on this, please refer to the discussion on the origin of meaning mentioned in the 
previous footnote).      
121
 Fish‘s experiment resembles Rosemary Arrojo‘s experiment in her Oficina de Tradução (refer to Part II, 
Section 2.2 above) whereby half the class reads William Carlos Williams‘ poem ‗This is Just to Say‘ as a note, 
and the other half reads it as a poem.  
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operations my students began to perform once they were told that this was a poem‖ (idem, 
326). Fish goes further and says that ―interpretation is not the art of construing but the art of 
constructing. Interpreters do not decode poems; they make them‖ (idem, 327). So Fish largely 
disregards the context of text production to place greater emphasis on the context of 
reception, since it is reception that will turn the words written on a piece a paper or on a 
blackboard into a text as such – hence the witty name of his 1980 book, Is There a Text in 
this Class?, in the sense that without reception, there is indeed no text.   
 Britto‘s main criticism in his ‗Lycidas‘ stems precisely from this fact, namely that 
―[Fish] says poems are poems solely because they are read with the intention of reading 
poetry into them. He doesn‘t take into account the intention to write poetry‖ (BRITTO 1995, 
142 – his emphasis). On the one hand, Britto admits that he agrees with some of Fish‘s 
arguments. In fact, he even says that it is an ―obvious fact that a poem‘s poeticalness (...) is 
not a property of the molecular structure of the ink it‘s written in or the paper it‘s written on‖, 
and also that ―all these things make sense only in the cultural context of a system that has to 
be learned‖. However, the Brazilian professor finds it absurd that this should lead to ―the 
bombastic conclusion that the only thing that makes a poem a poem is the fact that you look 
at it with ‗poetry-seeing eyes‘‖ (idem, 146 – quoting Fish – his emphasis). Indeed, he stresses 
that ―nothing justifies this quantum jump‖ (idem).   
Britto‘s paper is a very well-written ―more or less platonic dialogue‖ (idem, 142 – see 
above) between a young professor of English and literature who has just read Fish‘s text and 
is impressed by it, and a middle-aged, sceptical Brazilian literature professor who read the 
text as well and is not in the least enthusiastic about it. Thanks to this witty structure, Britto 
manages to anticipate most of the counterarguments one would bring forth in response to his 
own critique, presented of course through the voice of the sceptical professor. Therefore, the 
sceptical professor, as Britto‘s persona, conducts the dialogue in such a way as to unveil what 
he sees as the weaknesses in Fish‘s theory, often presenting alternatives to the dilemmas he 
encounters. The younger professor, in turn, presents the counterarguments.  
 Largely basing his arguments on Wittgenstein‘s concept of ―Familienähnlichkeit‖, 
first presented in the Austrian philosopher‘s 1953 book Philosophische Untersuchungen, 
Britto disputes the fact that things do not possess intrinsic characteristics, as Fish defends. 
According to the Brazilian thinker, just because certain elements of a ―class‖ or ―family‖ do 
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not possess every single distinguishing feature normally attributed to that class of elements, it 
does not mean that it is not a member of that class or family.  
The main example that the two characters in Britto‘s paper discuss is William Carlos 
Williams‘ poem ‗This is just to say‘ (refer to Part II, Subchapter 2.2 above). What the 
persona defends is that this modern poem, despite not containing all distinguishing features 
expected of a poem, still contains some poetic features, which means it can still be ascribed to 
the class we all know as ―poetry‖. Britto, impersonated by the middle-aged professor, 
contends that this is the reason why Williams‘ poem is a poem, precisely because of its 
intrinsic characteristics, and not because one looks at it with ―poetry-seeing eyes‖, as Fish 
suggests. The Brazilian professor goes further and explains that in this light one can account 
for a fact Fish cannot, namely the number of intrinsic characteristics a poem possesses, for 
example, will determine how easily or quickly readers will recognise it as a poem or not. In 
order to illustrate his point, he mentions ‗Shall I Compare thee to a Summer‘s Day‘: ―whether 
it is scribbled on the door of a subway train or written on a blackboard or printed on a piece 
of paper found in the garbage, [it] is recognized by any literate member of English-language 
culture as a poem‖ (idem, 145). ‗This is just to say‘, in contrast, is not perceived as a poem at 
first sight, and exemplifies how literature professors like Britto‘s two characters must often 
―engage in strenuous argument in order to convince people that a given text is a poem‖ 
(idem).  
 As their fictitious dialogue advances, the young professor criticises the older professor 
for taking things (in this case, poems) in their essence, as if he had access to them without his 
reading, his interpretation, his construction of what they are. Britto‘s persona then replies that 
this (i.e. the fact that everything is a reading, a construction) is obvious, so obvious that it 
becomes ―practically irrelevant‖ (idem, 146). To illustrate his point of view, the sceptic 
brings up the epistemological challenge of other minds, whereby one would not be able to tell 
whether other human beings actually have minds since one can account solely for one‘s own 
mind and behaviour. Yet, the middle-aged professor stresses that one must act as though one 
thought other human beings actually had minds. Therefore, ―the other-minds problem is 
really a nonproblem, in the sense that it affects nothing, that it has no practical consequences 
whatsoever‖ (idem). In other words, saying that one only has access to things (in this case, 
poems) through one‘s perception, one‘s reading, and that this reading or perception is not 
  
217 
exactly the same as the thing itself (to which one never has access) is such an obvious 
assertion that it becomes irrelevant.  
Another supposed weakness of Fish‘s theory revealed through the voice of the 
sceptical professor refers to the fact that if interpretive communities were indeed relevant and 
played an essential role in the shaping of minds and production of meanings, people like Fish, 
for example, would never have been able to come up with an idea that contradicts or is not 
part of the set of ideas circulating in this very same community. The following ironic and 
bitter remarks by the older professor clarify his point:  
So are we supposed to conclude that Kant‘s mind was really determined by the 
institutional structure of the University of Königsberg? Or that Galileo‘s mind was 
determined by the institutional structure of seventeenth-century Italy, including the 
Aristotelian physics and the Ptolemaic astronomy he was brought up on? Come on, give 
me a break (idem, 147).   
As he draws to his conclusion, Britto‘s middle-aged character tries to explain to his 
younger colleague that even though he agrees that meanings are not stable and interpretations 
vary greatly, he chooses to pretend he believes otherwise so as to withstand the pressure 
imposed by translating. He maintains that in the same way as one has to pretend other people 
are human (in spite of the problem of other minds), one has to pretend meanings can be stable 
and translations can be accurate, faithful to the author‘s intentions (idem, 148): ―When I read 
or translate a text, for instance, I have to act – provisionally, anyway – as if I had full access 
to the text‘s objective meaning; otherwise infinite regression would stop me cold‖. This 
―acting‖ would of course be a fiction, but a necessary one according to him. Language and 
hence communication and translation would be a game of pretending and make-believe. 
Taking Fish‘s essay as an example, he explains how far the fiction goes (idem, 148-149 – my 
emphasis):  
In the world we live in, Professor Fish writes his articles pretending (...) his readers will 
capture precisely the meaning he has in mind, (...) but wait a minute, we have to indulge 
in make-believe in even more ways than that: after all, we didn‘t read what Fish actually 
wrote, but only a translation of his article (...). We also have to pretend that the translator 
did a reasonably good job, so that we understand exactly what Professor Fish meant to 
say. That being the case, it seems more sensible (...) to assume the working hypothesis 
that the text does contain a stable, definite meaning, which may be identified with what 
the author meant to say and can be captured in a translation, and that the different 
readings of a text are functions of the individual differences between readers, who are not 
mere cake moulds that culture fills with exactly the same cake mix — even though I 
know it‘s impossible to prove that this is really the case, even though I know this is just a 
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useful fiction. Because Fish‘s fiction (…) doesn‘t seem that useful once you realize what 
its implications are. 
 Faced with this scepticism and sarcasm, the younger professor then asks whether they 
are now back to rationalism, back to structuralism, pretending philosophers like Nietzsche, 
for example, never existed. His sceptical colleague retorts that this is by no means the case 
precisely because these ideas are only fictions. In other words, he knows meanings are not 
stable and translations cannot be said to be faithful or unfaithful in absolute terms; 
nevertheless, he chooses to stick with these fictions because they are useful, more useful than 
Fish‘s theory. The older professor clarifies that ―it‘s one thing to assume an absolute 
conception of the subject or of meaning as was done in the nineteenth century, and something 
else again to hold that such notions cannot be taken to be absolutes, but that for certain 
practical purposes they remain useful fictions‖ (idem, 149 – my emphasis). 
 Therefore, when it comes to the work of the translator, the Brazilian professor has his 
older character explain that ―any attempt to translate a poem on the basis of the notion that it 
allows an infinite number of possible readings would be doomed from the outset‖ (idem). He 
then makes an interesting analogy with painting (idem, 150): ―It would be like trying to paint 
someone‘s portrait based on the notion that the person‘s face is constantly changing (...). If I 
am to translate a poem, the poem must sit still, at least for a while‖122.  
*** 
 Once again, similarly to the first two papers analysed in the present section, Britto 
seems to expect fierce radicalism and thus criticises Fish‘s theory on this basis. The Brazilian 
scholar discards the idea of ―interpretive communities‖ because he takes them to an extreme 
and extends their scope to all realms of human behaviour, completely excluding creativity 
and individuality. Fish advocates that the community to which one belongs helps to shape the 
way in which meanings are produced. To Britto, however, this would mean that human 
beings are not capable of coming up with anything unless it has already been produced and 
acknowledged within a given community. One could also speak of a ―quantum jump‖ here 
(see above). To the same extent that men organise themselves in communities and make use 
of language as a means of reference and communication (and therefore strive to understand 
                                                             
122 I will come back to this same analogy in Part IV, Chapter 2 below.  
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and be understood), they also tend towards change, innovation or ―progress‖, as some might 
prefer to call it.  
 Kant was undoubtedly a product of the University of Königsberg in the sense that he 
belonged to a certain system, followed a number of rules to obtain his degree and to become a 
lecturer and later, a professor. He is even more obviously a member of his ―interpretive 
community‖ when one takes into account the fact that he used language to convey his then 
innovative ideas. By teaching lectures and writing texts in certain formats, he (as any other 
member of his community) conformed to different sets of (mostly) tacit rules. Had it not been 
for these tacit rules, nobody would have found any relevance in what he had to say or write; 
worse, nobody would even have had access to what he wanted to say. So in summary, saying 
that interpretive communities limit one‘s consciousness does not necessarily mean human 
beings are only capable of repetition (which is a contradiction in itself), but rather that in 
order to be understood, one will unconsciously rely on certain communication norms, which 
in turn will gradually and constantly change, as human products. 
 When Arrojo (see Part II, Subchapter 2.1) approaches the question of interpretive 
communities, she always stresses their power and the importance of being aware of their 
power. As a teacher, one must know and obey certain rules, but can also help to shape them 
as society evolves. As students, learning about their interpretive communities is the key 
factor that will allow them to change them later. As translators, knowing our interpretive 
communities is a paramount prerequisite to translating anything because this is the only way 
to know what is acceptable, what works in our community. But as Arrojo explains (ARROJO 
[1986] 2002, 78), knowing these tacit rules in no way means blindly following them, but 
rather having privileged access to them in order to help to carve their contours.     
 Another key element that Britto appears to disregard is the impact of the ―fictions‖ he 
defends on translation. Whereas he asserts that without these fictions of stable meanings and 
authors‘ intentions any translation task is doomed, I would claim the exact opposite (as 
addressed at the end of Part I above): it is precisely because of these fictions that translation 
has been perceived as doomed for over two thousand years. It seems evident that translators 
who claim that their translations are ―faithful‖ and ―transparent‖ (BOHUNOVSKY 2001 and 
KATAN 2009), or who, confronted with two different translations of the same text, cannot 
tell which one is ―the right one‖ (see Part I, Chapter 3 above), do not refer to fictions. Nor is 
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it the case when so-called translation critics mechanically point out the alleged mistakes of 
the translator, claiming that a given translation is inaccurate and unfaithful – as one so often 
sees in literary sections of newspapers and magazines.    
    I have attended two conferences by Britto, first in the I Jornada de Estudos da 
Tradução at the Universidade Federal do Paraná in 2006, and then in the Congresso Ibero-
Americano de Tradução e Interpretação, in São Paulo in 2007 (for more on them, see 3.3 
below). His apparently stimulating words on the unquestionable and obvious importance of 
the author‘s intentions, on the stability of meanings and on the need to seek perfect 
equivalents had a twofold impact on the crowd – at least on the other MA students with 
whom I had contact. At first, they too were excited, relieved that someone as renowned as 
Britto does not appear to have been influenced by deconstruction. ―Relief‖ in the sense that 
his speech seemed to free them from the apparent ―constraints‖ imposed by the ever growing 
discussion about the instability of meanings and the power of ideologies. ―Relief‖ very much 
in line with Fish‘s ―theory hope‖, in the sense that through his words one could again believe 
in a fully scientific, almost mathematical (refer to Section 3.3 below) translation theory. 
Later, however, their feeling of relief ended up feeding the vicious circle already described in 
Part I above, i.e. the hope for a fully scientific translation theory leads to its own 
impossibility, which in turn projects itself onto translation practice, making it, too, seem 
impossible; from practical impossibility and dissatisfaction ―theory hope‖ emerges again, and 
on it goes.  
 Finally, the necessary fictions Britto defends do not seem so necessary when one 
thinks about their nature. To take the example of Britto‘s persona in the paper in question, 
why do translators have to pretend they believe in equivalence, author‘s intentions and stable 
meanings? Why pretend? Should simply different interpretations not suffice? Why must one 
necessarily say that one such translation is good or bad because it respects the author‘s 
intentions or the original text? Can one not simply say ―this translation more or less matches 
the way I have read this text and therefore it works well‖; or ―I see other elements as more 
important than the ones privileged in this translation and therefore I do not find it a good 
translation‖? 
 The answer to the questions I ask above is not an easy one. It seems to me that our 
logocentric tradition, our tradition of private property and copyright simply does not allow us 
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to assign as much importance to interpretation and bias as to original intentions, texts and 
authors. As Britto very clearly reveals through his main character in this last paper discussed 
above, he himself feels his work as a translator is doomed if he cannot believe that his 
interpretation perfectly matches what the original author meant to say, what the words in the 
text actually mean. Relying on his own interpretation as an experienced and renowned 
translator, acclaimed writer and successful professor would not be enough, and this is how far 
our essentialist tradition goes.  
 It appears that Britto‘s resistance to so-called postmodern ideas lies in the fact that he 
sees structuralism as necessary, useful and legitimate, although he agrees with a number of 
poststructuralist positions. His attitude reflects the structure of our own society, in which it is 
simply easier and more useful to pretend that certain fictions (such as truth, impartiality and 
pure reason) are actually possible. In Britto‘s case, it is quite clear that he takes them as 
fictions, as his work inarguably indicates. In the case of many other translation scholars and 
students, however, Britto‘s ―fictions‖ are actually their strong beliefs and convictions. Indeed, 
this is probably the reason why a number of scholars and practitioners all around the world 
are still looking for miraculous translation models and solutions; translation critics are still 
listing translators‘ mistakes; translation students are still wondering about perfect equivalence 
and authors‘ intentions. In this sense, this game of ―make believe‖ has drastic consequences; 
consequences which we can no longer afford to have. I will develop this argument further in 
Part IV, Chapter 3 below.     
 But let us remember Britto‘s standpoint here, and let us keep in mind that he defends 
these so-called fictions because they are more useful (see above). Useful in the sense that they 
can be applied to practice more easily and directly – to translating, marking papers, teaching 
translation, proposing translation exercises, and so on. Surely most translation teachers would 
not like to admit that their correction criteria are rather subjective; that they, too, do not know 
for a fact what the author meant to say. Likewise, for practical reasons, translators would not 
like to admit that their work is not definitive, finished, stable – would authors? Here is what 
Michael Cunningham has to say about it (CUNNINGHAM 2010): 
A novel, any novel, if it‘s any good, is not only a slightly disappointing translation of the 
novelist‘s grandest intentions, it is also the most finished draft he could come up with 
before he collapsed from exhaustion. It‘s all I can do not to go from bookstore to 
bookstore with a pen, grabbing my books from the shelves, crossing out certain lines I‘ve 
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come to regret and inserting better ones. For many of us, there is not what you could call 
a ―definitive text.‖ 
It is interesting to note that a writer as celebrated as Michael Cunningham can admit that his 
texts are not ―definitive‖ – why is it that so many translators cannot?  
 Whether this kind of usefulness that Britto advocates is honest and ethical is now 
beside the point – we will come back to this question in Part IV, Chapter 3 below. In any 
case, discussions such as the one proposed by Fish certainly do not address translation 
practice – they do not contribute to practice nor do they have to. In this sense, judging them 
by their usefulness seems not only pointless, but also diminishing. But Britto appears to be 
mostly committed to practice-oriented issues after all (as addressed under 1 and 2 above), so 
it is only natural that he should tend to look for usefulness in Fish‘s and Arrojo‘s 
propositions. If we remember Britto‘s analogy presented in Chapter 4 of Part I above, Britto, 
Fish and Arrojo are lost in a forest, and all Britto wants is to get home. In this sense, his idea 
of a translation theory clearly presupposes the marriage of theory and practice, as we 
repeatedly observed in Part I above. Precisely because theory must necessarily lead to a more 
efficient practice, must necessarily be useful as far as practice is concerned, contributions 
such as the ones by Arrojo and Fish seem somewhat irrelevant. Particularly regarding Fish‘s 
considerations about what makes a poem a poem, Britto should feel strongly about some of 
the American critic‘s suggestions as Britto is a poet himself, and thus is fully entitled to 
perceive his own practice differently.            
 But let us now move on to the next section, dedicated precisely to Britto‘s papers on 
the work of the poetry translator in comparison to that of the poet – an issue so close to his 
heart for obvious reasons. This section will help to shed light on his notion of translation 
practice, thus greatly contributing to our discussion here. It will also help to clarify a few of 
his reservations as for Fish‘s remarks discussed in the present section.    
3.2 The Craft and Art of the Literary Translator 
Poetic influence, in its first phase, is not to be 
distinguished from love, though it will shade soon 
enough in revisionary strife. 
Let me reduce my argument to the hopelessly 
simplistic; poems I am saying, are neither about 
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―subjects‖ nor about ―themselves.‖ They are 
necessarily about other poems; a poem is a response to 
a poem, as a poet is a response to a poet, or a person to 
his parent. 
Harold Bloom 
Being a poet and literary translator, Britto is one of the only Brazilian translation thinkers to 
investigate the processes involved in the work of the literary or poetry translator, mostly in 
comparison to the work of the writer or poet. Indeed, in his paper entitled ‗Tradução e 
Criaçãoř, or Translation and Creation (1999), he compares the work of a poet to that of a 
poetry translator because ―a much discussed issue in the field of translation studies is the 
nature of the difference between an original and a translation‖ (BRITTO 1999, 239). If we 
look back at Part I above, we will remember Britto‘s long quotation in which he complains 
that 
Some theorists maintain, for example, that the notion of original in translation is a myth, 
that literary translators should enjoy the same status as the author of the allegedly 
―original‖ work (and in their texts the word ―original‖ always comes between inverted 
commas); the inferior role of a translation when compared to the original text would be a 
product of capitalism, of chauvinism, of logocentrism, of the oppression imposed by 
European cultures on peripheral cultures, etc.
123 
In this light, Britto sets out to investigate the processes of poetry translation and creation so 
as to identify differences and similarities between them, and hence determine whether the so-
called poststructuralist argument whereby ―the notion of original in translation is a myth‖ has 
any truth to it. In a long footnote he explains that he derives this ―poststructuralist‖ argument 
from Venuti and Levine, and then quotes the following passages by both authors: ―Neither 
the foreign text nor the translation is an original semantic unity; both are derivative and 
heterogeneous‖ (VENUTI 1992, 7) and ―there are no originals, only translations‖ (LEVINE 
1992, 83).      
                                                             
123 In what follows (please refer to the entire quotation on page 46 above), Britto also maintains that ―As a 
response, translators then quite rightly claim that these very same theorists who defend the impossibility of 
distinguishing between translation and original text, the impossibility of accessing the author‘s intentions, the 
radical relativity of all and every value judgement of a translation, these theorists, when faced with a translation 
of their own texts, behave in the exact same way as the logocentric, Eurocentric, phallocentric authors they 
criticise: they expect their translators to reproduce in their translations exactly what they meant to say, 
demanding the very same notion of ―fidelity‖ to the ―original‖ of which they so fiercely disapprove‖. This 
argument against poststructuralist thought is indeed recurring and ―by no means knock-down‖ (NORRIS [1982] 
2002, 185). In other words, poststructuralist thinkers are accused of at once denying that language and texts can 
possess any objective features and expecting their own texts to be read correctly. This is exactly Abrams‘ 
argument is his 1978 ‗How to do Things with Texts‘. I will come back to this question in Part IV, Chapter 2 
below.   
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In the Introduction he summarises the so-called structuralist and poststructuralist 
views on the matter of ―originals‖ and ―translations‖, the former being as follows: 
the poetic text is a unique new production of a unique, conscious and creative subject, 
based essentially on his or her own living experience, whereas a translated poem, like 
any other translation, is a text produced on the basis of an original in a different 
language, with the intention of serving in its stead (BRITTO 1999, 241-242). 
As for the poststructuralist point of view, we can read the following description in Britto‘s 
text: ―any text t refers back to a multitude of previously existing texts and is referred to by an 
indefinite number of subsequent texts, in the same language or in other languages‖ (idem, 
242). He quite predictably admits that ―I believe that the poststructuralist position (…) runs 
into serious trouble when applied to translation studies (and, indeed, most other fields)‖ 
(idem, 241). Despite that, he concedes that poststructuralist thought ―has had the merit of 
forcing all who are involved in the discussion of theoretical issues related to translation (…) 
to reconsider a number of concepts that had been accepted unquestioningly for a long time‖ 
(idem). At any rate, he adopts the poststructuralist perspective but announces, at the end of 
the introduction, that in spite of that, both the more traditional and the more postmodern 
reader will probably be satisfied with the conclusions at which he will arrive.     
What he does next is thoroughly analyse all the different drafts he wrote both of a 
translation (of Wallace Steven‘s ‗Sunday Morning‘) and a poem of his own (‗Pessoanař – in 
BRITTO 1997, 87), looking for similarities and differences in both processes. He then 
explains that source text authors rely on their own feelings, background and knowledge when 
writing a text, whereas translators take their own feelings, background and knowledge into 
account as well, but always in combination with one specific source text
124
.  
The Brazilian poet eventually comes to the conclusion that both processes – of poetic 
translation and creation – are characterised by a movement towards autonomy and a 
movement towards approximation. In other words, ―autonomy‖ refers to the fact that poets 
strive to distance themselves from their own literary influences, whereas translators strive to 
distance themselves from the constraints imposed by source language, source text or even 
other texts that may influence them. ―Approximation‖, on the other hand, concerns the fact 
that poets welcome such literary influences and use them in their texts through intertextuality, 
                                                             
124 For a discussion on the relationship between original authors and translators through a poststructuralist 
perspective, please refer back to Part II above, particularly Section 2.3 and the last paper of Section 2.4.  
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whereas translators strive to stick to the source text when writing the target text. Britto finds 
that the movement towards autonomy is undoubtedly more conspicuous in creation, while in 
translation ―the two movements are more or less balanced‖ (BRITTO 1999, 250-251). 
Nevertheless, both movements are found in both processes. He then asserts that 
the first source, or original, has a controlling effect on translation: every time the 
translation strays too far from the original, confrontation with the original pulls it back 
home. But when a poem is being written, the first source has no controlling effect on the 
new text. Quite the contrary (idem, 251 – his emphasis). 
Indeed, this is exactly what he observes by analysing his own processes of translation 
and creation: his new drafts of the translation clearly denote a pendular movement from 
autonomy to approximation, mostly ending in approximation. Unlike the translation, the new 
drafts of his own poem, which stretched over a period of six years, denote a movement 
towards autonomy. Incidentally, this was the only reason why he needed nine drafts to finish 
his own poem, i.e. in order to be able to ―find [some]thing that hadn‘t been said before by 
Fernando Pessoa‖ (idem, 249). Therefore, Britto speaks of the translation process as one that 
involves a centripetal force, very much in line with the idea of a controlling effect exerted by 
the source text, the ―centre‖ of the process. In contrast, the creation process is characterised 
by a ―self-consciously‖ centrifugal force, whereby the poet struggles to ―overcome‖ these 
alien influences (idem).       
 By resorting to a few mathematical formulae, Britto arrives at the final conclusion that 
―as long as we have access to the succession of versions resulting in the production of a text 
of arrival and to its possible texts of departure (...), we may say that the text of arrival in 
question either is or is not a translation‖ (idem, 252). The criteria he establishes for this 
definition are as follows: (i) source and target text must be in different languages; (ii) source 
text must have been written before target text; and (iii) there is a ―controlling relation‖ (idem) 
between source text (and source text only) and target text, which in turn occurs through a 
series of interventions in the target text ―with the effect of approximating‖ it to the source-
text (idem). His formulae are presented in the Appendix below as they were translated by 
Britto (refer to footnote 118 above).   
Through his model and formulae one should be able to unquestionably determine 
whether a text is a translation or an original, since however many similarities there may be 
between the two processes, they are different. So going back to the issue of the supposedly 
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poststructuralist argument of the original as a myth in translation, Britto explains that ―even if 
much of the poststructuralist argument is accepted, it is still possible to point to the existence 
of clear-cut differences between the acts of ‗translating‘ and ‗creating‘ – that is, between 
writing translations and writing pure and simple‖ (idem – his emphasis).  
The greatest contribution of this paper is the questioning of originality. Through his 
argumentation, the Brazilian author unveils that the production of both source and target texts 
is always strongly influenced by various literary forces – i.e. the literary experience and 
background of both poet and translator. Therefore, one cannot speak of pure originality since 
every piece of writing is indeed derivative, at least to a certain extent. By acknowledging that, 
one no longer classifies translations as minor, derivative work. The difference, in Britto‘s 
view, is that in translation this strong compelling force exerted by the source text is, to a 
certain degree, healthily and consciously dealt with by the translator. In creation, on the other 
hand, these external literary influences are rather more unconscious, imprecise and, to a 
certain extent, unwelcome, since poets usually want to achieve some ―originality‖. In 
conclusion then, Britto maintains that the processes behind works of poetry translation and 
poetry creation may even be similar, but there are ―clear-cut differences‖ (see above) between 
them. 
However enlightening Britto‘s paper may be regarding the processes of poetry 
translation and creation, presenting a rather innovative comparative approach of the two 
activities, I would like to call the readers‘ attention to a few issues. Firstly, the mathematical 
conclusion he draws. At the beginning of the paper, he justifies the choice of his own 
translation and poem by claiming that ―since my analysis will rely on the subjectivity of the 
author/translator and refer to possible unconscious or semiconscious associations, use of my 
own work makes things much easier‖ (idem, 241 – my emphasis). For the purposes of this 
thesis it is beside the point whether he would be able to consciously describe the unconscious 
or semiconscious processes going on in his own mind; in any case, the nature of one such 
description would certainly not be mathematical, thus not leading to mathematical 
conclusions. But yet another question seems even more relevant than that: why should one 
need to resort to mathematical formulae when dealing with such a subjective, abstract issue? 
Or why would one even want to mathematically determine the difference between original 
and translation? 
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As this part of Britto‘s work indicates (as will the next one below), the Brazilian 
translator appears to share the ―theory hope‖ diagnosed in many scholars, practitioners and 
students (as we saw above, particularly in Part I), hence his need for exact, absolute formulae. 
Despite his acceptance of a number of poststructuralist ideas – as he admits in the paper in 
question, but also in the papers examined in the previous section – he still relies, or pretends 
to rely, on structuralist principles because they are allegedly more useful, more legitimate 
(see above).  
Britto‘s mathematical conclusions lead to a vicious circle already familiar to those 
involved in translation studies today. Even if one took his formula seriously, disregarding the 
fact that the notion of equivalence is not explained, and neither are the notions of different 
languages (would different media count, such as book and film, picture and text?) and text 
(written, oral, texts taken as literary, non-literary?), one would only find exceptions and blind 
spots. What happens when one takes an old text and updates it into the ―same‖ language – 
such as Shakespeare into modern English or Camões into modern Portuguese? That would 
not be included in his formula, but is it not a ―translation‖? How about books made into 
films, such as The Hours (2002 – book by Michael Cunningham 1998) or Atonement (2007 – 
book by Ian McEwan 2001
125
)? And what about situations in which target texts must stray 
from their source texts in order to fulfil a different function in the target culture, as is the case 
in the translation of CVs, advertisements and so many other specific text types? His formula 
would then have to be enhanced, expanded to include more cases; nevertheless, it would 
never be able to comprise all minor exceptions, all the subjective and abstract aspects 
involved in work with language. The elaboration of a new, all-embracing formula would have 
to be postponed to the distant future, when science would finally bring all subjectivity to an 
end, and so on and so forth
126
. 
Another issue that I would like to discuss about Britto‘s paper is the assumption that 
so-called poststructuralist thinkers ―relativiz[e] the differences between ‗author‘ and 
                                                             
125 Incidentally, Britto translated this book into Brazilian Portuguese in 2008 for Companhia das Letras 
(Reparação).  
126 Britto does seem to restrict his conclusions to poetry translation, so some of my arguments here may be 
misplaced. But if one proposes such a scientific, rigid approach, one must also detail the applicability of one‘s 
approach. Why only poetry and not other text types as well? What distinguishes poems from other texts? If his 
formula is so comprehensive and refers to such clear-cut differences between translation and original, should it 
not be applicable to any text type?   
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‗translator‘ and between ‗original‘ and ‗translation‘ almost to the point of abolishing them‖ 
(idem – his emphasis). Once again there appears to be an element of radicalism in Britto‘s 
expectations towards so-called poststructuralist perspectives that is simply not pertinent. As 
mentioned in the present thesis time and again, it is part of the poststructuralist repertoire to 
question and criticise dichotomies such as signifier versus signified, subject versus object, 
original text versus translated text; what is not part of poststructuralist thought is to abolish 
these dichotomies.  
When Suzanne Levine claims that ―there are no originals, only translations‖ (see 
above – LEVINE 1992, 83), she is drawing a parallel between the concept of Ursprache (as 
discussed by Steiner in After Babel), of the myth of an original language, and the idea of an 
original text. She mentions Borges‘ ‗Pierre Menard, Autor del Quijote‘ (see Section 2.2 in 
Part II above) as an example of this questioning of ―sources‖ and ―origins‖. But once again  
her point seems to be to call attention to the illusory character of what we name ―original‖ 
rather than to completely do away with the idea of an original.  
As for Venuti (see above), the derivativeness and heterogeneity he advocates as 
ineluctable marks of both source and target texts can by no means make the boundaries 
between original and translation disappear – but rather make evident that these boundaries are 
not that clear-cut as, by the way, Britto‘s own paper appears to illustrate. It is as Rodrigues 
puts it: ―A crítica pós-moderna à oposição tradicional entre original e tradução não implica 
supô-los iguais; vale apontar que ambos são heterogêneos e plurais, que ambos são tecidos 
de diferenças‖ or the postmodern critique of the traditional opposition between original and 
translation does not imply that they are the same; one must bear in mind that both are 
heterogeneous and plural, both are made up of differences (RODRIGUES 1999, 222). I will 
come back to Rodrigues‘ argumentation later in this subchapter, once we have analysed 
another paper by Britto on the same subject.   
In any case, once again the question of standpoints is key, outweighing all other 
questions. In ‗Tradução e Criação‘, Britto seeks to clearly and unequivocally determine the 
features that distinguish original from translation – so clearly and unequivocally (shall I say 
scientifically?) that he must resort to mathematical language to convey his conclusions. He is 
most certainly not operating on a level of epistemological reflections on the differences and 
similarities between translation and original – as Venuti or Levine appear to be. Instead, he 
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draws examples from his practical experience as a writer and translator and deducts from 
them mathematical formulae that should allow one to determine with absolute precision what 
a translation is and what an original text is. Notwithstanding his references to so-called 
poststructuralist perspectives, his concerns, his conclusions are clearly practice-oriented. And 
there is absolutely nothing wrong with this – it all makes sense actually, considering once 
again that Britto has translated over 100 books, that his field of specialisation is linguistics 
and that his affinities lie closer to structuralism. It makes sense that he should want to 
produce mathematical formulae to be applied to concrete cases of poetry translation.          
But let us look into another paper of his, still concerning poetry creation and 
translation. Based on the opening lecture he gave at the Universidade Federal de Juiz de 
Fora at the start of the first term of 2008, Britto wrote the paper – which strikes one more as 
a personal account than as a paper – ‗Poesia: Criação e Tradução‘ (2008b)127, or Poetry: 
Creation and Translation. As he explains in the first paragraph of his paper, his main 
objective is to examine the notion of ―subject‖ in poetic creation (BRITTO 2008b, 11), which 
he does by first looking into his own experience as a poet and translator. Once again he is 
motivated by so-called poststructuralist perspectives on translation, which allegedly threaten, 
in his view, to completely get rid of the traditional opposition subject versus object.  
His autobiographical journey may be roughly summarised as follows. Britto‘s interest 
in poetry began when he was still a teenager. He became an avid reader then and, a bit later, 
started writing his own poems. Back then he thought he wrote poems because of his ―need to 
express himself‖ (―necessidade de expressão‖ – idem), but often found that he did not know 
the feelings he wanted to express until he actually wrote them down. In addition to that, he 
found that some of his poems expressed feelings far different from the ones he assumed he 
had. This experience made him perceive his poetry writing as a need to build feelings, to 
build a persona rather than to merely express pre-existent feelings (idem). In other words, it 
was his writing that determined his poetic personality and not the other way round.  
But yet another discovery would change his perception of poetry even more 
drastically: the Tropicália movement in the 1960s, particularly through the anthology of 
critical texts about Brazilian Popular Music organised by Augusto de Campos and entitled 
                                                             
127 Unlike most papers in this section, this one has not yet been translated by Britto, so all translations of this 
particular paper were done by me.  
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Balanço da Bossa (as already mentioned above). According to Britto, this book opened his 
eyes to literary theory and showed him how little he actually knew about poetry. More 
importantly than that, the book made him realise that his technique (using traditional metre 
and rhymes) was long out-dated, having been replaced by more visual, iconic texts without 
any syntax – indeed, concrete poetry was the style of the moment. Furthermore, the 
Tropicália movement opened his eyes to the project of the poet, who was no longer engaged 
in expressing personal feelings, but rather was a part of a larger aesthetic project whereby 
each poet worked as an engineer building texts that expressed this collective mission – and 
here the influence of Brazilian poet João Cabral de Melo Neto was paramount (as addressed 
under 1 above).  
These discoveries led Britto to an impasse: for him poetry was a means to manifest or 
build a subjective identity for himself, and yet the great poets of the time argued that poetry 
had nothing to do with subjectivity. Not surprisingly, this predicament made him stop writing 
poems for five or six years (idem, 12), and he only took it up again because of translation. 
Indeed, by translating he did not have to resort to his own persona. As a translator, he could 
claim that all the subjectivity and traditional structures had been chosen by the poets and not 
by himself. Of course his choices of poet and his translation choices still helped him to shape 
his own poetic self, but always through other personae. He summarises this point as follows: 
―Traduzir poesia foi para mim uma maneira de dar continuidade a meu projeto de 
construção de uma personalidade para uso próprio, só que utilizando sujeitos líricos alheios 
para esse fim‖ or by translating poetry I was able to carry on with my project of building a 
personality for myself, but I used other personae to reach my goal (idem, 13).   
Based on the experiences I briefly summarised above, Britto asserts that one could 
easily come to the conclusion that there is no difference whatsoever between writing and 
translating poetry. After all, both processes involve the construction of a persona, a poetic 
self, and this construction takes place in more or less the same way. Moreover, as the 
Brazilian poet quite rightly points out (again), neither poetry translation nor poetry creation 
are fully original activities. As his personal experience illustrates, he only started writing 
poetry once he had read enough poetry; he was only able to start building his persona thanks 
to all the other personae he had built from his reading of other poets. In this sense, 
―originality‖, ―subject‖, ―author‖ and ―meaning‖ would be nothing but ―ideological 
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reifications‖ (idem). Similarly, the persona behind a poem by Fernando Pessoa would be as 
artificial as the persona behind a translation of the same poem
128
.  
Although Britto agrees with the conclusions described above, he asserts that this sense 
of similarity between translation and creation is unacceptable. He presents the two following 
motives for his objection: firstly because poets/translators like himself always clearly 
distinguish between the texts they create and the ones they translate
129
. Secondly because 
even those who claim that creation and translation are ―the same‖ – or rather have the same 
status – tend to attribute translations to original authors (as we saw under 3.1 above when 
Britto criticises Rosemary Arrojo for quoting Nietzsche in Portuguese and not mentioning the 
translator). And here once again the Brazilian professor resorts to the concept of ―fiction‖. 
For him, the differences between translating and creating may be fictions, but necessary 
fictions (idem). He then sets out to find theoretical arguments to justify why these fictions are 
absolutely necessary.  
The first argument he presents concerns the fact that while so-called original texts are 
based on an indefinite number of previous texts, translations are based on one text only 
(idem, 14 – his emphasis):  
um texto que resulta de um processo de criação poética remete a todos os textos poéticos 
lidos pelo autor e de algum modo citados ou glosados no seu poema; por outro lado, o 
texto resultante de um processo de tradução remete basicamente a um texto específico e 
definido, dito Ŗoriginalŗ. 
a text derived from a process of poetic creation relates to all poetic texts read by the 
author and, in a way, quoted or glossed in the poem; a text derived from a process of 
translation, on the other hand, relates to one specific text, the so-called ―original‖.  
 The second argument regards the function of a persona and the relationship it bears to 
both poet and translator. Britto argues that when translators build a persona to translate a 
poem, the sole function of this persona is to get the translation done. In contrast, when poets 
build a persona in one of their own poems, this persona plays an important role in their lives 
                                                             
128 Indeed, as Britto very opportunely points out, this is what one can read in Fernando Pessoa‘s famous poem 
‗Autopsicografia‘, thoroughly analysed in LEAL (2007b). The poem can be read as follows: a poet, who has his 
or her own feelings, writes about these feelings in a poem. These two sets of feelings, however, are different. 
The reader, who has his or her own feelings at a certain point in time as well, reads the poem and builds yet 
different feelings. At the end it is as though there were four different sets of feelings at the same time: the poet‘s, 
the ones put down on paper, the reader‘s and the ones the reader reads in the poem, all different.           
129 Please refer to Section 2.3 in Part II above, where Lacan‘s translator, Forrester, claims in an indented 
quotation that one such distinction is by no means clear.  
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as well; it becomes a part of the poet‘s personality. He concedes that the personae built by 
him in translation also influence his personality and help to build his own persona, the one in 
his poems. He nonetheless maintains that the difference between the two – i.e. the personae 
derived from translation and the one derived from creation – is quite clear, mainly because 
the former relates to his personal biography far less than the latter (idem). And here he quotes 
Foucault (part of the quotation below) to show precisely what it is he disagrees with. In 
Foucault we read the following:  
these aspects of an individual which we designate as making him an author are only a 
projection, in more or less psychologizing terms, of the operations we force texts to 
undergo, the connections we make, the traits we establish as pertinent, the continuities 
we recognize, or the exclusions we practice (FOUCAULT 1979, 150). 
Unlike Foucault, Britto contends that ―O poeta lírico elabora uma determinada persona 
poética para fins utilitários que vão além da literatura: ela é uma parte importante Ŕ em 
certos casos, vital Ŕ da sua personalidade‖ or poets build a given poetic persona for purposes 
that go beyond literature; indeed, this persona is an important, sometimes vital part of their 
personality (BRITTO 2008b, 15). 
 Even though the Brazilian translator admits that personae and authors do not coincide 
perfectly, he stresses that the relationship between the two is tight-knit. He briefly examines 
Romanticism, and how back then poetic personae were perceived as the most authentic 
expression of their authors‘ personalities. Indeed, as Britto explains, it was not until the end 
of the 19
th
 century that people became aware of how artificial, how construed the personae 
projected by literary works were. He claims that Modernism followed this trend; yet, he feels 
it inherited from Romanticism the importance given to the interaction between the poetic 
persona and the author‘s self-image. As examples of this important interaction he mentions T. 
S. Eliot and Ezra Pound. For him, much of J. Alfred Prufrock corresponds to concrete facts of 
Eliot‘s life (idem). Similarly, he reads the same voice in Pound‘s Cantos, The ABC of 
Reading and his personal letters.  
 Before closing his paper, Britto goes back to Concrete Poetry, to João Cabral de Melo 
Neto. Today, decades later, he finds it easier to see João Cabral‘s subjectivity hidden behind 
the negation of subjectivity; the poet/engineer built his own personality by denying he was 
doing so. The Brazilian thinker then ends his inspiring paper by defending the concepts of 
―author‖, ―persona‖ and ―subject‖ as necessary, despite their construed or even fictitious 
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nature. He concedes that in times when even the notion of ―subject‖ is severely questioned, it 
is only natural to challenge the boundaries between ―translator‖ and ―author‖; but still he 
feels that these boundaries are necessary for the reasons he presented in his paper.  
 I confess that I agree with Britto‘s general reasoning here but would like to call the 
readers‘ attention to a few specific points. Going back to the first argument he brings forth to 
support why the ―fiction‖ that distinguishes translation and creation is necessary (see 
previous page), I do not believe that the number of texts to which original and translation 
relate is a decisive factor. Translations must, indeed, bear a special relation to one specific 
text; otherwise they would not be called translations. However, this is by no means the same 
as saying that no texts other than the source text influence translators when they are 
translating. Britto himself presents a very interesting example in the article analysed above in 
this section (BRITTO 1999, 246). As he was translating Stevens‘ ‗Sunday Morning‘, a verse 
by Fernando Pessoa ―popped‖ into his mind. Later he noticed the similarities between the two 
poems – Stevens‘ and Pessoa‘s – and therefore justified this unconscious interference. 
Indeed, any reader of poetry who has tried to translate poetry certainly feels these apparently 
inexplicable influences, like hidden echoes in our minds. In this sense, of course translation 
usually takes one text strictly into account; yet, the influence exerted by other texts cannot be 
denied.  
Correspondingly, I suppose poets sometimes identify very specific sources that 
influence the creation of a certain original work. Incidentally, Britto mentions an instance of 
that as well in the aforementioned paper (BRITTO 1999). As he is attempting to write his 
own poem, ‗Pessoana‘ (see BRITTO 1997) – which in turn is a poem about Fernando 
Pessoa‘s traditional theme of the dissociation between knowledge and feeling – he realises 
that the two main sources of influence are indeed a poem by Pessoa, ‗Autopsicografiař, and a 
poem by Sá de Miranda, ‗Cantiga VII‘ (BRITTO 1999, 249-250). Therefore, Britto‘s first 
argument in 2008b about the number and nature of the influences working on poetic 
translation and creation appears to be questionable. What seems more solid is his argument in 
the 1999 paper about the movements of ―autonomy‖ and ―approximation‖ that seem to 
characterise both processes in terms of how each one handles these influences. 
The second argument Britto presented in this last paper analysed above (BRITTO 
2008b) in favour of a ―fictitious‖ difference between poetry translation and creation concerns 
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the importance of the translator‘s persona and the poet‘s persona for the artist, and here two 
aspects seem particularly relevant to me. Firstly, readers – or the public in general, if we 
think of artists in a broader sense – tend to have difficulty separating an artist‘s personal life 
from his or her work. So it is only natural for members of the public who are acquainted with 
aspects of an artist‘s personal life to find similarities and references in the artist‘s work. One 
cannot forget one‘s knowledge about a certain subject, say, for example, the biography of an 
author, when appreciating his or her work. Nonetheless, just how meaningful this interaction 
between the persona and the actual person can be is questionable, and therefore should 
probably not be taken as seriously as Britto suggests.  
A curious example of this ―dangerous‖ interaction is what happened with Chico 
Buarque, one of the most prominent Brazilian artists of all times, when his 1998 album As 
Cidades came out. Chico is well-known in Brazil for his brilliant lyrics during the military 
dictatorship that started in the 1960s. ‗Apesar de Você‘ is an example of a song that, despite 
its potentially offensive content, was miraculously not censored because the text was actually 
very ambiguous and subtle. Back then, Chico became a symbol of resistance, of political 
criticism and force, characteristics that forced him into exile in Italy in 1969. His career 
flourished in the 1980s and 1990s as well, with political issues playing a less important role 
in his songs as the dictatorship gradually became less harsh until it was replaced by a 
democratic regime. During these decades, Chico was an open supporter of the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT – Workers‘ Party), with Luís Inácio Lula da Silva at its forefront.  
When As Cidades came out in 1998, one of the songs, entitled ‗Injuriado‘, called the 
attention of the media. That year president Fenando Henrique Cardoso had been re-elected 
(the elections took place in 1997), beating Lula already in the first round. Not surprisingly 
(and actually quite rightly), many critics interpreted that particular song as another of Chico‘s 
typically political songs, with double meanings and hidden criticism, this time addressed to 
the newly elected president. However, Chico was not in the least bit pleased with what was 
being published about his song, and finally clarified that it was not addressed to anyone in 
particular, and that he had nothing to say to President Fernando Henrique.  
Here one could ask a number of ―what if‖ questions, such as ―what if Chico, for 
whatever reason, had not been able to reply to the comments of the critics?‖, ―what if Chico 
was lying and actually had meant to criticise Cardoso?‖, ―what if he had not meant to criticise 
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Cardoso, but after reading the critiques decided it was actually an interesting reading of his 
song, seeing as he was a supporter of PT?‖, and so on and so forth. The point of this example 
is to show that the interaction between persona and person is not that clear-cut. Perhaps what 
we take as actual truths of the person (as the critics did in this example with Chico Buarque, 
or as Britto does with Eliot and Pound) based on history, letters and facts, are nothing but 
nuances of the persona
130
. Of course this is an endless discussion in literary theory, one that 
we unfortunately cannot enter because of time and space constraints. In any case, many of the 
considerations drawn here were inspired in Antoine Compagnon‘s Literature, Theory and 
Common Sense ([1998] 2004, 29-68 – translated by Carol Cosman).  
The second issue I would like to put forth is somewhat similar to the first one. I am 
sure that the long and constant process of construction of Britto‘s persona in his own poems 
is extremely important to him as a person. I believe it probably does work as one of the key 
elements of his personality, his personal history. To the reader, however, this is of little 
importance. This is more of a personal experience to the poet than something to be taken into 
account by readers, translators or critics. It would be naive to assume that a careful reader, 
examining a poet‘s letters, biographies and facts surrounding his or her life, and then 
comparing all that to the artist‘s works, would come up with an accurate outline of the artist‘s 
personality and his or her poetic persona, or would come up with something with which the 
artist would actually agree. Of course studies like that may shed light on the artist‘s oeuvre, 
may assist translators and critics in their work, may enrich and enlarge the perception a 
community has of a given artist
131
. But these contributions have to be taken with a pinch of 
salt, as construes, as products of perceptions delimited by time and context. Overvaluing the 
interaction between persona and author for the sake of his or her feelings seems exaggerated.  
And here again we have the question of standpoints: Britto is certainly not very fond 
of what Fish (refer to 3.1 above) or Foucault, for example, say about the nature of literary 
                                                             
130 I have recently attended the exhibition of Frida Kahlo‘s paintings at the Bank Austria Kunstforum in Vienna 
(―Frida Kahlo Retrospektive‖ – from September to December 2010). As a school teacher arrived with a number 
of pupils and started talking about the paintings, I could not help but pay attention to what they were saying. 
Indeed, the entire analysis of the paintings in question was built based directly on Frida‘s biography – her 
relationship with Diego Rivera, her miscarriage in the USA, her relationship with Trotsky, and so on. However 
much one such analysis may glamorise Frida‘s life, I wonder whether it does not end up impoverishing her 
works, her creativity, her art.     
131 And, by the way, what I am doing with Arrojo‘s and Britto‘s life and work may be said to go along these 
lines.  
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texts or the (lack of) importance of the author because he, as a poet, perceives the entire 
process differently, from a different side. But then again Fish and Foucault are not speaking 
of the same as Britto – they are not concerned with the genesis of literary texts, as Britto 
appears to be, but rather are looking at literary texts from the point of view of their reception.      
It also seems pertinent to point out yet again that it is not part of the poststructuralist 
reflection to suppose translation and original to be the same. The way I understand it, Britto‘s 
paper (2008b) appears to be another example – as we saw in the previous section – of 
exaggerated criticism of the reception of deconstruction in Brazil. It is true that a number of 
so-called poststructuralist theorists question the alleged superiority of original texts when 
compared to translated texts, and suggest their status should be the analogous. However, 
those theorists who oppose poststructuralism take this literally and accuse their academic 
opponents of defending a relationship of absolute equality between translation and original – 
hence their need to defend the difference between original and translation. As already 
mentioned above, Britto is one of those theorists who oppose poststructuralist perspectives 
and expect them to be extreme, to break with structuralism completely. Although in the paper 
in question (BRITTO 2008b) he does not make any reference to which theorists would claim 
translation and original – or author and translator – are the same, I suppose it might be 
another case of radical, unjustified criticism.  
Regarding the relationship between original and translation within the reception of 
deconstruction in Brazil, I tend to understand it as Rodrigues (1999, 221-224) explains it. 
Postmodern thought forces one to question the hierarchical opposition traditionally attributed 
to translation and original for a number of reasons. As we saw in Part I, Chapters 5 and 6 
above, this questioning starts with the very notion of sign, which can no longer be understood 
as a stable, constant relationship between signifier and signified. This new perspective makes 
the idea that meanings can simply be decoded from texts and that translating consists of 
transferring these decoded meanings no longer viable. Hence both translation and original are 
made up of conventional and arbitrary signs that are subject to interpretations and contexts. In 
this sense, the relationship between original and translation cannot by any means be described 
either as a relation of equivalence or as a relation of opposition. Instead, as Rodrigues 
defends, the nature of this complex relationship is of supplementation and mutual dependence 
(RODRIGUES 1999, 221-222). 
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Nevertheless, this does not mean that translators are free to interpret and translate 
texts however they want, neither does it allow for translation and original to be perceived as 
the same thing. This is another common misconception unfairly (and in a very ill-informed 
fashion) attributed to deconstruction, as Norris asserts (and here we could substitute ―critics‖ 
with ―translators‖):  
But if one thing is certain it is the fact that these readings [of Paul de Man and Jacques 
Derrida] bear no resemblance to the popular idea of deconstruction as a species of out-an-
out hermeneutical license, a pretext for critics to indulge any kind of whimsical, free-
willing of ‗creative‘ commentary that happens to take their fancy (NORRIS [1982] 2002, 
136 – his emphasis)132.      
Precisely because signs are conventional and arbitrary, translators – and writers or speakers in 
general, for that matter – will struggle to learn and, to some extent, conform to the rules valid 
in their community. This way, the author, rather than being the central element around which 
the translation process revolves, becomes one of the elements to be taken into consideration 
during the translation process, one of the elements within this complex activity of meaning 
production.  
 As for the difference between original and translation, Rodrigues quotes Culler and 
his ideas about enunciation and the system of distinction. As the Brazilian professor explains, 
Culler stresses the importance of ―difference‖ when it comes to signs, since it is precisely the 
differences between signs that allow us to define a sign:  
The fact that these (...) signifieds are arbitrary divisions of a continuum means that they 
are not autonomous entities (...). They are members of a system and are defined by their 
relations to the other members of that system. If I am to explain to someone the meaning 
of stream I must discuss the difference between a stream and a river, a stream and a 
rivulet, and so on (CULLER [1976] 1986, 34 – his emphasis).  
The American theorist then remarks that ―signifieds (...) are nothing but the product or result 
of a system of distinctions‖ (idem, 35), and quotes Saussure‘s famous Course: ―Their [the 
signifieds‘] most precise characteristic is that they are what the others are not‖ (apud 
CULLER [1976] 1986, 36). In this light, in order to create meaning – say, in a conversation 
or written text – one must employ a number of distinctions. As Rodrigues puts it, the first 
system of distinctions to be used in an utterance is that of the signifiers, employed to convey 
a certain form that can then be interpreted within the system of distinctions of the signifieds 
                                                             
132 I will come back to this quotation and the issue of deconstruction being an ―out-an-out hermeneutical 
license‖ in Part IV below.  
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(RODRIGUES 1999, 222-223). This refers, of course, to a single linguistic system, a single 
language. But Rodrigues suggests we go a step further and look into Derrida‘s work (―la 
traduction pratique la différence entre signifié et signifiant‖ – DERRIDA 1972, 31 – see 
above) and apply Culler‘s ideas to translation. In other words, the Brazilian thinker speaks of 
translating as using a system of distinctions – the source language – to produce a form that 
may be interpreted within another system of distinctions – the target language (RODRIGUES 
1999, 223). 
*** 
 In the present section, Britto‘s opinion on the differences between the work of the 
poet and that of the poetry translator reinforce some of the views already discussed in the 
previous section above. However much he concedes that poststructuralist thought has 
contributed towards a more critical understanding of concepts that before used to be taken as 
absolute truths (such as the notions of equivalence, subject versus object, intention, amongst 
many others), he chooses to defend some of these former ―absolute truths‖ for the sake of 
practicality and usefulness. And let us not forget that this behaviour is certainly very much in 
line with his work as a translator and translation professor whose interests tend towards 
translation practice. Britto appears to be reluctant to do away with these fictions because he 
cannot imagine his routine as a poet, translator and professor without them. But should he 
have to do away with them in the first place?  
We shall now move to the third and last section of the present chapter, dedicated to 
what is perhaps the most controversial part of Britto‘s work: his model of translation 
criticism. I will address this last question (see previous paragraph) in Part IV, Chapter 3 
below. For now, let us keep it in mind as we advance into this last, longer section.                 
3.3 Translation Criticism        
No centro [da relação transferencial] há um leitor ou 
tradutor que inevitavelmente chega tarde para ser o 
autor do texto que deseja e que, por isso mesmo, 
precisa tentar usurpar esse cobiçado lugar autoral num 
ato parricida pelo qual paga com uma culpa muitas 
vezes ―invisível‖ e com uma declaração explícita de 
auto-apagamento e de respeito irrestrito ao original. 
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  Rosemary Arrojo 
In 2006, Paulo Henriques Britto took part in the I Jornada de Estudos da Tradução at the 
Universidade Federal do Paraná. Consisting mostly of translation and literature students and 
professors, the audience was rather dazzled by his dynamic model of poetry translation 
criticism. The reaction was not dissimilar to when he presented the same conference in the 
2007 Congresso Ibero-Americano de Tradução e Interpretação, in São Paulo.  
 Claiming that the recent dissemination of poststructuralist ideas in the field of 
translation studies has turned translation criticism into a dubious, obscure field, Britto 
proposes a return to ―positivist‖ principles. Guided by his fierce disapproval of postulates 
such as ―one cannot say, in absolute terms, that a certain translation is better than another 
one‖, or ―there is no such thing as author‘s intentions‖, just to mention two, he devises a 
model whereby source poem and target poem are analysed mathematically – in a seeming 
attempt to bring the subjectivity and polysemy commonly associated with the study of poetry 
to an end. Although he concedes that one can no longer speak of author‘s intentions or stable 
meanings as one did, say, in the mid-20
th
 century, he maintains that, as a literary translator 
himself, he needs these allegedly logocentric principles to be able to carry through his work 
(see above). From his point of view, if one does not assume that the words in the text one is 
about to translate have stable meanings, intentionally and carefully chosen by its author, then 
one cannot read, never mind translate. 
 In these two conferences the object of Britto‘s analysis was two different Brazilian 
translations of John Donne‘s ‗To his Mistress Going to Bed‘ – one by Paulo Vizioli and the 
other one by Augusto de Campos
133
. His objective was to show that, in spite of 
poststructuralist reservations, one can mathematically determine which translation is better, 
more faithful to Donne‘s original. In the latter half of 2006, a paper with the contents of these 
conferences came out in the journal Terceira Margem (‗Fidelidade em Tradução Poética: O 
Caso Donne‘ or Faithfulness in Poetry Translation: The Donne Case). Before we analyse it, 
though, let us look at yet another paper on the same issue that came out earlier, as a chapter 
                                                             
133 The polemic surrounding these translations is also the object of Arrojo‘s paper ‗A que são Fiéis Tradutores e 
Críticos de Tradução? Paulo Vizioli e Nelson Ascher Discutem John Donne‘ (ARROJO 1993, 15-26), 
thoroughly analysed in Section 2.3, Part II above. I believe Britto‘s choice of this particular example might not 
have been random, as Arrojo‘s point in her paper is precisely that one cannot determine in absolute terms which 
translation is better – the very opposite of Britto‘s argument here.    
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of the book As Margens da Tradução, entitled ‗Para uma Avaliação Mais Objetiva das 
Traduções de Poesia‘ – or Towards a More Objective Evaluation of Poetic Translation134.  
Therefore, in the present subchapter I will present Britto‘s works in chronological 
order since in many of these papers he makes references to his previous works. However, 
there shall be one small exception, namely a 2000 newspaper review that will be addressed 
after the presentation of this first 2002 paper. After the 2000 review, we will look into two 
papers published in 2006 and, finally, another paper published in 2008.   
In his 2002  ‗Para uma Avaliação Mais Objetiva das Traduções de Poesia‘, Britto 
undertakes a similar project to the one in the 2006 conference and paper, but takes into 
consideration his own translation of a poem by Elizabeth Bishop, namely ‗Shampoo‘. Both 
Bishop‘s poem and Britto‘s translation can be found in the Appendix below in the way they 
were presented in Britto‘s essay – including all analyses of formal aspects.  
 At the very beginning of the paper, Britto announces that ―Evaluating the translation 
of poetry is a complex and delicate task. Poetic texts deal with language on all its levels – 
semantic, syntactic, phonetic, and rhythmic, among others‖ (BRITTO 2002, 54). Therefore 
his objective is to ―sketch out a methodology for the evaluation of poetic translations, which 
requires a systematic examination of the different levels of language involved in the poem‖ 
(idem). Given the paramount importance of the concept of ―correspondence‖ in his 
methodology, the Brazilian translator explains that he must first define it ―with some degree 
of precision‖ (idem). 
In order to do so, Britto takes the poetic feature metre. In summary, what he does is 
propose ―levels of correspondence‖ between the English iambic pentameter (―with a pyrrhic 
substitution in the fourth foot and a spondaic substitution in the fifth‖ – idem, 55) and a 
Portuguese metric structure. On the first and strongest ―level of correspondence‖ we have ―an 
identical sequence of stressed and unstressed syllables in Portuguese‖ (idem, 56). On the 
second and thus looser level of correspondence, the English iambic pentameter ―corresponds‖ 
to the Portuguese iambic decasyllable. In other words, the English and Portuguese lines ―have 
                                                             
134 This text was also originally a conference, delivered in Portuguese at the seminar As Margens da Tradução, 
at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro in 2001, and published a year later in a homonymous collection of 
papers. However, as most other papers in this section, this one was available in English (translated by the author 
himself) on Britto‘s webpage (please refer to footnote 118 above).   
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the same length and the same general stress pattern, but there is no exact one-to-one 
correspondence between the syllables of the two lines‖ (idem). Next, on the third level of 
correspondence the only feature that remains the same is the number of syllables, with the 
English pentameter corresponding to the Portuguese decasyllable. Finally, the fourth level of 
correspondence is a generalisation, i.e. a long line in English corresponds to a long line in 
Portuguese. 
Based upon these ―levels of correspondence‖, Britto then defines the second most 
important principle in his methodology, namely the concept of ―loss‖ (idem – his emphasis): 
―the weaker the sense in which ‗correspondence‘ is taken in a given translation – that is, the 
higher the level of generality on which it operates – the greater the loss‖. Unfortunately the 
Brazilian theorist does not explain how one such scheme would apply to what he calls the 
―semantic‖ or ―phonetic level‖ (see above), for example, and simply states that ―the same 
reasoning can be applied to other formal elements‖ (idem, 57).  
Having defined the two pillars of his model, ―levels of correspondence‖ and ―loss‖, 
Britto proceeds to the analysis of Bishop‘s ‗Shampoo‘, trying to identify which elements – 
amongst rhyme pattern, metre, rhythmic structure and alliterations – seem more prominent. In 
his view, ―when we translate a poem, we should attempt to reproduce those elements that are 
most regular in the original, since they are likely to be more conspicuous in the source 
language‖ (idem, 59). In the poem in question, the rhyme scheme, together with a ―clearly 
(...) calculated‖ passage in the second stanza (idem), strikes him as the most conspicuous 
features, and this is what he has in mind when carrying out his translation. 
After presenting his translation, he finally begins the ―evaluation of poetic 
translation‖, as the title of the article suggests. One by one, he looks into rhyme, metre, etc., 
and compares it to the original, striving to numerically establish the level of correspondence 
he achieved. Up until this point – more than half way through the paper – he does not account 
for possible language differences that would make such a strict notion of one-to-one 
correspondence not only impossible, but also frequently undesirable. However, when he gets 
to metre, he does mention that even though it was not a regular feature in the original poem, 
he tried to ―reproduce‖ the distribution of short and long lines. And then he quickly remarks 
that ―Portuguese words ten[d] to be longer than English words‖ (idem, 62), which results in 
the lines in his poem being longer than the ones in the original poem. Despite this ―shift‖, he 
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does not account for the level of correspondence achieved in this case: ―strict 
correspondence‖ would mean to have the exact same number of syllables both in original and 
translation even when one of the languages contains longer words and a longer sentence-
pattern? Or would that sort of adaptation to the nature of the languages in question count as 
―level one correspondence‖?  
Unfortunately, Britto does not elaborate much on these questions and moves on to the 
alliterations, when he admits that ―this is one case where the sort of analysis I propose runs 
into difficulties: when the poetic resource in the source language does not exist, or exists in 
quite a different form, or is much less prominent, in the target language‖ (idem). Here he 
explains that the use of alliteration is far more abundant in English than in Portuguese, and 
that in the poem in question, the distribution of alliteration is not at all regular. He is 
nonetheless quite surprised to find that ―there is an abundance of sibilants in the first three 
lines of the first stanza of the translation, much as in the original‖ (idem), and goes on to 
admit that ―this result (...) is a product either of chance or of the translator‘s unconscious‖ 
(idem). Concluding this issue Britto asserts that ―this may perhaps be taken as a sort of 
compensation for the losses on other levels, an effect created in Portuguese to make up for 
those in the original which could not be reproduced‖ (idem). I will address these various 
issues below, at the end of the presentation of this paper.  
Relying on a traditional form-content structure, Britto proceeds to the analysis of the 
content but warns the reader that, due to space constraints, he will only examine the first three 
verses of the poem, as well as one particularly important verse in the second stanza. He 
begins his content analysis by asserting that ―the first level of correspondence, a literal 
translation, is rarely possible in poetic translation‖. Once again it is not clear whether he 
means that this first level does not exist and must therefore be substituted by something else, 
or whether ideally literal translations should be used where possible. His analysis, though, 
indicates that literal translations should indeed be used where possible, as he proudly 
comments that in the first verses ―The rate of correspondence is relatively high: only the 
translation of ‗spreading‘ and ‗engordam‘ cannot be said to be literal‖ (idem, 63). As for the 
particularly prominent verse in the second stanza, where two long Latinate terms contrast 
with everyday, Anglo-Saxon vocabulary, Britto concedes that for obvious reasons one-to-one 
correspondence is simply impossible in this case, and then moves on to present other 
possibilities, lower in the correspondence hierarchy. 
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In his conclusion, he claims that before examining the ―degree of loss‖ between 
original and translation, one must first ask three questions, as follows: ―how relevant is the 
feature in the original?‖, ―is the maximum degree of correspondence feasible?‖, and ―how 
desirable is an exact match?‖ (idem, 66). Indeed, this attitude is precisely what I would like to 
discuss in Britto‘s model – an attitude that resembles those of his predecessors, particularly 
Mounin and Newmark (see Part I, Chapter 5 above). The answer to these questions will 
depend on a number of factors, three of which being the languages in question, the purpose of 
the translation and the way the translator interprets the text, i.e. which elements strike him/her 
as prominent and which do not. These factors, in turn, are inevitably intertwined and greatly 
depend on the interpretive community to which the translator belongs. In any case, not only 
are these three points highly specific, varying from text to text, context to context, translation 
brief to translation brief, translator to translator, and so on and so forth, but they are also 
subjective, meaning that no mathematical formulae or absolute levels of correspondence 
apply. And yet, despite his resemblance to Mounin or Newmark, for instance, he closes his 
paper on a cheerful note: 
I have presented here no more than a preliminary sketch of a method; many details 
remain to be spelled out. Still, I believe that my proposal amounts to a promising way to 
arrive at less subjectivistic forms of evaluating poetic translation, relying on more 
objective data and making it possible to quantify value-judgements expressed through 
such concepts as ―correspondence‖ and ―loss‖ (idem – his emphasis).                      
I will comment on Britto‘s conclusions at the end of the present section. 
At any rate, in the same paper, Britto makes reference to a very short newspaper 
article that is in fact a translation critique. The article is called ‗Uma Forma Humilde‘ (A 
Humble Form) and was originally published in Portuguese in Jornal de Resenhas no. 60, in 
Folha de São Paulo (11
th
 March 2000) as a review of Paulo Vizioli‘s135 translation of Oscar 
Wilde‘s The Ballad of the Reading Gaol. Most newspaper reviews of translations consist of 
lists of ―mistakes‖ (that is, if they mention the translation at all), and Britto‘s certainly is an 
exception as he actually compliments aspects of Vizioli‘s translation, as well as other 
translations done by him. According to Britto, ―Vizioli reproduces quite faithfully (…) formal 
features of the original: he even reproduces the internal rhymes that are sometimes to be 
                                                             
135
 Paulo Vizioli is the same translator whose translations of John Donne are the object of a paper by Arrojo 
(1993) and another one by Britto (2006b) – please refer to page 245 below, as well as to Section 2.3 in Part II 
and footnote 133 above.  
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heard between the second and the fourth beat of the four-foot lines‖ (BRITTO 2000, 7). The 
―mistake‖, however, seems to lie in Vizioli‘s choice of metre: 
But the stanza he uses – alexandrines alternating with hexasyllables – is simply not a 
standard form in Portuguese poetry, and certainly not in our popular poetry. And nothing 
could be more alien to the folksiness of the English ballad form than the general effect of 
Vizioli‘s ponderous lines, more strictly metered than the original (idem).    
 Britto believes that even though there is no ―close Portuguese equivalent‖ to the 
English form chosen by Wilde (in this case Vizioli‘s choice being the closest possible), there 
are ―better solutions‖ in Brazilian Portuguese. Nevertheless, although these ―better solutions‖ 
are ―formally not equivalent to the English ballad, [they] may be said to correspond to it 
functionally‖ (idem). Moreover, adopting one of Britto‘s ―better solutions‖ would ―force the 
translation to take daring liberties (...). But such a translation, though less faithful to the letter 
of the original, would certainly be closer to its spirit‖ (idem). And in order to justify why 
Vizioli‘s choice is ―less than successful‖ and ―disappointing‖, Britto relies on the ―tone 
sought by Wilde‖, on the ―spirit‖ of the poem, as well as on the ―special meaning‖ the ballad 
obviously had to Wilde, given his circumstances. In Britto‘s opinion, choosing the ballad, the 
―humblest of all English poetic forms‖, was Wilde‘s way of dealing with his imprisonment 
and subsequent loss of reputation (idem).  
 As Britto himself remarks, Vizioli‘s choice of metre was the closest ―correspondent‖ 
in Brazilian Portuguese to the English ballad, thus achieving Britto‘s first ―level of 
correspondence‖ (please refer to BRITTO 2002 above). In this case, however, a third or even 
fourth level of correspondence would be more desirable than the first level, according to 
Britto. In other words, by looking at his model, one can contradictorily remark that a ―less 
faithful‖ translation is a ―better solution‖ than a ―more faithful‖ translation. Indeed, is this not 
the case of most translations in general? 
 The considerations made by Britto strike me as extremely relevant and pertinent. 
Though I have not studied Vizioli‘s translation carefully, I might even agree that a different 
choice of metre might have been an interesting decision. On the other hand, it is obvious that 
to Vizioli, creating a similar metric and rhyme scheme was far more important than adapting 
the metre to a more Brazilian form. Furthermore, as Britto himself points out, Vizioli is well-
known for his sophisticated, sometimes nearly ―literal‖ translations (see footnote 135 above). 
This is Vizioli‘s style and, like it or not, it has made him a successful, renowned translator. 
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From this point of view, it seems to me that a more ethical translation review should mention 
Vizioli‘s style and comment on how this translation is another instance of it. Suggesting a 
new metre should be absolutely no problem, but instead of justifying it for being closer to the 
―spirit‖ of the poem (did only Britto have exclusive access to this ―spirit‖?) or to ―the tone 
sought by Wilde‖, Britto could simply explain that he, personally, would have translated it 
differently, that he feels Wilde‘s life at the time influenced his choice of metre, that he 
interprets this choice as the most meaningful characteristic of the poem, and so on and so 
forth. I find these justifications – particularly coming from such an experienced translator and 
brilliant poet – far more plausible than saying that this is what Wilde ―meant‖ to say. Not to 
mention the fact that using Wilde‘s intentions and biography as justifications for translation 
decisions make Vizioli sound unfairly ill-informed, as though Britto had taken one look at the 
poem and had figured out what Wilde had meant to say, whereas Vizioli had simply been 
incapable of doing the same.      
 But let us now go back to that 2006 paper on the two Brazilian translations of 
Donne‘s ‗To His Mistress Going to Bed‘, ‗Fidelidade em Tradução Poética: O Caso 
Donne‘136 (BRITTO 2006b – refer to footnotes 133 and 135 above). This paper is actually at 
once a declared critique to another essay by Arrojo and a step further on his model of 
criticism of poetry translation. At the very beginning of the paper he announces that 
poststructuralist thought currently exerts a certain influence on the field of translation studies 
in Brazil, and then associates this perspective with what he calls contemporary scepticism in 
its most radical version (―versão contemporânea do ceticismo em sua versão mais radical‖ – 
BRITTO 2006b, 239). Largely based on Arrojo‘s abovementioned paper, Britto argues that 
this poststructuralist view holds that 
os textos não possuem significados estáveis que correspondam a intenções que seus 
autores tivessem (...); só temos acesso a nossas próprias leituras dos textos. Assim, 
quando dizemos que uma dada tradução é fiel ao original, estamos dizendo apenas que 
nossa leitura dessa tradução é fiel à nossa leitura do original; nada podemos afirmar 
sobre os textos em si. Entende-se, pois, que não haja consenso absoluto a respeito dos 
méritos relativos de duas traduções de um dado texto (...) (idem). 
texts do not possess stable meanings that correspond to their authors‘ intentions (…); all 
we have access to is our own reading. In this sense, when we say that a given translation 
is faithful to the original, all we are saying is that our reading of the translation is faithful 
to our reading of the original; we can say nothing about the texts themselves. One may 
                                                             
136 As this paper has not been translated by Britto yet, all translations presented here were done by me.  
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conclude, then, that there can be no consensus in terms of the relative merits of two 
translations of the same text (…).   
 Therefore in his view, poststructuralist thinkers would argue that translation criticism 
is pointless because it is always marked by the critic‘s personal perspectives, preferences, 
bias and subjectivity. Not satisfied with this conclusion, however, he draws a parallel 
between the Humanities and the Natural Sciences, claiming that if Arrojo‘s propositions are 
valid for translation studies, they should be equally valid for all other fields as well. He then 
mentions string theory
137
 as an example of an issue around which there is no consensus in the 
academic community but despite that is very much discussed and vehemently defended by a 
few members of these circles. Thus, his conclusion is that there is no reason why one should 
not apply rational arguments and a method of test and refutation of hypotheses to the 
comparative analysis of poems. In fact, poststructuralist objections aside, he contends that 
these so-called scientific methods can and should be employed in all fields of knowledge 
(idem, 141).        
 The Brazilian professor then turns to the translations of Donne‘s poem and announces 
right away that the vast majority of the translators and translation scholars he knows tend to 
favour Campos‘ translation over Vizioli‘s. In view of this fact, his main goal is to objectively 
and mathematically determine why one such preference exists by firstly carefully comparing 
each translation to Donne‘s original, and then the translations between themselves.  
Before he sets out to analyse all three poems, nonetheless, he anticipates again the so-
called poststructuralist answer to the question of why there tends to be a preference for 
Campos‘ translation. He sarcastically speaks of Fish‘s ―interpretive communities‖ (refer to 
3.1 above) and says that Campos probably reflected the values and tacit rules of his 
community more successfully than Vizioli did, hence more members of the community 
identify with Campos‘ style than with Vizioli‘s. He speaks of cheap Foucauldianism 
(―foucaultianismo vulgar‖ – idem) to justify why Campos might have more disciples, more 
institutional power than Vizioli (idem). Finally he asks, rather ironically, ―Não seria possível 
arriscar a hipótese de que o respeito que ele [Campos] goza entre os tradutores de poesia se 
deva a características de seu trabalho de tradutor, características essas que podemos 
                                                             
137
 For more on this, Britto recommends the reading of Jim Holt‘s 2006 paper entitled ‗Unstrung‘, published in 
The New Yorker (2nd October 2006) and available at http://www.newyorker.com/printables 
/critics/061002crat_atlarge (last accessed in April 2006).   
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depreender através da análise de suas traduções?‖, or could we not perhaps consider the 
hypothesis that Campos may enjoy a certain status amongst poetry translators because of 
characteristics of his work as a translator, which we can derive from the analysis of his 
translations? (idem).              
 In the following pages, the Brazilian professor presents both translations side by side 
with the original, using different symbols (boldface, italics, underline) to mark the following 
features: (i) words in the original that do not seem to have been transposed in the translation 
(omissions), (ii) passages whose meaning has been altered significantly, and (iii) words and 
expressions that have absolutely no correspondent in the original (additions) (idem, 144). 
Verse by verse, Britto carefully and meticulously examines both poems in terms of form and 
content, often choosing which translator handled which situation better, numerically keeping 
track of gains and losses.  
Unsurprisingly, at the end of his analysis he comes to the conclusion that Campos‘ 
translation can be mathematically proven to be superior to Vizioli‘s. A key factor appears to 
have greatly influenced Britto‘s judgment, namely the translators‘ choice of metre. Donne 
used heroic couplets in his poem, whose closest equivalent in Portuguese would be the so-
called decasyllables – since both contain 10 syllables. Campos did opt for the decasyllables; 
Vizioli, in contrast, chose to use dodecasyllables, which is perceived by Britto as a legitimate 
strategy because Portuguese word and sentence patterns tend be longer in comparison to 
English. In this light, choosing a lengthier verse pattern should allow Vizioli to avoid 
omissions in his translation, whereas Campos might have trouble conveying all ideas present 
in the original with a shorter choice of metre. In reality, however, Britto found that both 
translations contain a similar number of omissions (13 in Vizioli‘s and 15 in Campos‘), and 
that the number of additions is more than seven times as high in Vizioli‘s (15) as it is in 
Campos‘ translation (two). 
 In his conclusion, Britto admits that there may be readers who disagree with specific 
steps of his analysis, whose opinions may vary as far as particular aspects of his method are 
concerned – such as ―I would not consider this to be an omission‖ or ―this does not strike me 
as a significant meaning alteration‖, etc. Despite this, however, he argues that just because 
there can be no absolute consensus on something, it does not mean that absolute dissension 
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should automatically ensue (idem, 52). As far as criticism of poetry translation is concerned, 
Britto argues that (idem) 
é possível utilizar o discurso racional para fazer avaliações e tecer considerações em 
torno de traduções, fazendo referência a certas propriedades dos textos traduzidos com 
relação às quais há um certo grau de acordo entre um bom número de pessoas 
envolvidas na atividade de traduzir. Dadas duas traduções de um mesmo texto, A e B, 
cotejem-se A e B com o original e uma com a outra, linha a linha, sílaba a sílaba, 
examinando e pesando as diferenças, para se chegar a uma conclusão baseada em fatos 
(...). 
it is possible to use rational discourse to assess the quality of translations, making 
reference to particular textual properties about which there is a high level of agreement 
amongst translation specialists. Faced with two translations, A and B, of the same text, 
one can compare them to the original and then to each other – line by line, syllable by 
syllable, pondering the differences – so as to reach a conclusion based on facts (…).        
Britto then once again praises the scientific method – with its falsifiable hypotheses, careful 
data analysis and formulation of rational arguments – as the most suited method both for the 
Natural Sciences and the Humanities; he goes even further and suggests that this is the only 
way one can build knowledge – ―É assim Ŕ e só assim Ŕ que se constrói o conhecimento‖ 
(idem – my emphasis).  
 As in the previous papers analysed in this chapter so far, Britto‘s objections to 
poststructuralist thought on translation appear to arise mostly from the two aspects repeatedly 
mentioned here, i.e. his keenness on theories that are useful as far as practice is concerned, 
and his expectation of so-called poststructuralist perspectives to be radical. These two 
elements mark his attempts to write translation theory as well, as it is quite evident that his 
utmost concern is to systematise translation practice – very much in line with his standpoint 
as a literary translator. From this point of view, poststructuralist thought has very little to 
contribute, as it is very rightly not deemed useful by Britto. These questions have come up a 
few times so far and will still be very much present in the two final papers that compose this 
chapter. I will return to them at the end of the chapter, as well as in Part IV below.    
In another 2006 paper, called ‗Correspondências Estruturais em Tradução Poética‘138 
(or Structural Correspondence in Poetic Translation), Britto revisits the topic of poetic 
translation criticism. Once again he opens his paper by asking how one can determine 
                                                             
138 Unfortunately the translated version of this article is not available on Britto‘s webpage, so I will translate the 
Portuguese quotations into English myself.  
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whether the formal elements of an original poem and those of its translation correspond to 
one another (BRITTO 2006a, 53). He takes it for granted that the reader is acquainted with 
his 2002 paper on the same topic, and adds that he intends to particularly investigate how this 
―poetic transposition‖ takes place when the elements in question are not a part of the 
―conventional repertoire‖ of formal resources of a given language, but rather are specific to a 
certain poet or poem (idem).  
 Once again he takes a poem by Elizabeth Bishop (‗Cirque dřHiver‘139) as his object of 
study, together with his own translation of it, and carries out a typically linguistic analysis of 
original poem and translation, dividing the texts into form and content. As in his 2002 paper, 
the Brazilian translator establishes which elements appear to stand out in the original poem, 
and then sets out to skilfully recreate them in his translation. Indeed, his conclusions go back 
to this initial objective (idem, 64 – his emphasis): 
ao trabalhar com um poema que utiliza uma forma regular ad hoc, é necessário antes de 
mais nada fazer uma avaliação dos diferentes recursos formais em jogo e de sua inter-
relação com os aspectos semânticos. Como é impossível recriar em outro idioma de 
modo exaustivo todas as características de forma e significado de um poema, essa 
análise detalhada servirá para que se possa determinar quais elementos devem ser 
reproduzidos da maneira mais fiel possível, por serem os mais importantes.  
when working on a poem with an ad hoc regular form, one must first and foremost 
examine the different poetic resources in question, as well as the relationship they bear to 
the semantic aspects. Since exhaustively recreating all and every aspect of the form and 
content of a poem is impossible, this detailed analysis shall help to determine which 
elements are the most important ones and hence must be translated as faithfully as 
possible.    
As for the feasibility of this task, he concedes that ―naturalmente, nem mesmo essa meta mais 
modesta será atingida por completo (...). Em tradução, temos sempre de nos contentar em 
atingir apenas em parte a meta almejada‖ or of course not even this very humble objective 
can be completely fulfilled (...). In translation, only partially fulfilling the desired objective is 
already enough (idem).  
 Despite his careful, detailed analysis and interesting translation, Britto does not take 
the discussion much further than he did in his 2002 paper. He seems to run into the same 
difficulties by saying that the ―most important‖ features of a poem must be translated 
―faithfully‖ (see indented quotation above). As already pointed out previously, what is 
                                                             
139 As in BRITTO (2002), the analysis of this poem and its translation can be found in the Appendix.    
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perceived as ―most important‖ by some may be perceived as less important by others. 
Moreover, as Britto himself admits, strict faithfulness is mostly not desirable in poetry 
translation (nor is it in translation in general, for that matter), so what does ―as faithful as 
possible‖ mean exactly? As in the previous papers, his analysis appears to indicate that 
―faithful‖ means ―literal‖; nevertheless, there are cases in which a lower ―level of 
correspondence‖ is more effective than ―level one correspondence‖ (see BRITTO 2002). So 
what is ―faithful‖ after all? 
 It is precisely the notion of ―faithfulness‖ or ―fidelity‖ that Britto discusses in yet 
another paper, entitled ‗A Tradução para o Português do Metro de Balada Inglês‘ (2008140) 
or The Brazilian Portuguese Translation of the English Ballad. In this text he completely 
disregards his model based on ―levels of correspondence‖ and ―gains and losses‖ (see 
BRITTO 2002) and simply shows, in a very direct and absorbing way, how strict levels of 
correspondence are often not desirable when it comes to poetic translation.  
 The object of this paper is once again the English ballad (see BRITTO 2000), this 
time in a poem by Emily Dickinson. He starts the paper by addressing the concept of 
―fidelity‖ (BRITTO 2008, 25 – his emphasis): 
Em tradução de poesia, o desejo de ser fiel à forma do original pode nos levar a adotar 
soluções insatisfatórias. Muitas vezes a noção de fidelidade não deve ser entendida como 
reprodução de uma forma poética de um idioma num outro, não só porque nem sempre 
tal coisa é possível, mas também porque o significado de uma determinada forma no 
idioma de origem pode não ser o mesmo no idioma para o qual se está traduzindo.  
When it comes to translating poetry, trying to remain faithful to the form of the original 
text may lead to unsatisfactory solutions. The notion of fidelity must not be understood 
as the mere reproduction of the poetic form of one language into another language, not 
only because this is not always possible, but also because the meaning of a particular 
structure in the original language may differ from that of the target language. 
Britto goes on to thoroughly analyse first the structure of the English ballad and then the way 
Dickinson used it in her poem. He later turns to the translation by asking the following key 
question: ―o que devemos fazer ao traduzir um poema em metro de balada se quisermos ser 
fiéis à forma do original?‖, or when translating a ballad, what should one do in order to 
remain faithful to the form of the original text? (idem, 27). The first answer that springs to 
mind, Britto says, is to find the ―closest formal equivalent‖ possible in the target language 
                                                             
140 The translation of this particular paper is also not available on Paulo Britto‘s personal webpage, so all 
translations here were done by me.  
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(idem), in this case 6 and 8-syllable verses. But as the Brazilian writer very aptly points out, a 
poem with 6 and 8-syllable verses would not strike a Portuguese-speaking reader as a typical 
poetic form, unlike the English ballad, which in turn would immediately be recognised as a 
typical poetic form. Britto‘s way out of the dilemma is the following: one should look for a 
typical poetic form in Portuguese that, though not strictly equivalent to the English ballad, 
evokes similar meanings. For him, ballads are a symbol of simplicity and spontaneity, a 
poetic form that contrasts with the complexity normally associated with poetry. In this case 
specifically, Britto sets out to translate a ballad by Dickinson (J870
141
) whose main 
characteristic, from his point of view, is precisely the contrast between form and content. 
According to him this is the main feature he has in mind when writing his translation.  
  Britto concludes his paper by saying that even though he identified a number of 
―losses‖ comparing original and translation, he is satisfied with the form he has chosen (idem, 
32). He also quite rightly points out that other poetic forms – including the option with 6 and 
8-syllable verses – might have worked well, too. What he means to emphasise, however, is 
the fact that there may be functional correspondence between poetic forms that are not strictly 
analogous in terms of structure (―pode haver correspondência funcional entre formas 
poéticas que não sejam estritamente análogas do ponto de vista estrutural‖ – idem). 
*** 
 This last section about Britto‘s works on literary criticism unveils a rather 
contradictory model of poetry translation and criticism of poetry translation. While on the one 
hand his considerations on the work (mostly his work) of the literary translator are highly 
interesting and enlightening, bringing numerous contributions that could only be made by 
someone as experienced as he is, on the other hand his attempts to formalise such knowledge 
and experience into formulae and rigid precepts is not without its difficulties. The voice that 
appears to stand out, particularly in the papers of this last section, is the voice of the poet and 
translator, and not that of the academic.  
 In these papers one can clearly see the combination of the two factors surrounding the 
concepts of theory and practice analysed in Part I above, namely a predominantly essentialist 
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 Britto uses Thomas H. Johnson‘s numbering system. In his paper, the Brazilian translator presents original 
and translation side-by-side in a table, where a number of poetic features are analysed. This table is available in 
the Appendix below.    
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tendency and a practice-oriented standpoint. And both these factors are revealed mostly 
through his choice of method, very much in line with the so-called traditional sciences. The 
use of mathematical language and inflexible rules lends an air of ―science‖ to his reflections, 
and so does the exclusively practice-oriented character, the ―utilitarian purpose‖ (see Chapter 
2, Part I above) of these same reflections. His works analysed here seem to distinctly convey 
his aspirations as an academic-practitioner: Britto strives to scrutinise and systematise his 
own practice as a translator so as to devise general rules with a view to helping other 
translators and translation teachers to do their jobs more easily, more efficiently. In this light, 
and remembering the allegory Britto so often mentions in his talks (see Chapter 4, Part I 
above), all he wants is to get home, and he certainly does his utmost to help others to get 
home, too.  
 Surely if Britto were to compile all these papers into one work, one model of criticism 
of poetry translation, he would very competently flesh out many of the issues that here, in 
these papers, appear to only have had their surfaces scratched. In this sense, perhaps what 
comes across as inadvertent incoherences – such as the issue of whether one should seek 
level one correspondence or not – may be nothing but a matter of formulation, of clearer 
writing. In addition to that, he may have come to regret a few of these theoretical propositions 
made in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which is perfectly natural and healthy. But still it is 
important to point out that the expectations of the reader faced with one such model, one such 
theory that promises to systematise poetry translation are indeed quite high. As numerous 
voices to which we listened in Part I above exemplified, many of Britto‘s readers would be 
eager for watertight, clear-cut categories and absolute rules, and hence they would not 
tolerate the smallest incoherence or illogicality. As addressed in Part I time and again, they 
would envision the perfect marriage of theory and practice – as Britto seems to do as well. 
Any flaw in this direct application of theory to practice and their divorce would immediately 
follow, feeding back the vicious circle of ―theory hope‖, as well as the ―suspicious feeling‖ 
(see Part I, Chapter 3 above) many practitioners and students are said to have as far as 
translation theory is concerned.   
 Going back to the expectations sketched at the end of Chapter 2 above in terms of 
Britto‘s standpoint and his interests and motivations in relation to translation theory, one can 
say that these expectations were indeed pertinent, at least to a certain extent. Britto‘s 
academic papers do convey a sense of ―utilitarian purpose‖ (see above), of direct applicability 
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to translation practice, very much in line with his own work as a practitioner and translation 
professor. His keenness on linguistics is also quite noticeable in his papers, not only because 
of his predominantly scientific, rigorous methods and aspirations, but also in view of the 
countless typical linguistic categories of which he makes use with no further questioning or 
criticism – such as ―semantic level‖, ―phonetic level‖, ―form‖, ―content‖, and so on and so 
forth. And it is also through his scientific method and his interest in linguistics that his 
essentialist tendencies are revealed, his ambitions to bring subjectivity and abstractedness to 
an end as far as poetry translation is concerned. His attempt, it seems, is indeed to make jobs 
like his – translating, criticising translations, teaching translation, correcting translations, 
devising translation exercises, etc. – easier, more systematised, objective and automatic.  
 On the other hand, his eagerness to dialogue with thinkers like Arrojo, Fish and 
Foucault (see above), for example, appears to denote a different kind of interest, at least in a 
very incipient fashion. Unlike him, these thinkers do not tend to have practice-oriented issues 
as their top preoccupations, and their notion of theory seems more in line with that notion, 
repeatedly discussed in Part I above, of a stimulus for reflection with no direct practical 
purpose in mind. It is true that he then criticises or discards some these thinkers‘ ideas 
precisely for their lack of usefulness as far as practice is concerned but, from my point of 
view, it is in these moments of philosophical debate and confrontation that Britto‘s voice as 
an academic speaks the loudest and contributes the most.  
 In the next and final part of this thesis, I will discuss the validity and the place of 
theories such as Britto‘s within the field of translation studies. Additionally I will address 
some of the questions raised in the present chapter, as follows: (i) to what extent the 
usefulness Britto repeatedly advocates when criticising theories is sound, (ii) to what extent 
his determined defence of certain concepts as fictions (such as equivalence, author‘s 
intentions, loss, etc.,) is ethical in translation studies, (iii) why scholars like Britto (and 
others, as addressed under 3 in Part I and 2 in Part II above) expect fierce radicalism of 
poststructuralist theories, immediately discarding them on these grounds, and (iv) to what 
extent the methods of the Natural Sciences are suited to the Humanities, to translation studies 
(a question raised in Part I above as well).         
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PART IV: CLOSING REMARKS TO AN OPEN DEBATE 
_____________________________________________________ 
You see, pure unity or pure multiplicity (…) is a 
synonym of death.  
    Jacques Derrida 
So far innumerable crucial issues have arisen in the present thesis, issues that do not solely 
concern translation studies in Brazil, but rather affect our basic notions of theory, practice, 
higher education, professionalism and research. Not to mention so many other, more specific 
issues surrounding the nature and impact of poststructuralist thought in the Humanities, along 
with the contours of translation studies as a discipline, its institutionalisation and its methods. 
As I hope it has been made clear thus far, I have no pretensions to providing universally 
applicable answers to the questions asked in Parts I, II and III above, nor do I intend to 
promote the reconciliation of the antagonistic sides involved in the various debates that I 
propose here. In fact, by bringing these issues up again and commenting on them I will 
somewhat contribute to the already patent heterogeneity that appears to prevail in this thesis.  
Looking back at the previous pages I know that all the issues I should address here are 
intertwined to such an extent that I can hardly imagine them separately. For this reason, I ask 
for the readers‘ understanding as regards the structure of the present part – a structure that, 
like translation, seems to obstinately resist systematisation. Four chapters will make up Part 
IV, as follows. Chapter 1 will be devoted to a few analogies and anecdotes – some already 
mentioned, others new – that illustrate particularly the following questions: what makes 
translators professional and what is the role of higher education. The reflections carried out in 
this first chapter will also brush on the subject of the aim and contours of translat ion theory, 
an issue that will nevertheless be addressed at length in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 2 will be dedicated to poststructuralist thought and deconstruction. The 
objective is to try and clarify three main common misconceptions surrounding these 
poststructuralist tendencies, namely that they are (i) overly radical and (ii) pessimistic, and 
that (iii) they make way for people to indulge in random, inexplicable behaviour under the 
pretext of their subjectivity, unconscious or whatever they might fancy mentioning. As it will 
be made clear, beneath these misconceptions is a strong unwillingness to give in to, but 
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mostly a profound ignorance of, poststructuralist thought. In this sense, the chapter will also 
address some of the criticism – in my view often unjustified – of which these perspectives 
have been the target.          
Next, Chapter 3 will approach translation studies more specifically, discussing, 
amongst other things, the issue of its institutionalisation both as it happened in Europe and as 
it might happen in Brazil; the question of interdisciplinarity in translation studies; whether 
there should be clear ―utilitarian purposes‖ in translation studies, i.e. whether research should 
be exclusively applied and theory should be useful; as well as the issue of the methods of the 
Natural Sciences and their applicability to translation studies. This chapter will also address 
some of Britto‘s claims in terms of his attack to poststructuralist tendencies for their lack of 
usefulness, and in terms of his defence of certain concepts (such as equivalence and author‘s 
intentions) as necessary fictions.  
Finally, in Chapter 4 I will investigate the impact of poststructuralist thought in 
translation studies and the future of translation studies. Here, the notion of the ―savage horde‖ 
proposed by Freud (see Section 2.3, Part II above) will be crucial. Are we, in translation 
studies, a savage horde, too? And if so, should we ideally eventually reach homogeneity and 
unanimity? This will be the leitmotif of the chapter, exploring the issue of global, universal 
translation theories and the wish for reconciliation. Accordingly, in this chapter I will address 
the question of whether the negligible impact of poststructuralist tendencies in translation 
studies should remain negligible.  
The main goal of Part IV is to show how all these issues are interrelated and, to a 
certain extent, inseparable. Additionally, I intend to stimulate reflection and contribute to the 
various debates that have been the subject of so many academic events and publications in 
translation studies (but not exclusively) in the past few years. As already stated above, I do 
not intend to arrive at definite answers; at best, I hope that I can inspire the reader to 
reformulate certain questions, or at least see the same questions in a different light.  
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1. Translation, Higher Education, Professionalism: Analogies and Anecdotes 
_____________________________________________________ 
Our language, even if we are pleased to speak it, has 
already substituted too many articulations for too many 
accents, it has lost life and warmth, it is already eaten 
by writing. Its accentuated features have been gnawed 
through by consonants. 
       Jacques Derrida (translated by Gayatri C. Spivak)  
Chapter 4 in Part I above opened with that forest analogy proposed by Britto (see Part III 
above). This analogy illustrated the question of standpoints, i.e. whether one wants go get 
home as quickly as possible, or whether one is speaking of one‘s understanding and 
perception of the world. It would be impossible to argue in favour of the former or the latter; 
the point is simply that they are different, circumscribing utterly disparate, irreconcilable 
standpoints – at least momentarily. The question is what higher education should be about – 
or, formulated in narrower terms, what should be the point of translator and interpreter 
training, what makes translators and interpreters professional. And here another analogy, this 
time proposed by Wagner in the aforementioned Can Theory Help Translators? 
(CHESTERMAN and WAGNER 2002, 4-5), comes in handy. 
 Wagner uses an interesting analogy about the training of medical students to address 
the question of translator training – which, in her view, should be practice-oriented, primarily 
fulfilling the needs of the market. She explains that a doctor, faced with a malaria epidemic, 
must be able to rapidly and efficiently diagnose the disease and treat it successfully. For her, 
relying solely on ―probabilistic laws‖ and the ―observation and imitation of what other 
professionals do‖ would not suffice (idem, 4). Instead, this doctor should have proper 
prescriptive training, whereby s/he is taught to apply the techniques and strategies devised by 
his/her predecessors. Wagner goes further and says that 
How can we translators lay claim to professional status, and assert ourselves as 
professional and not charlatans, if our research scientists fight shy of real-world problems 
and the advice that would help us to solve them? There seem to be no clear guidelines on 
how to select people for translator training, how to assess a translation, how to specify the 
purpose of a translation, how to measure and thus ensure reader satisfaction (idem). 
 But what Wagner seems to forget is that someone must first devise diagnostic 
strategies and a treatment to diseases like malaria. Someone must be able to do research and 
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think beyond existing methods for medicine to break new grounds. Someone needs to be able 
to then teach incoming doctors and stimulate them to go further than their precursors have 
managed to. If doctors were trained merely to mechanically apply what their predecessors 
achieved in the past, who would be able to develop new treatments or improve current 
techniques?  
 But more importantly than that, let us consider in the indented quotation above the 
underlying notion of language and translation implied by Wagner‘s medicine allegory, as 
well as the feasibility of her demands. Wagner appears to believe that going about translating 
a text or treating a patient is somewhat analogous. Like doctors that should immediately be 
able to tell what illness is afflicting a patient and what treatment will be most effective, 
translators should be able to look at texts and determine the most adequate translation. One 
such skill and awareness should come initially from training: doctors learn about the typical 
symptoms of a disease together with the most effective treatments available. If they find an 
infection, for instance, caused by particular bacteria, they will know that a certain type of 
antibiotics will probably inhibit the growth and hopefully even destroy those bacteria. 
Similarly, translators should be able to deal with languages in the same objective and 
scientific fashion: faced with a particular text, a particular group of words, they should know 
what group of words in the target language best corresponds to it. Indeed, they should have 
been given ―clear guidelines‖ to ―assess a translation‖, to ―specify the purpose of a 
translation‖ and to ―measure and thus ensure reader satisfaction‖ (see above) just like doctors 
have ―clear guidelines‖ to ―assess‖ clinical states and ―ensure‖ healing.   
 Well, but if the objectivity of medicine is already highly questionable, are Wagner‘s 
expectations as regards language and translation not too farfetched? We all know only too 
well that curing ailments is far from purely objective. We go to numerous doctors until we 
feel that we agree with how they propose to go about treating us. Faced with the same 
symptoms, the same test results and the same complaints, doctors manage to come up with 
different opinions and suggest different treatments. So much for the strict objectivity of their 
training. Also, we all know only too well that medicine will work differently in different 
patients or even in the same patients in different moments of their lives. Some might 
experience side effects, others might feel no improvement at all, others might even develop 
additional problems as a result of the treatment. It all depends on an endless series of factors 
– some of which are quite palpable, like age, weight, eating habits; others, in contrast, remain 
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in the mysterious realms of abstractedness and subjectivity, such as moods, feelings, one‘s 
outlook on the treatment, along with several others that we probably lack words to name. And 
this is without going into placebo research or alternative medicine at all and sticking to 
allopathy. 
 I have not heard of many cases of patients who had such a matter-of-fact experience 
treating health problems as Wagner suggests in her analogy. There is always personal history 
in the way, always individual empathies and antipathies, always unforeseeable effects and 
strange developments. However much we may want to believe that medicine is flawless and 
purely objective, I highly doubt that Wagner herself does not have her own anecdotes to tell 
about how illusory these beliefs are. But let us go back to translation studies. Why should we 
expect it to be able to function in a strictly objective manner? Why should we hope translator 
training to fulfil all and every market need? If, like doctors, translators will face highly 
changeable settings constantly subject to external influences and personal preferences, how 
can we expect their training to prepare them to mechanically deal with every single possible 
text or situation that might come up? 
 Frankly speaking, these objectivity aspirations on the part of Wagner (and numerous 
others involved with translation) entail a strong ―theory hope‖, and this hope is unrealistic 
and harmful. As mentioned time and again in this thesis, ―theory hope‖ drives people to 
believe in a kind of ascetic pre-babelic state (as Arrojo would argue), where languages and 
meanings are exact and constant, and human beings are capable of full detachment from the 
world around them. As these ambitions do not in the least bit ―match‖ reality, these ―hopers‖ 
are stimulated to hope further, regarding their ―current‖ state of chaos and ―probabilistic 
laws‖ (see above) with contempt and envisaging a brighter, more disciplined future. And 
―theory hope‖ is certainly present in different areas, too. Let us not forget the much sought-
after correlation between wave and particle in physics, for example – the dream of a unified 
theory of matter and energy that would transcend Heisenberg‘s uncertainty principle. It is just 
that translation, because of its peculiar nature, tends to lay bare in a more obvious way the 
discrepancies between its ―reality‖ and these scientistic hopes.  
 Of course translator/interpreter training and translation theory should not completely 
disregard the market; of course translation strategies and other so-called practice-oriented 
methods should be a part of the curricula of translation courses (see Chapter 3 below). 
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However, we must first acknowledge the limited and narrow character of these strategies and 
methods, so that we do not expect them to be able to comprehend every single aspect of the 
profession, both in the present and in the future, everywhere in the world. In other words, 
beyond the possibilities they open, all strategies and methods have limitations. Of course they 
can be applied in many situations, but cannot be taken as universal and infallible. Faced with 
a highly changeable scenario, translators had far better work on their awareness of the 
environment surrounding them than on minute (but not ―probabilistic‖) laws and strategies to 
be applied to a particular text in a particular situation.  
 And here the question of the purpose of higher education enters the scene again (refer 
to Chapter 2 in Part I above). It seems to me that any professional had better invest in a 
broader understanding of his/her area, its history, the values that inform it and its relationship 
with cognate areas. This kind of knowledge appears to be more fitting to equip pupils with 
the tools that they need to perform their jobs with autonomy and to help to carve the contours 
of their jobs in the future. So let us to go back to Aristotle and rethink the whole idea of an 
education. Should we be taught to do or to think? Well, I suppose both, though it seems easier 
to me, at least from my experience, to come up with actions and strategies based on 
awareness and reflection, than to depart from mechanical actions and achieve greater 
awareness. I am convinced that those taught how to think will probably be more versatile, 
autonomous and enterprising when it comes to performing a job than those taught to 
objectively apply strategies to mock situations without much reflection. It is like in Britto‘s 
forest analogy: I am sure that those who would advocate the illusory character of cardinal 
points know how to use them to their benefit; on the other hand, I am not sure whether those 
who strictly want to get home have ever stopped to think about the construed nature of 
cardinal points.      
 Let us remember the example of self-taught translator Vera Pereira quoted in Chapter 
3 in Part I above. She claims not to be able to tell which of two translations of the same text is 
the correct one, and she reluctantly feels suspicious of the authority of the original author 
who, in her view, sometimes suggests translations that are inadequate. Having received no 
training whatsoever, she does not claim to miss objective strategies – like Wagner – but 
rather the understanding of her role in society, of how language and translations work, and of 
the role of the original author. In this case, translator training should be able to provide her 
with awareness of these issues, with a source of reflection. This broader outlook on her job 
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and area is what would make her a professional translator in the full sense of the term. And 
let me emphasise here that this awareness is not restricted to knowledge of translation 
strategies; this awareness would most likely not even affect the way she actually translates as 
it is not supposed to be useful in practical terms.  
 Vera Pereira can be perceived – to use yet another allegory – as a competent musician 
who has never learnt music theory. She can read music and perform beautifully, but she does 
not understand the relationship between the tones and chords she plays. She probably 
memorised them individually and learnt how to use them, but she does not know how they 
are formed, where they come from, how they work. Studying theory now would probably not 
have any impact whatsoever on her playing, for she plays well as it is, she is experienced. 
What it would do is enhance her understanding of her practice, her awareness of what she 
does. 
 Let us remember another medical analogy, this time proposed by Mona Baker (see 
Chapter 5 in Part I above). She very rightly claims that without theory and theorisation 
translators will ―never be seen as anything but witch doctors and faith healers‖ (BAKER 
1992, 4). In other words, she defends institutionalisation and professionalisation as ways to 
legitimise and raise the status of our profession. But if these measures – theorisation, 
institutionalisation and professionalisation – lead to ―theory hope‖, the status of the 
profession will not be raised. As already pointed out in different parts of this thesis, 
theorisation rooted in essentialism invariably leads to ―theory hope‖, which inevitably sets a 
vicious circle in motion whereby the present ―chaos‖ is discarded in the name of a scientific 
future. And this scientific future entails transparent renderings, translator‘s invisibility, full 
objectivity and mathematical faithfulness – and universalism, of course. Well, if we are 
investing all our hopes in the possibility of full invisibility and objectivity, in other words, if 
we expect our ―science‖ to advance to a level in which it will deal with language and 
subjectivity mathematically, how can we expect the status of our profession to be raised? If it 
were actually possible for our subjectivities and interventions to be fully erased, if we could 
reduce our conduct to mechanical and fully objective actions, than we might as well be 
replaced by computers and not exist at all.  
 I do feel that Baker is right when she advocates that theorisation will lead to the 
elevation of the translator‘s status in society. Nevertheless, we appear to be barking up the 
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wrong tree here since this theorisation should not lead to the denial of our presence as 
translators, but rather the very opposite. I very much agree with Arrojo when she asserts that 
it is through the questions raised by poststructuralist thought that we will achieve the much 
sought-after goal of raising the status of our profession (see Part II above). After all, it is 
poststructuralist reflection that enables us to legitimise our interference, our presence and our 
visibility. In any case, I will come back to the question of poststructuralist thought in 
translation in the next chapters. For now let us simply stick to the idea that this theorisation 
defended by Baker in her analogy – and by Wagner in hers, too – should be more awareness-
raising than practice-oriented. And even when it is practice-oriented – as some of it is bound 
to be – it must be awareness-raising as well. Let us not forget Derrida‘s analogy of the 
faithful guardian stood at the university gates: yes, we shall embrace the market needs and 
accommodate them as well as possible in our courses, but let us be critical of them, let us 
dare influence them, let us constantly deconstruct them in our classes (see Chapter 2 in Part I 
above). 
 If businesses would rather have incoming employees fresh out of university with 
highly specific training, so that they do not need to provide these newcomers with additional 
instruction, we might as well openly and directly affiliate universities to businesses, as is 
already the case in many areas (refer to Chapter 2, Part I above). How willing are we to bow 
to these demands? Should we not perhaps slowly ―show‖ the market that they are better off 
with students who were taught how to think critically, than with students who were trained to 
perform one specific task? Deconstructing these demands in class and understanding the 
dynamics and motivations underneath them might prove far more fruitful than obediently 
following them and striving to fulfil them through universal (and not ―probabilistic‖) laws. 
 In one of the chapters of Lyotard‘s 1979 The Postmodern Condition, entitled 
‗Education and its Legitimation through Performativity‘ (LYOTARD [1979] 2006, 92-99 –
translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi), he defends a similar idea. Lyotard 
describes how the ―performativity principle‖ is now crucial as far as higher education is 
concerned. In other words, performing a task is key, i.e. applying techniques and technologies 
with a view to their use in the market. So much so that the chief question now asked by ―the 
professionalist student, the State, or institutions of higher education‖ is indeed ―what use is 
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it?‖, which often translates as ―it is saleable?‖ and ―is it efficient?‖142, he claims (idem, 95 – 
my emphasis). This leads to a notion of competence that is strictly ―operational‖143, as well as 
to a notion of education as the mere ―reproduction of skills‖ (idem, 96). But then, Lyotard 
maintains, 
If education must not only provide for the reproduction of skills, but also for their 
progress, then it follows that the transmission of knowledge should not be limited to the 
transmission of information, but should include training in all of the procedures that can 
increase one‘s ability to connect the fields jealously guarded from one another by the 
traditional organization of knowledge (idem)
144
.  
In other words, if we look back at Wagner‘s analogy, we should try and go beyond the level 
of the ―reproduction of skills‖, beyond the scopes of questions like ―what use is it?‖ or ―is it 
efficient?‖ (see above).           
 Moreover, to remain within the medical analogy, I am convinced that successful, 
acclaimed doctors and translators do not achieve their success strictly because of their 
objectivity, neutrality and performance, but rather because of their subjectivity and 
interference. We tend to like or dislike doctors mostly for subjective factors – whether they 
confirm our expectations as for our treatment, whether they inspire our trust, whether they 
understand our claims in a way that satisfies us, whether we feel safe in their hands and find 
comfort in their judgement, whether they share our values. If everything were so black-and-
white, so objective and universal; in other words, if everything came down to performing 
efficiently, why would we seek different doctors and second opinions?  
 Likewise, translators and interpreters have to communicate with clients in this 
―special‖ way in order for their relationship to last. Though I am not an acclaimed translator, 
I have had the same clients from the Universidade Federal do Paraná for nearly 10 years 
                                                             
142 If we look back at Part I above, particularly at Chapter 1, we will see that my entire experience with higher 
education has been marked by questions such as these.  
143 In Part I, Chapter 2 above, there was a quotation by Derrida in which he made a strikingly similar remark. 
Firstly he asked: ―does the university have as its essential mission that of producing professional competencies, 
which may sometimes be external to the university?‖, and then ―is the task of the university to ensure within 
itself – and under what conditions – the reproduction of professional competence by preparing professors for 
pedagogy and for research who have respect for a certain code?‖ (DERRIDA 1983, 17). As a reply, he asserted 
that one such acceptance of ―the reproduction of professional competencies‖ should ―be accompanied at least by 
a movement of suspicion, even of rejection with respect to the professionalization of the university in these two 
senses, and especially in the first, which regulates university life according to the supply and demand of the 
marketplace and according to a purely technical ideal of competence‖ (idem).   
144 I will come back to the question of interdisciplinarity implied in this quotation in Chapter 3 below.   
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now. These scholars from various fields write papers in Portuguese which then have to be 
translated into English to be published in foreign journals. I know their style and they know 
mine, and my style pleases them, they like my presence in their papers. I interfere all the time 
and they know that: I ask questions, I suggest changes, I adapt. They tell me that they like me 
precisely because I write the text with them, because I tell them what I like and dislike, 
because they are constantly aware of my presence. No wonder there are so many politicians, 
for example, who work with the very same interpreters and translators for decades. And of 
course competence plays a pivotal role, but most of the time, when we do not feel like seeing 
a doctor again, it is for subjective reasons rather than for questions of competence – though 
we might like to think that that particular doctor must be incompetent after all. The same goes 
for translation. If it were all so black-and-white, anyone with specific training would be 
capable of successfully fulfilling the client‘s needs. But we know it does not work like that at 
all. So however much we like to think that doctors and translators go about performing their 
jobs objectively, however much we like to think that we empathise with particular doctors 
and translators because they are the right ones or the good ones, we know that our affinity 
goes beyond strictly objective parameters.      
 But let us now advance into the second half of this chapter. Two similar anecdotes, 
one involving me and another one involving Brazilian scholar Maria Paula Frota, will help to 
develop this notion of translation theory and translator training further. As these anecdotes 
concern the teaching of literary translation, I will address some of the questions I asked at the 
end of Part III above, apropos of Britto‘s model of poetry translation. This issue will then be 
raised again in Chapter 3 below.    
 As I was doing a course on Irish Poetry during the last year of my BA in English and 
Portuguese – with emphasis on translation studies – at the Universidade Federal do Paraná, I 
had the chance to work with a very experienced literary translator and writer, undoubtedly 
one of the best teachers I have ever had. Towards the end of the course we were given the 
assignment to translate Sebastian Barry‘s poem ‗The Smell‘145:  
 Buttery, vanilla...  
                                                             
145 Unfortunately I do not possess Barry‘s book from which this poem was taken. As he has published two 
volumes of poetry, The Water Colourist (1983) and The Rhetorical Town (1985) – along with numerous 
volumes of fiction and drama – and as I am sure that this poem is not in The Water Colourist, I suppose it is in 
The Rhetorical Town.    
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Tobias, moments old,  
my nose against his head, 
sniffing, trying to make out 
 
the soft word of his smell  
couched in memories  
of clover maybe,  
crushed, inhaled  
 
but elusive, also 
the cow‘s milk years ago  
skited by Auntie Anne  
for a joke from the udder,  
 
that odour of inside skin,  
interior, private,  
lightless, no language,  
something lovely of that order.   
I remember discussing the poem in class on the day we were supposed to hand our versions 
in. The key question that the teacher asked us on that occasion was who ―Tobias‖ was. The 
class was divided: some believed Tobias was a new-born calf because of the cow in the third 
stanza and all the other animal-like descriptions. Others, in contrast, felt it was a new-born 
baby, maybe the persona‘s child. Personally, I did not find the question extremely relevant 
precisely because it seemed to me that this mixture between animals and humans was what 
made the poem so special. Nevertheless, deep down I liked to think Tobias was a calf for my 
own personal reasons. 
 When I was growing up I used to go to my aunt‘s farm in Minas Gerais, a state in 
central Brazil. Since it was a proper farm, going there was always a wonderful experience. 
We got to play with animals, drink freshly squeezed milk and eat fresh vegetables. One 
particular day, however, really marked me forever. I must have been about four or five. A 
cow was about to give birth, and the children were allowed to watch as my uncle assisted it. 
All I can remember is the strong smell of milk I always felt around the stable (indeed, 
―buttery, vanilla‖), as well as the indescribable display of love between cow and calf. I hardly 
recall any blood – which is quite strange – but rather the way the cow put its ―nose against 
[the calf‘s] head / sniffing, trying to make out / the soft word of his smell‖, and how the calf 
patiently looked for the udder and sucked the milk eagerly and gently at the same time.  
 I did not share this story with my classmates and teacher back then, but we talked 
about whether the idea of the smell of a stable sounded positive or negative to us, and I 
  
265 
remember finding it curious that some students actually felt disgusted by the idea of a stable, 
whereas to me it was one of my fondest childhood memories. When discussing the best 
translation for the title of the poem, these personal preferences proved to be paramount, as 
some preferred words in Portuguese with slightly negative connotations, whereas others 
chose positive words. But the question in which the teacher was most interested was indeed 
who Tobias was. At the time she told us that she was rather disappointed that none of us had 
―discovered‖ the actual ―truth‖ behind the poem; that a simple, careful Google search would 
have ―revealed‖ that Tobias is actually the name of Barry‘s son, therefore ―proving‖ that the 
poem is ―obviously‖ autobiographical. She took the opportunity to say that the work of a 
translator is usually detective-like; that one must put the pieces of the puzzle together if one 
wants to produce an ―accurate‖ translation.   
 Incidentally, I was writing my BA thesis at the time – ―The German Functional 
Approach in Translation: Christiane Nord‘s Model Applied to the Translation of Three 
British Contemporary Short-Stories‖ (originally written in Portuguese). Working with Nord‘s 
model of text analysis (see NORD [1988] 2005) I had already come across the extratextual 
factor entitled ―author‘s intention‖, and had already had my doubts about it. As I thoroughly 
explain in LEAL (2006), I had just made quite an extraordinary discovery about one of the 
short-stories I was translating. In a given passage of the story – whose style was extremely 
prosaic and simple – the author made use of perfect metre, making that particular excerpt 
stand out. As Britto puts it in one of his papers, it was a ―clearly (…) calculated effect‖ 
(BRITTO 2002 – refer to Subchapter 3.3 in Part III above). When asked about it, however, 
the author (Anne Cassidy) was rather surprised herself, claiming that she never intended to 
insert poetic feet into her story.  
 After exchanging a couple of e-mails, Cassidy and I arrived at the conclusion that two 
factors must have contributed to the ―production‖ of those poetic feet. Firstly because 
originally she had written the story to be read out loud in a story-reading club, and this must 
have unconsciously influenced her. Secondly because I had been trained to read and analyse 
poetry, and hence would probably find poetic features even in the manual of a washing 
machine
146
. The question that remained unanswered was whether I, as the translator, should 
                                                             
146 This incident resembles Fish‘s experiment in ‗How to Recognise a Poem When You See One‘ – please refer 
to Subchapter 2.2 in Part II, as well as to Subchapter 3.1 in Part III above.     
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strive to make that excerpt stand out as well, thus being faithful to my interpretation, or 
whether I should do as Nord ([1988] 2005, 53-57) recommends in her model and strictly 
follow the ―sender‘s intentions‖. At the time I decided that I should translate the poem as I 
had read it since one‘s interpretation is all on which one can normally rely. After all, in most 
cases translators have no access to the original author, and their experience and knowledge 
should suffice. In any case, my Irish poetry professor at the time would probably not have 
accepted my position. And I wonder what Britto would do if the authors he translates came 
up to him and said that what he takes as ―clearly calculated effects‖ – based on which he 
mathematically justifies his choices – were actually not intentional at all. Would he then rely 
on his interpretation as a legitimate justification or simply change his translations to match 
the authors‘ intentions? And do unconscious intentions count as well?            
 Speaking of Britto‘s model (refer to Section 3.3 in Part III above), along with all the 
issues pointed out in this thesis about essentialist models as a whole, we still have to add a 
number of subjective factors for which these theories simply do not account. As my 
experience with Barry‘s poem illustrates, one relates to everything around one (including 
texts) in one‘s own way, so what I may find prominent in a given text may be considered less 
prominent by a different reader, or even by the same reader at a different point in time. I am 
absolutely convinced that one cannot mathematically calculate the joy or anguish of reading a 
poem, for example.  
Similarly, if one speaks of strict ―correspondences‖ and ―losses‖ in translation (as 
Britto does), how does one account for the pleasure of reading a poem, for example, in one‘s 
mother tongue? In Britto‘s scheme of gains and losses, should that not count as a gain? It is 
as Stäel puts it: ―lors même quřon entendrait bien les langues étrangères, on pourrait goûter 
encore, par une traduction bien faite dans sa propre langue, un plaisir plus familier et plus 
intime‖ (STÄEL [1821] 2004, 142). Models such as Britto‘s do not take into account that 
reading a text in one‘s own mother tongue will set different processes into motion, will create 
new impressions and feelings.  
Another subjective element largely neglected in Britto‘s model is what he himself 
calls ―products of chance‖ or of ―the translator‘s [or author‘s] unconscious‖. In his translation 
of Bishop‘s ‗Shampoo‘, a number of alliterations ―found their way‖ into the text either by 
chance or as a product of his unconscious. What happens if some of the poetic devices Britto 
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takes as ―clearly calculated‖ in Bishop‘s original were products of chance or of her 
unconscious? Would they be less relevant then? And how can one mathematically account 
for the translator‘s and reader‘s unconscious?    
Indeed, these issues surrounding Britto‘s model – as well as any translation theory 
influenced by essentialist views – unveil his ―theory hope‖ in the same way as Wagner‘s 
allegory (see above) unveils hers. Before we return to these questions and their implications 
for translation theory and translator training, let us analyse the last anecdote that will make up 
the present chapter – which by the way is remarkably similar to my experience reading 
Barry‘s ‗The Smell‘.  
In 2000 Maria Paula Frota
147
 published her PhD thesis, conducted under Rosemary 
Arrojo (refer to Chapter 1 in Part II above). The book, entitled A Singularidade na Escrita 
Tradutora: Linguagem e Subjetividade nos Estudos da Tradução, na Linguística e na 
Psicanálise (Singularity in Translational Writing: Language and Subjectivity in Translation 
Studies, Linguistics and Psychoanalysis), is certainly one of the most interesting volumes on 
translation ever published in Brazil. Right at the beginning of the book she makes a brief 
digression that, according to her, illustrates her entire PhD project (FROTA 2000, 23). The 
anecdote goes as follows: one of her undergraduate students of the course Translation Theory 
questioned her one day about the discrepancies between the rather open theoretical 
discussions they had been carrying out in her class, and the ever so closed correction criteria 
of Frota‘s colleagues. What particularly bothered the student was the translation of a single 
verb in a poem by Sylvia Plath, ‗Kindness‘. The verb was ―picking up‖, which the teacher in 
question claimed was closer to ―catando‖ in Portuguese, in the sense of lifting or collecting. 
Yet the student had translated it as ―colando‖, in the sense of ―bringing together‖ or ―sticking 
together‖ (idem, 24-25). The subject of the verb was ―sugar‖, and the object was ―pieces‖.  
To cut a long story short, Frota encouraged the student to explain why she was so 
determined that ―picking up‖ must be translated as ―colando‖, contrary to her teacher‘s 
advice. The student then explained that, when she was a child, her mother (who baked cakes 
for a living) had always taught her that sugar, or rather frosting, was the best remedy to 
                                                             
147
 Frota is a colleague of Britto‘s at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. It may be that the 
second teacher involved in her anecdote here is indeed Britto, as he usually teaches the poetry translation 
courses. But this is of course speculation and not really relevant.    
  
268 
―stick‖ the ―pieces‖ of cakes ―together‖; that no matter how fluffy or crumbly the cake was, 
frosting worked as an effective glue (idem, 24). This brief digression explains why student 
and teacher looked at the same English verb and had different pictures in mind; indeed, each 
had their own personal history with that word and subject, and both ―fit‖ to the poem 
somehow. Frota summarises the question as follows: 
proponho apenas que encaremos o Ŗcolandoŗ como um acontecimento singular, 
expressão de um momento em que tradutora e texto constituíram-se simultânea e 
mutuamente. Uma expressão singular porque efeito de um trânsito particular de um certo 
sujeito entre os elementos estruturais da linguagem; efeito de uma certa vinculação 
subjetiva com esses elementos Ŕ um trânsito e uma diferença que implicam uma diferença 
para além da polissemia já codificada de picking up (idem, 25 – her emphasis). 
I suggest we perceive ―colando‖ as a singular happening, as the expression of a moment 
in which both translator and text constituted themselves simultaneously and mutually. It 
is a singular expression because it is the result of a particular transit of a particular 
subject amongst the structural elements of language; it is the result of a certain subjective 
link to these elements – a transit and a difference that imply a difference beyond the 
known polysemy of ―picking up‖.               
In other words, the student in question could not leave her personal history outside the 
translation process – and who can anyway? And this personal history cannot by any means be 
perceived as a mere whim. The student in question probably grew up watching her mother 
bake cakes and listening to her advice, so this connotation of a verb like ―picking up‖ came to 
form her very understanding of the verb.   
 Abstracting now from questions such as ―which translation is better‖ or ―which 
translation is more faithful‖ – because these questions are completely beside the point – let us 
consider the implications of these two anecdotes to translator training. Both poetry translation 
teachers (my teacher and Frota‘s colleague) appear to have been entirely committed to the 
questions above – i.e. faithful translations, equivalents and author‘s intentions. Yet this does 
not seem to have contributed much to the students‘ understanding of language and 
translation, to their awareness of their role, the teacher‘s role and the author‘s role both in 
translation and in society – as proposed in the first part of this chapter.  
 The first teacher – my teacher – categorically declared that a Google search had 
revealed the truth of the poem. The second teacher – Frota‘s colleague – crossed the student‘s 
translation out without further inquiries to favour a more ―literal‖ translation. But when it 
comes to translation, should pupils not work precisely on their awareness of these language 
  
269 
and cultural phenomena? If anything, these teachers‘ attitudes led students to forever seek the 
truth of poems, to forever seek perfect, literal translations – whatever ―literal‖ may mean. In 
my view, it would have been significantly more fruitful if these teachers had taken these 
opportunities – these discrepancies, these differences – to analyse the values and motivations 
lying beneath these dissimilar interpretations. Instead of merely learning that Sebastian 
Barry‘s son is named Tobias and that the word ―picking up‖ translates as ―catando‖ in Plath‘s 
‗Sweetness‘, they would have increased their awareness as for the different values that inform 
the members of their communities. Furthermore, they would have learnt from where different 
interpretations sometimes come, and that power relations – in this case teacher-student and 
author-translator – are not the be-all and end-all of these situations. This sort of reflection 
could equip students with the knowledge and awareness to expand these ideas and adapt them 
to new situations, new texts.  
 In other words – and going back to Britto‘s forest analogy – translator/interpreter 
training or even higher education in general can and should be about teaching students how to 
get home quickly and safely, but not without acknowledging the illusory and changeable 
character of cardinal points; not without relativising that my North, here in Austria, may be 
someone else‘s South, say, in Oslo; not without emphasising that cardinal points are human 
construes and not absolute truths above and prior to mankind; not without the willingness to 
deconstruct these construes and to acknowledge our presence in them. In other words, higher 
education should not be restricted to teaching pupils how to get home.   
 If our laws in translation studies are only ―probabilistic‖ and not absolute, as Wagner 
claims (see above), perhaps we should have less to do with ―laws‖ after all. Being a 
translation student myself, I would far rather have been told that translating is subjective, 
abstract and hence no model or law can embrace all its specificities and peculiarities. That 
would certainly have been less frustrating than spending years studying translation models 
only to come to the conclusion that they do not comprehend the complexity imposed by 
translation.     
 I will come back to some of the issues discussed in this first chapter in what follows. 
Let us now move on to Chapter 2, dedicated more specifically to poststructuralist thought and 
deconstruction.  
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2. Poststructuralist Thought: Three Common Misconceptions 
_____________________________________________________ 
The answer is simple enough: this definition of the 
deconstructionist is false (that‘s right, false, not true) 
and feeble; it supposes a bad (that‘s right bad, not 
good) and feeble reading of numerous texts, first of all 
mine, which therefore must finally be read or reread.  
       Jacques Derrida (translated by Samuel Weber)     
In the previous chapter, I briefly mentioned that it is probably through the questions raised by 
poststructuralist thought that we will be able to eventually raise the status of translation – 
both as a profession and as a discipline. Throughout this thesis I hope to have made clear that 
I find in poststructuralist reflection a thought-provoking niche for translation studies, one that 
allows us to reformulate the age-old questions that have haunted us for so long – such as the 
questions of fidelity and equivalence, to mention only two. But there seems to be a lot of 
resistance as regards poststructuralist thought in translation – and not only in translation. 
From my point of view, this resistance appears to stem from three main misconceptions, 
briefly summarised as follows: poststructuralist thought is (i) too radical and (ii) pessimistic, 
and works as (iii) an excuse for whatever sort of behaviour. Christopher Norris, for example, 
in the 1991 afterword to his 1982 Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, claims that 
Often it [the word deconstruction] is used with a strongly negative connotation: thus 
‗deconstruct‘ = ‗take things apart‘ (literary texts, philosophical arguments, historical 
narratives, truth-claims or value systems of whatever kind) in a spirit of game-playing 
nihilist abandon and without the least concern for constructing some better alternative 
(NORRIS [1982] 2002, 135 – my italics). 
So in the present chapter I intend to address these misconceptions and to try and understand 
where they might come from.   
 Amongst translation studies scholars I have only very rarely come upon instances of 
thorough criticism of poststructuralist thought. As I have argued elsewhere (LEAL 2010b), 
the attitude of those who do not openly defend these postmodern trends tends to reveal either 
listlessness, in most cases, or antagonism, in a few cases. This is perhaps one of the reasons 
why I find Britto‘s criticism highly interesting; unlike many of his peers, he invests time and 
effort in this undertaking, which contributes greatly to the debate. It is curious to observe – 
not to say sad – that Derrida, for example, is criticised in various cognate areas for his 
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―extravagant style‖ and ―counter-intuitive conclusions‖ (NORRIS [1982] 2002, 144), as 
opposed to logical and ―structured‖ discourse, which in turn appears to prevent him from 
being taken seriously. In translation studies, nevertheless, criticism to poststructuralist 
thought tends to remain confined within the modest limits of hasty and impressionistic 
conclusions drawn from second hand readings.  
 Let us take, for example, Chesterman‘s view on deconstruction expressed in the 
abovementioned Can Theory Help Translators?, already quoted in Chapter 3 of Part I above: 
―I will bypass here the deconstructionist argument that there is no objective (…) in the first 
place‖ (CHESTERMAN and WAGNER 2002, 9-10); ―Some postmodern/deconstructivist 
thinkers (…) stress that (…) the author is dead (…). Outside texts: nothing. Further: 
meanings are not fixed but endlessly shifting and deferred, all is indeterminate, everyone 
interprets a text in their own way (…)‖ (idem, 24). For anyone acquainted with 
poststructuralist tendencies, these remarks strike one as hasty and ill-informed – though 
Chesterman‘s competence is of course not in question, but rather his understanding of these 
views he so obviously despises.  
 Derrida himself speaks with utter contempt of similar remarks made by equally 
acclaimed scholars. The epigraph that opens the present chapter is an example, written as a 
counterreply to Searle (DERRIDA [1988] 1992, 146). Another instance is his reaction to 
Walter Jackson Bate‘s and Willis J. Bennett‘s comments on deconstruction published in the 
early 1980s, both in celebrated American media. In a long footnote, Derrida (translated by 
Catherine Porter and Edward Norris) exemplifies his assertion that people do not read his 
texts at all before criticising deconstruction (DERRIDA 1983, 15 – quoting Bennett and Paul 
de Man): 
Among many possible examples, I shall mention only two recent articles. They have at 
least one trait in common: their authors are highly placed representatives of two 
institutions whose power and influence hardly need to be recalled. I refer to "The Crisis in 
English Studies" by Walter Jackson Bate, Kingsley Porter University Professor at 
Harvard [Harvard Magazine, Sept./Oct. 1982], and to "The Shattered Humanities" by 
Willis J. Bennett, Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities [Wall Street 
Journal, Dec. 31, 1982]. The latter of these articles carries ignorance and irrationality so 
far as to write the following: "A popular movement in literary criticism called 
'Deconstruction' denies that there are any texts at all. If there are no texts, there are no 
great texts, and no argument for reading." The former makes remarks about 
deconstruction – and this is not by chance – that are, we might say, just as unnerved. As 
Paul de Man notes in an admirable short essay ["The Return to Philology," Times 
Literary Supplement, December 10, 1982], Professor Bate "has this time confined his 
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sources of information to Newsweek magazine... What is left is a matter of law-
enforcement rather than a critical debate. One must be feeling very threatened indeed to 
become so aggressively defensive." 
But before we look into how Chesterman (and Bate and Bennett) could possibly have come 
to such a conclusion, let us focus on the radicalism that appears to be the source of their 
protest.   
 As already pointed out repeatedly in Part II above, there does seem to be a tendency 
for those committed to poststructuralist perspectives to express themselves in a way that may 
come across as radical and even aggressive. I shall not belabour this issue much further as I 
have already done so at length in Part II. But although I can grant this much, I feel that a 
careful reading of texts by poststructuralist thinkers should suffice to unveil far more than 
sheer radicalism. Even Arrojo‘s work which may, at first sight, strike one as overly militant, 
offers plenty of resources for the reader to overcome this initial impression.    
 Norris ([1982] 2002) offers great insight into the matter of deconstruction and its 
seeming radicalism, finding various opportune responses in Derrida‘s work to these claims of 
extremism. Apropos of Derrida‘s debate with Austin, for instance, Norris maintains that  
Derrida‘s point is certainly not to argue that we should (…) suspend all the usual 
(properly philosophical) criteria of truth and falsehood, logical rigour, consequential 
argument, (…) and henceforth treat his writings as belonging to a realm of generalised 
―undecidability‖ where those standards can no longer be taken to possess the least 
relevance or critical force (idem, 145 – his emphasis). 
Likewise, Norris remembers that Derrida by no means denies (and even insistently affirms) 
―that we have to think in accordance with classical logic if we are not only to make adequate 
sense of (…) texts but also to locate their symptomatic stress-points – the moments of aporia 
or logical tension – where such thinking meets its limit‖ (idem, 163 – his emphasis). In this 
sense relativising and deconstructing are a far cry from abolishing and destroying. And this 
point bears repeating as it reflects the very idea of deconstruction – and to a certain extent of 
poststructuralist thought as a whole. Exercising deconstruction is not about systematically 
getting rid of and replacing existing entities; rather, it is in Norris‘s words ―that to which we 
aspire – individually and collectively – while acknowledging its unattainability in practice 
and also the fact that it cannot be gainsaid or rendered historically obsolete by the melancholy 
records of failures and setbacks to date‖ (idem, 167).  
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 It is this notion that I have tried to defend in the previous chapter. Instead of a full 
reform of higher education, for example, the idea is simply to ―acknowledge‖ the 
―unattainability‖ of what we ―aspire to‖ ―in practice‖, and still strive to achieve it within the 
given limits available to us. This is by no means radical, as the works of scholars like Arrojo 
might appear to suggest. And I did warn the reader several times in Part II above that this 
seemingly radical discourse of hers, in the hands of readers less acquainted with 
poststructuralist thought, appears to fall to pieces once she gets to more ―practical‖ matters. 
Her suggestions regarding translator training, specific translation exercises and even 
translation strategies and translation criticism are far from radical
148
. Nevertheless, like 
Derrida‘s critics, those who oppose her ideas seem to overlook these passages and still accuse 
her of radicalism. Norris exhorts that we take notice of these clearly not radical passages in 
Derrida‘s work (idem, 153) and quotes a part of the following excerpt by Derrida:                  
(…) the value of truth (and all those values associated with it) is never contested or 
destroyed in my writings, but only reinscribed in more powerful, larger, more stratified 
contexts. And that within interpretive contexts (that is, within relations of force that are 
always differential – for example, socio-political-institutional – but even beyond these 
determinations) that are relatively stable, sometimes apparently almost unshakable, it 
should be possible to invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of consensus, 
good faith, lucidity, rigour, criticism, and pedagogy (DERRIDA 1989, 146).   
So to come back to Chesterman‘s view on deconstruction – which is by no means singular in 
translation studies – his remarks strike me as a hasty, superficial sort of blanket criticism. It is 
precisely as Derrida puts it in the epigraph that opens this chapter as regards Searle‘s view of 
deconstruction – it is ―false‖ and ―bad‖.  
 Of course in Arrojo‘s case one may claim that she plays her part in the production of 
these hasty conclusions. She does resort to far too many binary oppositions – often without 
much relativisation – and relentlessly defends one over the other. Her systematic use of 
quotation marks also seems to point in this direction – i.e. of an exaggerated will to 
subversion. Britto (see Part I, Chapter 3 above) is the one to complain about her insistent use 
of quotation marks around words like original, author and fidelity. Well, it is true that these 
words are key when it comes to translation, but if we were to be so pedantic about the 
                                                             
148 Let us not forget that this is because deconstruction is not an approach, not a methodology; it is a practice in 
itself and therefore does not make recommendations as for other practices. In the abovementioned work, Norris 
argues that ―Deconstruction is (…) an activity of reading which remains closely tied to the texts it interrogates 
and which can never set up independently as a method or system of operative concepts‖ (NORRIS [1982] 2002, 
31).   
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possible connotations of every word, we would have to write everything between quotation 
marks
149
. Incidentally, Christopher Norris says that when his 1982 book Deconstruction: 
Theory and Practice came out, it caused a lot of huffing and puffing amongst ―Derrida 
acolytes‖ because Norris reportedly missed some of the most ―basic principles‖ of 
deconstruction (NORRIS [1982] 2002, 162). A pivotal problem, they held, was Norris‘ use of 
binary oppositions – beginning with the subtitle of the book, ―theory and practice‖, which 
―any self-respecting deconstructionist ought to have spotted a mile off‖ (idem). But if this use 
is careful and well aware of its implications, I personally see no need for constant concern
150
. 
And I am sure that Arrojo‘s use of binary oppositions is also careful, but since she resorts to 
them far too often, I believe that those readers less familiar with poststructuralist thought 
might get the wrong impression. 
 As already pointed out at the end of Part II above about poststructuralist thought, 
radicalism is at once out of the question and the only possible way to convey ideas. The 
question is what radicalism and radicalism to whom. When we look at flatly common sense 
assertions about these poststructuralist tendencies, radicalism usually takes on a ―practical‖ 
form. As numerous examples in this thesis have illustrated, in these assertions deconstruction 
would claim that texts do not exist, that reading is impossible and useless, that all claims to 
objectivity and truth must be abolished, and so on. This kind of practical radicalism that some 
perceive in poststructuralist thought is simply misplaced (refer to footnote 123 above) 
because those claims are never made – and it would defeat the very objective of 
poststructuralist thought if they were made.  
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 Having said that, I must admit that as my proofreader is reading the present thesis, he constantly asks me 
why I use the expression ―so-called‖ so often, to which I reply that I mean to relativise certain concepts instead 
of categorically and bluntly stating them; that I mean to show that I am critical of them. He then says that in this 
case every word should be preceded by ―so-called‖, and he is probably right. In any case, I have consciously 
tried to shun this overly careful manner of writing, obstinately avoiding words that might allude to 
―problematic‖ ideas. A word particularly disliked amongst certain poststructuralists is ―paradox‖ because of its 
essentialist roots. But if I am aware of these roots and challenge them, of course I can still use the word. These 
connotations change and only by using words with ―more careful‖ connotations will these changes really take 
place.      
150 And let us not forget here that the reception of deconstruction is widely varied and, embedded in the larger 
context of poststructuralist thought, is the source of an awful lot of disagreement. Roustang‘s use of the term 
―savage horde‖ (refer to Subchapter 2.3 in Part II above) might well be used to describe those committed to the 
postmodern condition as well. As the focus of this thesis lies on translation, I did not enter these quarrels 
surrounding poststructuralism and merely treated it as a relatively unified line of thought. But as I hope to have 
made clear already in the Interchapter in Part I above, this is an illusion – and Norris‘ 1982 book, particularly 
the 1991 Afterword and the 2002 Postscript, go into these disagreements in great detail (NORRIS [1982] 2002, 
134-178).     
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 But there is another radicalism in question here – the one of discourse. 
Poststructuralist discourse may be perceived as radical because it strives to reveal the 
moments of aporia particularly of canonical texts. It is as Derrida explains in the indented 
quotation of page 279 below: deconstruction entails, at once, on the one hand the respect to a 
text and to classical logic and, on the other hand, critical reading in the sense of a will to 
subversion. This radicalism in its discourse is inevitable, but let us not forget that respect for 
texts and respect for classical logic are not abandoned in the name of this radicalism. So all in 
all, if we ask whether poststructuralist thinkers are unjustly accused of radicalism, we have to 
answer ―yes and no‖. Yes, because they never suggest radical measures to be put into practice 
as far as practices other than discourse are concerned. Yes, because even when 
poststructuralist discourse is radical, it does not discard classical logic and disregard the text 
under deconstruction. No, because in comparison to other types of discourse – discourse that 
is not labelled as poststructuralist – poststructuralist discourse does sound radical.                   
 As I make these efforts to relativise the radicalism of which poststructuralist thought 
is often accused, I hope to be also calling the readers‘ attention to the fact that claims to 
pessimism and nihilism are likewise usually unjustified and exaggerated. Many are the 
examples of thinkers who dismiss Derrida‘s ideas on these grounds too – Norris mentioned 
chiefly Habermas and Searle (idem, 155). Critics like Gross and Levitt, for example, appear 
to perceive nothing in postmodern thought beyond radicalism and pessimism. In an entire 
chapter devoted to this issue – appropriately named ―The Realm of Idle Phrases: 
Postmodernism, Literary Theory, and Cultural Criticism‖ (GROSS and LEVITT 1994, 71-
106) – words like ―nihilism‖, ―negation‖, ―scepticism‖, ―radicalism‖, and ―moral blankness‖ 
echo throughout the text. Gross and Levitt maintain, for example, that         
Derrida‘s deep epistemological pessimism has infected his disciples as much as have his 
stylistic eccentricities. Deconstructionism holds that truly meaningful utterance is 
impossible, that language is ultimately impotent, as are the mental operations conditioned 
by linguistic habit. The verbal means by which we seek to represent the world are 
incapable, it is said, of doing any such thing. (…) There is no reality outside the text, but 
texts themselves are vertiginously unstable, inherently self-contradictory and self-
cancelling (idem, 76). 
They go further and claim in astonishment that Derrida‘s position offers ―little cheer to the 
would-be revolutionary or radical reformer‖, and yet it became popular amongst them – 
though ―in contrast to literary critics, few serious philosophers have had much use for 
[Derrida‘s] ideas‖ (idem – my emphasis). Gross and Levitt too, as numerous other thinkers 
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influenced by essentialism quoted in this thesis, associate the idea of optimism with 
usefulness, very much in line with scientism.   
 The question of pessimism has already been addressed at the very the end of Part I 
above, when the title of the present thesis was explained for the first time. I suppose one can 
only attribute pessimism and nihilism to poststructuralist thought if one has a limited view of 
these tendencies, if one hastily takes relativisation as abolishment, and questioning as 
negation. Beyond this level of the ―unnerved remarks‖ (see Derrida‘s 1983 indented 
quotation above) and flatly common sense assertions, the questions proposed by 
poststructuralist thought are a very positive source of reflection. 
 Though the chapter dedicated to analogies was the previous one, let us quickly recall 
Britto‘s analogy of the painter trying to paint a portrait that changes incessantly (see Section 
3.1 in Part III above). His point was that, as a translator, he needed to assume that words had 
fixed meanings and that meanings were stable, otherwise his work would be doomed from 
the onset. But if we know that this is by no means real, if we know that countless elements 
will alter the image we are painting – light, angle, canvas, paint type, brush, use of colour, 
age and conservation of the painting, amongst many others – is it not somewhat relieving to 
think that difference is an inevitable part of the process? Is it not realistic to be sure that no 
two things can be the same – in Britto‘s analogy person and portrait, original and 
translation
151
? In this light, if poststructuralist thought helps one to perceive one‘s obsessions 
with stability, objectivity and sameness more critically, why should it be deemed pessimistic? 
And I do concede that the process of deconstruction of our convictions can be rather painful; 
I ask myself nonetheless whether going through painful processes is not a necessary part of 
maturing. Should learning be exclusively ―cheerful‖ and ―useful‖ in order for it to be worth 
one‘s while?   
 Of course I must admit that I can imagine from where these claims to pessimism 
might come, however much I feel that they are not particularly thought-out. Britto‘s fictions 
(see Chapter 3 in Part III above) are a corollary of these claims. I understand that they may 
                                                             
151 This analogy is also quite meaningful in terms of the purpose of higher education. In plastic arts, learning 
fairly objective techniques on how to paint a portrait, for example, is undoubtedly paramount. Nevertheless, 
being knowledgeable and aware of these countless elements that influence one‘s painting plays just as pivotal a 
role. And here we should think not only in terms of ―palpable‖ elements like the ones mentioned above, but also 
as far as the values and history of the values that inform the production and reception of one‘s work are 
concerned.  
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represent cold comfort to some, as is Britto‘s case. Nevertheless, let us take the challenge of 
perceiving the glass half empty and half full; in other words, let us strive to see at once the 
pessimistic and optimistic entailed by these different views. In this sense, I mean to say that 
the very same issues that may be perceived as sources of optimism and ―cheerfulness‖ in 
essentialist thought – its usefulness, its objectivity, its universalism, its constancy – may 
unveil their eminent drawbacks and unfeasibility and quickly turn to dust. I will come back to 
this issue and Britto‘s fiction in Chapter 3 below.    
 In addition to allegedly being too radical and pessimistic, poststructuralist thought is 
also often (contradictorily) understood as an ―out-and-out hermeneutic license‖, as Norris 
puts it, whereby ―critics‖ (or in our case, translators/interpreters) can ―indulge any kind of 
whimsical, free willing or ‗creative‘ commentary that happens to take their fancy‖ ([1982] 
2002, 136 – his emphasis152). How can pessimism and full liberation possibly go hand in 
hand? Well, the same critics that appear to discard these tendencies for their lack of ―cheer‖ 
and ―usefulness‖ and for their excessive ―negativity‖, also seem outraged by the 
―hermeneutic license‖ it bestows on its followers (see above). In other words, it is often said 
that poststructuralist thought allows one to find excuses for whatever sort of behaviour, 
legitimising even the most unpardonable gesture. Indeed, many would claim that if meanings 
are unstable and every act of translation involves the subject who translates – together with 
his/her subjectivity, personal history, ideology, etc. – then this translator may translate a 
given word however s/he pleases, for virtually anything is possible.      
 This view, particularly of deconstruction as an excuse for unjustifiable behaviour, 
goes as far as to become an argument against poststructuralist thought as a whole because of 
de Man‘s renowned papers, written during the Nazi occupation of Belgium153. As Norris very 
aptly explains, several critics, such as David Hirsch, Roger Kimball and David Lehman – but 
also Gross and Levitt (1994, 76-77) – used de Man‘s writings as a ―platform for advancing 
their blanket view of deconstruction as a[n] (…) enterprise bent upon covering the tracks of 
wartime collaborators‖ (NORRIS [1982] 2002, 159). Further, they claimed that a 
deconstructive view ―was one that could always find excuses for condoning any amount of 
                                                             
152 This excerpt has already been quoted in Part III, Chapter 3.2 above.  
153
 For more on this, please refer to de Man‘s posthumously published Wartime Journalism, 1939-1943, as well 
as to the volume edited by Werner Hamacher, Neil Hertz and Thomas Keenan in 1989 entitled Responses: On 
Paul de Manřs Wartime Journalism.   
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bad behaviour‖ (idem, 173-174). In other words, these critics took deconstruction as de 
Man‘s excuse for writing offensive texts, claiming that it may work as a justification for any 
kind of extravagant reading or interpretation on the part of its acolytes.  
 The issue of the truth or falsehood of interpretations is indeed a sensitive one within 
poststructuralist thought because different currents perceive it in various ways. As already 
pointed out above in footnote 150, since this thesis does not focus specifically on the various 
tendencies within poststructuralist thought, but rather on its reception particularly within 
translation studies in Brazil, I shall not belabour this issue much further. In any case, to my 
knowledge there is no poststructuralist tendency that advocates absolutely ―free‖ and 
idiosyncratic interpretations. As we saw in Part II above, Arrojo defends the idea of the 
conventionality of signs, ascribing the limits of interpretation to these constantly renewed 
tacit pacts that regulate every human undertaking. In other words, different groups at 
different moments will consider a particular interpretation adequate or inadequate in a given 
context. This emphasis on the social and conventional aspect of language is very much in 
tune with Stanley Fish‘s notion of interpretive communities, a thinker to whom Arrojo often 
turns in her works. But Fish, though labelled as a poststructuralist, is by no means a 
deconstructionist
154
.  
 In deconstruction the issue of the limits of interpretation is perceived differently – or 
rather its focus appears to lie in a different element. As Norris insists, ―deconstruction 
involves no slackening or suspension of the standards (logical consistency, conceptual rigour, 
modes of truth-conditional entailment, etc.) that properly determine what shall count as a 
genuine or valid philosophical argument‖ (idem, 149). In his view, a common misconception 
often associated with the idea of radicalism discussed above is that Derrida‘s readings of 
canonical texts resort to a ―wholly unfamiliar (…) species of textualist ‗logic‘‖, and that this 
logic in turn would ―license all manner of wild interpretive games‖ (idem – his emphasis). 
The British critic stresses that Derrida‘s (and de Man‘s) readings are but ―meticulously 
faithful‖ and rigorously follow the text‘s logic, taking it to its extreme and thus revealing 
                                                             
154 And here a critic such as Norris would have his objections, as he argues that particularly Fish and Rorty take 
poststructuralist thought in a significantly different direction in comparison with Derrida and de Man, for 
example. His disagreements, particularly with Rorty and his readings of Derrida are explored at length in 
Norris‘ Deconstruction and the Unfinished Project of Modernity (NORRIS 2000). The similarity between this 
debate and Freud‘s ―reception‖ by Lacan and Laplanche is probably no mere coincidence – please refer to 
Section 2.3 in Part II above.  
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meanings not traditionally attributed to those texts. He very rightly concedes that Derrida and 
de Man do produce various heterodox or counter-intuitive arguments, but always based upon 
a detailed reading of the text in question and always referring back to specific excerpts of the 
text (idem, 149-150).  
 Norris opportunely quotes a passage by Derrida in which he addresses his well-known 
readings of Rousseau. Whereas on the one hand Derrida speaks of ―critical readings‖, of 
readings as a ―critical production‖ of ―signifying structures‖, on the other hand he defends a 
certain respect for the text‘s ―classical exigencies‖, and herein lie the limits of interpretation 
(DERRIDA [1967] 1997, 158 – translated by Gayatri C. Spivak – his emphasis): 
To produce this signifying structure obviously cannot consist of reproducing, by the 
effaced and respectful doubling of commentary, the conscious, voluntary, intentional 
relationship that the writer institutes in his exchanges with the history to which he 
belongs thanks to the element of language. This moment of doubling commentary should 
no doubt have its place in a critical reading. To recognize and respect all its classical 
exigencies is not easy and requires all the instruments of traditional criticism. Without 
this recognition and this respect, critical production would risk developing in any 
direction at all and authorize itself to say almost anything. But this indispensable 
guardrail has always only protected, it has never opened, a reading (see NORRIS [1982] 
2002, 150).   
Similarly, Norris quotes Paul de Man in his preface to Carol Jacob‘s 1978 The Dissimulating 
Harmony: Images of Interpretation in Nietzsche, Rilke and Benjamin: ―reading is an 
epistemological event prior to being an ethical or aesthetic value. This does not mean that 
there can be a true reading, but that no reading is conceivable in which the question of its 
truth or falsehood is not primarily involved‖ (apud NORRIS [1982] 2002, 151 – my 
emphasis).  
 So when it comes to the so-called limits of interpretation, though emphasis may be 
added to the suasive-rhetorical aspect of language (as is Fish‘s case), or to the double gesture 
of subversive ―critical production‖ and respect in the sense of traditional criticism (as in 
Derrida‘s case), no ―out-and-out hermeneutic license‖ (see above) is granted to anyone. In 
this sense, this third common misconception – along with the supposed radicalism and 
pessimism of poststructuralist thought – may also be perceived as the product of hasty 
conclusions drawn from not very careful and thorough readings of the texts produced by 
poststructuralist thinkers. Without proper care, one can promptly see how a remark such as 
―this does not mean that there can be a true reading‖ (see de Man‘s quote above) may easily 
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turn into ―any reading is acceptable‖. Between the two assertions, nevertheless, there is an 
entire philosophical tendency that cannot be taken for granted. 
 All in all, these three misconceptions surrounding poststructuralist thought discussed 
here appear to stem from a generally ill-informed perception of these tendencies. Particularly 
in translation studies, I suppose that few thinkers have gone to great lengths to carefully 
criticise works labelled as poststructuralist, quoting canonical works and presenting 
counterarguments. As I have argued at the beginning of this chapter, a general sense of 
listlessness and even unwillingness to hear anything remotely related to poststructuralist 
thought seems to prevail. As different quotations by Derrida, de Man and Norris have 
illustrated, even those thinkers who appear to have put time and effort into criticising 
deconstruction in particular, have done so only half-heartedly, revealing not the most 
thorough and careful reading of the works in question.             
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3. Translation Studies: Independence and Utilitarian Purposes  
_____________________________________________________ 
Thus Derrida plays the role of an arch-debunker, a 
latter-day sophist or wily rhetorician whose special gift 
is to dance rings around those earnest seekers-after-
truth (…) who still make believe that such problems 
exist, or that theirs is the discipline best equipped to 
solve them. 
  Christopher Norris 
In Part I above, amongst other issues I addressed mainly the following questions: (i) should 
the institutionalisation of translation studies take place in Brazil as it did in Europe, i.e. with 
little interdisciplinarity and a lot of independence from cognate areas?; (ii) in order to be 
taken seriously, must the institutionalisation and professionalisation of translation studies 
entail large amounts of scientism?; (iii) should research in translation studies be exclusively 
applied and, likewise, are the methods of the Natural Sciences applicable to translation 
studies?; and (iv) should translation theory be useful to translation practice and hence market-
oriented? 
 Parts II and III revealed very different perspectives as far as these questions are 
concerned. Issues of standpoint were particularly crucial, since scholars tend to be more 
willing to engage in theoretical discussions without obvious bonds to practice than 
practitioners, who in turn tend to expect theory to resolve their practical difficulties. 
However, these standpoints are not to be taken isolatedly and in absolute terms because only 
in comparison with other standpoints and embedded in a context can they be said to have any 
meaning. If we take the example of Andrew Chesterman, for instance, in comparison with 
Emma Wagner (CHESTERMAN and WAGNER 2002), he seems far more disposed to take 
theorisation as an awareness-raising activity than as a strictly practice-oriented matter. 
Nevertheless, in comparison with Arrojo (ARROJO and CHESTERMAN 2000), Chesterman 
appears to emphasise that theory should have its roots in practice, or at least strive to 
systematise and improve practice, as opposed to Arrojo, who stresses that theory should first 
and foremost raise one‘s awareness about one‘s area.  
 In this debate, one‘s position as regards essentialist perspectives also played a pivotal 
role. If we take this last example of Chesterman and Arrojo, it is clear that precisely because 
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of their overt affinities with essentialist and anti-essentialist views, respectively, they cannot 
reconcile their ideas on the contours of translation studies and on the aim of translation 
theory. A similar dynamics appears to have taken place between Arrojo and Britto, both as 
far as standpoints are concerned and in terms of their relationship with essentialist 
perspectives. Most of their disagreements concerning the questions proposed above appear to 
stem from their utterly disparate standpoints – one as a renowned, accomplished scholar and 
the other as an acclaimed writer and profuse translator. Moreover, Britto‘s declared affinities 
with essentialist views seem to prevent him from seeing any purpose in translation theory and 
translator training other than to prepare pupils for the market. Arrojo, in contrast, appears to 
be critical of these ―utilitarian purposes‖ and defends theorisation as a means to overcome the 
age-old essentialist prejudices that have tormented translation for so long.    
 Between different standpoints and theoretical affiliations – along with personal 
dispositions, political and institutional interests, different cultures and contexts, and so many 
other factors – there is a gargantuan constellation of possible views on these questions, some 
utterly conflicting and others rather complementary. As already argued above, determining 
the correct and most appropriate view and then expecting it to become unanimous is not the 
way to approach this debate, since these questions of institutionalisation, professionalisation, 
research and theory invariably reflect the heterogeneous values and motivations of those 
behind them.  
 Well aware of my own standpoint and theoretical affinities, I feel more inclined 
towards Derrida‘s ideas, expressed in his 1983 paper discussed in Chapter 2 in Part I above. 
A double gesture of protection and openness is necessary, and here this image should be 
twofold: it concerns not only the protection from and openness to market demands, but also 
the protection from and openness to cognate areas – especially those traditionally associated 
with translation, such as linguistic studies and literary studies
155
. One such way of thinking 
does not entail major institutional changes since both the universities that declared 
independence for translation studies decades ago (like the Universität Wien) and the 
universities in which translation is the sub-area of a sub-department in the Humanities (like 
most universities in Brazil) can accommodate this protection and openness in their existing 
curricula. It is of course a matter of awareness on the part of the faculty of these universities, 
                                                             
155 Refer back to Lyotard‘s indented quotation in Chapter 2 above for this idea of interdisciplinarity.  
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awareness of this need for a constant double gesture – of openness and protection, of 
rejection and acceptance, of assentation and criticism; in other words, of relentless 
deconstruction.    
 In this light, I tend to disagree with Arrojo‘s seemingly categorical views on the 
urgent independence of translation studies, particularly from linguistics. Aware though I am 
of her motivations (see Chapter 1 in Part II above), her gesture seems as potentially extreme 
as the ones behind the full segregation of translation studies as it took place in Europe
156
. It 
should not be either openness or protection; it should be both at once. I do understand 
Arrojo‘s outcry for a place for translation studies within higher education at all. However, 
this outcry would probably not end with the establishment of sub-areas in sub-departments 
but would most likely advance to maximum protection, until translation studies makes up a 
fully independent branch at university. In any case, I must concede that it is not the complete 
institutional separation that is necessarily bad: as long as those involved in it are aware of the 
need for interdisciplinarity and make room for it, as long as both openness and protection are 
exercised at the same time, then full separation is not an issue. The challenge for rapidly 
developing countries like Brazil is now to find a balance between extreme scenarios – 
whereby translation has a safe niche at university that is not completely segregated from 
cognate areas. 
 In the specific case of Brazil, the fact that there still is a course called Letras – in 
which literary studies and linguistic studies live side by side in relative harmony – is a 
consolation, since within this course students can still profit from a little interdisciplinarity. 
As translation studies has been emerging precisely from these departments of Letras, the 
question is whether or not this urge for protection and independence will propel it beyond the 
boundaries of these departments. And though I hope not, I have to admit that this is probably 
what is going to happen
157
.   
                                                             
156 And let me emphasise here that I do not disagree with this segregation, nor do I find it harmful. Indeed, it 
was certainly the only possible way for translation studies to go back then. Nevertheless, now, decades later, we 
can look back and rethink some of the premises of this independence and be more critical of it.  
157
 Witness the establishment of PGET (Postgraduation in Translation Studies – see footnote 12 above) at the 
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, which per se is extremely positive, but whose development might 
eventually lead to full segregation.  
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 So to the same extent that translation should become institutionalised by a double 
gesture of simultaneous openness to, and protection from, cognate areas, it should become 
professionalised by a double gesture of simultaneous openness to, and protection from, 
market demands. As already argued under 1 above, even when translator training is openly 
practice and market-oriented it should be critical of these ―utilitarian purposes‖, it should 
deconstruct them, it should seek to carve their contours differently. And here is where the 
relationship between structuralist and poststructuralist tendencies is laid bare: because they 
must at once oppose and complement each other, they mutually and relentlessly feed each 
other. This is why some of Arrojo‘s remarks in Part II above may sound radical, particularly 
when she seems to fully discard the contributions by thinkers she deems essentialist. And I 
say seems because she does occasionally concede that her intention is by no means to do so, 
though perhaps not often enough. Teachers committed to the postmodern condition need 
essentialist models to deconstruct with their pupils, to read deconstructively and spot their 
moments of aporia. Only through essentialist precepts can we ―acknowledge‖ the 
―unattainability‖ of what we ―aspire to‖ ―in practice‖ (NORRIS [1982] 2002, 167 – see 
Chapter 2 above) and thus practice deconstruction.  
 In this light, let us address the question of whether translation theory should be useful, 
as Britto, for example, so ardently defends. As already pointed out at the end of Part III 
above, Britto‘s intentions to derive insight from his vast experience with translation practice 
and to systematise it in theoretical precepts are valid and legitimate. As such an experienced 
translator, I am sure he could not do otherwise – and should not. What may strike one as not 
as legitimate are his claims for absoluteness and universality, for truth and objectivity. For his 
productions are but the undertaking of a sole individual, embedded in a context and marked 
by bias and ideology. Of course his models may be useful to some, and being useful is in no 
way a problem. But these models should acknowledge their own local and finite character 
rather than lay claim to full objectivity. 
 And here Britto‘s ―fictions‖ acquire utmost importance. Being well-informed of 
poststructuralist contributions and even embracing several of them, Britto – unlike many of 
his peers by the way – is not naïve enough to actually argue that perfect equivalence and 
author‘s intentions are palpable and attainable. So he appears to hide behind his ―fictions‖, 
i.e. he concedes that these essentialist elements are illusory, but claims that he cannot do 
without them – hence they are ―necessary fictions‖. But as I have already argued in Part III 
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above, defending these fictions as necessary is not very ethical of him, particularly 
considering that we live in a world built upon such fictions. Defending them is the same as 
encouraging pupils to pursue them endlessly and hopelessly, very much in line with our age-
old essentialist tradition of unattainable goals and unfeasible tasks. Believing in these fictions 
is what allows Britto to criticise translations in absolute terms under the false pretences of 
objectivity and neutrality. And, as a matter of fact, when Britto arrives at his conclusions of 
what translation is mathematically better, he does not refer to fictions; instead, he 
categorically states, in a very factual fashion, who is better and who is worse – regardless of 
contexts and points of view.  
 Of course Britto can defend these concepts as fictions, and here we can even draw a 
parallel between his attitude and Derrida‘s. In a way, Derrida takes certain notions – such as 
logic and reason – as fictions because he uses them to his benefit and is, at the same time, 
critical and aware of their illusory character. But as Britto‘s work illustrates, rather than call 
attention to the illusory character of his ―fictions‖, he emphasises their necessary character. 
In my view, this is when he runs into ethical problems – as already thoroughly explained at 
the end of Part III above.  
 But for now let us focus on the idea of the usefulness of theorisation. As Britto‘s 
example illustrates, I believe that theories may aspire to be useful so long as they 
acknowledge the essentialist gesture behind this aspiration. All in all, theories influenced by 
essentialism seem to lack honesty – honesty about their local and limited context, honesty 
about the theorist‘s motivations and impartialities, honesty about the feasibility of their 
ambitions. Only when theories stop promising ―the world‖ – i.e. universality, neutrality, 
scientific rigour and objectivity – will those involved with translation bring their ―theory 
hope‖ to an end. If they carry on coming across models that allow them to harbour 
expectations for the taming of subjectivity and the systematisation of language, they will 
carry on hoping and ultimately feel frustrated that these objectives were not achieved after 
all. The vicious circle shall continue for as long as there are theories to feed it.   
 But theories – and this is key – need not be exclusively practice-oriented. Defending 
the solely useful character of theory in translation studies would be similar to claiming that 
after reading, say, Kant‘s Critique of Pure Reason, one should be able to do things 
differently, to apply Kant‘s ideas to practical situations and thus lead a different life. It would 
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be similar to claiming that employing scientists to study the rings of Saturn is a waste of time 
because they do not have any practical impact on the Earth today. And legitimate though 
practice-oriented theorisation may be, I am convinced that theorisation rooted in reflection 
should be the priority of translator training. Let us not forget the double gesture: even when 
theory is practice-oriented, it can foster reflection, criticism, questioning – rather than mere 
obedient assentation.  
 When Britto and Arrojo speak of translation theory, or when Chesterman and Arrojo 
speak of translation theory, they do not seem to be speaking of the same thing – and indeed 
they are not. They cannot possibly reconcile their views when one defends theorisation as a 
source of reflection whereas the other claims that theorisation should lead to more efficient 
practice. Of course the former will look at the latter with disdain claiming that latter‘s view 
leads to no reflection and greater awareness; similarly, the latter will look at the former with 
disdain because the former‘s view leads to no improved and more efficient practice. But as 
already stated in Part I above, one view need not exclude the other. What they need is to be 
acknowledged as different and irreconcilable, and thus no longer be unjustly criticised for not 
being what the other one is.  
 This ambivalence of the term theory is by no means exclusive to translation studies. 
Engineers, for example, will have numerous theoretical courses with no direct application 
whatsoever to their future jobs. The aim of these ―useless‖ courses is to teach them to think in 
a certain way, to make their reasoning more acute, to raise their awareness of their area. Of 
course they will also have various so-called practice-oriented courses, in which specific 
guidelines are taught to be applied to concrete situations of their future jobs. Both ―theories‖ 
need not exclude each other, though the harmony in which they live may be questionable. In 
physics, for example, the so-called theoreticians tend to belittle the so-called practitioners 
because they (the practitioners) are the ones in charge of the hands-on matters. Practitioners, 
on the other hand, also tend to look down on theoreticians precisely for their lack of regard 
for hands-on matters. Surely these ―quarrels‖ are more of a joke than serious conflicts, but the 
question of difference is and will always be constantly present
158
.  
                                                             
158 The information presented here about engineers and physicists is based on my personal inquiries to my 
friends in Brazil and Austria, respectively. I do not mean to state it categorically since I am sure that these 
circles have different dynamics in different countries and institutions. In any case, I think the parallel might be 
useful.    
  
287 
 This brings us to the final questions we should approach in this chapter, namely the 
ones surrounding research in translation studies. Even in various areas of the Natural 
Sciences theoretical works – i.e. not applied works – are very much welcome, so I do not see 
why there should in translation studies be a near obsession with applied and/or empirical 
research. Influential though Popper‘s model may be, it is by no means the be-all and end-all 
of research, certainly not in translation studies. The methods of the Natural Sciences may 
even be fit for research in the Humanities, I do concede. But here the same reservations as 
regards practice-oriented theories apply. Writing a thesis on, say, literary translation, and 
pretending it is fully objective and scientific is probably too much. If one must have 
falsifiability as a chief criterion, then let it not be presented in absolute terms, without taking 
the researcher and his/her circumstances into account.  
 More important than that, however, is the acknowledgment that research which does 
not promote the marriage of theory and practice is just as legitimate. If we embrace the idea 
that there is theorisation in translation studies that does not necessarily take practical issues of 
translation into account – but rather a discourse on translation – then it should be perfectly 
acceptable for research to be devoted to these discourses, without any regard to translation 
practice.  
 Taking a second look at the dozens of theses defended in the Translation Studies 
Programme at the Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (see Chapter 1 in Part I above), 
the only one that hints at a theoretical concern that exceeds the limits of the marriage theory-
practice is entitled ―Os Clássicos Árabes da Teoria da Tradução‖ (Arabic Translation Theory 
Classics), by Manhal Kasouha
159
. A closer look at the text, nevertheless, reveals that the 
student translated these classic texts into Portuguese based on Antoine Bermanřs theories. In 
other words, instead of focusing on these thinkers‘ discourses on translation, the student 
dedicated a large part of the work to applying Berman‘s ideas to the translation of the texts in 
question. Because the Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina has become a reference for 
translation studies in Brazil, being the only one to offer a programme on translation strictu 
sensu, I fear that this model of applied, empirical research predominant there has become a 
reference in translation studies in Brazil too. And I know that this prevalence of applied 
                                                             
159
 As already remarked in Chapter 1 of Part I above, all theses defended in this programme (―Pós-Graduação 
em Estudos da Tradução‖) at the Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina are available on their website: 
www.pget.ufsc.br (last accessed in January 2011).    
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research is not a trend exclusive to this university, nor is it particularly typical of translation 
studies only in Brazil – as I have argued elsewhere (LEAL 2010b).   
 So all in all I would like to urge the reader to address the questions suggested in the 
present chapter with Derrida‘s double gesture. Let us be in favour of the independence of 
translation studies, but let us ensure that it communicates with cognate areas as well. Let us 
produce translation theories with a view to their practical applications, but let us acknowledge 
the limits and circumstances of these theories. Let us accommodate market needs as well as 
possible in translator and interpreter training, but let us be sharply critical of them. Let us use 
the methods of the Natural Sciences in our research, but let us unveil the limitations of these 
methods. Let us embrace applied, empirical research in translation studies, but let us not 
forget that they are not the sole modes of research of our area. And this call to action should 
in no way imply a will to unanimity, since circumstances and motivations are and will always 
be different.  
 But the question of unanimity and consensus will be addressed at length below, in the 
next and last chapter of this thesis. So let us now analyse how some of the issues discussed so 
far relate to the question – so popular these days – of global theories.                                               
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4. Consensus, Homogeneity and the Savage Horde 
_____________________________________________________ 
Only when one sees itself as a gang of killers, as an 
assemble of madmen or, according to Freud, as a 
savage horde, does a psychoanalytical society take on 
the only form suited to it, the only image that it can 
uphold without misrepresenting psychoanalysis. If one 
looks for the effects of psychoanalysis, one can see 
them in that any group of psychoanalysts carries within 
it the principle of its own disintegration. If the group is 
stable and functions well, however, it is a proof of the 
contrary: it has definitely abandoned the Freudian 
discovery.  
  François Roustang  
  (translated by Ned Lukacher) 
Why all this cultural busyness, colloquia, interviews, 
seminars? Just so that we can be sure we‘re all saying 
the same thing. About what, then? About alterity. 
Unanimity on the principle that unanimity is suspect. 
      Jean- François Lyotard  
      (translated by Georges van den Abbeelen)  
Let us begin the present chapter by looking into Roustang‘s words and Freud‘s image of the 
―savage horde‖ in psychoanalysis. The key question that will permeate this last chapter is 
indeed whether we in translation studies cannot help but be a ―savage horde‖ too, and 
whether those thinkers affiliated to poststructuralist thought are nothing but a ―savage horde‖. 
And the implications of the idea of savagery go straight to the heart of the question – in such 
vogue these days – of global theories, of standardised methods, of a unified terminology for 
translation studies. Let us take the adjective ―savage‖ here not necessarily as wild but rather 
as a state of disagreement, conflict and lack of unanimity. 
 As already briefly remarked in Part I in footnote 25, there have been growing 
concerns in translation studies because of its stubborn heterogeneity. This heterogeneity, 
many claim, would afflict not only the overall terminology employed in the area, but also its 
methods and even its name. In this light, this heterogeneity is perceived as an impediment to 
the establishment both of translation studies as an academic discipline and of the translator 
and interpreter as proper professionals. In Part I above I mentioned Lambert‘s 2007 paper as 
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an example of this concern over heterogeneity. In fact, as I thoroughly explain in LEAL 
(2010b), the wish for standardisation and uniformisation in translation studies was rather 
conspicuous at the 2009 CETRA Summer School at the K.U.Leuven, coming across 
particularly incisively in Lambert‘s, Delabastita‘s and Gambier‘s seminars160.    
 Lying beneath these issues of homogeneity and consensus is the question of 
reconciliation. Words such as ―global‖, ―unified‖ and ―standard‖ entail unanimity and thus 
reconciliation of conflicting views. In a way, it is as Arrojo puts it in her attempt to find 
shared ground with Chesterman (see Section 2.4 in Part II above): the establishment of 
translation universals presupposes the imposition of a privileged, predominant group over 
countless others, less powerful. ―Less powerful‖ probably because of the languages they 
speak and the countries they come from. Let us first explore the idea of heterogeneity, and 
then I will come back to the question of power.   
 Within poststructuralist thought, the issue of heterogeneity is described in a more 
―positive‖ light, or as an unavoidable trait of humanity. Lyotard, for example, includes the 
rejection of a consensus in his very definition of the postmodern (LYOTARD [1988] 1997, 
15 – translated by Julian Pefanis, Morgan Thomas and Don Barry – my emphasis): 
The postmodern would be that which in the modern invokes the unpresentable in 
presentation itself, that which refuses the consolation of correct terms, refuses the 
consensus of taste permitting a common experience of nostalgia for the impossible, and 
inquires into new presentations – not to take pleasure in them, but to better produce the 
feeling that there is something unpresentable.   
In other words, a consensus would be understood as a shared perspective through which 
people can entertain their nostalgia for the impossible, the unattainable; it would be a sort of 
all-embracing ―theory hope‖. Similarly, Derrida places the idea of heterogeneity close to the 
heart of deconstruction. In response to Thomas Busch‘s question, ―Is there a place for unity 
after deconstruction?‖, Derrida asserts that 
I think we do have to choose between unity and multiplicity. Of course deconstruction 
(…) insisted not on multiplicity for itself, but on the heterogeneity, the difference, the 
dissociation, which is absolutely necessary for the relation to the other. What disrupts the 
                                                             
160 José Lambert did write a response to my 2010 paper, which in fact was a critical account of the event and 
mentioned this question of the global versus the local time and again. Unfortunately he did not elaborate much 
on this issue in his reply (LAMBERT 2010). At any rate, there are countless works by other thinkers – such as 
Pym, Schlesinger, Baker, amongst various others – that defend this kind of globalising, universal approach to 
translation – though in different terms.    
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totality is the condition for the relation to the other (CAPUTO and DERRIDA [1997] 
2004, 12-13)
161
.     
As already mentioned a few times in the present thesis, Derrida‘s very reading of Saussure is 
emblematic of this defence of heterogeneity. Derrida is interested precisely in what Saussure 
leaves out of linguistics, in the differences Saussure either excludes or conveniently flattens. 
In this sense, Derrida‘s deconstructionist reading is always marked by a move towards 
heterogeneity and away from consensus and unity – away from the ―structure‖ as a 
homogenising whole. To avert misunderstandings, though, in his response to that same 
question Derrida insists that he is not calling for the destruction of unity (idem, 13 – his 
emphasis):   
Now this does not mean that we have to destroy all forms of unity wherever it occurs. I 
have never said anything like that. Of course, we need unity, some gathering, some 
configuration. You see, pure unity or pure multiplicity (…) is a synonym of death162. 
What interests me is the limit to every attempt to totalize, to gather, versammeln (…).  
 This is indeed the question at stake in translation studies: what is the limit of this 
attempt to totalise, to standardise? How much consensus is necessary in order for the 
discipline to be sufficiently acknowledged? Once again this question is similar to so many 
others addressed in the present part. How much must the university open itself to the outside 
so that it does not close in on itself? How much must translation theory attend to practical 
needs so that it does not completely disregard the market? How much must translation studies 
open itself to other areas so that it is not fully segregated from them? The answers to these 
questions are all very similar and call for a double gesture, though they are not at all precise 
or palpable.      
 Even within Freud‘s ―savage horde‖ there is a certain amount of consensus. Yes, ―we 
need unity, some gathering‖, says Derrida (see above). Of course some homogeneity must be 
achieved for there to be heterogeneity at all. There must be some sort of community for one to 
be able to perceive its heterogeneity, its impossibility. It is as John Caputo explains in his 
commentary on the interview with Derrida mentioned above: the idea of a ―universal 
community‖ is a contradiction because communities must have ―an inside and an outside‖ 
                                                             
161 In the first part of this book, Derrida is interviewed by Busch on several issues. The interview takes place 
directly in English, so this is why I have not mentioned a translator here. In the second and longest part of the 
book, Caputo comments on various questions raised in Derrida‘s interview.   
162 Refer back to the epigraph that opens Part IV above. 
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(idem, 108). Moreover, within deconstruction a closed community would be inconceivable 
since deconstruction is the very ―preparation for the incoming of the other‖ (idem). In this 
sense, in Caputo‘s words Derrida exhorts against ―the guard that communities station around 
themselves to watch out for the other‖ (idem).  
 Let us explore the idea of a community a bit further. This is what Derrida has to say 
(DERRIDA [1992] 1995, 355 – translated by Peggy Kamuf): 
I don‘t much like the word community. (…) If by community one implies, as it is often 
the case, a harmonious group, consensus and fundamental agreement beneath the 
phenomena of discord and war, then I don‘t believe in it very much and I sense in it as 
much threat as promise. There is doubtless this irrepressible desire for a ―community‖ to 
form, but also for it to know its limit – and for its limit to be its opening.    
So, in other words, any attempt in translation studies to form one such ―universal 
community‖ must be well aware of the danger of flattening differences and repressing 
heterogeneity. Furthermore, this community should be well aware of its limits and, as Derrida 
suggests, this awareness of its limits should not cause it to close in on itself but rather to open 
itself. So even though a certain degree of consensus might be necessary so that there is ―a 
gathering‖ at all, full consensus should not be a question – because ―unanimity is suspect‖ 
(see Lyotard‘s epigraph above). It is in this sense that I see translation studies through a 
poststructuralist light as a savage horde (see Roustang‘s epigraph above).  
 And even when such small doses of consensus are admitted, issues of power and 
imposition remain at the centre of the debate, for imposition is inevitable and has its impact 
on every aspect of society. One of the crucial issues at stake at the moment in translation 
studies is the widespread use of English as lingua franca. As I have addressed this issue at 
length elsewhere (LEAL 2010b), I will only briefly mention it here. Inspired by Snell-
Hornby‘s latest works (please refer to SNELL-HORNBY 2010), it seems that a double 
gesture is required here as well. Of course we cannot decidedly affect the dominance of the 
English language, which manifests itself everywhere and exceeds the domains of language. 
What we can do is mitigate its impact on our area, an area that should par excellence embrace 
linguistic diversity rather than repress it. We can embrace this dominance to a certain extent 
(we have no choice after all), but not without being critical of it, without fostering its 
deconstruction in our circles. Yet there still are numerous publications and events in 
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translation studies that accept contributions in English only – the CETRA Summer School 
(see above) being an example of it.  
 And again those who oppose this critical attitude towards the dominance of the 
English language do so on grounds of usefulness. I remember at the 2009 CETRA 
Conference ―The Known Unknowns of Translation Studies‖, after Snell-Hornby‘s seminar 
precisely on this issue, Daniel Gile jokingly started his seminar in French instead of in 
English, and then quickly remarked in English that however interesting Snell-Hornby‘s words 
may be, they cannot be put in practice. But rather than suddenly allow the use of any 
language at conferences and in journals, Snell-Hornby appears to be calling our attention to 
this issue which would otherwise go unnoticed; she is asking for our awareness and critical 
attitude. Dismissing an opportunity to reflect upon something simply because it is not useful 
as far as practice is concerned seems unthoughtful. So in translation studies we are not 
willing to turn to interpreting at our academic events; in translation studies we are not willing 
to deal with linguistic heterogeneity. What does that say of translation studies? What does 
that say of its awareness of its limits (see above)? 
 The question of language policies should go far beyond the ―useful‖ and the ―easily 
applicable to practice‖. In a book entirely dedicated to the then latest (early 1990s) 
developments in Europe, Derrida asks the following question:                 
What philosophy of translation will dominate in Europe? In a Europe that from now on 
should avoid both the nationalistic tensions of linguistic difference and the violent 
homogenization of languages through the neutrality of a translating medium that would 
claim to be transparent, metalinguistic, and universal? (DERRIDA [1991] 1992, 58 – 
translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas).      
Needless to say, Europe has opted for the latter. In fact, the word ―translation‖ is not even 
used at all, as texts are taken to have been produced ―originally‖ in each of the EU languages. 
In this sense, the attitude of the European Union is not so different from the attitude at 
CETRA, for example. In both instances translation is not a question: language is merely taken 
as a neutral vehicle of ideas, regardless of the languages in question. Nevertheless, in both 
translation is constantly an issue – in the case of the EU into one of their 23 official languages 
and, in the case of CETRA, into English. What they have in common is that both choose not 
to speak about translation, not to question it, not to address its implications.  
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 And here I ask the reader not to fail to notice the similarity between this debate and 
that of closed communities. Derrida very aptly claims that he dislikes the term ―community‖ 
because it presupposes consensus and harmony on the surface while hiding disagreements 
and wars underneath the surface. But because the term ―community‖ is used, consensus is 
often taken for granted and disagreements are often not addressed. If we take this question of 
language policies, both the EU and an institution like CETRA resort to a similar dynamics. 
Neither will speak of translation because it is fairly consensual that both avoid translations – 
CETRA by having everything in English and the EU by having everything ―written‖ in each 
of the 23 languages. This is what ensures their unity, what closes their communities. But 
underneath the surface translation is there, whether they like it or not.   
 So to come back to the questions proposed at the beginning of the chapter above, the 
desire for consensus, for the formation of communities will always be strong and legitimate – 
and healthy, at least to a certain extent. This desire may be behind the establishment of 
translation theories and schools, of societies and organisations of various kinds. It may be 
behind the choice of language or languages to be used. And in postmodern times this desire 
need not in any way be repressed, but rather its implications must be acknowledged – as 
Derrida defends (see penultimate indented quotation above). In a way, if we wish to be 
honest as for our disagreements, as for our inevitable heterogeneity, then we have to embrace 
the idea of the ―savage horde‖ (see Roustang‘s epigraph above). We can but strive to reach a 
consensus, but that should not prevent us from acknowledging the impossibility of this 
consensus. We can but hope for reconciliation, though we should be aware of the fact that full 
reconciliation is neither feasible nor desirable.        
 At the heart of the reconciliation debate is the question of the impact of 
poststructuralist thought in translation studies – the last question I wish to address in this 
chapter. Though I have no well-regarded numeric source to quote and must rely solely on my 
scant experience in translation studies, the influence that the so-called poststructuralist views 
has exerted in the area appears to be negligible. Having been in intense contact with three 
different universities, two in Brazil and one in Austria, I have always been one of the only 
ones – if not the only one – interested in poststructuralist thought. My impression of the 
academic events in which I took part is no different. Having attended numerous conferences 
in a few different countries, I fear poststructuralist thought has featured in very few of them. 
The vast majority of my peers – I mean translation students – from countless different 
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countries and in the most varied contexts have never expressed the least interest in these 
perspectives. To be honest, I can only think of one fellow student in Brazil who dedicates her 
research to poststructuralist thought in translation. 
 But should this impact remain negligible? Would popularity and consensus not 
―defeat the objective‖ of poststructuralist thought? As I have already mentioned above, I 
hardly think that this consensus and popularity is remotely likely to be achieved. In order for 
poststructuralist thought to prevail, say, in translation studies, a vast number of thinkers 
would have to be willing to reconsider their entire tradition, to deconstruct their own 
convictions, and this is just not going to happen. Of course poststructuralist thinkers also 
strive for consensus in their own manner; but they are aware that ―unanimity is suspect‖ (see 
Lyotard‘s epigraph above). So however much scholars committed to poststructuralist thought 
might wish to be able to convince other people to think the way they do, this attempt is 
immediately followed by the questioning of the attempt, by a feeling of suspicion. And here 
we are reminded of Derrida‘s statement about unity (see epigraph to Part IV above): ―pure 
unity or pure multiplicity (…) is a synonym of death‖. Striving for pure consensus and being 
intolerant of difference and heterogeneity is not an option. Likewise, not attempting to reach 
a consensus at all would be the same as condemning oneself to silence, which is equally not 
an option.       
 So this makes me wonder whether any impact of poststructuralist thought can be felt 
today in thinkers whose research is not necessarily committed to it. Though on the surface 
this impact seems negligible – at least in a more overt fashion – I wonder whether there has 
been an impact at all. Is the fact that people now take notions such as ―author‘s intentions‖ 
and ―fidelity‖ with a microscopic pinch of salt all poststructuralist thought is going to achieve 
in translation studies? Back in the early 1980s Norris wrote that 
In the hands of less subtle or resourceful readers deconstruction can become – it is all too 
clear – a theoretical vogue as uniform and cramping as the worst New Critical Dogma. At 
best it has provided the impetus for a total revaluation of interpretive theory and practice; 
the effects of which have yet to be fully absorbed (NORRIS [1982] 2002, 17). 
Nearly 10 years later, Norris seemed more able to assess the effects of one such way of 
thinking (idem, 134): 
It [deconstruction] is a term that now comes readily to novelists, politicians, media 
pundits, pop journalists, TV presenters, newspaper columnists (…) and others with an eye 
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to intellectual fashion or a taste for debunking such pretentious jargon. What they mostly 
have in mind (…) is a vague idea of ‗deconstruction‘ as the kind of thing that academics 
typically get up to when they question commonsense truths and values that everyone else 
takes pretty much for granted. And when the word is applied with non-derisory intent 
(…) it tends to mean simply ‗criticism of received ideas‘ (…). 
As far as translation studies is concerned, I see a similar trend to the one described by Norris. 
With the exception of those who openly defend deconstruction and those who openly attack it 
(but sometimes they too), most people do show signs of ―criticism of received ideas‖ amidst 
their listlessness to poststructuralist thought. Today it is not uncommon for thinkers with 
clear essentialist affinities to say that we cannot speak of fidelity and equivalence in the same 
way that we used to. Nor is it rare – though less common – for thinkers like that to say that 
they want to render their context and bias clear to their audience in papers or at conferences, 
so that the audience takes their views embedded in this context. In any case, the words 
―deconstruction‖ or ―postmodern thought‖ never accompany these gestures, but rather they 
appear to stem from some new kind of common sense – more or less as Norris puts it.  
 At the Universität Wien, for instance, I find it rather curious that the students are 
usually more than ready to concede that there is not just one correct interpretation of a text, 
that reading is always conditioned by context, that our personal history plays a fundamental 
role in reading too, and so on and so forth. When it comes to translation, nonetheless, their 
views are out-and-out essentialist: one has to respect the author‘s original intentions, one‘s 
job is to find the most suited equivalents in the target language, etc. So this tells me that their 
―enlightened‖ views about reading are probably derived from some instance of common 
sense, and for this reason are not particularly well thought-out. Hence they seem initially 
unable to expand these views to translation, for example.  
 In this sense, I agree with Norris that deconstruction has affected common sense 
slightly. And let us bear in mind that Norris drew those conclusions nearly 20 years ago, so 
this impact should now be more clearly visible and crystallised than in the early 1990s. What 
he described then appears to have developed into a nameless trend, some sort of common 
sense view of which everyone seems to be aware and which has no greater implications in 
one‘s way of thinking. Amongst translation scholars it usually takes the shape of ideology as 
it seems quite consensual today that ideology is everywhere and cannot be stopped. Amongst 
students it appears to be some kind of urge to freedom from older, stricter views on what is 
right or wrong, acceptable and unacceptable. But in both cases its implications are not far-
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reaching but rather confined to these limited areas. In other words, a scholar who would 
defend the importance of ideology might still uncritically defend original texts as the source 
of insight for translation decisions. Similarly, a student who defends the plurality of 
interpretation might claim that translations have to obey the author‘s intentions.  
 I am not sure whether the impact of poststructuralist thought will remain restricted to 
the terms described above. But one thing is certain: its defenders will continue trying to call 
attention to it while knowing that reaching a consensus would not be desirable.     
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FINAL REMARKS 
_____________________________________________________ 
I would like to close the present thesis by returning to its title, ―Is the Glass Half Empty or 
Half Full?‖ Though in general this thesis appears to emphasise the heterogeneity of 
translation studies, its title hints at a similarity, an approximation of seemingly antagonistic 
sides. For however much we would like to claim that Rosemary Arrojo‘s glass is half empty 
while Paulo Henriques Britto‘s glass is half full, let us not forget that the glass is the same 
and that the difference lies in perspective.  
When we examined the different concepts of theory and practice back in Part I, it 
became clear that disparate dimensions seemed to be at stake. Some spoke of theory as a set 
of precepts that systematises and controls practice. Others, conversely, defended theory as a 
sort of awareness-raising reflection. For this second perspective, practical issues were not at 
all in question. So much so that these awareness-raising reflections, particularly when 
labelled as poststructuralist, should not have any impact whatsoever in one‘s practice, but 
rather on one‘s perception of this practice. 
Let us not forget that deconstruction is not a method, that it is not radical as far as 
practices are concerned and that it does not propose concrete changes to existing practices, 
nor does it suggest that new practices be adopted. If we take Arrojo and Britto‘s example 
again, it is easy to see these different perspectives. Their attitudes as far as translation 
criticism, for instance, is concerned, are not strikingly different in practical terms. Both 
choose what they like and dislike, what they believe works and does not work, what they 
would do differently and what they would not. This is why Arrojo‘s Oficina de Tradução is 
so useful regardless of the reader‘s philosophical affinities.  
But what is utterly different is their perspectives of their practice, their discourses 
about their practice. And this refers to another dimension altogether – a dimension of 
reflection, of discourse, of theoretical thinking. Poststructuralist thought has a lot more do to 
with this dimension than with practical issues. And it is precisely this dimension of ―thought‖ 
that sometimes seems lacking in our theories, in our higher education. 
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But I have already expressed my opinion, in Part IV above, as far as the questions 
raised in the present thesis are concerned. As for its title, the challenge lies not only in 
perceiving the glass half empty and half full, but also in understanding the simultaneous 
difference and similarity, distance and approximation, entailed by the image of the glass. This 
paradoxical gesture, this double gesture is the idea that I would like the reader to keep in 
mind. 
It would be somewhat disappointing if the criticism that the present thesis received 
were limited to the modest boundaries discussed in Part IV above. This is not a strictly 
scientific work, it is not useful in terms of translation practice, it does not provide absolute 
and universally-applicable answers, it contains large amounts of controversy, doubt and 
heterogeneity, and it leaves a lot of room for discussion.  
My suggestions for future research include the investigation of the different 
poststructuralist tendencies and their interface with translation studies. I was very dissatisfied 
with the way this issue was handled in the present thesis. Only in the Interchapter and in Part 
IV do I warn the reader about a few of the many different perspectives within 
poststructuralist thought. In addition to that, it would be interesting to see more analyses of 
works by different scholars that take the scholars‘ standpoints into account. In other words, it 
might be fruitful to try and understand the interests and motivations lying beneath a particular 
work before studying the work itself. 
As for translation studies in Brazil, I believe that the most effective way to go about 
drawing an overview of the field would be to set up a large research group whereby different 
scholars and students would be engaged firstly in mapping the field and then analysing 
particular tendencies. It would not surprise me if one such group had already been established 
at the time of writing. 
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